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Abstract 
This thesis empirically investigates the use of impression management in the narrative 
sections of the annual reports of UK listed companies. Impression management is 
examined by testing the obfuscation hypothesis which claims that firms with poor 
performance have a tendency to obfuscate negative organisational outcomes. For this 
purpose, the thesis provides an assessment of the extent to which reading difficulty 
and self-presentational dissimulation are associated with the disclosure of favourable 
or unfavourable results ('good/bad news') in annual financial statements, conditional 
on a firm's size and sector of operations. 
Impression management has previously been studied in the context of agency theory 
explanations of managerial and investor behaviour. This study contributes to the 
understanding of impression management in a corporate reporting context by first 
reviewing relevant theoretical work in behavioural finance, social psychology, and 
linguistics. Social psychology provides additional insights into the managerial 
motivation to engage in impression management, the circumstances fostering 
managerial impression management, and preferred managerial strategies. Behavioural 
finance offers insights into the effectiveness of impression management. Research in 
linguistics and social psychology provides the basis for developing new 
methodologies for measuring impression management in corporate narrative 
documents which overcome the validity problems inherent in conventional measures. 
Three new methodologies are introduced. The first develops cohesion-based measures 
of reading difficulty that focus on grammatical devices within and between sentences, 
including the number and density of cohesive ties and the proportion of new and 
given information (MMAX2). The second methodology provides multiple cohesion-
based measures of readability, as applied in web-based readability scoring (Coh-
Metrix). The third methodology measures impression management in the form of self-
presentational dissimulation (i.e. portraying a public image of firm performance and 
prospects inconsistent with a managerial view of firm performance and prospects), 
using linguistic markers which include word count, self-reference, reference to others, 
the use of emotion words, and cognitive complexity. 
The empirical analysis that is reported in this thesis is based on a sample that is 
balanced across industrial sectors and representative of the size distribution of firms. 
Results show firm size and not 'good/bad news' to be the determining factor in 
reading difficulty. Although the main effects model shows 'bad news' to be directly 
related to reading difficulty, this association is no longer significant when 'good/bad 
news' is interacted with firm size. Results suggest that large firms are more likely to 
produce corporate narrative documents which are less cohesive (and thus more 
difficult to read) than small firms. This is not interpreted as impression management, 
but as an indication that firms might tailor their corporate narrative documents to the 
reading strategies of their target readership groups. Thus, large firms seem to cater to 
the needs of high-kno\\'ledge readers (professional investors or readers largely 
familiar with the infom1ation content of the chairman's report), and small firms to th\? 
needs of lo\\'-kno\\'ledge readers (individual investors or readers largely unfamiliar 
with the information content of the chairman's report). Results regarding impression 
management in the fom1 of self-presentational dissimulation suggest that the linguistic 
Xlll 
markers are not indicative of impression management in the form of self-
presentational dissimulation, but of other psychological issues. 
XIV 
Chapter 1: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND DEFINITIONS 
1.1 Introduction and background 
In the light of recent corporate scandals, the issue of financial reporting quality has 
been in the forefront of both public and academic discussion. Previous research on 
aspects of financial reporting which inhibit financial reporting quality has focused 
largely on earnings management. However, firms may also use a much more subtle 
form of influencing outsiders' impressions of firm performance and prospects, namely 
by means of manipulating the presentation and content of narrati\'e annual report 
sections - with the purpose of "'distort [ing] readers' perceptions of corporate 
achievements" (Godfrey et al. 2003: 96). 
In the accounting literature, this mechanism is referred to as impression management. 
While narrative sections of annual reports are primarily the focus of impression 
management research, other vehicles include press releases, managerial forecasts, 
websites and conference calls. Example 1 provides some illustrations of impression 
management from the annual report of Enron immediately prior to its collapse. 
Example 1: Extracts from Enron's Letter to Shareholders, Annual Report 2000 (emphasis added) 
"Enron's perfonnance in 2000 was a success by any measure, as we continued to outdistance the 
competition and solidify our leadership in each of our major businesses. In our largest business, 
wholesale services, we experienced an enormous increase of 59 percent in physical energy deliveries. 
Our retail energy business achieved its highest level ever of total contract value. Our newest business, 
broadband services, significantly accelerated transaction activity, and our oldest business, the interstate 
pipelines, registered increased earnings. The company's net income reached a record $1.3 billion in 
2000." (p.4) 
Key: Text in bold amounts to performance claims 
The highlighted phrases indicate the positi\'e bias introduced by Enron in order to 
manipulate readers' perceptions of corporate achic\,ements. It is e\'ident that 
impression management potentially constitutes an important factor in the impairment 
of financial reporting quality. It is therefore an empirical question whether such 
behaviour is systematic across firms. 
1.2 Motivations for studying impression management 
Impression management can be regarded as an important part of social activity. 
Advertisers, religious and political leaders, and environmental and social pressure 
groups, devote time, energy, and resources to influencing people's perceptions of 
themselves, of their beliefs and ideas, or of their products (Leary and Kowalski 1990; 
Schlenker and Pontari 2000). Yet, we know comparatively little about impression 
management in a corporate reporting context. 
Indeed, it is possible that impression management has been largely neglected by 
previous accounting research because accounting academics are more comfortable 
investigating financial statements than the accompanying textual material. However, 
since impression management, like earnings management, involves "managers 
us[ing] judgment in financial reporting ... to alfer financial reports to ... mislead 
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company" 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999: 368), it has the same serious implications with regard to 
potentially adverse capital misallocations. Impression management thus constitutes an 
important area of accounting research, given the potential economic consequences. 
According to the Arthur Andersen (2000: 7) survey of 100 listed UK companies, the 
narrative sections of corporate annual reports occupy 57 percent of the annual report 
in 2000, as compared with 45 percent in 1996. Narrative annual report sections 
provide "almost twice the amount of quoted information as do the basic financial 
statements" (Smith and Taffler 2000: 624). This grov.:ing importance of unregulated 
descriptive sections in corporate annual reports has resulted in an increased 
sophistication in the presentation and disclosure of information often aimed at 
portraying the company, its performance, and prospects in the best possible light. 
The aim of this study is to contribute to the understanding of impression management 
in a corporate reporting context. Using insights from a variety of disciplines~ 
including accounting, behavioural finance, social psychology, and linguistics, this 
study explores what constitutes impression management III a corporate reporting 
context, the reasons management engages in it, the circumstances fostering 
managerial impression management, preferred managerial impression management 
strategies, and the potential impact of impression management on users of corporate 
narrative documents. 
1.3 Issues for research 
The research design follows a two-part structure. The first part is concerned with the 
measurement of impression management in corporate narrative documents and the 
second part with the factors that may influence its use. 
Impression management research usually makes the presumption that "sections of the 
[annual] reports are allegedly managed so as to present management in as favourable 
light as possible" (Stanton et al. 2004: 57). This is attributed to the information 
asymmetry between management and annual report users. Since managerial 
remuneration and tenure is linked to firm performance, management is expected not 
to be neutral in its presentation of corporate performance (Sydserff and Weetman 
1999: 460). The resulting bias can lead to management attempting to draw attention 
away from failures (Adelberg 1979: 187). 
This view, that managers of companies with poor performance use the corporate 
narrative report sections "to create an impression at variance 1l'ith an overall reading 
of the report" (Stanton et al. 2004: 57), is reflected in what is termed 'the obfuscation 
hypothesis' by Courtis (1998) which claims that companies with "bad news' obfuscate 
negative organisational outcomes in order to manipulate outsiders~ perceptions of firm 
perfomlance and prospects. 
For this reason the vast majority of impression management studies attempts to 
establish a relationship between impression management in narrative corporate report 
sections and firm performance reported in the financial accounts. 
Smith and Taffler (1992b) find the narrative sections of companies with 'good news' 
easier to read than those with 'bad news'. In a subsequent study, Smith and Taffler 
(1995) show that the content of the chairman's report provides useful information for 
discriminating between failing and non-failing companies. Aerts (1994) also finds a 
significant association between impression management in the form of performance 
attributions and financial performance. 
In contrast, Abrahamson and Amir (1996) find the information content of the 
narrative corporate report sections to be consistent with the information contained in 
the financial statements. This suggests that management does not use narrative 
corporate report sections "to reduce the effect of bad news or to smooth the effect of 
good news" (1159). What is more, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) find that companies 
with either 'good news' or with 'bad news' focus on the positive aspects of their 
performance. The results also show the performance attributions of companies with 
'good news' and with 'bad news' not to differ significantly. 
However, the use of impression management might be related to other organisational 
characteristics, such as firm size and the environment in which the firm operates. 
Previous studies find significant associations between impression management and 
firm size. but again the evidence is inconclusive. For instance, Jones (1988) and Baker 
and Kare (1992) find reading difficulty and firm size to be directly associated, 
whereas Short and Palmer (2003) find a significant inverse association between 
impression management in the form of performance comparisons and firm size. 
The current study builds on this prior work by examining the association bet\\'een 
impression management and financial performance by developing new approaches to 
measuring reading difficulty. by introducing a measure of impression management in 
the form of self-presentational dissimulation. and by redefining good and bad news. 
\vhilst also controlling for firm size and industry classification. 
1.4 Research methodology 
1.4.1 Population and sample 
The population with which this study is concerned comprises all UK companies (CK 
domicile) listed on the London Stock Exchange. I The companies are grouped into 
sectors, based on the Dow Jones Market Sector classifications. 
A sample was constructed to include firms of different sizes and from diverse industry 
groups. The three sectors with the highest number of companies, namely Industrial, 
Consumer Cyclical, and Technology, were chosen for analysis. 31 companies from 
each sector, i.e. 93 in total, were selected for the final sample.2 For this purpose, the 
companies in each sector were ranked according to size (end of year market 
capitalization 2002 in fmillion) and systematic sampling was used in order to make 
the sample representative of the population. 
1.4.2 Measuring impression management 
In written communication, the behaviour displayed by management engagmg m 
impression management cannot be directly observed, but manifests itself verbally. 
This entails a linguistic analysis of texts. For this reason, linguistics provides the 
appropriate methodology for analyzing the verbal manifestations of impression 
management used in narrative annual report documents. 
As noted, this study focuses on the analysis of impression management in the form of 
obfuscation of negative organizational outcomes. In this context, it investigates two 
types of obfuscation in narrative corporate report sections, namely (1) linguistic 
obfuscation by means of reading ease manipulation and (2) self-presentational 
dissimulation. Whereas reading ease manipulation is based on the way language is 
used to manipulate the impressions of external parties, self-presentational 
dissimulation focuses on the unconscious use of language during the process of 
presenting an image incongruent with one' s self-image. 
I 1,983 companies. as 0[30 April 2004. 
2 Traditionallv, statistical texts point to a 111 inimum sample size of 30 random obsen at ions. which is 
based on sim~lation studies involving the Central Limit Theorem. Thus. from a stati-;tics perspective. a 
sample size 01'90 firms (3 for each industry sector) is deemed adequate. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the way obfuscation by linguistic means IS measured and 
analyzed in this study: 
Figure 1.1: Measuring obfuscation by linguistic means 
Proxy for 
obfuscation 
Focus of 
analysis 
Measures 
Text analysis 
program 
• 
• 
• 
Reading ease manipulation 
Textual difficulty 
Cohesion 
~ 
Cohesive ties • Adjacent 
Cohesion argument 
density overlap 
Given/new • Argument 
info overlap 
• Adjacent stem 
overlap 
• Stem overlap 
~ 
• MMAX2 
• Coh-Metrix 
Reading ease manipulation 
Dissimulation 
Word use 
• Word count 
• Pronoun use 
• Emotion words 
• Cognitive complexity 
Linguistic markers of 
se If-presentational 
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Reading ease manipulation IS concerned with the obfuscation of negati\'e 
organisational outcomes by means of altering the reading difficulty, i.e. readability, of 
narrative annual report documents. It is presumed that management is able to 
influence the perceptions and decisions of narrati\'e annual report readers by means of 
rendering the text more difficult to read. Thus. the prose itself functions as a proxy for 
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obfuscation. Consequently, the basic problem underlying the study of impression 
management in accounting narratives as manifest in reading ease manipulation is 
choosing a methodology which is able to accurately identify, analyze and measure 
readabili ty. 
Conventional methodologies tend to be problematic, since they have limited linguistic 
and psychological validity. This means that to date - with few exceptions - the 
analysis has been limited to the sentence level and has not taken the elements 
impacting on text comprehension into account. 
This study proposes a new methodology based on discourse analysis. Discourse 
analysis is a linguistic sub-discipline which focuses on the interconnection within and 
between sentences. It thus allows the analysis of written texts to be extended "beyond 
the sentence level and considers the communicative constraints of the context" 
(Connor 1996: 11). It furthermore provides the "descriptive apparatus for describing 
textual cohesion, structures of texts, theme dynamics, and metatextual features" 
(Connor 1996: 11). This results in a concept of readability which is based on textual 
complexity which is better suited to the analysis of corporate narrative documents. 
Selfpresentational dissimulation 
This second approach to measuring impression management in narrative corporate 
report documents is based on the assumption that impression management involves 
presenting an image of the firm and its performance to outsiders which is inconsistent 
with the way management may see these (Leary and Kowalski 1990). 
The methodology adopted in this study for detecting impression management in the 
form of self-presentational dissimulation has been empirically validated by research 
carried out in psychology. It is based on Ne\\man et al.'s (2003) research on 
psychological aspects of word use. Using Linguistic inquily and Tr'ord ('ount, a 
computerized textual analysis program, they examine the linguistic devices 
differentiating true and false stories, i.e. the linguistic indicators of dissimulation. 
Thes~ include \vord count. self-reference, reference to others, emotion \\'ords, and 
cognitive complexity \\'hich "are the result of anxiety. negative emotional stales, and 
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cognitive demand' (Carlson et a1. 2004: 7) occurnng during self-presentational 
dissimulation. 
Unlike the detection of obfuscation in the form of reading ease manipulation, this 
approach does not involve evidence based on the knowledge and recognition of 
specific impression management strategies (Johnson et a1. 1993: 473), such as reading 
ease manipulation or thematic manipulation, but focuses instead on the process of 
perpetrating the dissimulation (Johnson et a1. 1993: 474), i.e. verbal cues, such as 
decreased use of self-reference and increased use of negative emotion words. 
1.4.3 Predicting impression management 
Previous research has shown firm performance to be an important predictor of 
impression management with findings suggesting that impression management is 
directly related to negative organisational outcomes. In this study, positive and 
negative organisational outcomes are referred to as 'good/bad news'. In order to 
reflect different aspects of firm performance, the variable is measured in four different 
ways, namely (1) positive/negative earnings, (2) positive/negative earnings change, 
(3) sales increase/decrease relative to the sector, and (4) positive/negative long-term 
growth relative to the sector. 
In addition, the study adopts a political cost hypothesis and argues that impression 
management in the form of reading ease manipulation and self-presentational 
dissimulation is inversely related to firm size, since large companies do not wish to 
draw attention to their profitability and hence will be more reluctant to obfuscate 
negative outcomes. The current study measures firm size as log of market 
capitalization at the financial year-end of 2002. 
Finally, in order to introduce heterogeneity into the sample, it includes companies 
from three industrial sectors, based on the Do\v Jones Market Sector classifications, 
namely Consumer Cyclical (CYC), Industrial (IOU), and Technical (TEe). Courtis 
(1995) finds no difference in the reading difficulty of chairman's reports between 
different sectors. We thus hypothesise that industry classification is not a factor in 
explaining differences in impression management behaviour. 
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1.4.4 Statistical analysis 
First, the main effects of each measure of reading difficulty and each linguistic 
indicator of self-presentational dissimulation with respect to 'goodlbad news' and 
firm size are investigated. The association between impression management (reading 
ease manipulation/self-presentational dissimulation) and firm size is estimated by 
means of regression analysis and any differences in impression management when the 
news is good or bad are estimated by means of one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). 
Subsequently, for each measure of reading difficulty and each linguistic indicator of 
self-presentational dissimulation the interactions between 'goodlbad news' and firm 
size are estimated by extending the analysis of variance to a general linear model 
(GLM). The advantage of GLM is that it allows the detection of interaction effects 
between variables, and, therefore can be used to test more complex hypotheses 
1.5 Contribution of this study 
The contribution of this study is twofold, namely (1) theoretical, and (2) 
methodological. All prior research is based on agency theory explanations of 
impression management. Agency theory, as specified by neoclassical economics, is 
rooted in traditional finance assumptions concerning the rational economic behaviour 
of market participants. However, we propose a concept of impression management 
that draws on behavioural finance, in which impression management is regarded as 
the managerial attempt to influence investor perceptions and decisions by means of 
introducing both cognitive and affective bias into corporate narrative documents. 
The focus of this study is on the analysis of impression management in UK 
chairman's reports and the finn characteristics associated with it. It is based on the 
assumption that managers, on average. are able to choose which impression 
management strategies to employ. It is further assumed that managers arc not 
susceptible to biases in the form of managerial optimism or hubris. However. the 
eventual effects of impression management on investor behaviour are not considered 
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empirically in the current study, whose main focus IS on the contemporaneous 
association with financial results. 
Prior studies classify impression management research into two areas, namely 
thematic studies and readability studies (Jones and Shoemaker 1994). By sub-dividing 
thematic studies into two different types and by including rhetorical manipulation. this 
thesis identifies four impression management strategies aimed at the obfuscation of 
negative organisational outcomes, namely (1) reading ease manipulation. (2) 
rhetorical manipulation, (3) thematic manipulation, and (4) narrative disclosure. In 
addition, three further impression management strategies are identified. namely (1) 
attribution of organisational outcomes, (2) performance comparisons, and (3) choice 
of earnings number presented in narrative corporate report sections. 
The majority of prior studies on reading ease manipulation focuses on the textual 
aspects of reading difficulty and uses simplistic readability scores which are based on 
word and sentence length. This study introduces two new methodologies for 
meaSUrIng reading difficulty which focus on cohesion as a function of reading 
difficulty. They are not based on simple formulae, but incorporate insights from 
linguistics and psychology into the characteristics of reading difficulty based on 
textual complexity. This provides them with increased linguistic and psychological 
validity. 
What is more, a new approach to detecting impression management in a corporate 
reporting context is introduced in the form of self-presentational dissimulation, which 
is based on linguistic markers. Using a methodology developed in social psychology, 
this approach focuses on verbal cues of dissimulation, including, amongst others, 
decreased use of self-reference and cognitive complexity. 
And last. but not least, the study extends the measurement of positive/negative firm 
performance by n1eans of using not one, as is common in previous research, but four 
measures of "goodlbad news'. The majority of previous studies focus on short-term. 
company specific measures, such as increasing/decreasing financial performance 
measured as positive/negative percentage change in earnings from one year to the 
next. However. for any company. "goodlbad news' is not contined to time-series 
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measures of financial performance, but also includes cross-sectional comparisons \\"ith 
industry competitors. For this reason, this study not only includes two traditional 
measures of 'good/bad news' , namely positive/negative earnings and 
positive/negative earnings growth, but also two measures which are based on 
industry-comparisons, namely relative sales growth (relative sales increase/decrease 
compared to the industry) and positive/negative long-term firm growth (relative 
increase/decrease in assets and sales over a four-year period compared to the 
industry). 
1.6 Organization of the dissertation 
Chapter two provides an overvIew of research, gIvmg insights into the use of 
impression management in narrative annual report documents. In order to provide a 
better understanding of the strategies, objectives, and consequences of impression 
management, it draws on studies from two academic disciplines, namely behavioural 
finance and social psychology, and three related areas of accounting research, namely 
impression management, earnings management, and fraud. 
The first part of chapter two (sections 2.1 - 2.5) reports on conventional approaches to 
impression management, including theoretical foundations, manifestations of 
impression management in corporate narrative documents, factors impacting on the 
use of impression management (2.1 - 2.4), and investor reactions to impression 
management (2.5). The second part (sections 2.6 and 2.7) introduces theories from 
behavioural finance and social psychology. First, the concept of impression 
management in a traditional financial economics framework is compared with that in 
a behavioural finance framework. Then, theories from social psychology are 
introduced which provide insights into the motivation for engaging in impression 
management, the conditions fostering impression management, and impression 
management strategies. Subsequently, it is demonstrated how impression management 
in the fom1 of self-presentational dissimulation can be applied to accounting research 
(2.8) and two methods of detecting impression management in corporate narrative 
1 1 
documents are discussed (2.9). Finally, the suitability of the chairman's report as an 
impression management vehicle is discussed (2.10). 
Chapter three summarizes the conventional methodologies used for analyzing and 
measuring impression management in the form of reading ease manipulation and 
introduces the new methodologies developed in this study. 
Chapter four sets out the research questions underlying this study, namely (l) whether 
there is any evidence of impression management in narrative corporate report sections 
and (2) whether impression management is associated with 'good/bad news', and (3) 
whether ImpreSSIOn management IS associated with other organizational 
characteristics, specifically firm size and industry classification. 
Chapter five presents the sample and discusses the research methodology and the 
measurement of 'good/bad news', firm size, and industry classification. It also 
describes the statistical techniques used to examine the relationships between the 
variables. 
Chapter six comprises a three-part analysis. First, the corporate narrative sections of 
the entire sample are investigated for evidence of impression management. Second, it 
is examined whether impression management varies in relation to (1) 'good/bad 
news' or (2) firm size. Then, the association between impression management and 
'good/bad news' and firm size is investigated simultaneously. Finally, it is 
investigated whether results differ depending on industry classification. 
Chapter seven provides a summary of findings, discusses their implications, and 
compares the findings with those of previous studies, and considers further research 
possibilities. 
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Chapter 2: IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT RESEARCH 
This chapter discusses how impression management has been viewed and analysed in 
previous accounting research. It then provides insights from finance and social 
psychology and demonstrates how these insights jointly inform the research study 
described in this thesis. 
We first discuss how the previous accounting literature views impression management 
(2.1) and also document the different types of impression management behaviour 
identified by previous research (2.2). We then discuss the association between 
impression management and various corporate characteristics (2.3 and 2.4) and the 
potential effects of impression management on users of corporate narrative reports 
(2.5). Having reviewed the state-of-the-art research in relevant areas, we then examine 
how insights from alternative finance theory (2.6) and social psychology research 
(2.7) might contribute to impression management research. We subsequently show 
how self-presentational dissimulation can be applied in accounting research (2.8), 
discuss strategies for its detection (2.9), and discuss the use of the chairman's report 
as an impression management vehicle (2.10). 
2.1. Agency theory and impression management 
Accounting research focusing on impression management in a corporate reporting 
context is based on defining impression management as "the process by l1'hich people 
attempt to control the impressions others form of them" (Leary and Kowalski 1990) 
which entails "shap[ing] an audience's impression of a person (e.g., self, friends, 
enemies), object (e.g., a business organization, a gift, a consumer product), event 
(e.g., a transgression, a task performance), or idea (e.g., pro-life versus pro-chOice 
policies, capitalism versus socialism)" (Schlenker3). In the context of corporate 
reporting, impression management thus constitutes an activity aimed at inlluencing 
J http://www.psych.ufl.edu/-schlenkr/imgrad.htm 
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others' impressions of (i) persons such as managers. the CEO, and the chairman. (ii) 
the organization as a whole, (iii) outcomes such as financial performance. 
environmental performance, ethical performance, (iv) events such as priYatization. 
demutualization, mergers or acquisitions, and (v) concepts, such as that of profit as 
the only legitimate measure of corporate success. 
However, the majority of studies focus on one aspect of impression management. 
namely the manipulation of perceptions of firm performance. As will be demonstrated 
in section 2.6, this narrow focus can be attributed to agency theory assumptions 
underlying impression management research which explain managerial and investor 
behaviour strictly in terms of positivist arguments. Section 2.6 of the current study 
discusses impression management in the context of alternative finance theories. 
Section 2.7 offers insights from social psychology on impression management which 
provide a better understanding of impression management in a corporate reporting 
context. 
2.1.1 Managerial impression management as opportunistic behaviour 
Prior literature focusing on impression management in a corporate reporting context 
assumes that corporate narrative documents are biased. This is due to agency theory 
assumptions of managerial behaviour (Smith and Taffler 1992b, 2000; Abrahamson 
and Park 1994; Hooghiemstra 2000, 2001; Godfrey et al. 2003; Rutherford 2003; 
Courtis 1995, 2004a, b; Aerts 2005). Managers are assumed to opportunistically select 
a style of presentation and choice of content which provide a favourable impression of 
firm performance and prospects. Impression management is thus regarded as attempts 
by management "to control and manipulate the impression conveyed to users of 
accounting information" (Clatworthy and Jones 2001: 311). As a result. management 
is presumed to use corporate reports as impression management vehicles to 
"strategically ... manipulate the perceptions and decisions of stakeholders" (Yuthas et 
al. 2002: 142). Hooghiemstra (2000: 60) defines impression management as "a field 
of S{lhZ\, lI'ithin social psychology studying hOI\' individuals present themselves to 
others to be perceil'cdfavollrably by others". 
Accounting research regards corporak reports as impression management \·ehicles 
which can be used to present a self-interested yie\v of corporate performance 
l~ 
(Bettman and Weitz 1983: 166-167; Staw et al. 1983: 584; Abrahamson and Park 
1994: 1302; Beattie and Jones 2000: 160; Clatworthy and Jones 2006; Mather et al. 
2000: 68). Thus, the majority of impression management studies focus on the 
manipulation of outsiders' perceptions of firm performance and prospects. Figure 2.1 
outlines this notion of impression management in the context of corporate reporting.4 
Figure 2.1: Impression management as manipulation of perceptions of firm performance 
and prospects 
/'---_M_a_ni+-p_lll_at_io_n--l 
/ " 
Management 1------1+ .. 
~ 
Information 
about firm 
performance 
and prospects 
1----.. Company outsiders 
2.1.2 Managerial motivation to engage in impression management 
Since managers operate '"in an environment in which their remuneration and -wealth is 
linked to the financial performance of the companies that employ them, [they] have 
powerful economic incentives" to mask negative aspects of firm performance 
(Rutherford 2003: 189). In this respect, impression management can be regarded more 
explicitly as opportunistic managerial behaviour resulting from contractual 
agreements between principals and agents. 
Impression management entails managers taking advantage of the information 
asymmetries between them and outsiders in order to maximise their own wealth as a 
function of share prices, salary, cash bonuses, and future job security. Any conflicts of 
interest are overcome by aligning the interests of management with those of 
shareholders with respect to these factors, i.e. in the form of shares and share options. 
compensation contracts, and tenure. Remuneration in the form of shares and share 
4 Odgden and Clarke C:~005) are an exception in that they examine impression management as the 
manipulation of outsiders' perceptions of organizational legitimacy. In the field of management 
impression management is studied as the manipulation of outsiders' perceptions of corporate self and 
corporate reputation (White and Hanson 2002). 
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options links share performance to capital gains. Remuneration in the form of 
compensation contracts links firm performance to cash bonuses. Tenure increases 
management's welfare by means of revising its future remuneration, depending on the 
perceived success or failure of the company they are managing. 
It can thus be assumed that managers engage in impression management in order to 
(1) increase share prices, (2) optimise short-term-bonuses and (3) to extend tenure. 
For example, managerial impression management may be aimed at reducing the 
likelihood of takeover attempts, since a reduced risk of takeover improves managers' 
chances of keeping their jobs or at influencing attempts to change control of the firm, 
such as management buyouts and proxy contests. Managers involved in proxy 
contests may engage in impression management in order to persuade shareholders to 
hold on to their shares and keep faith in the current management. They may also 
engage in impression management in order to prevent non-routine executive changes, 
such as dismissals.5 
Thus, management is presumed to engage in impression management for the same 
reasons as it engages in earnings management (by means of overstating earnings), 
namely (1) to improve market participants' perceptions of firm performance and 
consequently the value of the firm and (2) to increase management's compensation or 
job security. 6 
It is these arguments that motivate much of impression management research, i.e. 
establishing a link between managerial reward and firm performance, arguing that 
management has both strong economic incentives and the opportunity to engage in 
5 More specifically, Abrahamson and Park (1994) explain managerial impression management as an 
attempt to protect their bonuses and reputations. In a broader context, see Healy et al. (1988) for the 
optimisation of short-term bonuses, DeAngelo (1986) and Perry and Williams (1994) for management 
buyouts, DeAngelo (1988) for proxy contests, and Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) and Pourciau 
(1993) for non-routine executive exchanges. 
(> The vast majority of impression management studies focus on (1). One exception is Godfrey et al. 
(2003) who examine the use of impression management in the context of CEO changes. What sets their 
study apart is the investigation of impression man.ag~ment in con.junctio~ with earnings management, 
finding some, albeit limited, evidence of the aSSOCIatIOn between ImpreSSIOn management by means of 
graphs and CEO changes. 
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impression management, due to the fact that management controls "the accounting 
communication process which monitors their performance" (Adelberg 1979: 187). 
2.1.3 Earnings management and impression management 
Some authors consider earnings management to be a subset of impression 
management. Clatworthy and Jones (2003: 173) state: "In practice, impression 
management is demonstrated across a whole range of accounting research issues 
[including] earnings manipulation ... ". Davidson et al. (2004) posit that attempting to 
manage impressions may lead to excessive earnings management. Thus, impression 
management constitutes the foundation for earnings management, or, put differently, 
earnings management constitutes one manifestation of impression management. This 
means that the classic definition of earnings management by Healy and Wahlen 
(1999: 368) can also be applied to impression management, i.e. earnings management 
and impression management occur "when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting ... to alter financial reports to ... mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company." 
Godfrey et al. (2003: 96) regard impression management and earnings management 
both as selective and/or biased financial representation 7 resulting In a 
misrepresentation or distortion of financial results. Whereas impression management 
entails selecting "the information to display and presents that information in a 
manner that is intended to distort readers' perceptions of corporate achievements", 
earnings management entails the use of the discretion afforded by the financial 
reporting process to manipulate accounting numbers by means of accounting policy 
choices and accruals. 
Figure 2.2 provides a comparison of the manipulation of outside parties' perceptions 
of firn1 performance and prospects by means of (i) earnings management and (ii) 
impression management. Whereas earnings management is primarily concerned with 
the over- and understatement of various accounting line items and the effect on the net 
income reported in the accounts, impression management is likely to be more 
7 See section 2.4.1 for a more comprehensive discussion on the use of selection and bias for impression 
management purposes. 
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extensive occurring both in the financial statements (the presentation of accounting 
numbers by means of repetition, hierarchy, highlighting, etc.) (see Guillamon-Saorin 
2006) and in the narrative sections of the annual report where it involves the 
manipulation of the disclosure and presentation of information in the form of numbers 
(choice of specific accounting numbers reported in narrative annual report 
documents), text (its content, style, and visual effects), pictorial material, and graphs.8 
8 See section 2.2 of the current study for a detailed of discussion of manifestations of impression 
management and impression management techniques identified by previous research. 
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Beattie and Jones (2000: 160) regard impression management and earmngs 
management as arising from the same managerial motivation, namely providing a 
self-interested view of corporate performance. As the discussion of the underlying 
motivation of impression management in section 2.1.2 has shown, the managerial 
self-interest is influenced by economic and reputational benefits. In this respect, the 
underlying motives of impression management are the same as for earnings 
management, namely "obtaining private gain for .'. managers" (Schipper 1989: 92) 
Thus, impression management and earnings management clearly share the same 
motivation and objectives and only differ in their execution. 
2.1.4 The obfuscation hypothesis 
This opportunistic managerial behaviour which is assumed to lie at the root of 
impression management has given rise to the so-called obfuscation hypothesis. It is 
based on the assumption that management is not neutral in its presentation of 
accounting narratives (Sydserff and Weetman 1999: 460). The resulting bias, which 
arises from strong economic incentives and the opportunity to provide a self-
interested view of corporate performance, leads to management obfuscating failures 
and emphasising successes (Adelberg 1979: 187). 
The obfuscation hypothesis (Courtis 1998) states that managers are particularly driven 
to manipulate outside parties' perceptions of firm performance and prospects in the 
case of bad news. This results in reporting bias. This asymmetrical behaviour is 
understandable because conflicts of interest between management and shareholders 
mainly arise in the context of negative organizational outcomes (Aerts 2005: 497). It 
is for this reason that management is only motivated to engage in impression 
management in the case of 'bad news'. Indeed, management obfuscates negative 
organizational outcomes for the same reasons as management overstates earnings, 
namely (1) to improve market participants' perception of firm performance and (2) to 
increase management's compensation or job security.9 
9 Thus, impression management research is bas~d o~ two impli~it .assumpti~n~ of ~anagerial 
behaviour, namely (I) managers are rational economic bemgs whose aml IS to maximize their personal 
wealth and (2) managers believe in market inefficiency. For a more detailed discussion on this issue. 
see section 2.6 of the current study. 
20 
The assumption that managers engage III impression management to obfuscate 
negative organizational outcomes has resulted in studies analyzing corporate 
narratives for evidence of this behaviour in various forms, namely (1) reading ease 
manipulation, (2) rhetorical manipulation, (3) thematic manipulation, and (4) narrative 
disclosure. These are discussed in the following section. 
2.2 Impression management in corporate narrative documents 
In accounting research, impression management constitutes a strand of the financial 
disclosure literature, where, as indicated above, it is regarded as a response to 
negative organizational outcomes. Since negative organizational outcomes lead to a 
conflict of interest between management and shareholders, management is driven to 
adopt one of the following four strategies identified in prior studies, namely (1) 
concealment! 0 (obfuscation), (2) a defensive framing tactic which shifts the blame for 
negative outcomes away from themselves (attribution)!!, (3) a choice of benchmarks 
which portrays firm performance in the best possible light (performance 
comparisons), or (4) a choice of earnings number disclosed in corporate narratives 
which portrays firm performance in the best possible light (choice of earnings 
number). !2 Each of these four strategies can result in a misrepresentation or distortion 
of firm performance and prospects. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the four strategies that management may adopt when engaging in 
impression management: (1) obfuscation, (2) attribution, (3) performance 
comparisons, and (4) choice of earnings number. Figure 2.3 also shows how the first 
of these, the obfuscation of negative organizational outcomes in narrative corporate 
report sections, can take the forms of reading ease manipUlation, rhetorical 
manipulation, narrative disclosure, and thematic manipulation. 13 Finally. Figure 2.3 
10 One aim of the social psychology literature on impression management is to examine how people use 
and conceal information in order to advance their self-interests (Schlenker website). 
II Aerts C~OOS: 497). 
12 Aerts (2005: 497) also mentions a timed strategy of bad news disclosure. However, this constitutes a 
disclosure rather than an impression management strategy. 
\J Traditionally, impression management research is classified into thematic studi~s and readability 
studies (Jones and Shoemaker 19t)-l). B: sub-di\iding thematic studies into three different areas and b: 
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indicates the type of manipUlation and obfuscation involved in the four strategies~ the 
proxy for obfuscation (where applicable), and the focus of the analysis. The current 
study focuses on the obfuscation of negative organisational outcomes by means of 
reading ease manipulation. It also investigates self-presentational dissimulation, i.e. 
presenting an image of the firm and firm performance to outsiders which is 
inconsistent with the way management may see the firm and firm performance. This 
is an impression management strategy not previously examined in a corporate 
reporting context. See section 2.8 of the current study for a more detailed discussion 
of self-presentational dissimulation. 
including rhetorical manipulation, we identify seven impression management strategies (see Figure 
2.3). 
l' 
Figure 2.3: Manifestations of impression management in corporate narrative documents 
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Table 2.1 summarises prior impression management research by classifying it into 
four methodological categories, namely (1) obfuscation of negative organisational 
outcomes, including (i) reading ease manipulation, (ii) rhetorical manipulation, (iii) 
narrative disclosure and (iv) thematic manipulation, (2) attribution of organisational 
outcomes, (3) performance comparisons, and (4) choice of earnings number disclosed 
in corporate narratives. 
Table 2.1: Classification of impression management research 
(i) Reading ease manipulation 
Adelberg ( 1979) 
Parker (1982) 
Lewis et al. (1986) 
Courtis (1986) 
Jones (1988) 
Baker and Kare (1992) 
Stevens et al. (1992)1 
Smith and Taffler (1992a) 
Smith and Taffler (1992b) 
Subramanian et al. ( 1993) 
Courtis (1995) 
Jones (1996) 2 
Jones (1997)1 
Courtis (1998) 
Sydserff and Weetman (1999) 
C latworthy and Jones (2001 b) 
Sydserff and Weetman (2002)3 
Rutherford (2003 ) 
Courtis (2004a) 
(1) Obfuscation of negative organizational outcomes 
(ii) Rhetorical manipulation (iii) Narrative disclosure 
Thomas (1997) Ingram and Frazier (1980)4 
Jameson (2000) Frazier et al. (1984) 
Sydserff and Weetman (2002i Tennyson et al. (1990) 
Yuthas et al. (2002) Smith and Taffler (1995) 
Davis et al. (2005) Clatworthy and Jones (2006) 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) 
(2) Attribution of organisational outcomes 
Staw et al. (1983) 
Aerts (1994) 
Baginski et al. (2000) 
Hooghiemstra (2001) 
Aerts (200 I ) 
Clatworthy and Jones (2003)5 
Lee et al. (2004) 
Baginski et al. (2004) 
Aerts (2005) 
Ogden and Clarke (2005)6 
(3) Performance comparisons 
Cassar (1999) 
Short and Palmer (2003) 
Schrand and Walther (2000) 
1 Methodological discussion, therefore not included in Table 2.2 to follow. 
2 Jones (1996) is a comment on Courtis (1995), and is therefore not included in Table 2 to follow. 
(iv) Thematic manipulation 
Abrahamson and Park ( 1994) 
Smith and Taffler (2000) 
Clatworthy and Jones (2003)5 
Rutherford (2005) 
Henry (2006) 
(4) Choice of earnings number 
Johnson and Schwartz (2005) 
Bowen (2005) 
Guillamon Saorin (2006) 
3 Sydscrff and Weetman (2002) is difficult to classify as it uses three methodologies: one reading ease manipulation and two rhetorical manipulation. 
4 Ingram and Frazier (1980) is a corporate social reporting study. 
5 Clatworthy and Jones (2003) test both for the association between positive/negative organizational outcomes and increasing/declining performance and 
the attribution of positive/negative organizational outcomes to internal/external factors and increasing/declining/performance. 
6 Odgen and Clarke (2005) exam ine impression management in the context of legitimacy. They use attribution of organisational outcomes in the form of 
entitlements and excuses as par1 of a whole array of impression management techniques aimed at gaining legitimacy. 
------- ---- --
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2.2.1 Obfuscation of negative organizational outcomes 
Current research opinion regards annual reporting "as an exercise in obfuscation. 
Sections of the reports are allegedly managed so as to present management in as 
favourable light as possible" (Stanton et al. 2004: 57). This means that management is 
not neutral in its presentation of accounting narratives (Sydserff and Weetman 1999: 
460). The resulting bias leads to management obfuscating failures and underscoring 
successes (Adelberg 1979: 187). 
However, Aerts (2005: 497) draws attention to the asymmetrical behaviour of 
management regarding positive/negative organizational outcomes. Conflict of interest 
between management and shareholders only arise when negative organizational 
outcomes occur. For this reason, management is only motivated to engage in 
impression management in the case of 'bad news'. 
This asymmetric behaviour of management regarding positive/negative organisational 
outcomes also fits with behavioural theory assumptions about different value 
functions for gains and losses. Whereas traditional finance models focus on utility 
which is usually defined only in terms of net wealth, prospect theory focuses on value 
which is defined in terms of gains and losses. What is more, prospect theory argues 
that the value function for losses is different than the value function for gains in that 
losses "loom larger" than gains. This means that a loss of £500 is felt more than a gain 
of £500. (PIous 1993: 95-96). In a behavioural finance context of rational managers 
and irrational investors this means that managers exploit this asymmetric value 
function of investors by concentrating their impression management efforts on 
negative organisational outcomes. 
Reading ease manipulation 
Impression management by means of reading ease manipulation involves the 
obfuscation of negative organizational outcomes by means of rendering corporate 
narrative documents difficult to read. Research focusing on reading ease manipulation 
regards syntactical complexity as a proxy for obfuscation. It is based on the 
assumption that n1anagement conceals negati\'e organizational outcomes by means of 
complex prose. 
26 
Thus, impression management studies which focus on reading ease manipulation are 
based on the premise that management has the "tendency to manipulate or arrange 
prose to ... mask 'bad news' (negative organizational outcomes) with more difficult 
writing" (Courtis 1998: 461). They investigate whether management manipulates the 
perceptions of outside parties by rendering narrative corporate report sections difficult 
to read. Table 2.2 provides an overview of impression management studies focusing 
on reading ease manipulation. The reading difficulty measures used in previous 
studies are explained in detail in chapter 3, section 3.2. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of reading ease manipulation studies 
Study Country Time # Narrative Readability Independent Statistics Results 
scale sections measure Variables 
Adelberg (1979) US 1974175 16 Footnotes, Cloze Performance Pearson Standard footnotes and 
Management Correlation management's review of 
review of operations are difficult to read; 
operations, Profitability is inversely related 
Auditors' to the reading difficulty of non-
reports standard footnotes and of 
auditor's reports. 
Parker (1982) Australia 1980 10 Chairman'sl Fog None Narratives were of low 
directors' review readability 
of operations 
Lewis et al. Australia 1977- 9 Managing Fog, Flesch, None Narratives were of low 
( 1986) 1980 director's report, Kwolek, Dale- readability 
Operations Chall, Lix, Fry 
review 
Courtis (1986) Canada 1982- 142 Chairman's Fog, Flesch Performance, Mann- Poor quality readability was not 
1983 address, Corporate risk Whitney U related to poor performance or 
Financial test high risk 
statement 
footnotes 
Jones (1988) UK 1952- Chairman's Flesch Performance, Time, Linear Readability declined as turnover 
1985 report Firm size, Listing Regression, (proxy for firm size/corporate 
status, Multiple complexity) increased, over timc 
Title of chairman's regressIon and when the company became 
narrative, Chairman listed. 
Baker and Kare US No info 44 President's Flesch Performance, Correlation Presidents' letters of largcr firms 
( 1992) letter Firm size, analysis were morc rcadable 
Smith and UK 1978- 66 Chairman's Flesch, Lix, Cloze Firm survival Correlation There was no diffcrcncc in 
" attlcr ( 1992a) 1985 report analysis readability bctween failed and 
non-failcd companics 
~~-----~-
28 
Table 2.2 (continued): Summary of reading ease manipulation studies 
Study Country Time scale # Narrative sections Readability measure Independent Variables Statistics Results 
Smith and UK 1978-1985 66 Chairman's report Flesch, Lix, Cloze Firm survival Readability and 
Taftler (l992b) understandability measure 
different concepts; 
Understandability is a 
function of the soph istication 
of the target audience 
Subramanian et US 1987,1988 60 Letter to Fog, Flesch Performance Pearson Annual reports of good 
al. (1993) stockholders Correlation performers were more 
readable 
Courtis (1995) Hong 1986,1991 32 Chairman's report, Fog, Flesch, Lix Performance, No significant difference was 
Kong Footnotes to the Firm size, found between readability 
accounts Industry and independent variables 
Courti<; (1998) Hong 1994/95 120 Chairman's report Flesch Performance, Press Narratives of companies with 
Kong coverage high press coverage were 
significantly less readable 
Syd<;erff and UK 10 Operating and Flesch, Texture index None Texture index captures 
Wectman financial review factors not captured by 
( 1999) readability formulas 
Clatwonhy and UK 1995/96 120 Chairman's report Flesch Performance ANOVA Variability of readability is 
Jones (200 I b) not explained by 
performance. Thcmatic 
structure is a key driver of 
variability of readability 
Sydscrff and UK 1999/2000 27 Chairman's report Flesch, Transitivity Performance Transitivity index and 
Wectman index, Diction DICTION are useful 
(2002) altcrnatives to readability 
formulas 
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Table 2.2 (continued): Summary of reading ease manipulation studies 
Study Country Time scale # Narrative Readability measure Independent Statistics Results 
sections Variables 
Rutherford UK 1998 64 Operating and Flesch Perfonnance, Multiple Poorly performing firms 
(2003 ) financial review Finn size, regressIOn do not obfuscate using 
Corporate risk, analysis textual complexity. 
Organisational Readability was 
complexity , insignificant for all other 
Statutory variables 
regulation 
Courtis (2004a) Hong 1997 60 Annual reports, Flesch Perfonnance, Low reading ease, and 
Kong Interim reports, Corporate age, high readability variability 
Prospectuses Corporate is associated with 'bad 
complexity news' 
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Although readability is only "one a/the many characteristics which management may 
manipulate" (Jones 1996: 90), it represents a subtle way of obfuscating negati\'e 
organizational outcomes. Courtis (2004a) argues that, because of its subtlety it may be 
more likely to succeed than other form of impression management. Reading ease 
manipulation thus constitutes a very powerful impression management mechanism. 
Readability studies can be grouped into four categories: (1) investigations focusing on 
the reading difficulty of various narrative annual report documents in order to 
determine whether they are difficult to read (Lewis et al. 1986; Courtis 1986). (2) 
investigations of the variability of readability within a particular narrati\'e annual 
report document in order to determine whether some sections are more difficult to 
read than others (Courtis 1998, Clatworthy and Jones 2001; Courtis 2004a), (3) 
studies investigating the association between the reading difficulty of narrative annual 
report documents and various company characteristics, most commonly firm 
performance (see section 2.3 and 2.4), and (4) studies focusing on methodological 
development (Courtis 1986; Smith and Taffler 1992a, Stevens et al. 1992, Jones 1997. 
Sydserff and Weetman 1999, Syserff and Weetman 2002). The latter studies test 
various readability measures and compare results in order to determine which measure 
is the most suitable for examining the readability of accounting narratives. 
Courtis (1986) finds the narrative annual report sections (chairman' s reports and 
footnotes) of 142 Canadian companies difficult to very difficult to read. Based on the 
fact that these levels correspond to the reading skills equivalent of a university 
education and the fact that 43.9 percent of Canadian shareholders have a university 
degree. he judges the reading difficulty to be adequate. 
Using six readability measures, namely Fog, Flesch, Kwolek, Dale-Chall. Lix, and 
Fry,14 Lewis et al. (1986) find the narrative corporate report sections of Australian 
companies difficult to read. 
\4 These readability measures all regard reading difficulty as a function of word length and sentence 
length. Sel' chapte; ,), ~ection 3.2.1 for a more detailed discussion of these measures 
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Courtis (2004a) uses both low readability and high variability of readability as a proxy 
for obfuscation. He finds an association between obfuscation and the location of the 
hardest to read passage in interim reports, but not annual reports, and prospectuses. 
Smith and Taffler (l992a) compare the results of three readability measures. namely 
Flesch, Lix and Cloze. In order to rule out the effect of company characteristics on 
textual difficulty, they include both failed and non-failed companies which are 
matched by sector, turnover, and financial year-end. Based on all three measures. the 
chairman's reports of all companies are found to be difficult to read. Cloze scores 
indicate that "even users of the greatest sophistication have difficulty in fully 
comprehendingfinancial narratives" (Smith and Taffler 1992a: 94). 
Courtis (1995) uses the Flesch, Fog, and Lix scales to examine the readability of 
Hong Kong annual reports, which have been prepared in English, but whose target 
readership speaks English as a second language. His hypothesis is that annual reports 
of Hong Kong companies should be easier to read. This is based on the assumption 
that preparers would take the limited linguistic abilities of their target readership into 
consideration. However, his hypothesis is not borne out by the results of his analysis. 
Previous research attributes reading difficulty to two factors, namely (l) managerial 
manipulation and (2) bad writing. Rutherford (2003: 189) and Courtis (2004: 292) 
regard reading difficulty as a consequence of deliberate managerial manipulation, 
whereas Courtis (1995: 4) leaves the issue "whether writing which is difficult to read 
is executed deliberately to mask some unfavourable aspect of corporate behaviour, or 
is performed uml'ittingly out of ignorance" open to discussion. Whereas the former 
represents a deliberate effort on the part of management to mislead readers about firm 
performance and prospects and thus constitutes impression management, the latter is 
due to lack of skill on part of the writer. In practise, however, it is impossible to 
differentiate between the two. 
Ho\Vcn~r, based on the importance of the annual report as a financial reporting and 
investor relations vchicle. one \yould expect that narrative corporate report sections of 
listed companies are \\Titten by skilled \\Titers. Considering the adverse efTect of a 
badly executed annual report in terms of money and reputation. it can be assumed that 
companies spend both time and care ensuring that they communicate exactly what 
management wants them to communicate. Thus, they either employ professional 
outside agencies or employ suitably qualified inside staff to write narrati\'e report 
sections which convey the right message. 
In the context of this study reading ease manipulation is regarded as the deliberate 
manipulation of reading difficulty. This follows from the earlier definition of 
impression management as an intentional manipUlation of perceptions of firm 
performance and prospects with the aim of misleading outside parties. In the case of 
reading ease manipulation this is achieved by means of manipulating the reading 
difficulty of annual report sections. 
Another factor contributing to the reading difficulty of narrative corporate report 
sections are the genre characteristics of narrative corporate report sections. Research 
in linguistics and education explain the reading difficulty of narrative corporate report 
sections by means of their genre characteristics. They constitute expository texts, i.e. 
texts whose main purpose is explanation. Such texts are textually more complex than 
narrative texts (Graesser et al. 2003) and thus more difficult to process and read. 
However, genre characteristics manifest themselves across the entire genre. This 
means that, e.g. all chairman's reports, regardless of company characteristics, such as 
size or firm performance, should be equally difficult/easy to read. Research findings 
indicate that this is not the case. For this reason, genre characteristics are not the 
decisive factor in the reading difficulty of narrative annual report documents. 
However, since the concept of reading difficulty is borrowed from education research, 
economics-based theories of reading difficulty do not exist. As a result, prior literature 
fails to address whether the application of the linguistic techniques required to 
manipulate the reading difficulty of texts are executed consciously or unconsciously. 
It could thus be argued that reading ease manipulation may take place both on a 
conscious and on an unconscious leveL depending on the level of awareness of these 
techniques on part of the writer. This view takes account of the fact that corporate 
communication professionals may use the linguistic techniques aimed at achieving 
reading ease manipulation more consciously than management and thus allows for the 
., .... 
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use of impression management in the form of reading ease manipulation by both 
management and corporate communication professionals. 
This situation can be compared to people going to job interviews. All candidates 
intentionally manipulate the perceptions (and thus, hopefully, the decisions) of the 
interview panel regarding their suitability for the job in question in order to make the 
best impression possible, but might have different degrees of awareness of the means 
they use to do so. 
In interview situations some factors can be identified as being crucial for making a 
good impression, e.g. matching one's style of dress to the dress-code of the 
organization, making eye-contact with all the members of the interview panel. and 
asking questions about the organization they are applying to at the end of the 
interview. However, although candidates might all adopt these strategies, it does not 
mean that they all do so consciously with a view to making a good impression. 
In the context of this study, impression management in the form of reading ease 
manipulation is defined as the intentional managerial manipulation of firm 
performance and prospects with the aim of misleading other parties by the conscious 
and unconscious application of linguistic techniques associated with reading 
difficulty. 
Rhetorical manipulation 
Research focusing on rhetorical manipulation regards persuasive language as a proxy 
for obfuscation. It is based on the assumption that management conceals negative 
organizational outcomes by means of rhetorical devices, such as passive voice. Table 
2.3 provides a summary of impression management studies based on rhetorical 
manipulation methodologies. 
Table 2.3: Summary of rhetorical manipulation studies 
Study Country Time Sample Narrative sections Content analysis technique Independent Statistics Results 
scale size Variables 
Thomas ( 1997) US 1984-1988 Manager's message Passive constructions, Performance Negative news not 
to stockholders Sentence openers, Relationship attributable to individuals thought to be responsible between first and last paragraph, 
Euphemisms 
Jameson (2000) US 1996/97 200 Entire annual report Multiple voices, Embedded Performance t-tests, chi- Uses complex linguistic 
genres, Contrasting focal points square tests analysis to show how 
mixed return compared 
with top return funds are 
explained 
Lang and US 1992 41 + 41 Disclosure Type of statements Equity Logistic Disclosure increases prior 
Lundholm documents (performance, management offering / regressIOn to equity offerings. Tone is 
(2000) spin, forward looking, other), nonoffering predominantly optimistic 
Tone of disclosures (optimistic, firms 
pessimistic) 
Sydserff and UK 1999/2000 27 Chairman's report Transitivity index, DICTION Performance Transitivity index balances 
Wectman but does not supplant use 
(2002) of readabi lity scores 
Y uti1(l\ ct aI. US 2001 14 President's letter Comprehensibility, Truth, Performance Positive and negative 
(2002) and MD&A Legitimacy, Sincerity, performers are more 
DICTION communicative 
Davis ct <II. US 1998-2003 24,000 Press releases Optimistic/Pessimistic language Future Regression Positive (negative) 
C~OO5) use, DICTION performance, association between 
Size, Industry, positive (negat ive) 
Year language and future 
performance 
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Narrative disclosure 
Research focusing on narrative disclosures regards the choice of themes as a proxy for 
obfuscation. Management conceals negative organizational outcomes by means of 
including specific themes and excluding others. 
It is based on the assumption that the themes contained in the narrative sections of 
successful and unsuccessful companies vary. Studies focus on investigating the 
association between thematic content and firm performance, with the aim of using the 
content of narrative sections to predict the financial prospects of the firm (see section 
2.3.3). Table 2.4 summarises this stream of research. 
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Table 2.4: Summary of narrative disclosure studies 
Study Country Time # Narrative Content analysis Independent Statistics Results 
scale sections technique variables 
Ingram and US 1970- 40 En vironm ental WORDS Environmental Multiple Weak association only between 
Frazier ( I 980) 1974 disclosures performance regressIOn quantitative measures of 
analysis disclosure content and 
environmental performance 
Frazier et aI. US 1978 74 Management WORDS Performance, Regression More thematic similarities than 
(1984 ) analyses of the Management! analysis differences were found between 
results of owner good/poor performers and 
operations controlled management!owner controlled 
firms 
Tennyson et al. US 1978 46 Management WORDS Firm survival Logistic Narrative disclosures were 
(1990 ) discussion and regression significant in explaining financial 
analysis distress 
(MD&A), 
President's letter 
Smith and UK 1978- 66 Chairman's User perception Firm survival z-scores Narratives are useful predictors of 
Taffler ( I 995) 1985 report financial performance but are not 
as useful as quantitative 
information 
Clatworthyand UK 1997 100 Chairman's Length of accounting Performance Descriptive Profitability is directly related to 
Jones (2006) report narratives, statistics the length of accounting 
Number passive narratives, to the number of key 
sentences, Number financial indicators, to the number 
key financial of quantitative references and to 
indicators, the number of personal references 
Number personal used, and inversely related to the 
references, Number number of future references used. 
quantitative Both profitable and unprofitabll' 
references companies emphasize good news. 
Number future 
references 
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Thematic manipulation 
Studies dealing with thematic manipulation are based on the assumption that 
management conceals negative organizational outcomes by not reporting them or by 
not reporting them to the same extent as they report positive organizational outcomes. 
Research in this area explores whether management shows preferences in the 
reporting of positive and negative organizational outcomes in the narrative sections, 
dependent on the financial performance of the firm. It focuses on investigating the 
association between the 'good/bad news' contained in the narrative statements in the 
form of positive/negative organizational outcomes and the 'good/bad news' contained 
in the financial accounts in the form of financial performance (see section 2.3.4). 
These studies are summarized in Table 2.5. 
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TabJe 2.5: Summary of thematic manipuJation studies 
I' 
I 
~ 
Study Country Time Sample Narrative Content analysis Independen Statistics Results scale size sections technique t variables 
Abrahamson US 1989 1,118 President's letter Negative organizational Performance, Correlation analysis; Outside directors, large institutional and Park to shareholders outcomes Various Regression analysis investors and accountants limit 1994) 
corporate concealment of negative organisational 
governance outcomes 
variables I 
Smith and UK 1978- 66 
Taffler (2000) 1985 
Chairman's report Positive/negative keywords Firm survival Linear discriminant Firms' discretionary narrative disc losures 
analysis are closely associated with financial 
performance 
latworthy and UK 1997 100 Chairman's report Performance attributions Performance Regression analysis No systematic differences were found in Jones (2003) 
readability between profitable and 
unprofitable companies. 
Rutherford UK 1998 44 Operating and Frequencies of90 key Performance, Mann-Whitney U test Language is biased toward the positive. 2005) financial review words Gearing 
Henrv (2006) US 1988- 1,366 Press releases Tone (frequency Abnormal Regress ion analysis Tone of earnings press releases influence 2002 positive/negative key share price investors ' reactions. 
words - DICTION), Length returns 
of press release, Textual 
complexity, Numerical 
intensity 
I Percentage of outsiders, Percentage of shares held by outsiders, Percentage of shares held by top officers, Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders, Owner control, 
In stitutional investor control, Percentage of shares held by nondominant institutional shareho lders, Auditor's opinion, N umber of officers se lling shares, Value of shares so ld by officers, 
Number of outside directors se lling shares, Value of shares sold by outside directors. 
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2.2.2 Attribution of organisational outcomes 
Accounting research has adopted attribution theory from social psychology (see 
section 2.7.5) to explain managerial impression management attempts in the case of 
positive and negative organisational outcomes. Research focusing on attribution in a 
financial reporting context examines impression management in the form of 
performance explanations. It claims that managers use narrative corporate report 
sections in a self-serving manner, and not to report performance objectively. 
Managers are assumed to attribute good performance (positive organizational 
outcomes) to internal factors and bad performance (negative organizational outcomes) 
to external circumstances. These studies are summarized in Table 2.6. 
Staw et al. (1983), who analyze the President's Letter to Shareholders of 81 US 
companies, find that firms use self-serving attributions in their narrative sections. 
There is evidence of management taking credit for successes and attributing blame for 
failures to external causes. 
Aerts (1994) finds that negative organizational outcomes are explained by means of 
technical accounting terms, whereas positive organizational outcomes are interpreted 
by means of cause and effect. In this context, accounting explanations are used to 
avoid explaining negative organisational outcomes. 
Hooghiemstra (2001) investigates the CEO's letter to shareholders of 30 large 
American and Japanese companies in order to examine the differences in attributional 
behaviour. He hypothesizes that variations in attributions of positive and negative 
organisational outcomes will be a function of the cultural background of the two 
countries with American managers showing more self-serving bias than their Japanese 
counterparts. He also hypothesizes that Japanese managers will be more modest in 
attributing positive outcomes, which will also be attributed to external causes, and 
more self-deprecating with regard to negative outcomes, which will be also attributed 
to internal factors. The results support the hypotheses to a large extent. 
lIe also investigates the use of language used to explain positive and negati\\.~ 
organizational outcomes. hypothesizing that finlls tend to explain negatin? outcomes 
in ambiguous accounting terminology and positive outcomes by means of clear causal 
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relationships. However, both positive and negative organizational outcomes are found 
to be explained in causal language, with Japanese managers using technical 
accounting language to a larger extent than their American counterparts. 
Baginski, Hassell and Hillison (2000) examme causal attribution disclosures in 
relation to management forecasts. They find that causal attributions to external factors 
are more likely to accompany bad news forecasts, while good news forecasts are 
attributed to internal factors. This they describe as egotism-drive bias. Baginski, 
Hassell and Kimbrough (2004) argue that investors are more likely to demand 
explanations for unexpected bad news. Consistent with their expectations. they find 
that attributions are more likely with bad news forecasts. 
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Table 2.6: Summary of attribution of organisational outcomes studies ) 
Study Country Time Sample Narrative Content analysis Independent Statistics Results 
scale size sections technique variables 
Stawet. al. US 1976- 81 Letter to Performance Change in stock Correlation Impression management is effective in 
(1983 ) 1977 shareholders explanations price, Institutional analysis that self serving attributions were 
ownership, Age of associated with improvements in stock 
CEO, Tenure of pnce 
CEO, Salary of CEO ".~ Aerts (1994) Belgium 1983 50 Directors' reports Performance Short-term Descriptive Accounting narratives are biased, with ,o4j 
explanations performance, statistics, success being claimed but negative 
Stability of Binomial test, factors being blamed on extemal 
performance, Firm t -test, uncontrollable factors. 
size, Industry ANOYA 
Baginski et al. US 1982- 2,085 Management Manual coding of Forecast type, Bivariate Attributions more likely with bad news 
(2000) 1986 forecasts intemal / extemal Analyst following, correlation, forecasts. Attributions enhance precision 
causes Forecast horizon, Regression or credibility of the forecasts . 
Disclosure package, analysis 
Other 
announcements, 
Share prices 
Hooghiemstra US, 1999 60 CEO's letter to Performance Performance Regression Both American and Japanese CEOs 
(200 I) Japan shareholders exp lanations, analysis attribute positive outcomes to intemal 
Technical language factors; Both American and Japanese CEOS explain positive and negative 
outcomes in causal language. 
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Table 2.6 (continued): Summary of attribution of organisational outcomes studies ff. 
, 
Study Country Time Sample Narrative Content analysis Independent Statistics Results 
scale size sections technique variables 
Aerts (2001) Belgium 1983- 22 Directors' reports Performance Short-term Correlation Significant degree of consistency in 
1990 explanations performance, Long- analysis, accounting narratives over time was 
term performance, Regression found. Consistently high level of positive . Listing status, Firm 
analysis attributions were unresponsive to \ ;:; Size performance change. v.; Lee et al. (2004) US 1975- 294 Annual reports Attributional Stock prices Correlation Companies that made se lf-disserving t/ 
1995 statements analysis attributions (i.e., internal , controllable) for 
Regression negative events had higher stock prices 
analysis one year later. 
Baginski et al. US 1993- 951 Management Manual coding of Firm size, Earnings Logistic Attributions more likely for larger firms, 
(2004) 1996 forecasts internal /external volatility, Good/bad regression bad news forecasts, maximum type 
causes news, Forecast type, forecasts; Less like ly in regulated 
Regulation, Industry, industries and in longer horizon forecasts. 
Other disclosures Associated with greater abso lute and 
more negative price reactions to 
management forecasts . 
Aerts (2005) Belgium 1997 167 Directors' Performance Self-serving tendencies in attributional 
reports explanations behaviour depend on context, and the 
nature of the accounting effect explained 
-
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2.2.3 Performance comparisons 
This stream of research is based on the assumption that firms manage impressions by 
means of choosing performance comparisons which enable them to portray their 
current performance in the best possible light. Impression management by means of 
performance comparisons has been studied in the context of (1) performance 
referents, (2) benchmark earnings number, and (3) benchmark comparisons in share 
performance graphs. These studies are summarized in Table 2.7. 
The use of performance referents for organisational performance is based on the 
assumption that CEOs manage impressions by means of comparing performance 
indicators against reference points, namely either time-series (past performance) and 
cross-sectional (industry averages and competitors). The use of benchmark earnings 
numbers is based on the assumption that firms manage impressions by means of 
choosing the lowest prior period comparative benchmark earnings number in order to 
report the highest year-on-year increase in earnings. The use of benchmark 
comparisons in share performance graphs is based on the assumption that firms 
manage impressions by choosing the type of benchmark which provides the most 
favourable image of their share performance. 
Short and Palmer (2003) investigate the way CEOs monitor and interpret 
organizational performance by means of comparisons of performance indicators 
against internal (such as past performance) and external (such as competitors and 
industry averages) reference points. They perform content analysis on President's 
Letters to Shareholders of 116 US companies. They find a strong preference for the 
use of internal referents (85.40/0) as compared to external referents (14.60/0) to assess 
performance. They find CEOs of large and highly perforn1ing companies use more 
cxternal referents (comparisons with competitors and industry averages) in their 
perforn1ance explanations than those of small and poorly performing companies. 
Schrand and Walther (2000) find that managers are more likely to select the lowest 
prior period comparatiyc benchmark earnings number that enables them to repor1 the 
highcst year-on-year increase in earnings. :\s such, managcrs are managing the 
perceptions of earnIngs rather than the earnIngs themselves - thus fitting our 
definition of impression management. 
Cassar (1999) investigates use of benchmark compansons In share perfonnance 
graphs. He examines how Australian firms report their performance compared with 
US companies. Two possible benchmarks are observed: (1) an index comparing 
company performance against the overall market and (2) a peer index. to compare 
company performance to other companies in the same industry. Australian companies 
have discretion over which benchmark to include in their reports whereas US 
companies do not. Cassar's (1999) findings show that almost all Australian companies 
(87 percent) perform better than their benchmark, but that only 52 percent of the US 
companies perform better than their benchmark. This suggests that, when managers 
have discretion, they select the information presenting the best perfonnance for the 
company. 
TabJe 2.7: Summary of performance comparisons studies /,r. 
" 
, ( 
I 
Study Country Time Sample Narrative Content analysis Independent Statistics Results 
scale size sections technique variables 
Schrand and US 1988- 130 Quarterly Prior period earnings Share price Regression Managers select prior period bench mad< 
Walther 1994 earnmgs benchmarks reaction analysis that results in greatest increase in 
(2000) announcements earnings. Investors use the benchmark 
to evaluate earnings. 
Cassar (2001) Australian 1996 484/392 Annual reports Disclosure of share Comparison share Logistic Better performing firms are more likelY' 
(l/5 years) performance graphs price performance, regressIOn to disclose share performance graphs. 
" 
Firm size 
This selectivity, together with choice of 
comparisons in graphs resulted in 87% 
of firms performing better than 
disclosed comparisons. 
Short and US 1996 119 Pres ident's letter Performance referents Firm size, MANOVA CEOs of large, highly perform ing and 
Palmer (2003) Performance, young companies use more external 
Corporate age performance referents than CEOs fro m 
small, poorly performing and 
established firms 
_ ... _-- - .. _--
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2.2.4 Choice of earnings number in corporate narrative documents 
Pro forma earnings are earnings numbers other than those calculated under generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Thus, pro forma earnings can be computed in 
many different ways. Pro forma earnings have been referred to as "earnings excluding 
all the bad stuff' (Fox 1998: 48). Two possible explanations for pro forma earnings 
have been put forward: (1) Management are motivated to provide investors with more 
accurate useful information or (2) Managers are making the firm look more profitable. 
If the latter motivation is the case, then use of pro forma earnings fits the definition of 
impression management. 
There is widespread evidence that pro forma earnings are predominantly income 
increasing over their GAAP counterpart (Johnson and Schwartz 2005). Managers 
select for inclusion in press releases the metric that portrays the firm in the best light. 
This supports an impression management motivation for such reporting. Johnson and 
Schwartz (2005: 924) refer to using pro forma earnings for the purpose of "managing 
readers' perceptions of earnings". They find support for managerial self-serving 
behaviour in that pro forma earnings exclude more than non-recurring items. They 
also find that firms that report pro forma earnings have earnings that are no different 
in persistency compared with firms that report GAAP earnings. This, they say, 
contradicts the notion that firms use pro forma earnings to draw investors' attention to 
less persistent, more transitory items in GAAP earnings. Studies focusing on the 
choice of earnings number in corporate narrative documents are summarised in Table 
2.8. 
Guillamon Saorin (2006) finds that companIes disclose far more positive than 
negative information, both qualitative (keywords or statements) and quantitative 
(amounts in general, and the best profit number in particular), although the amount of 
negative quantitative information included in the press releases is greater than the 
amount of negative qualitative information. Around 30 percent of the profit figures 
included in UK and Spanish press releases were not reported in the profit and loss 
account. FUl1her, she finds that the selection of profit figures from the profit and loss 
account for inclusion in the press release is different for Spanish and UK companies. 
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Bowen et al. (2005) examine pro forma earnings in press releases, in particular the 
emphasis placed on that number for firms that disclose both pro forma and GA-\P 
earnings. Emphasis is measured in two ways: positioning of the disclosure item of 
interest (pro forma earnings; GAAP earnings) in the press release, and the relatiye 
positioning of pro forma compared with GAAP earnings. They find that managers 
emphasise the metric that portrays the firm in a better light. 
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Table 2.8: Summary of choice of earnings number studies 
Study 
Bowen et al. 
2005) 
Johnson and 
Schwart 
2005) 
Gui llamon 
Saorin (2006) 
Country 
us 
Time 
scale 
2001-
2002 
US 2000 
UK and Spain 2000 
Sample 
size 
206 firms, 
1, 188 finn 
quarters 
433 
172 
Narrative 
sections 
Earnings press 
releases 
Press release 
Press release 
Content analysis 
technique 
Emphasis/positioning 
of pro forma earnings 
Pro forma earnings 
disclosures 
Repetition, 
Reinforcement, Visual 
emphasis 
Selectivity 
49 
Independent 
variables 
Value relevance 
Performance 
Media coverage 
Level of scrutiny 
from regulator 
Profitability, Finn 
size, Market risk, 
Ownership, 
Growth 
expectation 
Firm size 
Performance 
Nationality 
Industry 
Investor relations 
department 
Statistics 
Regression 
analysis 
Regression 
analysis 
Logistic 
regressIOn 
,;;;t:: 
1/ 
• 
Results 
Firms emphasise metrics that are more 
value relevant and that portray more 
favourable firm performance. \, 
Income increasing pro forma 
adjustments to GAAP earnings 
dominate the sample. Some highly 
profitable firms make income 
decreasing pro forma adjustments . 
Reporting bias and the se lection of 
information for disc losure is influenced 
by the performance of the company. 
Impress ion management practices differ 
by national ity 
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2.2.5 Impression management mechanisms 
Another way of categorising impression management research is by type of 
mechanism used to manipulate the perceptions of users regarding firm performance 
and prospects, namely by means of (a) disclosure choices and (b) the way information 
is presented. This is achieved by means of two mechanisms, namely (l) bias and (2) 
selectivity. Bias entails conveying information as positively as possible and selectiyity 
involves omitting or including certain items of information. Figure 2.4 illustrates the 
different ways impression management manifests itself in corporate documents by 
means of employing bias and selectivity to manipulate the disclosure and presentation 
of information. 
Figure 2.4 shows that bias and selectivity in corporate documents manifest themselves 
specifically on (1) textual material, (2) numerical disclosures \\'ithin the textual 
material, (3) pictorial material, and (4) graphs. 
Figure 2.4: Manipulation of disclosure and presentation of information 
Corporate documents 
-~
Material Tpvt Pictori1 material Graphs 
prelntation & Presentation & 
Disclosure Disclosure 
Type of ~Closure 
-------
~ I I \' 
manipulation 
~ Language V isual effects 
Mechanism 
selerVily BI' 1 
Bias and Bias and 
selectivity seleCrilY 
~ 
• Narrative • Thematic • Reading ease • Layout, graphic • Positive • Manipulation 
disclosure manipulation manipulation design Images of scale 
• Choice of • Perfonnance • Rhetorical • Visual emphasis • Selection of • Benchmark 
earnings companson manipUlation (bold text, bullet specific compansons 
number • Repetition & points) Images 
reinforcement 
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Disclosure choices 
Management uses either bias or selection in their disclosure choices to influence 
users' impression of the company's performance and prospects. 
In the textual sections bias and selection result in the obfuscation of negative 
organisational outcomes by means of narrative disclosure and thematic choice. 
Selecting specific items for disclosure amounts to narrative disclosure and disclosing 
items in a biased way amounts to thematic manipulation. Whereas disclosing 
information selectively involves selecting specific themes, disclosure bias involves 
emphasising positive information. 
Bias and selectivity also manifests itself in the numerical disclosures in narrative 
corporate report sections. It is possible to manage investor impressions using hard 
numbers as well as narratives in corporate annual reports. Bias involves choosing 
accounting numbers which show the firm in a positive light. Selection involves 
choosing specific accounting numbers and omitting others. In this context, there has 
been substantial research on pro forma earnings but the linkages between their use as 
impression management vehicles has not been explicitly made. IS 
Guillamon Saorin (2006) defines selectivity (a quantitative measure) as the selection 
of an earnings amount for inclusion in press releases from the whole range of earnings 
figures included in the underlying audited profit and loss account. There has been 
extensive research in the US on pro forma earnings. The choice of earnings numbers 
to disclose in narrative corporate reporting sections has been discussed in section 
2.2.4. 
Disclosure in the form of pictorial material is used to provide a visual representation 
of the company (See studies by (Graves et aI., 1996): (Preston et aI., 1996): (Douglis, 
2000). Bias of pictorial material is to emphasize positive images and selectivity of 
pictorial material draws attention to specific images. Courtis (2004b) has studied 
impression management using colour. 
15 Bias and selectivity are also used in the financial accounts where the) manifest themselves by the 
inrlusionlc:xclusion of specific numbers (such as profit before tax). 
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Disclosure in the form of graphs displays financial information in visual form. Beattie 
and Jones (1992, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002) have pioneered research on 
impression management using graphs in the UK (1992), in charity accounts (1994). in 
the US and UK (1997), in Australia (1999), and in different countries (2000). Courtis, 
(1997), Frownfelter-Lohrke and Fulkerson (2001), Mather et al. (2000)~ and Godfrey 
et al. (2003) have also studied graphical impression management. Bias in graphs is 
used to emphasize positive trends and conceal negative trends. For example. a 
carefully constructed graph can exaggerate an unspectacular rise in sales. Selectivity 
is used to include specific items of financial information and to exclude others. 
In an experimental study, Beattie and Jones (2002) test the effect of distortion in 
graphs and find that users are misled by such distortions, especially unsophisticated 
users. In particular, they test the effect on user perceptions of the slope parameters in 
graphs. Frownfelter-Lohrke and Fulkerson (2001) examine distortion in graphs of US 
listed companies, while Courtis (1997) examines graphs from Hong Kong annual 
reports. 
Cassar (1999) investigates the use of benchmark comparisons in share performance 
graphs. He examines how Australian firms report their performance compared with 
US companies. Two possible benchmarks are observed: (1) an index comparing 
company performance against the overall market and (2) a peer index. to compare 
company performance to other companies in the same industry. Australian companies 
have discretion over which benchmark to include in their reports whereas US 
companies do not. Cassar's findings show that almost all Australian companies (87 
percent) perform better than their benchmark, but that only 52 percent of the US 
companies perform better than their benchmark. This suggests that, when managers 
have discretion, they select the information presenting the best performance for the 
company. 
Presentation o[in[ormation 
Perceptions of firm perfOlTI1anCe and prospects can also be manipulated by the way 
information is presented in corporate documents. This also involves the use of bias 
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and selectivity in the textual material and the numerical disclosures included in the 
textual material. 
In the textual sections the manipulation of language by means of bias and selectivity 
result in the obfuscation of negative organisational outcomes by means of reading 
ease manipulation and rhetorical manipulation. Reading ease manipulation uses 
textual difficulty and rhetorical manipulation uses rhetorical devices as a proxy for 
obfuscation. The objective of studies on obfuscation by linguistic means is to 
investigate whether the language used in narrative corporate report sections 
transparently communicates performance information or whether it is being used by 
management to strategically manipulate the perceptions and decisions of shareholders 
and stakeholders. 
In the textual sections presentational bias also manifests itself by means of three 
different types of emphasis: (1) repetition, which occurs when an item is repeated 
more than once; (2) reinforcement, which occurs when a piece of information is 
emphasised by using a qualifier; and (3) visual emphasis, which occurs when 
companies use a number of methods to make a piece of information more obvious to 
readers (for example, bullet points, bold text, colour, etc.) (Guillamon Saorin, 2006; 
So and Smith, 2002; Courtis 2004b). 
Guillamon Saorin (2006) exammes the practices of repetition, reinforcement and 
emphasis in a study of UK and Spanish press releases. She finds the same information 
repeated several times in press releases. Moreover, most of the repetitions related to 
positive statements rather than negative statements. She also finds that reinforcement 
of positive rather than negative information was prevalent for both qualitative and 
quantitative information. Finally, companies positioned negative information in the 
least emphasised section of the press release, placing positive information more 
prominently than negative information. 
Bowen et al. (2005) exan1ine not merely the choice to report pro forma earnings in 
press releases but the emphasis placed on that number for firms that disclose both pro 
forma and GAAP ean1ings. They measure emphasis in two ways: positioning of the 
disclosure item of interest (pro forma earnings; GAAP earnings) in the press release. 
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and the relative positioning of pro forma compared with GAAP earnings. The\' find 
that managers emphasise the metric that portrays the firm in a better light. 
2.3 Association between impression management and firm 
performance 
This body of research attempts to establish a relationship between impression 
management in narrative corporate report sections and firm performance as reported 
in the financial accounts. It is based on the view that the management of companies 
with poor performance use the narrative annual report sections "to present 
management in as favourable light as possible [thus] creat[ing)] an impression at 
variance with an overall reading of the report" (Stanton et al. 2004: 57). 
Thus, the association between impression management and firm performance is based 
on the assumption of an information incongruity between the narrative corporate 
report sections and the financial accounts. If management has not engaged in 
impression management, the information provided by the financial accounts and the 
narrative statements on the firm's performance and prospects are consistent (assuming 
no earnings management has taken place). If, however. the information of the 
financial accounts is not consistent with the information in the narrative statements, 
we can assume that management has used the narrative statements to manipulate the 
impressions and decisions of annual report users. 
This gives rise to two possible scenarIOS In which impression management takes 
place, namely (1) the negative organizational outcomes reported In the financial 
statements are not reflected or are not strongly enough reflected In the narrative 
statements and (2) the positive organizational outcomes reported In the financial 
accounts are not reflected or are not strongly enough reflected in the narrative 
statements. The previous impression management literature solely focuses on the 
reflection of negatin~ organizational outcomes in narrative annual report documents. 
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The scenario of positive organizational outcomes reported in the financial statements 
not being reflected, or not being strongly enough reflected, in the narratiYe statements 
can occur when a company appoints a new CEO. Research on earnings management 
suggests that incoming CEOs take a 'big bath', i.e. they engage in downwards 
earnings management in the year they take over the running of the company and in 
and upward management in the following year. This is part of a strategy of managing 
expectations and setting achievable performance goals (Pourciau 1993). 
The majority of impression management studies examine the association between 
impression management and firm performance in order to discover whether there is a 
difference in the use of impression management between well-performing companies 
and badly-performing companIes. Some studies use the dichotomy of 
bankruptcy/survival as a proxy for performance. In the remainder of the studies finn 
performance is either measured in absolute or in relative terms. 
2.3.1 Reading ease manipUlation 
Studies in reading ease manipulation examme the association between reading 
difficulty and financial performance, the hypothesis being that companIes with 
negative organisational outcomes tend to obfuscate more than companIes with 
positive organisational outcomes which makes the narrative corporate report sections 
of firms with positive organisational outcomes easier to read than those with negative 
organisational outcomes. 
Jones (1988) uses the Flesch readability score to investigate the readability of a 
company's chairman's reports over a thirty-year period. The relationship between 
readability and seven independent variables is examined by means of regression 
analysis, namely 1) time, 2) operating profit/sales, 3) return on capital employed, 4) 
turnover, 5) listing status, 6) change of title from directors' report to chairman's 
report, and 7) change of chairman. Readability is judged to be low, and a negative 
correlation between readability and both turnover and time is established. As turnover 
increases and time passes, readability declines. Readability is found to be directly 
correlated with listing status. 
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Baker and Kare (1992) conduct research into the readability of US annual reports. 
They examine the relationship between the readability of the President's Letter to 
Shareholders, measured by means of the Flesch readability score, and profitability and 
company size. Results indicate that the President's Letter to Shareholders is difficult 
to read, i.e. requiring a reading level equivalent to college education. They find an 
inverse relationship between size and readability, but the association between 
readability and profitability is inconclusive. 
Smith and Taffier (1992b) test the usefulness of readability (Flesch and Lix) and 
understandability (cloze) measures for the prediction of bankruptcy. However. they 
find both readability and understandability scores to be unrelated to the profitability of 
the companies in question. 
In an experimental setting USIng student subjects, Smith and Taffler (1992a) 
investigate the relationship of the readability (Flesch and Lix) and understandability 
(cloze) of the chainnan's report and bankruptcy. They find readability to be a good 
predictor of bankruptcy, but understandability fails to successfully distinguish 
between failed and non-failed companies. This is attributed to the lack of accounting 
sophistication of the undergraduate accounting student test group. 16 
Subramanian et al. (1993) investigate the relationship between readability, measured 
by means of Flesch and Fog, and financial performance. For this purpose, they create 
a matched sample of under-perfonning and over-perfonning companies. They use a 
style analysis software program which complements the traditionally used readability 
measures with three additional components which capture style, namely a) strength, 
i.e. the strength of delivery of the document's message, which is based on simplicity 
and conciseness, b) description, i.e. the use of modifiers such as adjectives and 
adverbs, and c) jargon, i.e. the vocabulary only known by a group of people operating 
in a particular area of expertise. They find overall readability and strength to be 
16 However, it could equally be due to the lack of validity of the c/o::c procedure, which entails 
respondents completing te:'\ts which have had random \\ords deleted at regular intervals (see chapter 3, 
section 3.2 for a more detailed discussion), and is thus more likely to measure inference skills than 
comprehension. 
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directly associated with company performance. However~ they discover no significant 
difference in description and jargon between the two groups of companies. 
Courtis (1995) examines the association between the readability of Hong Kong annual 
reports (by means of Flesch, Fog, and Lix), and sector, size, and profitability, but 
none of the results are statistically significant. He also finds that readability has not 
improved significantly over time. In his critique of Courtis' (1995) article, Jones 
(1996) points out that this study provides evidence for the syntactical difficulty of 
Hong Kong annual reports rather than their understandability. He further draws 
attention to the difficulty of evaluating annual reports in a bilingual environment. 
Courtis (1998) examines the variability of readability scores within the chairman's 
report of 120 companies listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange by means of using 
the Flesch score. He hypothesises that the variability of readability scores is a 
reflection of managers trying to hide poorly articulated bad news amongst clearly 
formulated good news. He finds that all companies display statistical variability. He 
further explores the relationship between the variability of readability and both 
profitability and frequency of press coverage. Frequency of press coverage is a proxy 
for public attention, the hypothesis being that companies with a high public exposure 
obfuscate negative organisational outcomes by means of reading ease manipulation in 
order to minimise interference from investors, government and regulatory agencies. 
Consequently, Courtis' (1998) hypotheses are that companies with negative 
organisational outcomes and companies which are often cited in the press are more 
likely to hide bad news in their annual reports. He finds a significant relationship 
between variability of readability scores and companies with negative organisational 
outcomes, but not with companies often cited in the press. 
However, Clatworthy and Jones (2001), who replicate this study in the UK, fail to 
support Courtis' hypotheses. The fact that the first passage of the chairman's report is 
easier to read than the middle section and the end is attributed to thematic structure 
rather than obfuscation. In this respect, their study is unusual since it relates 
comprehension difficulty to thematic structure. However, the methodology, which 
leads to the discovery of a three-part structure with eleven main themes, is not made 
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explicit and no evidence is found for a relationship between thematic structure and 
company performance. 
Sydserff and Weetman (2002) analyze the chairman's report and manager's report of 
26 small UK investment trusts with the aim of discovering whether the narrative 
sections of well-performing and badly performing trusts show any significant 
differences in (a) Flesch readability score, (b) transitivity index, or (c) DICT/OX 
scores. Whereas the result of their analysis is mixed, the overall conclusion is that 
both the transitivity index and the DICTION scores provide "useful alternatives for 
the accounting researcher investigating impression management" (Sydserff and 
Weetman 2002: 539). 
Rutherford (2003) examines whether companies use textual complexity to obfuscate 
poor performance. Using the text length and the Flesch reading ease index to measure 
obfuscation by means of reading ease manipulation, he finds no evidence for the 
obfuscation hypothesis. 
Courtis (2004a) exammes the association between readability and variability of 
readability and financial performance, corporate age, and corporate complexity. He 
finds a weak association between reading difficulty and negative organisational 
outcomes. His overall conclusion is that "there is no systematic evidence to indicate 
that obfuscation is being used as a tool to deliberately deceive readers" (Courtis 
2004a: 308). 
The discussion of studies focusing on the association between reading difficulty and 
firm performance has shown results to be mixed and inconclusive. This can be 
attributed to two factors, a) the questionable reliability and validity of readability 
measures and b) the company-specific measures used to capture financial 
performance. For further discussion of these points see chapter three, section 3.3 and 
chapter five. section 5.2. 
2.3.2 Rhetorical manipulation 
I'homas (1997) performs a rhetorical analysis of the manager's message to 
stockholders which tests the association between rhetorical structures and 
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profitability. Her conclusion is that the manager's message to stockholders differs 
between profitable and unprofitable years. She finds negative organisational outcomes 
associated with rhetorical devices attributing blame to circumstances outside of 
management's control. Her overall conclusion is that "managers' letters suggest and 
imply, but they do not lie" (63), i.e. it is possible to read between the lines. 
Jameson (2000) also uses rhetorical analysis, in the context of US mutual funds 
explaining why returns are high in absolute and historical terms, but are low in 
relative terms by reference to benchmarks, market indices etc. Directness is one of 
three linguistic aspects he considers. Directness is where the main point is revealed at 
or towards the beginning of the business communication. He finds shareholder reports 
of mixed return mutual funds to be significantly less direct than those of top 
performing funds. 
As mentioned earlier, Sydserff and Weetman (2002) split 26 investment trusts into 
good performers and poor performers based on net asset value total return. They use 
two rhetorical analysis methodologies (Transitivity Index and DICTION). Results 
from differentiation between good and poor performers are mixed. While finding 
some evidence of impression management, they conclude that management is even 
handed in presenting narrative information. 
Yuthas et al. (2002) use DICTION to examme the association between the 
Habermasian principles of communicative action, consisting of comprehensibility, 
truth, legitimacy and sincerity, and earnings surprises. They analyze President's Letter 
to Shareholders and the Management and Discussion Analysis of seven firms \vith 
negative and seven firms with positive earnings surprises, matched in size. Their 
findings are that both companies with positive and negative earnings surprises exhibit 
a higher level of communicative action than companies without earnings surprises, 
randomly chosen from Fortune 500 companies. This seems to suggest that the 
management of companies with earnings surprises uses the narrative sections to 
emphasize its honesty and trustworthiness. 
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Davis et al. (2005) use textual analysis software (DICTION) to measure the level of 
optimistic and pessimistic language in earnings press releases, controlling for earnings 
surprises and other numerical disclosures. They test the relation between disclosures 
and future return on assets measured as the return in the four quarters after disclosure. 
They find a positive (negative) association between positive (negative) language and 
future performance. They conclude that managers use optimistic and pessimistic 
language in press releases to provide market participants with information about 
expected future financial performance. 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) analyse disclosures before new equity public offerings 
into three broad categories of disclosure: performance-related disclosures, 
management spin, and forward looking items. Management spin is measured in two 
ways: (i) significant additional detail concerning performance, and (ii) management 
quotes expanding on performance results. In addition, they take 15 different types of 
statement, and classify these into optimistic, pessimistic, and neutral. They find that 
the absolute and relative frequency of optimistic disclosures increases dramatically 
before equity public offerings, while pessimistic disclosures decrease slightly. After 
the offering the mix of tones becomes more neutral. 
2.3.3 Narrative disclosure 
Ingram and Frazier (1980) examIne the interrelationship between environmental 
performance and corporate disclosure by means of manual thematic content analysis. 
However, the results indicate only a weak association between quantitative measures 
of environmental disclosure content and environmental performance. 
Frazier et al. (1984) examine the relationship between the content of the management 
discussion and analysis (MD&A),17 performance and management controlled/owner 
controlled firms. They develop a content score by means of using a computer-assisted 
content analysis system called WORDS. No significant correlation bet\veen narrative 
content and managen1ent/ownership control is found, but a positive relationship 
bet,,'ccn content and future returns is established. 
17 In fact, the predecessor of the M D&A. namely the Management Analysis of the Results of 
Operations. 
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Tennyson et al. (1990) use the same content analysis program for examining the 
usefulness of narrative disclosures for explaining bankruptcy. The president's letter to 
shareholders and the management discussion and analysis fonn the basis of the study. 
WORDS identifies five thematic constructs for each document and assigns scores to 
each company, quantifying the importance of each theme for each finn. Subsequently, 
three issues are examined, namely a) the association between narrative content and 
bankruptcy, b) the existence of systematic differences between the disclosures in the 
two documents, and c) the additional infonnation content of narrative disclosures in 
predicting bankruptcy besides financial ratios. F or this purpose, a second 
classificatory model is created using both narrative theme scores and accounting 
ratios. The two models are subsequently compared. They find that the disclosures 
contained in the MD&A and in the president's letter are useful for bankruptcy 
prediction and enhance models based solely on financial ratios. 
Smith and Taffler's (1995) study is unique in that it compares the decision usefulness 
of accounting narratives compared to a) financial statements and b) both information 
sources presented together to annual report users, i.e. it "uses decision-makers as 
judges to determine how effectively they can make the failed/non-failed decision when 
presented with data in each of the alternative formats" (Smith and Taffler 1995: 
1196). The result is that the infonnation contained in narrative sections is a good 
predictor of corporate success or failure, but financial statements produce a better 
prediction rate. However, the two infonnation sources often contain conflicting 
information, which they conclude is due to management manipulation. 
Clatworthy and Jones (2006) examine the association between the content of the 
chairman's report and profitability. The aim of the study is to discover whether there 
is a systematic difference in reporting strategies between profitable and unprofitable 
companies as far as (1) length, (2) key financial indicators, (3) quantitative references, 
(4) personal references, (5) writing style, (6) future-orientation, and (7) focus on good 
news, is concerned. However, the rationale for selecting these particular seven factors 
and their connection with impression management is not explained. Their results 
show a significant correlation for five out of the seven factors. The two exceptions are 
\\Titing sty Ie. measured in number of passi \'e sentences, and use of key words. As far 
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as focus on good news is concerned, the findings show that both profitable and 
unprofitable companies focus on good news. 
2.3.4 Thematic manipulation 
Using key words denoting negative organisational outcomes, Abrahamson and Park 
(1994) find that the greater the decline in finn perfonnance the greater the negativity 
of the Presidents Letters to Shareholders. 
Smith and Taffler (2000) examine the association between narrative disclosures and 
bankruptcy. Their aim is to detennine whether the narrative disclosures contained in 
the Chainnan' s Report have any decision-usefulness by means of examining both the 
key words and the themes "that might together be systematically associated It'ith 
subsequent firm failure or success" (628). Both fonn-oriented and meaning oriented 
content analysis are used, the fonner based on word occurrences and the latter on 
thematic content. The results for the word based and the theme based analysis are both 
found to be highly associated with finn failure. The model proves to have the same 
degree of accuracy as financial ratio-based z-score models. 
Clatworthy and Jones (2003) examine the chainnen's narratives in the top and bottom 
performing 50 listed UK companies. They find that both performing groups 
emphasize the positive, both groups like to take credit for good news, and blame bad 
news on others. Thus, managers in both groups behave in a self-serving way. 
Rutherford (2005) examines the word frequencies of the Operating and Financial 
Reviews of 64 UK listed companies with the purpose of identifying genre rules. 
Regardless of financial perfonnance, he finds that companies are biased towards 
positive tenninology (what he calls the Pollyanna effect). He also finds that the 
Pollyanna effect is stronger in the case of poorly performing firms. 
Clatworthy and Jones (2006), who examine the association between seven factors -
one of which is focus on good ne\vs - and increasing/declining performance, find that 
both profitable and unprofitable companies focus on good ne\vs. 
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Henry (2006) examines whether investors are influenced by how press releases are 
written, rather than considering the relation between impression management and finn 
performance per se. Linguistic devices considered include tone (as measured by 
frequency of positive and negative key words), disclosure quantity (length of press 
release), numerical intensity (percentage of words versus numbers in press releases) 
and textual complexity (number of characters per word). She finds that tone is 
associated with a market reaction, with length of press release and numerical intensity 
also having an influence. 
2.3.5 Attribution of organisational outcomes 
Staw et al. (1983) find a significant association between performance explanations 
and 'good/bad news' in the form of percentage changes in stock price. Prior decreases 
in stock price are associated with defensive attributions, i.e. blaming negative 
organisational outcomes on external circumstances. What is more, both increases and 
decreases in prior stock price results in enhancement effects, which suggests that both 
positive and negative stock movements "can be a source of insecurity or provide 
reason to engage in self-serving attributions" (596). 
Aerts (1994) examines the association between performance explanation and short-
term profitability, stability of performance, size, and industry classification. He finds 
that companies are three times as likely to attribute success to company-internal than 
company-external factors. What is more, he finds that negative organizational 
outcomes are explained by means of accounting terminology, whereas positive 
organizational outcomes are explained by means of clear cause-effect statements. 
Baginski et al. (2000) and Baginski et al. (2004) examine attributions in connection 
with managerial forecasts. They investigate whether investors find managerial 
attributions credible, a perspective which is discussed further in section 2.5. Both 
papers find attributions to be more likely with bad news forecasts. They also find 
external attributions tend to be associated with bad news forecasts and internal 
attributions with good news forecasts. Further. forecasts are more likely to be 
accompanied by both external and internal attributions, followed bv c:\temal 
attributions only with forecasts containing internal attributions on their own least 
"' ' 
likelv. Bagi nski et al. (2004) consider a \\·ider range of variables and tind that 
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attributions are more likely for larger firms and bad news forecasts, and less likely for 
larger firms and longer horizon forecasts. 
Aerts (2001) examInes the association between performance explanations and 
financial performance over time. He investigates the performance explanations of 22 
Belgium companies over an eight-year period. He finds that, irrespective of financial 
performance, firms tend to focus on positive performance attributions. 
Hooghiemstra's (2001) analysis of performance explanations by US and Japanese 
managers shows no significant association between attributional behaviour and 
profitability. Managers of both profitable and unprofitable American firms attribute 
positive organizational outcomes to internal factors, i.e. attribute negative 
organisational outcomes to external factors. However, managers of profitable and 
unprofitable Japanese firms attribute negative organizational outcomes to external 
factors, but they do not show any self-enhancing tendencies, i.e. attribute positive 
organisational outcomes to internal factors. 
Clatworthy and Jones (2003) examIne the association between perfonnance 
explanations and financial performance of the top and bottom perfonning 50 listed 
UK companies. They find that irrespective of financial performance, finns focus on 
positive organizational outcomes. What is more, both managers of companies with 
improving and declining performance attribute positive organizational outcomes to 
internal factors and negative organizational outcomes to external circumstances. 
Lee et al. (2004) find that compames that made self-disserving attributions (i.e., 
internal, controllable) for negative events have higher stock prices one year later. 
Baginski et al. (2004) find attributions to be more likely for larger firms, bad news 
forecasts, maximum type forecasts and less likely in regulated industries and in longer 
horizon forecasts. What is more, attributions are associated with greater absolute and 
more negative price reactions to management forecasts. 
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2.3.6 Performance comparisons 
Schrand and Walther (2000) do not examine the use of performance comparisons by 
reference to firm financial performance/profitability. Instead they analyse the effect of 
such disclosures on share prices and they find that the likelihood of managers 
reminding investors of prior period nonrecurring events is stronger if so doing 
prevents showing a negative earnings surprise. This is discussed further in section 2.5 
on whether impression management is credible. 
Cassar (2001) finds that better performing Australian companies are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose share performance graphs in their annual reports. Performance is 
measured by share price and accumulated share investment - a different performance 
measure than in previous research. Companies are categorised as better or worse, by 
reference to a median measure for the sample for both one and five years. The relation 
between use of performance comparisons and financial performance is not tested in 
this paper. 
Short and Palmer (2003) investigate the use of performance referents by CEOs by 
means of performing content analysis on President's Letters to Shareholders of 116 
US companies. Their variables are firm size, firm age, and financial performance. 
They find CEOs of large and highly performing companies use more external 
referents (comparisons with competitors and industry averages) in their performance 
explanations than those of small and poorly performing companies. 
2.3.7 Choice of earnings number disclosed in corporate narratives 
Johnson and Schwartz (2005) find that firms that disclose pro forma earnings are less 
profitable than those that report GAAP earnings and that income increasing pro forma 
adjustments to GAAP earnings per share dominate the sample, although they find that 
some highly profitable firms make income decreasing pro forma adjustments. 
Bowen at al. (2005) find that firms emphasise metrics that portray more favourable 
firm performance. Firms with a history of prior losses place less emphasis on GAAP 
earnings, with greater relatil'c emphasis (difference in the placement of pro forma and 
GAAP earnings) on pro fornla earnings. 
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Guillamon Saorin (2006) analyses the use of selectivity (of earnings numbers and of 
keywords and statements) and emphasis (repetition, reinforcement and visual 
emphasis) by reference to firm performance. Sample companies are categorised as 
good/bad news companies depending on whether earnings are higher/lower compared 
with the previous year. She finds that good and bad news firms disclose the same 
number of positive quantitative amounts in their press releases and that good news 
companies select for disclosure in press releases significantly more profit figures from 
the income statement. 
2.4 Relationship between impression management and other firm 
characteristics 
2.4.1 Firm size 
The literature contains conflicting arguments regarding the association between 
impression management and firm size. 
Short and Palmer (2003) find a significant negative relationship between impression 
management in the form of performance referents and size. The larger the company, 
the more the narrative sections refer to external performance referents. 
Some studies argue that size is directly related to reading ease manipulation. Courtis 
(1998) views obfuscation by means of reading ease manipulation to be directly related 
to press coverage, which can be regarded as a proxy for size, by arguing that 
companies in the public eye aim "to reduce the chances of interference from 
investors, government and regulatory agencies" (462) by means of confusing their 
readership by obfuscating negative organisational outcomes. 
What is more, Jones (1988) and Rutherford (2003) also regard impression 
management in the form of obfuscation and size to be directly related by arguing that 
larger firms have more con1plex operations which results in syntactically more 
complex narratives. This hypothesis is confirmed by Jones's (1988) results. He finds 
impression management to be inversely related to size. HowcYt~r, this could be 
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attributed to the limited validity of the Flesch readability score, which is the proxy of 
impression management used in this study. 18 
2.4.2 Industry 
Disclosure studies hypothesize that industry is an important factor in explaining the 
differences in disclosure levels. However, Courtis (1995) finds no difference in the 
reading difficulty of chairman's reports between different sectors. 
2.4.3 Corporate governance factors 
Abrahamson and Park (1994) investigate the relationship between impression 
management in the form of thematic manipulation and several corporate governance 
mechanisms, including board independence, shareholding by outside directors, 
shareholding by top management, ownership, and audit opinion. They find impression 
management to be inversely associated with board independence, the presence of 
large institutional investors, and qualified audit opinion. 
2.4.4 Risk 
Courtis (1986) examines the association between the reading difficulty (Flesch and 
Fog) of randomly selected 100-word passages from the chairman's reports and 
footnotes of 142 Canadian annual reports and risk and financial performance. He finds 
no evidence for the association between low reading difficulty and low returns or high 
risk. 
Rutherford (2003) examines the relationship between impression management in the 
form of reading ease manipulation and risk. He hypothesises that due to increased 
scrutiny from debtholders, firms with higher risk (higher leverage) are more inclined 
18 However, we expect the opposite to be the case. Large finns have more funds at their disposal to 
produce annual reports which are clearly written. They have in-house PR departments which produce 
the company's annual reports or employ outside agencies to do so (Baker and Kare 1992: Courtis 
1995). For this reason, their narrative sections should contain less reading difficulty than those of small 
companies. In contrast to Court is 's argument (1998), the monitoring hypothesis states that increased 
monitoring by outside shareholders, governmental bodies, analysts, etc. decreases both the opportunity 
and the incentives for management to engage in impression management (Abrahamson and Park 1994). 
Since large finns are under more scrutiny from the public, the financial community. and from analysts, 
they have both less opportunity and incentives to engage in impression management. \\' e thus expect 
reading ease manipulation to be inversely associated with size. See chapter -t, section -t.1.2 for a more 
detailed discussion of the direction of association between impression management and finn size. 
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to obfuscate negative organisational outcomes than firms with lower risk (lower 
leverage). The findings in the paper do not support this hypothesis. 
Table 2.9 provides an overview of previous research focusing on the association 
between impression management and firm performance, categorised by the different 
types of manifestations of impression management. It lists the measurement of 
financial performance, the independent/control variables used, and results. 
2.4.5 Other factors 
Other factors examined by research are press coverage (Courtis 1998), organisational 
complexity (Rutherford (2003), corporate age (Short and Palmer 2003; Courtis 2004a) 
and listing status (Aerts 1994, 2001, 2005). Press coverage and organisational 
complexity are proxies for firm size. 
Short and Palmer (2003) find use of external performance referents to be directly 
associated with young companies. However, Courtis (2004a) find no significant 
inverse association between corporate age and reading difficulty. 
Aerts (1994) find listed companies to use more assertive performance attributions (i.e. 
attribute positive organisational outcomes to internal factors) than unlisted companies. 
However, Aerts (2005) finds no association between performance attributions and 
listing status. 
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Table 2.9: Association between impression management and firm performance (good and bad news) 
. ...::. 
Study Measurement of financial performance/performance ControUOther Results ( change variables Obfuscation of negative organisational outcomes 
Reading ease manipulation 
Adelberg (1979) Absolute change in earnings per share None Poor readability was related to poor perfonnance in the case! 
of non-standard fonnat footnotes and qualified auditors' 
reports 
Courtis (1986) Rate of return on total assets Corporate risk Poor readability was not related to poor perfonnance 
Jones (1988) Turnover; Return on capital employed; Net profit ratio Firm size Readability was not directly correlated with finn 
perfonnance 
Baker and Kare (1992) ROE; Net profit margin Firm size Poor readability is inversely related to firm size and to ROE ~ 
Smith and Taffler (1992a) Two groups based on finn survival None There was no difference in readability between finns that ' ':'1 
Smith and Taffler (1992b) Two groups based on finn survival None did/did not survive 
Subramanian et al. (1993) Two groups: Performed better (generated net profit) /worse None Narratives significantly less readable for poorly performing 
(generated net loss) group 
Courtis (1995) Return on investment (net income/total assets) Industry; Firm size No relationship was found between annual report readability 
and profitability, industry, and firm size 
Courtis (J 998) Top/bottom 30 firms based on percentage change in annual Press coverage No support for obfuscation hypothesis, as no significant 
profitability (based on profit before tax) difference in readability between top and bottom performers 
Clatworthy and Jones (2001) Top/bottom 30 firms based on percentage change in profit None No support for obfuscation hypothesis, as no significant 
before taxation difference in readability between top and bottom performers 
Sydserff and Weetman (2002) Net asset value total return None Poor readability (Flesch & transitivity) is inversely related to 
perfonnance. Results for DICTION mixed. 
Rutherford (2003) Return on capital employed; Return on equity; Profit Risk; Poorly perfonning firms do not obfuscate by us ing textual 
margin; Total operating profit positive or negative; Profit Organisational complexity 
for the year attributable to shareholders positive or complexity; 
negative; Total operating profit increased or decreased; Statutory 
Profit for the year attributable to shareholders increased or regulation 
decreased; EPS increased or decreased 
Courtis (2004a) Dummy variable - good news firm/bad news finn based on Corporate age; Only a weak association was found between reading 
increase/decrease in rate of profitability Corporate difficulty and ' bad news'. No association between reading 
complexity difficulty and corporate age and corporate complex ity 
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Table 2.9 (continued): Relation between impression management and firm performance (good and bad news) 
r---------------------------------------------------------------------------~. ~ / 
Study Measurement of financial performance/performance 
change 
Obfuscation of negative organisational outcomes (continued) 
Smith et al. (2005) Profit before tax/total assets 
ControVOther 
variables 
Performance, Size, 
Liquidity, Gearing, 
Board structure, 
PN4 status I, 
Industry 
Rhetorical manipulation 
Sydserff and Weetman (2002) Dummy variable - good performer/poor performer, based None 
Yuthas et al. (2002) 
Narrative disclosure 
Frazier et al. (1984) 
Tennyson et al. (1990) 
Smith and Tamer (1995) 
latworthy and Jones (2006) 
on short-term and long-term measures of total return on net 
asset value 
Dummy variable - Negative earnings surprise fIrms (at 20 None 
percent less than analysts' forecasts) matched against 
positive (higher than expected) earnings surprise fmns 
Dummy variable - lower growth fmnslhigher growth 
fIrms based on whether earnings (profIt before 
extraordinary items) growth over previous year's growth 
was positive or negative 
Bankruptcy/survival 
Bankruptcy/survival 
Percentage change in profit before taxation 
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Management 
control/owner 
control 
None 
None 
None 
Results 
No association is found between reading difficulty and 
fInancial performance. The readability of main board 
companies and PN4 designated companies (only second 
board) is higher than those of second board and non-PN4 
designated companies. 
Significantly higher readability score for good performers on 
only the long-term measure of return on net asset value "4-
Contrary to the obfuscation hypothesis, both groups of 
company exhibited high levels of communicative action in 
their narratives. 
A thematic analysis of narratives did not reveal that lower 
growth bad news firms misrepresented their performance. 
Thematic analysis reveals a relationship between narratives 
disclosures and financial distress . 
Narrative disclosures provide a usefu l discriminator between 
failed and survival firms. 
Profitability is directly related to the length of accounting 
narratives, to the number of key financial indicators, to the 
number of quantitative references, and to the number of 
personal references used, and inversely related to the number 
of future references used. 
Table 2.9 (continued): Relation between impression management and firm performance (good and bad news) 
Study Measurement of financial 
performance/performance change 
Obfuscation of negative organisational outcomes (continued) 
Thematic manipulation 
Abrahamson and Park (1994) Low performance measured by ROA; Decline in 
performance measured by change in ROA over 
Smith and Taffler (2000) 
latworthy and Jones (2006) 
Clatworthy and Jones (2003) 
Smith et al. (2005) 
previOUS year 
Bankruptcy/survival 
Percentage change in profit before taxation 
Dummy variable - profitable ftrms/unprofitable firms 
based on highest/lowest rank by reference to 
percentage change in profit before taxation 
Profitability - Profit before tax/total assets 
LLribulion rganisational performance 
Staw et al. (1983) Dummy variable - positive performers/negative 
performers based on EPS increase/decrease of >50% 
72 
ControVOther 
variables 
Various corporate 
governance 
variables2 
None 
None 
None 
Liquidity; Gearing; 
Size; Main/Second 
Board; Regulatory 
status; Industry 
Change in stock 
price; Stock price 
volatility; 
Institutional 
ownership; Age; 
Tenure of CEO; 
Salary of CEO 
Results 
The greater the decline in organisational performance. the 
greater the negativity in narrative disclosures. 
Discretionary narrative disclosures (keywords and themes) 
are highly discriminant in classifying firms by financial 
performance measured by ftrm failure/survival. \ 
Both profitable and unprofitable companies emphasize good 
news. 
Both profitable and unprofitable companies emphasize good 
news and attribute good news to internal and bad news to 
external factors . 
No significant relationships between readability and 
profitability were found . 
Differences in attribution of organisational performance not 
statistically significant between the two groups. 
Table 2.9 (continued): Relation between impression management and firm performance (good and bad news) 
r-------------------------------------------------------------------------------7~· / Study Measurement of financial ControVOther 
performance/performance change variables 
Attribution of organisational performance cont. 
Aerts (1994) Dummy variable - positive performance/negative Firm size 
performance based on change in performance from 
Aerts (2001) 
Hooghiemstra (200 I) 
Aerts (2005) 
Performance referents 
Short and Palmer (2003) 
previous year calculated using Net sales margin; ROA; 
ROE 
Dummy variable - positive performance/negative 
performance based on change in performance from 
previous year calculated using Net sales margin; ROA; 
ROE 
Positive/negative net income growth 
Dummy variable - positive performance / negative 
performance, based on change in ROE, change in ROA 
and change in net sales margin 
ROA 
EPS 
Listing status; 
Firm size 
None 
Listing status; Firm 
size; Profitability; 
Financial 
performance 
Stability; Leverage; 
Industry 
Firm size, 
Organisational age 
Results 
Reasoning patterns in accounting narratives are biased. 
Company management claim successes, and blame poor 
performance on external factors. 
Significant degree of consistency in accounting narratives 
over time was found. Consistently high levels of positive 
attributions were unresponsive to performance change. 
Both American and Japanese CEOs attribute positive 
outcomes to internal factors; Both American and Japanese 
CEOS explain positive and negative outcomes in causal 
language. 
No significant bias in attributional tendencies between 
positive performers and negative performers. 
CEOs of large, highly performing and young companies use 
more external performance referents than CEOs from small, 
poorly performing and established firms 
IThe Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange issued companies whose financial position was weak with Practice note NoA/200 1 to increase their pace of financial restructuring. 
" 
2 Percentage of outsiders, Percentage of shares held by outsiders, Percentage of shares held by officers, Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders, Owner control , 
Institutional investor control , Institutional investor control , Percentage of shares held by nondominant institutional shareholders, Auditor's report, Number of offers se lling shares, 
Value of shares so ld b"y officers, Number of outside directors selling shares, Value of shares sold by outside directors. 
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2.5 Reactions to impression management 
The literature points at the potentially harmful consequences of impression 
management in the form of "misinterpretation and consequent belief revisions, and 
adverse investment allocations" (Courtis 2004a: 293). This raises the question as to 
whether impression management is effective in changing the impressions of users of 
financial statements. Relatively few studies have examined the impact of impression 
management on investors' decision making processes and on the perceptions of 
investors. 
Impression management is constrained by the credibility issue. Thus. there is a limit 
to the extent to which managers can engage in impression management. If they go too 
far, the disclosures may lose credibility and be ineffective in managing impressions 
by altering investor perceptions. The question remains whether investors are mislead 
by impression management. Two approaches are taken in prior research. namely (1) 
capital market research focusing on share price reactions to narrative disclosures and 
(2) behavioural research involving laboratory experiments, mainly involving 
postgraduate students as surrogates for corporate narrative report users. 
2.5.1 Share price reactions to impression management 
Management are sensitive to the credibility issue. Bowen et al. (2005) find that firms 
were less inclined to include pro forma earnings in press releases in 2002 post-Enron 
and post-SEC cautions concerning the use of pro forma earnings. Thus. managers 
respond to the possibility that investors would view the use of pro fonna earnings as 
being opportunistic and lacking credibility. 
f\ tanagers use language to proyide information to the investors. The market responds 
to these disclosures suggesting they are perceived as being credible. The role 
languag~ plays in the perceptions of users has also been studied. 
Staw et al. (1983) is the first to study the effect of impression management on 
in\'~stors by nleans of examining the association between impression management 
and stock pric~s. In particular. they in\,estigate the association between perfonnance 
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attributions in president's letters to shareholders of 81 US companies, including both 
well-performing and badly-performing compames (measured In terms of 
decrease/increase of at least 50 percent in earnings per share. and share price 
changes). They find self-serving attributions (i.e. the attribution of positive 
organisational outcomes to internal factors) to be associated with subsequent 
improvements in share price, irrespective of the financial performance of the 
company. This is taken as evidence that "self-serving attributions appear ( ... ) to be 
convincing to the investing public" (582). This suggests that impression management 
is effective. 
Hoskin et al. (1986) study qualitative comments of company officers made in 
earnings announcement press releases. These qualitative comments are categorised as 
good news, bad news and neutral. They find that prospective officer comments have 
information content for investors in that they are significantly related to stock returns, 
suggesting they are credible and informative, even though not subject to audit. 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) test whether increased disclosures prior to new equity 
public offerings are mere hyping of the stock or whether there is a positive price 
reaction to the additional disclosures. They find that firms with significantly increased 
disclosure suffer greater negative returns at the announcement of the new share 
offering, which suggests that the market views such increased disclosure as ·'hype·'. 
Francis et al. (2002) explain increased share price reactions over time to earnings 
announcements as being due to the increased disclosures over time included in those 
announcements. They conclude that several types of concurrent disclosures contribute 
materially to investors' responses to earnings announcement press releases, including 
disclosure of officers' comments. Hutton et al. (2003) examine "soft talk" 
supplementary disclosures and veritiable forward-looking statements and they find 
that vcrifiable forward-looking statements add credibility to management forecasts. 
Baginski et al. (2000) question whether investors vIew management attributions 
accompanying management forecasts as credible. They find that investors react to 
these disclosures as being credible. and that attributions enhance the stock market 
reaction to earnings surprises. The price reaction undermines the notion that the 
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attributions purely reflect management bias and are therefore not credible. BaQinski et 
'-
al. (2004) conduct a similar study, but control for factors other than the attributions 
that might affect the share price reaction. They find that attributions are credible to the 
market, in that they are associated with higher absolute share price reactions. more 
negative share price reactions (controlling for forecast news) and greater share price 
reactions per dollar of unexpected earnings. However. they find that the 
informativeness of attributions is limited to external more verifiable attributions. 
Johnson and Schwartz (2005) observe that managers must believe that use of pro 
forma earnings will succeed in changing investor perceptions and that managers will 
suffer no penalty for engaging in such impression management. They use a more 
direct test of market reactions, based on a sample of firms that did/did not disclose a 
pro forma earnings number. While they find that pro forma earnings firms are priced 
higher, this higher pricing is not related to the pro forma earnings per se suggesting 
that investors are not mislead by pro forma earnings. 
The market reacts not only to narrative disclosures, but also to the presentational 
techniques adopted, such as emphasis by use of a benchmark or by the prominence of 
the positioning of the disclosure. Schrand and Walther (2000) find that investors are 
influenced by managers' strategic use of prior period benchmarks to report favourable 
increases in earnings. They conclude that managers must assume that investors are 
irrational in that they do not use publicly available information and are taken in by the 
use of the carefully chosen benchmark. Bowen et al. (2005) find that the stock market 
response to pro fonna earnings is greater with higher levels of emphasis. The 
incremental infonnation content of pro forma earnmgs increases as the relative 
emphasis on the pro fonna number increases. 
2.5.2 Behavioural research and impression management 
Using an experiment, Beattie and Jones (2002) examine the effects of distortions in 
graphs on decision-making. They tind that perceptions of financial statement users 
(represented by 52 second year business students) are. as a rule of thumb. affected by 
distortions in graphs of more than 10 percent. Users with lower levels of financial 
knowledge are more likely to be misled by distortions in graphs. Students with higher 
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levels of declared financial understanding are associated with greater accuracy in 
interpreting differences in corporate performance portrayed graphically. 
Stanton et al. (2004) investigate investor behaviour by means of an experimental 
study. They examine whether the impression of performance varies according to (1) 
access to information (narrative sections as opposed to full annual report) and (2) 
financial expertise of respondents (marketing students as opposed to accounting 
students). No significant differences are found. Their results suggest that management 
is not successful in manipulating the perceptions of annual report users through 
narrative sections. However, since they do not use real investors in their experimental 
study, their results have only limited significance. There is evidence from other 
disciplines (notably marketing and politics) that impression management is effective. 
i.e., that intended audiences alter their decisions as a response to impression 
management. Huang (2003: 25) cites empirical marketing evidence and consumer 
behavioural studies of companies manipulating consumer perceptions of risk. 
In experimental studies USIng MBA students Elliott (2006) and Fredrickson and 
Miller (2004) find that unsophisticated investors (MBA students) assign too high a 
share price to pro forma earnings numbers in press releases. whereas the judgements 
of sophisticated investors (financial analysts') were unaffected. The unsophisticated 
investors perceived the earnings announcement to be more favourable which 
Fredrickson and Miller (2004) describe as being due to unintentional cognitive 
effects. 
In an experimental setting, Krische (2005) confirms Schrand and Walther's (2000) 
conclusions. She finds that investors adjust for prior-period events when clear 
quantitative descriptions are present, but not when descriptions are absent even 
though investors have previously been made aware of the information. The disclosure 
concerning prior period events influences their judgment of current period 
performance. 
Barton and Mercer (2005) question \yhether managerial self-sen'jng disclosures are 
credihle and enhance capital market participants' perceptions of management ability 
and finll prospects. In an experimental s~tting, they test analysts' reactions to 
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plausible and to implausible explanations/attributions of poor performance. They tind 
that plausible explanations of poor performance are associated with higher analysts' 
forecasts of earnings. However, more plausible disclosures are not sufficient to 
improve the reputations of managers of poorly performing firms with the analysts. 
Mercer (2005) finds that managerial forthcomingness (accuracy, completeness and 
timeliness of disclosure) has a positive effect on management credibility but this 
cognitive reaction by investors is only a short term effect. 
2.6 Corporate finance and impression management 
Section 2.1 of the current study has indicated that the majority of impression 
management studies are either explicitly or implicitly based on agency theory 
assumptions of managerial and investor behaviour (Smith and Taffler 1992b, 2000; 
Abrahamson and Park 1994; Courtis 2004b; Courtis 1995; Hooghiemstra 2000.2001; 
Godfrey et al. 2003; Rutherford 2003; Courtis 2004a, b; Aerts 2005). 
Abrahamson and Park (1994) explicitly base their research on agency theory, arguing 
that in a public company context, conflicts of interest specifically arise when 
managers have to explain negative organisational outcomes to shareholders. The 
manipulation of reading ease is highlighted by Courtis (1996) as a potentially 
interesting way of testing agency and signalling theories. According to Courtis 
(2004a), the tendency to obfuscate is dampened by the potential for such obfuscation 
to adversely affect agency costs such as cost of capital and management reputation. In 
his study of impression management using colour, and whether colour is used to 
highlight good news and mask bad news, Courtis (2004b) indicates that the question 
is prompted by agency theory which argues that management seeks to act in its own 
self interests. In introducing their hypotheses, Smith and Taffler (2000) refer to 
agency and signalling theories. Within an agency theory setting, Hoogiemicstra 
C~OOl) predicts the use of impression management in the context of self serving 
behaviour. Rutherford (2003) states that the obfuscation hypothesis is derived from 
agency and signalling theory, whereby managers have economic incentiy('s to convey 
messages about good performance more clearly than bad performance. Godfrey et al. 
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(2003) use agency theory as the theoretical foundation of their research. in relation to 
the opportunistic self-interested incentives for CEOs to manage accounting 
information. In the context of fines on investment banks for impression management 
in client reports, Davidson et al. (2004) link agency theory and impression 
management by arguing that impression management may constitute an agency cost. 
if it is detrimental to shareholders. They suggest that impression management results 
from agency problems in the sense that managers do not operate the company in the 
shareholders' best interests. Aerts (2005) also refers to agency theory as appropriate 
to his study, pointing to the context-specific importance of information in a financial 
reporting downturn. 
2.6.1 Impression management and traditional finance theory 
Agency theory, which is rooted in traditional finance theory, IS based on the 
assumption of principals and agents as rational participants. This means that investors 
can take for granted that managers act in their self-interest, rationally responding to 
incentives shaped by compensation contracts, the market for corporate controL and 
other corporate governance mechanisms. Also, managers can take for granted that 
capital markets are efficient, with prices reflecting public information about 
fundamental values. In such a scenario, there is no room for impression management 
in the way it has been conceptualised by the previous literature. In an efficient capital 
market setting with share prices reflecting all publicly available information l9 , 
rational managers would not engage in impression management in the first place, 
since they would recognise the futility of manipulating rational investors' perceptions 
of firm performance. 
What is more, in traditional finance theory market prices are assumed to be set by 
professional investors. Due to their experience, professional investors are assumed to 
be less susceptible to managerial impression management attempts than individual 
investors. This means that any inefficiencies created by small, inexperienced investors 
whose perceptions and decisions regarding firm performance and prospects are being 
influenced hy managerial impression management, are priced away. Thus, under 
19 Based on the assumption of semi-strong market efficiency which underlies the majority of capital 
markets research in accounting. 
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traditional finance theory assumptions impression management does not han: an 
impact on market prices and is therefore not effective. 
The only function of impression management under traditional finance theory 
assumptions would be that of a corporate reporting ritual akin to the English greeting 
How are you? which does not necessitate a comprehensive response. In this case. 
management does not believe that their portrayal of organizational outcomes has any 
effect on investor behaviour, but they nevertheless introduce reporting bias into their 
account of organizational activities and outcomes as a way of putting 'gloss' on 
financial information. Observers of corporate activities, who subscribe to this view of 
managerial behaviour and belief systems, regard reporting bias as 'executive 
hyperbole' which constitutes "an irritating inefficiency in the financial system, 1rhich 
professional investors long ago learned how to tune out" (Guardian. 17 April 2004: 
27). Thus, under traditional finance theory assumptions, evidence of impression 
management has to be interpreted as mere corporate reporting ritual without any 
consequences for either party?O 
For researchers operating under a traditional finance model with assumptions of 
rational managers and rational investors, impression management is not an issue, 
since any reporting bias in publicly issued statements constitutes part of the corporate 
reporting ritual. It is mere executive hyperbole with no capital market consequences. 
However, despite incorporating impression management in a traditional finance 
framework, previous accounting research nevertheless does not subscribe to the view 
of impression management as a mere public relations exercise. In fact. the potentially 
harmful consequences of impression management in the form of "misinterpretation 
and consequent belief revisions, and adverse investment allocations" (Courtis 2004a: 
293) are explicitly identified. These views obviously conflict with assumptions of 
market efficiency inherent in a traditional finance framework of which agency theory 
IS part. 
10 Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005: S) put forward a similar argumL'nt when discussing persuasion in 
financL'. They state that "in the traditional theory ... consumers do no! take the if?f()rmaliol1lhey rt'ceil't' 
at 'face-value '''. 
so 
Research from behavioural finance suggests that impression management can have 
real economic consequences in the form of capital misallocations, since (1) less 
experienced investors are able to influence market prices (Shleifer 2000) (2) investors 
are not a fixed group (Huang 2004), and (3) even experienced professional investors 
are susceptible to systematic biases in their cognitive processing of information 
resulting from specific presentation formats (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). 
Further, research from "moody investing' (Huang 2004) suggests that investors are 
susceptible to affective biases which playa substantial role in managerial impression 
management attempts. 
2.6.2 Impression management and behavioural finance theory 
Traditional finance theories, such as the efficient markets hypothesis, have been 
questioned because of price behaviour anomalies inconsistent with these theories (see 
Daniel et aI., 1998; Lee 2001; and Shiller 2003~ for a discussion of these anomalies). 
These anomalies, and share price behaviours identified in the 1970s and 1980s, 
suggest that the assumptions of the efficient markets hypothesis are not reflected in 
practice in share price behaviour. 
Prospect theory, which was developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), is central to 
behavioural finance. It seeks to explain how individuals make decisions when faced 
with uncertainty.21 It focuses on a number of violations of classical rationality 
uncovered in empirical work. In numerous experiments they prove that the day-to-day 
reality of decision makers varies from the assumptions held by economists. 
Whereas traditional economic theory argues that individuals are highly rational utility 
maximisers who compute the likely effect of any action on their total wealth and 
choose accordingly, prospect theory is based on the assumption that people have 
cognitive capacity limitations and so must simplit~, some of the complex problems 
they confront. Thus, unlike expected utility theory. which is concerned \\'ith how 
dt'cisions under uncertainty should be made. prospect theory focuses on ho\\ 
decisions are actuall y made. 
21 ProsPL'C( theory claims that individuals define outcom,es in tams of gains and losses, with the losses 
having a more important impact on their welfare than gains, 
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Prospect theory suggests that the way information is presented (i.e. information 
format) affects the way investors process the information (Tversky and Kahneman 
1986). Since managerial impression management involves manipulating the 
presentation of information by means of introducing bias and selectivity (see section 
2.2.5), investors are unable to "process the messages they receive following Bayesian 
logic" (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005: 6) and thus may be susceptible to impression 
management. Daniel et al. (2004) discuss investor credulity resulting from a 
combination of limited cognitive ability and overconfidence. 
2.6.3 Impression management and 'moody investing' 
Social psychology and economics have put forward several theoretical approaches 
incorporating emotion into decision-making under risk or uncertainty. Huang's (2004) 
theory of 'moody investing' focuses on the emotional component of investor 
behaviour and thus introduces an extra dimension into finance theory.22 Huang (2003) 
argues that investor behaviour cannot be fully explained by means of either traditional 
or behavioural finance since both focus on the cognitive aspects of investor 
behaviour. Nofsinger (2005: 144) argues that the economy has to be regarded as a 
complex system of human interactions which is driven not only by what economic 
participants think, but also by what they feel. Mercer (2005) draws on an affect-based 
model of financial decision-making to demonstrate that in the long-term, investor 
decisions are driven by emotional, rather than cognitive reactions to news disclosure. 
While traditional finance theory postulates that investors unemotionally maximise 
expected utility functions (expected utility theory), behavioural finance "onl), 
considers emotions to explain why some investors utilize cognith'e biases and 
heuristics" (Huang 2003: 4). However, since impression management in the context 
of corporate reporting entails "an organization or its representatives act[ing] as 
gatekeepers of information and, in doing so, affect[ing] an audience's attitudes, 
opinions and, ultimate/}', behaviour" (Fisk and Grove 1996: 7), it involves both 
cognitive and affective components (Gardner and Martinko 1988: 322) by means of 
eliciting both a cognitin~ and an emotional response. 
22 He cites the dol. com stock bubble as an example of 'moody investing', 
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Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005: 6) argue that persuasive messages elicit both 
cognitive and emotional responses, resulting in "'people often ignor[ing] relevant data 
and ... not process[ing] the messages they receive following Bayesian logic". They 
state that effective persuasion either involves conveying ""incomplete and even 
misleading information" or '"irrelevant information that arouses an emotionally 
favourable response" (6). 
Pixley (2002) argues that emotion is routinely and rationally employed in financial 
decision-making. McGregor et al. (2000, 2002) and Dreman (2004) show that the 
investor decision-making process is not only driven by the quality of securities' 
underlying technical fundamentals, but also by affective evaluation. McGregor et al. 
(2000, 2002) find that affective evaluation is based on the image associated with a 
particular company. In particular, McGregor et al. (2002) find image evaluations to be 
correlated with financial judgments. Firms can exploit this association to their 
advantage by means of impression management. It involves pro-actively manipulating 
their image and thus the perceptions of firm performance and prospects. 
The fact that the message is conveyed by means of language makes narrative 
corporate report sections an ideal medium for conveymg emotion and thus of 
influence. McGregor (2002: 20) points out that "language is an extremely good 
carrier of emotion. This may be one of the areas where people are perhaps leas! 
aware of the extent to which they are influenced by the linguistic imagery that 
pervades their information environment." 
Impression management in a corporate reporting context thus needs to be explained 
by a framework which takes account of both cognitive and emotional components in 
the communication between management and company outsiders. Huang's (2004) 
theory of 'moody investing' incorporates emotional components into the financial 
reporting process by assuming that investment decisions are partly driyen by 
emotions. He argues that statements issued by companies do not only carry a 
cognitive. but also an affective component. This means that these statements ha\'e an 
impact on investor moods and thus lead to 'moody investing' by some investors, i.e. 
"[rlrey] il?tluellc(' the decisions hy some illl'L's{Ors" (35). Impression management can 
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thus be regarded as introducing both cognitive and affective bias into statements 
issued by companies whose aim is to influence investor perceptions and decisions. 
Huang (2004) refers to this affective component aimed at influencing inYestor 
behaviour as 'puffery'. 'Puffery' refers to statements issued by companies which are 
"vague, promotional, or hyperbolic" (17). He distinguishes between puffery which 
entails vague statements, such as "we are bullish on this company's future prospects" 
(19), and puffery which induces "false implied meanings that are thus decepth'e, 
misleading, and can be disproved" (19).23 
The existence of both types of 'puffery' in narrative corporate report sections has 
been confirmed both by accounting research and by anecdotal evidence in the context 
of impression management. The first type entails managerial attempts to . gild the lily' 
(Guardian, April 17, 2004, p. 27) or to 'enhance the story·24 (Courtis 2004a: 293) 
when reporting on financial performance. The second type involves the 
misrepresentation of firm performance and prospects (Godfrey et al. 2003).25 Huang 
(2004: 19) argues that puffery - and thus impression management - can have serious 
implications in the form of capital misallocations, due to its ability to "engender or 
generate implied meanings, not only cognitively, but also emotionally". 
However, it has been argued that investors see through promotional or hyperbolic 
statements issued by companies: 
Professional investors long ago learned how to tune out executive hyperbole and root around 
in the smalI print of financial statements to dig out the issues that are really keeping chief 
executives awake at night. While companies and investors know how the system works and 
23 Huang (2004: 19) argues that only the second type of puffery should be legally actionable, since the 
first type "is unlikely to induce any false implied meanings that directly affect investors' beliefs 
concerning that company's securities." 
24 In this context it is interesting to note that in their interpretation of corporate reporting by means of 
structural poetics Crowther et al. (2005: 25) also use the analogy of corporate reporting as story-telling. 
Management are the 'authors' of narrative corporate report sections which represent 'the script of 
Corporate reporting'. In their framework impression management thus constitutes the attempt on the 
part of the authors of the script of corporate reporting "10 control the H'(~l' in which the corporate story 
is i III a{7" L'I t' d .. 
25 l'ourtis (2004a: 306) differentiates between 'harmless' or 'non-malicious' and 'harmful' or 
'malicious' impression management. \Vhereas "a non-malicious approach seeks 10 put the besl 
rhetorical polish or 'spin' 011 the story-telling, (malicious impression management) '" seeks 10 decei\'e 
hy misrepresenting the true state of ailairs and this can lead to unwarranted belief rel'isions and 
Lld\'ust! allocation decisions." 
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the standard ways of bending it to their respective ends, the language of communication does 
constitute an irritating inefficiency in the financial system. (Guardian, 17 April 2004: 27) 
Conversely, Huang (2004: 19) states that "such a response ignores the fact that 
investors are not a fixed group, but instead consist of an ever-changing pool of 
investors, who as they become older and wiser are replaced by a new cohort still wet 
behind the ears and ready to be misled emotionally". What is more, Pixley (2002: 45) 
claims that the distinction made by Shiller (2005) between rational systematic traders 
and investors acting on 'irrational' emotional exuberance or panic cannot be made, 
but that emotions play some part in fostering the 'rational' decision-making process of 
all investors. 
Nofsinger (2005: 145) claims that communication in financial markets involyes not 
only conveying information, but also emotion and mood. Thus, "the cues we obtain 
from others influence our own opinions." We therefore argue that impression 
management in a corporate reporting context involves taking advantage of the 
emotional component of communication and using it to influence investor decisions. 
Impression management in a corporate reporting context entails rational managers 
introducing both cognitive and emotional bias into the information about firm 
performance and prospects in order to manipulate the decisions of irrational investors. 
2.6.4 Analysis of impression management under different finance theories 
Impression management research thus only becomes an issue for researchers 
subscribing to the behavioural finance model or to any of the theories underlying 
. moody investing'. Behavioural finance assumes that either investor or managerial 
behaviour, or both, is less than fully rational. 
,\Ianagerial behaviour 
Research on managerial behaviour raises two questions, depending on the 
assumptions of managerial rationality/irrationality. If managers are assumed to be 
rational, the investigation focuses merely on the issue of whether managers attempt to 
manipulate investor perceptions of firm performance and prospects. It entails 
investigating the presence/absence of impression management by means of analysing 
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public information issued by management, such as press releases, prospectuses. and 
annual reports. 
The majority of previous studies fall into this category, despite subscribing to agency 
theory assumptions of managerial and investor behaviour. Various narrative corporate 
report sections, including the chairman's report (Jones 1988: Smith and Taffler 1992a, 
1992b, 1995, 2000; Clatworthy and Jones 2006, 2001 b; Sydserff and Weetman 2002: 
Courtis 1986, 1998), the Operating and Financial Review (Sydserff and Weetman 
1999; Rutherford 2003), the President's Letter to Shareholders (Tennyson et al. 1990; 
Subramanian et al. 1993; Abrahamson and Park 1994; Abrahamson and Amir 1996; 
Thomas 1997; Yuthas 2002; Short and Palmer 2003); the Management Discussion 
and Analysis (Frazier et al. 1984; Tennyson et al. 1990; Yuthas et al. 2002) are 
analysed for evidence of impression management. 
However, impression management can also occur in the context of irrational 
managerial behaviour. This entails behaviour that departs from rational expectations 
and expected managerial utility maximisation. If managers are irrational, they may 
display behavioural biases, such as optimism and overconfidence. This assumption of 
managerial optimism is widespread in research in explaining the motives for mergers 
(hubris), but has not been adopted in explaining the reporting bias inherent in 
narrative annual report documents. 
If managers are regarded as irrational participants in the financial reporting process, 
then their tendency towards reporting bias could be the result of management not only 
deceiving others about firm performance and prospects, but also themselves. In this 
case, management is biased towards its own performance. This is referred to as ego-
centric bias or self-deception (Barrick and Mount 1996) in the social psychology 
literature which differentiates clearly between self-deception and impression 
management. Whereas the former is "a dispositional tendency to think afoneself in a 
/hvourablc light", the latter constitutes "a deliberate attempt to distort one's 
responses in order to creafe ajarollrable impression lrith others" (Barrick and i\lount 
1996: 262). Thus, in a setting of irrational managers, evidence of impression 
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management can be interpreted as managerial self-deception due to optimism and 
overconfidence.26 
If managers are assumed to be irrational, the investigation focuses on the issue 
whether the reporting bias in publicly issued statements constitutes impression 
management or managerial optimism and overconfidence resulting in ego-centric 
bias/self-deception. Three studies (Staw et al. 1983; Abrahamson and Park 1994: Fiol 
1995) focus on this issue, employing two different research strategies. Staw et al. 
(1983) and Abrahamson and Park (1994) find impression management in narrative 
corporate report sections to be related to subsequent selling of stock by corporate 
officers. This indicates that impression management does not constitute a genuine 
expression of corporate optimism, but a deliberate intent on the part of management to 
deceive investors. Fiol (1995) compares company executives' private and public 
statements. They are shown to differ as far as their positive and negative attributions 
for events are concerned. The preparation of external documents, such as the 
president's letter to shareholders involves the addition or deletion of evaluative 
statements "as part of a strategy of impression management for external 
constituencies" (534) which results in the attribution of positive outcomes to internal 
factors and of negative outcomes to external factors. 
However. previous research (Fiol 1995; Staw et al. 1983; Abrahamson and Park 1994) 
does not support the explanation of impression management as a result of irrational 
management behaviour. Evidence in the form of subsequent selling of stock by 
management (Staw et al. 1983; Abrahamson and Park 1994) and differences in 
management's private and public statements regarding positive and negatin~ 
attributions for events (Fiol 1995) suggests that the upbeat message inherent in 
narrative corporate report sections is not due to genuine optimism, but to a desire to 
manipulate investor perceptions of firm performance and prospects. This provides 
26 Dependino on the assumptions of investor rationality/irrationality. ego-centric bias or self-deception 
can have d~ferent consequences. If investors are assumed to be irrationa.1. thei~ reaction. to self-
deception is exact h the same as to impression management. i.e. their perceptions ot firm pertormanc.e. 
and prospects are 'manipulakd. resulting in adverse selection and capita.1 mi~allocatio~. Howe\ ~r. It 
investors are assumed to be rational. they are not influenced by the reportmg bias resultmg from either 
imprl'ssion management or ego-centric bias/self-deception. 
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evidence for the assumption of impression management as a result of rational 
managerial behaviour aimed at misleading investors. 
Investor behaviour 
If investors behave irrationally, then security prices can be either too high or too 10\\". 
DeLong et al. (1990) refer to unwarranted investor expectations of assets returns as 
'investor sentiment'. Shiller (2003) refers to certain impression management 
techniques as capable of generating a feedback effect. Feedback effects arise when 
some investors experience success with a stock, which attracts further investors. This 
effect can result in a speculative bubble. Impression management. he suggests, can 
lead to such speculative share price bubbles. In an unusual paper, Skoubic and 
McGoun (2002) tie together the notions of individual behaviour, images and 
investments. They conclude that although investors may be rational, quasi-rational. 
boundedly rational or irrational, they are not logical (for example, their decision 
processes cannot be modelled by computers). Alan Greenspan, the former chairman 
of the US Federal Reserve Board, coined the term 'irrational exuberance' to describe 
the irrational investor behaviour leading to the overvalued stock market in 1996. The 
phrase has even become the title of a New York Times bestselling book (Shiller 2005). 
Impression management is not an issue under the assumption of investor rationality. 
since rational investors are not swayed by managerial attempts to influence their 
perceptions of firm performance or prospects. However, under the assumption of 
investor irrationality. research focuses on investor reaction to managerial attempts at 
impression management. Thus, research focuses the question whether the 
manipulation of perceptions results in "misinterpretation and consequent belief 
revisions, and adverse investment allocations" (Courtis 2004a: 293). This entails 
testing the effect of impression management on investors by means of experimental 
studies involving various investor groups, such as institutional investors, or studying 
stock price reactions to impression management. See section 2.5 for a discussion of 
research dealing \vith investor reactions to impression management. 
In a scenano of irrational investors. rational managers make decisions that may 
encouragc the mispricing of securities. Rational managers aim to maximise the 
CUITent share price of the firm's securities. Impression management. i.e. manipulating 
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the perceptions of firm performance and prospects, represents one way of achieving 
this goal. Thus, in a setting of rational managers and irrational investors, evidence of 
impression management can be interpreted as managerial manipulation of investors' 
perceptions of firm performance and prospects in order to influence investment 
d .. 27 eClSlons. 
27 Traditionally investors have been viewed as a homogenous group. It is not nec~ssary. to assume that 
all investors are irrational. More recently finance theories distinguish ~etween rat~on~l.mves~ors (more 
likely to be institutional investors) and irrational no~se traders (~ore hkely to be mdlvldual mvestors), 
and recognise differences of opinion and heterogeneity amongst mvestors. 
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Table 2.10: Finance theories and impression management 
Theory 
Assumptions of human 
behaviour 
Focus 
Managers 
Investors 
Implications for impression 
management 
Interpretation of reporting 
bias 
Investor response to 
impression management 
Interpretation of investor 
reaction 
Capital market implications 
Traditional finance 
• Expected utility theory 
• Agency theory 
Cognitive 
CAPM 
Assumed to be rational 
Assumed to be rational 
a) Impression management 
does not exist 
b) Impression management 
as corporate ritual 
'Executive hyperbole' 
Rational response - no 
reaction to biased info 
No response 
Efficient - Impression 
management has no impact 
on asset pricing 
Behavioural finance 
• Prospect theory 
Cognitive 
Explanation of observed 'anomalies' in asset pricing by 
means of cognitive limitations 
a) Assumed to be rational 
a) Assumed to be irrational 
Impression management as 
manipulation of investor 
perceptions of firm 
performance and prospects 
Impression management 
Irrational response - biased 
info is acted upon 
'Irrational exuberance' or 
'investor sentiment' 
Inefficient - Impression 
management can lead to 
mispricing of assets 
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b) Assumed to be irrational 
b) Assumed to be rational 
Managers are optimistic and 
overconfident about firm 
performance 
Ego-centric bias/self-
deception 
Rational response - no 
reaction to biased info 
No response 
Efficient - Impression 
management has no impact 
on asset pricing 
'Moody investing' 
• Psychological expected 
utility theory 
Emotional 
Explanation of observed 
'anomalies' in asset pricing 
by means of emotional 
limitations 
Assumed to be rational 
Assumed to be emotional 
Managers manipulate 
outsiders' perceptions of firm 
performance and prospects 
by means of emotive form 
and content 
Impression management 
Emotional response - biased 
info is acted upon 
'Moody investing' 
Inefficient - Impression 
management can lead to 
mispricing of assets 
The previous discussion has shown that impression management as described in the 
previous literature, namely as the manipulation of outsiders' perceptions of finn 
performance and prospects, only makes sense in a behavioural finance,"moody 
investing' framework under the assumptions of managerial rationality and investor 
irrationality (see Table 2.10). Although it is impossible to attribute the 
misrepresentation of financial information in narrative corporate report sections of 
individual companies to impression management or self-deception, preyious research 
findings suggest that the resulting reporting bias is a consequence of deliberate 
investor manipulation by rational managers. 
We thus argue that impression management entails a scenario of rational managers 
exploiting irrational investor behaviour by means of introducing not only cognitiYe, 
but also affective bias to the form and content of infonnation provided. We can thus 
extend the impression management model introduced in Figure 2.1 (section 2.1) by 
adding both cognitive and emotional components to the communication process 
involved in corporate reporting. 
Figure 2.5: Impression management as introducing both cognitive and emotional bias into 
information content 
Medium: 
Annual report 
Impression 
management: 
Cognitive and 
affective bias 
, 
Sender: Message: Receivers: 
Management .. po Information • Company outsiders 
about firm 
performance 
and prospects 
Figure 2.5 illustrates communication in a corporate reporting context. It inyoh'es the 
exchange of infom1ation bet\\'ecn management (sender) and outside parties 
(recei\'crs). including shareholders and stakeholders. such as customers. cmployce~. 
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and the government. Information about the company's performance and prospects 
(message) is conveyed to company outsiders via various media, such as press releases, 
shareholder meetings, and the annual report. The channels involved are print (for 
written documents), airwaves (for spoken communication) and light \\"ayes (for 
images). Impression management involves exploiting the emotional components of 
communication by means of introducing not only cognitive, but also affectiye bias 
into the message conveyed by corporate communication documents. 
This study proposes a behavioural finance/'moody investing' model of impression 
management, in which impression management is conceptualised as the managerial 
attempt to influence investor perceptions and decisions by means of introducing both 
cognitive and affective bias into corporate narrative documents. 
However, the focus of this study is solely on finding evidence of impression 
management in corporate narrative documents and in detennining which particular 
circumstances give rise to this phenomenon. It is based on the assumption that rational 
managers attempt to exploit irrational investor behaviour by means of introducing 
cognitive and emotional bias into publicly issued statements. We thus do not assume 
that managers act irrationally in the sense that they engage in self-deception in the 
form of managerial optimism or hubris. It is further assumed that managers, on 
average, know which impression management strategies and techniques are effective. 
Finally, the effectiveness of impression management is not considered empirically 
since it is difficult to differentiate the effect of impression management from 'the 
noise' of new information entering the marketplace. This is especially the case for 
impression management in annual reports, which fonn the basis of investigation in 
this study, since the majority of infonnation contained in them is in the marketplace 
long before the annual report is released to the public. 
2.7 Social psychology and impression management 
rhis section discusses psychology theories explaining the impression management 
behaviour of managers. In particular. we focus on psychology theories proyiding 
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insights into what constitutes impression management, which circumstances prompt 
impression management, which impression management tactics are used, and ho\\· 
impression management manifests itself. 
2.7.1 Social psychology concept of impression management 
As discussed in section 2.l, based on Schlenker's definition (website). impression 
management in the context of corporate reporting constitutes an actiyity aimed at 
influencing others' impressions of persons, such as managers, the CEO, and the 
chairman, an object, i.e. the organization as a whole, an event, such as firm 
performance (financial performance, environmental performance. ethical 
performance, etc.), privatization, demutualization, merger or acquisition. and an idea, 
such as profit as the only legitimate measure of corporate success. 
However, preVIOUS studies have almost exclusively focused on one aspect of 
impression management, namely the manipulation of perceptions of firm 
performance. These have been discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
There are no studies focusing on impression management as influencing others' 
impressions of individuals responsible for running an organization and as influencing 
others' impressions of an idea. White and Hanson (2002) analyze impression 
management as the manipulation of outsiders' perceptions of the entire organization 
by means of studying the annual reports of Amcor, an Australian-based multinational 
forestry and manufacturing company, over a thirty year period. Ogden and Clarke 
(2005) analyze impression management as the manipulation of outsiders' perceptions 
of an event, namely the privatization of UK water companies and their subsequent 
legitimization attempts. 
2.7.2 Impression motivation and construction 
Leary and Kowalski (1990) argue that impression management consists of two 
different processes, namely impression motivation and impression construction. 
Impression motivation is concerned with the circumstances which motivate 
individuals to engage in impression management. Impression construction entails 
"choosing Ihe kind of imprcssion 10 create" and "deciding hOlt' [to] go aholll doing 
so .. (Leary and Kowalski 1990: 35-36). 
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The pnmary objective of individuals to engage in impression management is to 
maXImIze expected rewards and to minimize expected punishments. Leary and 
~ 
Kowalski (1990) list three reasons individuals are driven to manage others' 
impressions, namely (1) in order to maximize social and material outcomes, (2) to 
maintain and enhance their self-esteem, and (3) to create identity. The maximization 
of social outcomes involves gaining others' approval or obtaining power over others. 
The maximization of material outcomes entails rises in salary. bonuses, better 
working conditions, and promotion. Maintenance and enhancement of self-esteem is 
directed at eliciting self-esteem enhancing reactions, such as praise and compliments. 
particularly in situations entailing feedback on performance or behaviour. Impression 
management for identity-creation purposes involves individuals "indicat[ing)] the 
possession of identity-relevant characteristics" (38), such as behaving in a way 
perceived to be fitting with one's particular social role. 
All three motivations are potentially relevant in a corporate reporting context. The 
maximization of social and material outcomes provides psychological validity to 
agency theory explanations of managerial motivation to engage in impression 
management, i.e. in order to maximize benefits both in terms of compensation and 
reputation. To date there is no research on the role of self-esteem maintenance and 
identity creation regarding the impression management behaviour of managers in a 
corporate reporting context. 
Leary and Kowalski (1990) note that the strength of people's motivation to engage in 
impression management is dependent on three factors, namely (1) the goal-relevance 
of the impressions, (2) the value of the desired outcomes, and (3) the discrepancy 
between one' s desired and current social image. 
Individuals are motivated to engage in impression management. if it is relevant to 
achicving one or several of the three goals previously discussed (i.e. the maximisation 
of social and material outcomes, the maintenance and enhancement of self-esteem. 
and identity creation). The relevance of these goals is dependent on the publicity of 
the individual's behaviour and on thc individual's dependency on others for valued 
outcomes. Publicity is "u function 0.( roth the probability that one 's behariollr lrill be 
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observed by others and the number of others who might see or learn about it" (38). If 
an individual is dependent on others for valued outcomes, the individual's 
impressions on those people become more important and thus the individual' s 
motivation to engage in impression management becomes stronger. Leary and 
Kowalski (1990: 38) note that r.r.as a result, people are more likely to ingratiate 
themselves with their bosses and teachers than with their friends." 
Since the corporate reporting process is characterised by publicity, we can assume that 
managerial motivation to engage in impression management in corporate narratiYe 
reports in order to obtain the various material and social benefits (and possibly to 
enhance self-esteem and create desired identity) is strong. What is more, since 
managers' social and material benefits are dependent on both internal and external 
parties' approval, they are likely to engage in impression management (see section 
2.7.3 for a discussion of managerial impression management in an internal and 
external accountability process). 
The value of the desired outcomes is also a factor in impression management. The 
higher the value attached to a particular outcome, the stronger the motiYation to 
engage in impression management. The value of desired outcomes is also a function 
of scarce resources which means that impression management motivation is higher 
under such circumstances. This means that impression management in corporate 
narratives should be stronger during economic downturns when firms are in stronger 
competition for funds. 
The third factor impacting on impression management motivation is the discrepancy 
between desired and current image. Individuals are motivated to engage in impression 
management if they think that others have an image of them which is not consistent of 
the image they want others to have (usually a less positive image than desired). This is 
especially the case as a result of public failures or embarrassing incidents. Leary and 
Kowalski (1990: 39) note that "bofh jClilure and embarrassmellf increase impression 
mOli\'(1fion" which leads to attempts at repairing the damage by means of stressing 
one's positi\'t~ attributes and making self-serving attributions for one's failure, i.e. 
attributing negative outcomes to exten1al factors in the form of excust's (s('~ section 
~.7.5 for a more detailed discussion). 
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In a corporate reporting context, incidents involving company failure or 
embarrassment, such as negative environmental impacts or customer sen"ice 
problems, lead to a discrepancy between desired and current image and should thus 
give rise to increased impression management behaviour. Several studies apply 
legitimacy theory as an explanatory framework to analyze the reactions of firms 
facing legitimacy threats. Hooghiemestra (2000) uses an impression management 
approach to investigate Shell's handling of public controversy when it announced its 
plans to sink the Brent Spar in the Atlantic. Bansal and Clelland (2004) apply 
legitimacy theory in relation to disclosure of environmental liabilities and in relation 
to expressions of commitment to the environment. Ogden and Clarke (2005) apply 
legitimacy theory to the corporate communications practices of recently privatized 
water companies, focusing on customers, rather than investors. as the users of annual 
reports. 
According to Leary and Kowalski (1990), impression construction is dependent on 
five factors, namely (1) self-concept, (2) desired and undesired identity images, (3) 
role constraints, (4) target values, and (5) current and potential social image. 
Impression construction either involves constructing public images that are a 
reflection of one's self-image (albeit putting the best part of oneself into public view) 
or images which are inconsistent with one's self-concept. Self-presentational 
dissimulation, i.e. pretence, is most likely to occur for individuals employed in highly 
visible occupations, such as teachers, politicians, clergy, and salespeople. 
In a corporate reporting context impression construction invoh"ing both accurate and 
inaccurate self-concepts occur. The first type entails managing "sections of the reports 
."" so as to present management in as favourable light as possible" (Stanton et al. 
2004: 57) and the second entails inducing 'false implied meanings {hat are thus 
deceptive, misleading, and can be disprol'ed' (Huang 2005: 115). 
In so far as high-ranking company officers. such as CEOs, of large companies, well-
known companies. such as firms producing or sell ing consumer goods (e.g. T esco. 
~1arks and Spencer), or companies in the public ~rotlight due to scandals. kgal 
proceedings. record profits or lo~ses, etc .. occupy highly visible occupations. thev 
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might thus be more likely to engage in self-presentational dissimulation than high-
ranking officers of small, less-known, and less visible companies. However, both the 
monitoring hypothesis and the political cost hypothesis suggest that this might not be 
the case. The monitoring hypothesis claims that organisations with a high public 
profile are less likely to engage in impression management since they are subject to 
increased monitoring by institutional shareholders, the press, the government, and 
other parties. The political cost hypothesis suggests that highly visible companies are 
less likely to engage impression management, since this potentially increases their 
political cost. 
Leary and Kowalki (1990) further state that individuals tend to portray images of 
themselves which are biased in the direction of their desired self-image. What is more, 
individuals also tend to portray images of themselves which are not consistent with 
their undesired self-image. What is more, individuals also strive to ensure that their 
public image is consistent with their social role. In particular, individuals aim to 
match their social images to prototypical characteristics of the role they are playing. 
In a corporate reporting context this suggests that firms should portray themselves and 
their performance in the best possible light. This phenomenon has been examined in 
the context of the Pollyanna effect which states that companies present themselves in 
the best possible light by means of predominantly using positive words in their 
corporate narrative documents, regardless of their financial performance (Hildebrandt 
and Snyder 1981). Clatworthy and Jones (2003), who examine the association 
between performance explanations and financial performance find evidence of this 
behaviour. They find that firms focus on positive organizational outcomes, 
irrespective of financial performance. What is more, both managers of companies 
with improving and declining performance attribute positive organizational outcomes 
to internal factors and negative organizational outcomes to external circumstances. i.e. 
they make self-serving attributions. 
Leary and Kowalski (1990) further state that individuals also portray an image of 
themselves which matches the values and preferences of significant others. In a 
corporate reporting context this tendency can be applied to iI1\'estigate whether firms 
engage in impression management by means of emulating the target values of 
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important stakeholder groups or interest groups in society regarding issues such as 
environmentalism, gender and racial equality, or ethical concerns, such as fair trade 
issues. In this context, adopting a stakeholder theory perspective which focuses on 
mimetic isomorphism (see DiMaggio and Powell 1983), i.e. impression management 
entailing the copying of the behaviour or reporting strategies of other companies, such 
as industry leaders, could be fruitful. 
Finally, Leary and Kowalski (1990) state that impression management construction is 
also dependent on individual's current and potential image in the future, which might 
be the result of future revelations about the individual. This potential image, based on 
information others are likely to receive in the future, constrains impression 
management strategies, either by restraining certain impression management 
strategies or by requiring certain strategies. Public failures or embarrassments compel 
individuals to engage in impression management strategies aimed at countering or 
repairing one's damaged image by means of excuses, apologies, and self-serving 
attributions. 
In a corporate reporting context it would be interesting to investigate this type of 
impression management behaviour by means of analysing the corporate narrative 
documents of firms just before a scandal becomes public knowledge. The majority of 
studies of impression management in the context of corporate scandals have a re-
active rather than pro-active focus, i.e. they focus on strategies aimed at repairing the 
damage caused by scandals, such as Hooghiemstra's (2000) analysis of Shell's 
impression management attempts regarding the handling of public controversy 
surrounding its plans to sink the Brent Spar in the Atlantic. By contrast, Craig and 
Armenic's (2004) analysis of Enron's 2000 letter to shareholders, i.e. just before the 
scandal erupted, adopts a pro-active focus. Their investigation of the use of hyperbole 
leads them to conclude that the letter to shareholders "has ... serious implications 
regarding the authors' truth-telling (and) their grasp of even a rough socially-
constructed reality". 
2.7.3 Accountability theory 
Accountability is a key concept of social psychology. It refers to ",he condition of 
being annl'crable to audiences .f(JI' pelji)rming up to certain standards, thereby 
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fulfilling responsibilities, duties, expectations, and other charges~~ (Schlenker 
website)28. On the one hand, accountability entails the obligation of one party to 
provide explanations and justifications for its conduct to another party. On the other 
hand, it involves the first party's behaviour being subject to the scrutiny~ judgment 
and sanctioning of the second party. Thus, accountability can be analyzed from an 
internal and an external perspective. Internally, accountability results in the 
assessment of and response to external conditions to obtain both intrinsic (e.g. 
feelings of well-being and self-worth) and extrinsic rewards (increase in status, 
promotion, bonuses). Externally, accountability involves a control system with 
rewards and sanctions. 
According to Schlenker (website)29, accountability involves three components, 
namely (1) the inquiry component, (2) the accounting component, and (3) the verdict 
component. The inquiry component entails anticipating or submitting to an inquiry by 
an audience who evaluates one's actions and decisions in relation to specific 
prescriptions. The accounting component involves presenting one's version of events. 
This gives the individual the opportunity to describe, document, interpret, and explain 
relevant information with the purpose of constructing a personal account of events 
and providing reasons for their occurrence. The verdict component entails the 
audience delivering a verdict. This comprises both a judgment of the individual and 
the application of rewards or sanctions. Thus, the experience or anticipation of an 
evaluative appraisal is crucial to the concept of accountability. 
Frink and Ferris (1998), who apply the concept of accountability in organizational 
research, establish the link between accountability and impression management. They 
argue that in an accountability context individuals engage in impression management 
in anticipation of an evaluation of their conduct. Impression management thus serves 
as a way of influencing the impressions and decisions of relevant parties in order to 
win rewards and avoid sanctions. Thus, conditions of accountability foster impression 
management. 
28 http://sch\enker.socia\psycho\ogy.org/. 
29 http://sch\enker.socia\psycho\ogy.org/. 
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Figure 2.6 illustrates the role of impression management in the accountability process. 
It shows that impression management occurs in the accounting component of 
Schlenker's framework, which involves presenting one's version of events. 
Figure 2.6: The role of impression management in the accountability process 
(3) Delivery of 
judgment 
(2) Accounting: 
·1 Individual Presenting one's Jury version of events 
• ~ 
i 
Impression 
manag~ment 
---------------------------
(1) Anticipation of 
---------------------------
inquiry 
Accountability for performance is a fundamental principle of organization. It has been 
studied in the context of employee behaviour during the perfonnance evaluation 
process (Frink and Ferris 1998). They investigate whether goal-setting, which 
involves employees setting goals for their own future perfonnance, varies under 
conditions of high and low accountability. Results suggest that individuals approach 
goals differently according to accountability conditions. In conditions of low 
accountability, employees use goals for perfonnance-directed purposes, whereas in 
conditions of high accountability employees use goals for impression management 
purposes. 
Managerial behaviour in the corporate reporting process can also be analyzed in the 
context of an accountability framework. Managers are accountable to outside parties, 
including both shareholders and stakeholders, for their decisions and actions by means 
of the corporate reporting process. As Stanton and Stanton (2002: 492) note. 
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management uses the annual report as an accountability mechanism to react to the 
concerns of external parties. Impression management occurs in the accounting stage 
of the accountability process which involves providing information about the finn's 
performance and prospects by various means, including press releases, shareholder 
meetings, and the corporate reports. Management thus uses corporate reports to 
engage in impression management in anticipation of an evaluation of their actions and 
decisions by means of meetings with major shareholders and shareholder meetings. 
Impression management thus introduces bias into the corporate reporting process in 
order to influence the perceptions and decisions of outside parties of firm perfonnance 
and prospects, with the goal of ensuring economic (stocks and stock options) benefits 
for managers. 
Figure 2.7: The role of impression management and accountability in the corporate reporting 
process 
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However, since shareholders delegate the monitoring of managerial decisions and 
actions to an internal corporate governance system, management is also accountable 
to internal parties, including the board, its audit committee, (and independent 
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auditors).3o The board of directors represents shareholders' interests and scrutinizes 
managerial performance. Its inquiry mechanisms include regular board meetings, and 
meetings of sub-committees of the board such as the audit committee. The board's 
rewards and sanctions of management, especially of the CEO, comprise tenure 
decisions and compensation contracts. What is more, public limited companies in 
most jurisdictions are required by law to have an external audit of the financial 
accounts by qualified auditors. Managers engage in impression management as a 
result of their anticipation of an evaluation of their actions and decisions by means of 
board meetings (and the audit of the financial accounts). Management thus also 
engages in impression management in order to influence the perceptions and decisions 
of inside parties, with the goal of ensuring economic (tenure, compensation contracts, 
stocks and stock options) and psychological (reputation) benefits for managers. 
Figure 2.8: The role of impression management in the internal accountability process 
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Thus, it can be argued that managerial impression management in a corporate 
reporting context can be attributed to conditions of high accountability. Impression 
management is directed at both external and internal parties. It introduces bias into the 
corporate reporting process in order to influence the perceptions and decisions of both 
outside and inside parties, with the goal of ensuring economic (tenure, compensation 
30 However. the previous literature does not differentiate between impression managt'ment directed at 
inside and outside parties. 
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contracts, stocks and stock options) and psychological (reputation) benefits for 
managers. 
Schaffer's (2002) analysis of the differences in evaluation of managerial performance 
by inside and outside directors provides some insights into managerial impression 
management directed at company insiders. 31 He argues that inside and outside 
directors face different cognitive and social constraints which inhibit their ability to 
effectively evaluate managerial performance during times of negative organisational 
outcomes. For inside directors these constraints consist of (a) loyalty to the CEO and 
members of top management and (b) fear of retaliation. Outside directors face (a) 
informational constraints, (b) time constraints, and have (c) lower levels of 
commitment to the company. These constraints "may cause board members to use 
either incomplete or distorted information to make assessments" (Schaffer 2002: 98). 
Thus it can be argued that, due to these different constraints, inside directors are more 
likely to be in cahoots with management, whereas outside directors are more likely to 
be influenced by impression management. 
The previous impression management literature in accounting does not differentiate 
between impression management directed at inside and outside parties. However, as 
the discussion of accountability for managerial performance has shown, it is necessary 
to discuss impression management in a corporate context as directed both at internal 
and external parties, in order to explain the managerial motivation to engage in 
impression management. 
What is more, the previous impression management literature also fails to 
differentiate between managerial performance and firm performance. Whereas the 
motivation to engage in impression management is explained by means of using 
agency theory explanations of managerial behaviour, impression management as 
manifest in corporate narrative reports is regarded as a manipulation of firm 
performance and prospects. Whereas impression management directed at internal 
parties entails managers manipulating insiders' (i.e. board members) perceptions of 
31 In the context of manaoerial impression management directed at company insiders. both inside 
(managers involved in the ~veryday running of the firm) and outside (board members not involved in 
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managerial performance, impression management directed at external parties entails 
the firm (i.e. managers and board members) manipulating outsiders' perceptions of 
firm performance and prospects.32 
2.7.4 Impression management orientation 
Social psychology has developed a number of different theoretical impression 
management frameworks (Jones and Pitman 1982; Rosenfeld et al. 1995: Bozeman 
and Kacmar 1997; Tedeschi and Norman 1985, Tetlock and Manstead 1985, \Volfe et 
al. 1986), all of which conceptualize impression management in the form of positi\'e 
and negative strategies or tactics. 
However, the framework developed by Tedeschi and Norman (1985), Tetlock and 
Manstead (1985), and Wolfe et al. (1986) is particularly useful for analyzing 
impression management in the context of the corporate reporting process since it 
conceptualises the impression management tactics of an individual as a response to 
the anticipated reaction of another party. This results in two impression management 
orientations, namely a defensive (protective) and an acquisitive (assertive) orientation. 
The orientation is dependent on the expected reaction of the relevant other party 
concerned. If the individual expects to be met by disapproval. a defensive orientation 
is adopted, which manifests itself in justifications and excuses and is aimed at 
avoiding punishment or repercussions. If the individual expects to be met by approval, 
an acquisitive orientation is adopted, which manifests itself in self-promotion. 
exemplification, ingratiation, enhancements and entitlements and is aimed at 
enhancing the possibility of favoured treatment in the future. 33 Figure 2.9 contrasts 
these two diametrically opposed impression motivation orientations. 
the everyday running of the firm) directors are regarded as firm insiders, since it is the responsibility of 
the board to approve the financial accounts and thus the accompanying narrative documents. 
32 This issue is complicated further by the issue of the various identities which emerge in corporate 
narratives. As a result, chairman's reports do not only contain references to actions undertaken by the 
chairman (/, 111£', mine, myselj), but also references to actions undertaken by management and the board 
(lI'e, us, ours, ourselves), and references to actions undertaken by the firm and matters relating to the 
firm (the Group). Thus, in corporate narratives various interrelated and overlapping 'selves' are 
brought to bear, including what White and Hanson (2002) refer to as 'the embodied seIr of managers, 
board members and the chairman and 'the corporate self of the firm. See section 4.~ for a more 
detailed discussion of the use of pronouns and their referents in chairman's reports . 
.1.1 Ingratiation involws indi\iduals seeking to be \iewed as likable by flattering others or b~ doing 
fa\nurs for them. Self-promotion entails indiyiduals aiming to be percei\ed as competent by tlaunting 
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Figure 2.9: Impression management orientation of managers in a corporate reporting context 
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Application of the impression management orientation In a corporate reporting 
context implies that management uses the corporate reporting process to engage in 
impression management as a response to the anticipated reaction of shareholders and 
stakeholders regarding its performance. 
Palmer et al. (2001) apply this social psychology research on impression management 
orientations in a corporate context by surveying 95 international middle- and upper 
level managers in the US in the context of performance evaluations. They attempt to 
determine whether management is motivated by a defensive or an acquisitive 
orientation in trying to manipulate the perceptions and decisions of others. They find 
that managers predominantly exhibit an acquisitive orientation aimed at enhancing the 
possibility of future benefits. 
These findings provide psychological validity to agency theory explanations of 
managerial behaviour which regards impression management as arising from the 
desire to maximise future benefits in the form of economic (tenure. compensation 
contracts, stocks and stock options) benefits. 
their abilities and accomplishments. Exemplification involves individuals aiming to be viewed as 
dedicated by going above and beyond the call of duty. Enhancements and entit~ements are so-called 
acclaiming tactics which are used in the case of positive e\ents. The choice of tactIc is dependent on (a) 
the ambiguity of the responsibility for the outcome and (b) the desirability of the outcome. Entitlements 
are attempts to maximize responsibility for positive events. They are especiall) likel) to occur \\ hen 
responsibility for the positive outcome is either ambiguous or unclear. Enhanceml!nts try to mJ\imize 
the desirabi I ity of a positi\'t~ occurrence. 
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However, Ogden and Clarke (2005), who investigate acquisitive (assertive) and 
defensive (protective) impression management strategies in the narrative corporate 
report sections of ten privatised regional UK water companies, find that management 
uses both acquisitive and defensive impression management tactics. Their objective is 
to establish whether firms use impression management to gain and maintain 
legitimacy as customer-focused companies. They find that companies use assertive 
impression management techniques to build legitimacy and defensive tactics to 
address short-falls in their performance. 
What is more, research carried out on performance attributions in narrative corporate 
report sections shows that managers adopt both an acquisitive/assertive and a 
defensive/protective orientation in a financial reporting context (see sections 2.2.2 and 
2.3.5). They engage in so-called self-serving attributions which attribute positive 
organisational outcomes to themselves (in the form of entitlements) and negative 
organisational outcomes to external circumstances (in the form of excuses). 
2.7.5 Impression management strategies 
Research in social psychology suggests that the impression management tactics which 
individuals choose are dependent on the perceived outcome of an event: Acclaiming 
tactics are used in the case of a positive outcome of events and accounting tactics in 
the case of a negative outcome (Schlenker 1980). 
Acclaiming tactics are designed to explain an event in a way that maximizes the 
desirable implications for the individual. Accounting tactics are used to explain 
inappropriate behaviour and to bridge the gap between actions and 
expectation. Acclaiming and accounting use two tactics each, namely entitlements 
and enhancements in the case of acclaiming and justifications and excuses in the case 
of accounting. 
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The choice of tactic is dependent on (a) the ambiguity of the responsibility for the 
outcome and (b) the desirability of the outcome. Entitlements are attempts to 
maximize responsibility for positive events. They are especially likely to occur when 
responsibility for the positive outcome is either ambiguous or unclear. Enhancements 
try to maximize the desirability of a positive occurrence. Excuses are attempts to 
assign responsibility for negative outcomes to external circumstances. Justifications 
try to minimize the undesirability of the outcome. 
In the case of positive outcomes, individuals will choose the tactic of entitlements 
which allows them to assign responsibility for the event to themselves. if the 
responsibility for the outcome is ambiguous. However. if the responsibility for the 
positive outcome is beyond doubt, individuals will use the tactic of enhancements 
which allows them to maximize the desirability of the event itself. Table 2.11 
contrasts acclaiming and accounting tactics: 
Table 2.11: Acclaiming vs. accounting tactics 
Positive outcome: 
Acclaiming 
Attribution of desirability of Enhancements (maximise 
outcome desirability of event) 
Attribution of responsibility Entitlements (internal 
factors) 
Negative outcome: Accounting 
Justifications (minimise 
undesirability of event) 
Excuses (external circumstances) 
In the case of negative outcomes, individuals will choose the tactic of excuses which 
allows them to assign responsibility for the event to external circumstances, if the 
responsibility for the outcome is ambiguous. However, if the responsibility for the 
negative event is beyond doubt, then individuals will use the tactic of justifications 
which allows them to minimize the undesirability of the event itself. 
Schlenker (1980) differentiates the accounting tactics of excuses and justifications by 
noting that whereas excuses refer to either unforeseen consequences or extenuating 
circumstances, justifications draw on relevant social comparisons or higher order 
goals. Tedeschi and Riess (1981) argue that excuses point to a lack of intention. 
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planning, capacity, or will, and justifications appeal to a higher authority. ideology. 
nonns, or loyalties. 
The tactics of entitlements and excuses which are concerned with the allocation of 
responsibility to internal and external factors are also studied in the context of 
attribution theory. It claims that individuals attribute positive outcomes to themselyes 
and negative outcomes to external circumstances. 
Additionally, when individuals offer explanations of events, they can make either (1) 
an external attribution or (2) an internal attribution. An external attribution assigns 
causality to an outside agent or force thus claiming that some force outside of the 
individual's control motivated the event. By contrast, an internal attribution assigns 
causality to factors within the individual and thus attributes responsibility for the 
event to the individual. 
Thus, attribution theory focuses solely on the acclaiming and accounting tactics 
associated with the attribution of responsibility for a particular event, namely 
entitlements in the case of positive events and excuses in the case of negative eyents. 
Attribution theory was developed over time from the theories of social psychologists 
including Heider (1958), Jones and Davis (1965), and Kelley (1967) and is concerned 
with the study of a person's perceptions of events and deals with how individuals 
explain events. 
Accounting research has adopted attribution theory to explain managerial impression 
management attempts in the case of positive and negative organisational outcomes. 
Research focusing on attribution in a financial reporting context examines impression 
management in the form of perfonnance explanations. It claims that managers use 
narrative corporate report sections in a self-serving manner. and not to report 
perfonnance objectively. Managers are assumed to attribute good perfol111ance 
(positive organizational outcomes) to internal factors and bad perfol111ance (negative 
organizational outcomes) to external circumstances. This means that their behaviour is 
characterised by a combination of self-enhancement (entitlements) and self-protection 
(excuses) tactics (see Table 2.12). 
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Table 2.12: Attribution of responsibility in financial reporting 
Self-serving 
behaviour 
Positive organisational outcomes: 
Self-enhancement: Entitlements 
(attribute responsibility to internal 
organizational factors) 
Negative organisational outcomes: 
Self-protection: Excuses (attribute 
responsibility to external 
circumstances) 
The application of attribution theory in an accounting context has been discussed in 
section 2.2.2. 
2.8 Impression management as self-presentational dissimulation 
Since impression management in a corporate reporting context entails the attempt to 
present "information in a manner that is intended to distort readers' perceptions of 
corporate achievements" (Godfrey et al. 2003: 96), it constitutes dissimulation, i.e. 
constructing a public image of firm performance and prospects which is inconsistent 
with the way management may see firm performance and prospects. The social 
psychology literature discusses this phenomenon under the term 'self-presentational 
dissimulation' (Leary and Kowalski 1990: 40) and regards it as part of impression 
management construction (see section 2.7.2). 
Although self-presentational dissimulation has been recognized as one aspect of 
impression management (Courtis 2004a: 292; Huang 2004: 19), the impression 
management literature does not provide any insights on the conditions fostering self-
presentational dissimulation and the strategies adopted for creating impressions that 
are not accurate. However, we can borrow insights on the strategies adopted for 
dissimulation in a financial reporting context from the fraud literature (section 2.8.1). 
What is more, social psychology research offers insights on the conditions fostering 
dissimulation and provides a methodology based on the psychological aspects of \\"ord 
use during dissimulation (2.8.2). 
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2.8.1 Dissimulation in accounting research 
Research on fraud can provide valuable insights into the strategies adopted during 
dissimulation, since impression management (and earnings management) and fraud 
only differ in their underlying motivation (e.g. embezzlement as opposed to 
managerial gain from bonuses, stock options, and reputation). methods (infringement 
of accounting regulations versus use of judgment in financial reporting). and legal 
implications, but are carried out for the same purpose, namely to mislead other 
parties. Dissimulation in a corporate reporting context thus involves the process of 
"one agent [management] ... intentionally manipulate [ing] the attributes in an 
environment so as to create a misleading representation in the mind of a second agent 
[investors]" (Johnson et al. 1993: 485). 
Johnson et al. 's (1993) taxonomy of tactics used by management can also be applied 
in an impression management context. They distinguish between (1) dissimulation 
and (2) simulation. Dissimulation entails 'hiding the rear and simulation involves 
'showing the false'. In the sense that the obfuscation of negative organisational 
outcomes involves concealing the true facts of company performance it constitutes 
dissimulation. Johnson et al. (1993) identify three tactics involved in dissimulation, 
namely (1) deleting attributes of the environment, (2) modifying them, and (3) adding 
attributes to it. The three tactics can be divided into seven sub-tactics, namely (1) 
masking, (2) double play, (3) mimicking, (4) dazzling, (5) inventing, (6) repackaging. 
and (7) decoying. 
Table 2.13 lists the tactics and sub-tactics of dissimulative dissimulation, their 
definition, their application in narrative corporate report sections, and the 
corresponding impression management strategies. The definitions of the sub-tactics 
are based on Johnson et al. (1993: 471-472). 
It illustrates the way impression management uses one of these tactics, namely the 
modification of en\'ironmental attributes by means of mimicking. dazzling. and 
repackaging in the context of narrative corporate report sections. In the textual part of 
narrative corporate report sections the attributes of the environment are (1) the 
content. en the language, and (3) the visual effects (see Figure 2.2). Impression 
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management thus involves the modification of content (by means of selectivity and 
bias), language (by means of altering reading difficulty and using rhetorical devicest 
and visual effects (by means of altering layout and graphic design). 
Due to the nature of the tactics used, impression management can potentially have 
serious consequences in the form of capital misallocations resulting from the creation 
of false impressions of company performance and prospects. 
1 1 1 
Table 2.13: Dissimulation tactics involved in impression management in narrative corporate report sections 
Tactics Sub-tactics 
Deleting Masking 
Modifying Mimicking 
Dazzling 
Repackaging 
Double play 
Adding Inventing 
Decoying 
Definition 
Deleting from the environment attributes that suggest the correct 
representation. 
Modifying attributes in the environment in a way so as to suggest 
the incorrect representation. The attributes copy as faithfully as 
possible another environment. 
Modifying attributes in the environment in such a way as to 
obscure or blur these attributes whose interpretation suggests the 
correct representation, and to emphasize these attributes whose 
interpretation suggests the incorrect one. 
Modifying attributes in the environment in order to hinder the 
generation of the correct representation. Repackaging is weaker 
than mimicking because it is based on justification and distortion 
rather than replication of attributes. 
Manipulating attributes in the environment jn a way so as to 
weakly suggest the correct representation. The purpose of a 
Double-Play tactic is to reinforce the incorrect representation by 
weakly suggesting the correct one. 
Addin g new attributes to the environment in order to suggest the 
incorrect representation . 
Adds new attributes to the environment in order to hinder the 
generation of the correct representation . Decoying is weaker than 
inventing since the decoys are not directly suggestive of the 
incorrect representation. They simply direct attention away from 
the correct one. 
Application in narrative corporate report 
sections 
Selectivity is used to select specific themes and 
numbers 
Texts are rendered difficult to read in order to 
obscure meaning. 
Language is modified by means of rhetoric in order 
to obscure meaning 
Disclosure bias is used in order to emphasise 
positive organisational outcomes 
Impression 
management strategy 
Narrative disclosure 
Reading ease 
manipulation 
Rhetorical 
manipulation 
Thematic manipulation 
/" I' ,..- t ----
'\ 
1"-
Based on Johnson ct al. ( 199--=3:2..) __________________________________________________ -1 
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After establishing a link between dissimulation and l'mpress' . h IOn management In t e 
form of tactics, we can turn to social psychology research for insights on the factors 
and conditions fostering dissimulation and on strategies for uncovering dissimulation. 
This helps us establish whether the conditions in which management operates and 
corporate reports as a medium of communication are conducive to dissimulation and 
thus impression management. What is more, it provides us with alternative strategies 
of uncovering impression management in narrative corporate report sections. 
2.8.2 A social psychology perspective of dissimulation 
Newman et al. (2003: 666) point to a growing body of psychology research \vhich 
suggests that "we can learn a great deal ahout people's underlying thoughts. 
emotions, and motives hy counting and categorizing the 1, \'0 rJs ther lISC to 
communicate.~' Psychology research focusing on word use is based on the assumption 
that the way people express themselves "conveys psychological information" 
(Pennebaker et al. 2003: 550). This means that words are an indicator of "people"s 
underlying thoughts, emotions. and motives" (Newman et al. 2003: 666). 
This section draws on research on word use associated with honesty/dishonesty which 
is based on the assumption that "the words people choose when talking or writing 
may betray their thoughts and feelings" (Pennebaker et al. 2003: 572). Based on the 
concept of impression management as presenting "information in a manner that is 
intended to distort readers' perceptions of corporate achievements" (Godfrey et al. 
2003: 96), it fits into this stream of psychology research which is concerned with 
"messages and information knowingly transmitted to create a false impression or 
conclusion. There are many ways to deceive, such as lies, fabrications, concealments, 
misdirection, bluffs, fakery, mimicry, tall tales, l,vhite lies, deflections, evasions, 
equivocation, exaggerations, camouflage and strategic ambiguity" (Burgoon and 
Nunamaker 2004b: 1). 
Thus, this stream of research encompasses the whole spectrum of managerial 
impression management behaviour. described in the literature as . c,ccuti\ e 
hyperbole' (Guardian, 17 April 1004: 27). 'gilding the lily' (Guardian. :\pril 17,2004. 
p. 27), "enhancing the story' (Courtis 2004a: 293). 'putting .. the hesl rll(!torical polish 
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or 'spin' on the story-telling'" (Courtis 2004a: 306), 'representing information in the 
best possible light' (Beattie and Jones 1997: 35), and 'puffery' (Huang 2005). 
The social psychology literature discusses this phenomenon under the term • self-
presentational dissimulation' (Leary and Kowalski 1990: 40) and regards it as part of 
impression management construction. It entails constructing a public image which is 
inconsistent with the individual's self-concept. However, the social psychology 
literature does not provide any insights on which conditions foster this type of 
impression management behaviour and on people's preferred strategies for creating 
impressions that are not accurate (Leary and Kowalski 1990). 
In the wake of 9/11, there is a growing body of research in the US on dissimulation in 
the context of the psychological aspects of word use which aims to establish 
techniques for uncovering dissimulation in both oral and written communication.3.f 
However, this type of research does not focus on the dissimulation tactics discussed in 
section 2.8.1, but on the physical and verbal by-products of dissimulation, such as 
stuttering, lip-biting, and increased/decreased use of specific word categories during 
oral and written communication. The intention behind these studies is to construct 
'polygraph tests' based on specific verbal and/or non-verbal characteristics. 
Three types of studies on dissimulation in psychology research on word use provide 
insights into self-presentational dissimulation in the context of corporate reporting, 
namely research (a) on the moderators of dissimulation, (b) on the factors fostering 
successful dissimulation, and (c) on the linguistic characteristics differentiating true 
and false stories (i.e. the linguistic characteristics associated with dissimulation). The 
linguistic characteristics associated with dissimulation are discussed in chapter three 
(section 3.4.1) since they form the basis of measuring self-presentational 
dissimulation by means of linguistic markers. 
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Moderators of dissimulation 
Two moderators of dissimulation have been identified in the literature, namely (1) 
dissimulation regarding transgressions and (2) strength of motivation to engage in 
dissimulation (DePaulo et al. 2003). 
Dissimulation regarding transgressions 
Cues to dissimulation are stronger if dissimulation is about transgressions (DePaulo 
2003). Dissimulation as a result of transgressions "range from misdeeds such as 
cheating on tests to deep betrayals of intimacy and trust, such as affairs ... These lies, 
especially if discovered, can have serious implications for the individuals engaged in 
impression management' identities and reputations" (DePaulo 2003: 76-77). 
Managerial failure to perfonn can also be regarded as a fonn of transgression which 
has serious economic and reputational implications, if discovered. We can assume 
that managerial communication involving self-presentational dissimulation, such as 
the obfuscation of negative organisational outcomes in narrative corporate report 
sections, is characterised by strong cues to dissimulation. 
Motivation to engage in dissimulation 
Cues to dissimulation are stronger when told under conditions of high motivation to 
succeed (DePaulo 2003). The motivation to lie can be either identity-relevant or 
instrumental. Identity-relevant motivation involves the protection of one's status and 
reputation and instrumental motivation is linked to rewards in the form of pay and 
promotion. Since management has strong economic and reputational incentives to 
engage in impression management, its motivations to engage in self-presentational 
dissimulation can be said to be both identity-relevant and instrumental. For this reason 
narrative corporate report sections should contain strong cues to self-presentational 
dissimulation, if impression management has occurred. 
Since managerial self-presentational dissimulation IS concerned \vith hiding 
transgressions and is driven by a strong motivation on the part of management. 
narrative corporate report sections containing impression management should contain 
strong cues of self-presentational dissimulation. 
34 The purpose of this research is to uncover potential terrorist activities by means of analysing e-mail 
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Factors fostering successful dissimulation 
Research in social psychology confirms that dissimulation occurs across different 
media (Hancock et al. 2004). This includes corporate communication and specifically 
corporate reports. 
From a communication perspective, communication between two parties involves a 
sender, a receiver, a message, a medium, and a channel. Since impression 
management in narrative annual report documents, such as the chairman's report, is a 
process of manipulating not only the perceptions, but also the decisions, of relevant 
parties communication between company insiders and other parties has to be regarded 
as a two-way communication process, with feedback as an essential element. 
Figure 2.10: Features of the communication process in corporate reporting 
Sender: 
Management 
t 
Medium: 
Annual report 
Message: 
Information about the 
firm's performance and 
prospects 
Feedback (buying/selling shares resulting in 
increase/decrease in share price) 
~ 
Receiver: 
Company 
outsiders 
As shown in Figure 2.10, communication In a corporate context involves the 
exchange of information between management (sender) and company outsiders 
(receivers), including shareholders and stakeholders, such as customers, employees. 
and the government. Information about the company's performance and prospects 
(message) is conveyed to company outsiders via various media, such as press releases, 
shareholder meetings, and the annual report. The channels involved are print (for 
written documents), airwaves (for spoken communication) and light ","aves (for 
images). 
and text massages via mobile phones. 
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Research has established that certain characteristics of each component of the 
communicative process foster successful dissimulation. 
Sender-receiver characteristics 
Marett and George (2004) provide a perspective on dissimulation in a group setting 
involving one sender and multiple receivers. Although their study takes into 
consideration factors such as diverse knowledge base amongst receivers. and 
experience with communication medium on likelihood of detection of dissimulation, 
all the scenarios are conceptualised in a group setting where receivers interact with 
one another. 
However, communication VIa annual reports involves a group of senders 
(management) and multiple receivers (shareholders, stakeholders, etc.) who do not 
engage in any face-to-face interaction with each other.35 For this reason, the 
application of a methodology based on the self-presentational dissimulation tactics of 
individuals, such as linguistic markers of self-presentational dissimulation, which is 
introduced in chapter three, section 2.4.1, in a group-setting is potentially problematic. 
However, the chairman's report constitutes a special case of communication since it 
purports to be written by an individual (the chairman of the company), but as a matter 
of fact reflects both the actions and opinions of a unified group of people 
(management). This group cohesion also manifests itself linguistically by the frequent 
use of the first person plural (we, us, our, ours, ourselves) which gives the impression 
of a group thinking and acting as one (see section 2.10.2 on a more detailed 
discussion of the linguistic characteristics of chairman's reports). For this reason, we 
feel that it is appropriate to apply a methodology based on the dissimulation of 
individuals into a setting involving a unified group of people. 
Medium characteristics 
Carlson et al. (2004) identify six characteristics of media and their association with 
dissimulation. Table 2.14 summarises these six characteristics and indicates those 
applicable to corporate reports. 
J5 They only interact with each other in the sense that they follow stock price movements. 
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Media with low levels of synchronicity, cue multiplicity, and reprocessability and 
high levels of symbol variety, tailorability, and rehearsability aid self-presentational 
dissimulation. Corporate reports are written media available in both print and Pdf 
format consisting of text and visual material which are prepared in advance and can 
be repeatedly accessed by interested parties. Thus, corporate reports have three 
features which aid self-presentational dissimulation, namely a-synchronicity, symbol 
variety, and rehearsability. This renders corporate reports a likely medium for 
communication involving self-presentational dissimulation. 
Table 2.14: Medium characteristics of corporate reports 
Medium Explanation Annual Association Dissim u lation 
cha racteristics report with in corporate 
characteristic dissimulation reports 
Synchronicity Instantaneous dialogue between No Negative Yes 
participants 
Symbol variety Visual display of text by means Yes Positive Yes 
of colour, font, highlighting 
Cue multiplicity Simultaneous use of several Yes Negative No 
channels, e.g. text, images 
audio 
Tailorability Customisation of message No Positive No 
depending on receiver 
Reprocessabi I i ty Repeated accessibility of Yes Negative No 
message 
Rehearsabil ity Time to plan information and Yes Positive Yes 
presentation of message 
Key: Areas shaded in grey indicate the medium characteristics of annual reports fostering dissimulation. 
2.9 Detecting impression management 
Johnson et al. (1993: 473-475) list two strategies for detecting dissimulation, namely 
(1) strategies based on finding evidence suggestive of the process of perpetrating the 
dissimulation. i.e. the process through which the deceiver transfonns the initial 
environment into a deceptive one. and (2) strategies based on processing infonnation 
contained in the manipulated environment. Type (1) strategies include motivation-
based strategies, such as managerial gain by means of rises in share price. and 
118 
process-based strategies, such as red flag strategies. Type (2) strategies include 
recognition-based, conservative-based, and intentionality-based strategies. 
2.9.1 Detecting impression management in previous research 
Previous impression management research has focused exclusively on the 
recognition-based strategy for detecting dissimulation, which constitutes a Type (2) 
strategy. It involves basing the detection of impression management on the knowledge 
of common manipulations, i.e. manifestations of impression management (see section 
2.2), and their recognition when they appear (Johnson et al. 1993: 474). Impression 
management studies typically analyse specific narrative corporate report sections for 
evidence of a particular impression management strategy, such as reading ease 
manipulation or the use of performance attributions. 
The weakness of this strategy is that it is a very time-consuming process to examine 
narrative corporate report sections for evidence of all possible manifestations of 
impression management. What is more, since impression management entails the use 
of subtle psychological strategies aimed at manipulating perceptions, there might be 
numerous ways management engages in impression management which have not yet 
been identified by the literature. 
2.9.2 Alternative strategy for detecting impression management 
Research in linguistics on the linguistic cues of dissimulation provides impression 
management research with an alternative strategy for detecting dissimulation which is 
a process-based Type (l) strategy, i.e. a red flag strategy. This means that it does not 
involve looking for evidence of the manipulation activity itself, but of the signs of the 
manipulation activity (Johnson et al. 1993: 473). 
The advantage of Type (1) strategies for detecting dissimulation is that "symptoms of 
the Deceiver's manipulation activities may be easier to detect than the manipulation 
itself' (Johnson et al. 1993: 474). Another advantage is that Type (l) strategies are 
less time-consuming to detect, since they bypass the process of analysing narratiY~ 
corporate report sections for evidence of all possible manifestations of impression 
management. 
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Social psychology focuses on the verbal manifestations of dissimulation, such as 
increased/decreased use of specific word categories see chapter 3, section 3.4.1). The 
intention behind these studies is to construct a 'polygraph test' based on particular 
verbal characteristics. It specifically builds on studies focusing on the linguistic 
characteristics differentiating true and false stories. 
Whereas accounting research focuses on the conscious use of impression management 
strategies and dissimulation tactics, social psychology provides insights on the 
unconscious processes involved during dissimulation. 
Figure 2.11 shows that impression management has a conscious and an unconscious 
dimension which occur simultaneously.36 Conscious impression management 
strategies, such as reading ease manipulation and rhetorical manipUlation constitute 
Type (2) strategies, i.e. they focus on analysing information contained in the 
manipulated environment (see section 2.9.1). In contrast, the unconscious processes, 
such as use of self-reference and use of emotion words, constitute Type (2) strategies, 
i.e. they focus on the process of transforming the environment into a deceptive one 
(see section 2.9.1). 
Figure 2.1 I: Execution of impression management 
Conscious Obfuscation of negative organizational outcomes 
strategies Use of 
Reading ease Rhetorical Thematic Narrative Attribution of performance 
manipulation manipulation _ ~~~Ql}!l!t}9!1 ____ Ai_s~19~~!~ __ J?~ rt ~ ~J!l !l_n_ <:<: __ referents 
... -----------_ ..... ---------------------- ----------
Unconscious 
processes Verbal and non-verbal indictors of dissimulation 
Regardless of the conscious strategy adopted for the manipulation of perceptions and 
decisions, the unconscious processes involved are always the same. The adoption of a 
36 f ., t The difference between the two can be likened to measuring the use 0 ImpreSSIOn managemen 
during a job interview. The conscious strategies employed include self-promotion (perform~nce 
claims) and exemplification (going beyond the call of duty, appearing busy). The unconscIous 
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methodology based on the analysis of the unconscious aspect of dissimulation thus 
provides an advantage over conventional methodologies in that it covers the use of 
impression management in general, including all previously identified conscious 
strategies of impression management, and possible other ways of manipulating the 
impressions of shareholders and stakeholders. 
2.10 The chairman's report as an impression management vehicle 
Previous impression management research has used a variety of corporate narrative 
sections as their medium of analysis, namely (l) the chairman's report (Jones 1988, 
Smith and Taffler 1992a, 1992b, 1995, 2000; Courtis 1986, 1998; Clatworthy and 
Jones 2001 a, 2006), (2) the Operating and Financial Review (Sydserff and Weetman 
1999; Rutherford 2003), (3) the Management and Discussion Analysis (Frazier et al. 
1984; Tennyson et al. 1990; Collins et al. 1993; Bryan 1997; Clarkson et al. 1999: 
Yuthas et al. 2002), and (4) the President's Letter to Shareholders (Tennyson et al. 
1990; Baker and Kare 1992; Subramanian et al. 1993; Abrahamson and Amir 1996; 
Yuthas et al. 2002). The following sections outline the reasons why the chairman's 
report has proven to be the most popular in the UK context, outlines its specific 
linguistic and communicative characteristics, and discusses issues surrounding its 
authorship. 
2.10.1 Rationale for choosing the chairman's report 
The chairman's report is a tried and tested medium for the investigation of impression 
management in narrative corporate report sections (Jones 1988; Smith and Taffler 
1992a, 1992b, 1995, 2000; Clatworthy and Jones 2001, 2006; Sydserff and Weetman 
2002; Courtis 1998, 2004a; Smith et al. 2005). It is included in the annual reports of 
almost all UK companies, which simplifies sample selection. What is more, its brevity 
allows the selection of a large sample of firms, which, in tum, allows for a more 
dl'tailed analysis and thus greater validity. 
processes include both verbal and non-verbal indicators. such as use of passive voice or avoidance of 
eye contact during exaggerations and concealments. 
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The chairman's report is the most likely narrative annual report section to contain 
evidence of impression management since, unlike the Operating and Financial 
Revie~7, the company is under no statutory, professional, or stock exchange 
requirements to provide a chairman's report. Also, it is not subject to audit other than 
audit checking for information inconsistencies with the financial statements. 
Since it is not under close scrutiny by regulatory bodies and does not constitute a legal 
requirement, misrepresentation contained therein is more unlikely to be detected and 
more unlikely to result in company litigation than misrepresentation contained in 
regulated documents. For this reason, both the opportunity and the incentives for 
management to engage in impression management within the chairman's report are 
high. This is especially the case, since due to its nature as an informal communication 
vehicle between internal and external parties, it is the most likely narrative annual 
report document to be read38 and thus the most worthwhile for the use of impression 
management. 
The chairman's report has no specified format and the contents can differ from 
company to company. However, most chairman's reports include a review of the 
results for the year, details about the dividend, a description of the major changes in 
the company's activities for the year, and a review of the achievements of the 
directors and other employees. It may also provide an insight on how the chairman 
views the company's future. Its lack of predefined format makes it an ideal vehicle for 
impression management since it provides companies with the freedom to shape the 
chairman's reports to their individual requirements. 
Furthermore, since impression management is concerned with the manipulation of 
outsiders' perceptions of firm performance and prospects, the overall purpose of the 
chainnan's report, namely to provide "an interpretative account of [firm] 
performance within the context of its operating environment as noted by its gm'crning 
37 Since May 2005, the Operating and Financial Review is regulated ?y ~S 1. an ~ccounting Standards 
Board Reporting Standard, which is mandatory for all quoted compantes In the UK. . . 
J8 Lee and Tweedie (1981) found that professional institutional investment specialIsts name_d the 
Chairman's report as the next important section inside the corporate annual report after the profit and 
loss account and the balance sheet. 
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body" (Clarke and Murray 2000: 145), makes it ideally suited to impression 
management. 
Finally, Clarke and Murray's (2000: 150) survey of the perceptions of UK investment 
trust chairmen about the role of the chairman's report in communications policy and 
management shows that chairmen are fully aware of the impression management 
function of the chairman's report. The study suggests that "there is a definite 
perception of impression management underpinning the purpose of the chairman's 
report". It can therefore be assumed that the chairman's report is the most likely 
vehicle for impression management purposes. 
2.10.2 Communicative and linguistic dimensions of the chairman's report 
As already discussed in sections 2.1.1 and 2.10.2, from a communication perspective, 
the chairman's report is part of the corporate communication process which involves 
six elements, namely (1) sender, (2) message, (3) medium, (4) channel, (5) receiver, 
and (6) feedback (see Figure 2.12). 
Figure 2.12: Features of the communication process in corporate reporting 
Sender: 
Management 
t 
Medium: 
Annual report 
Message: 
Information about the 
firm's performance and 
prospects 
Feedback: Buying/selling shares resulting in 
increase/decrease in share price 
p 
Receiver: 
Company 
outsiders 
The sender, in the case of the chairman's report, the chairman, initiates the 
communication process. S/he, or someone on hislher behalf, encodes a message, i.e. 
puts the message into words or images, and selects a channel for transmitting the 
message to a receiver. The message is the information that the sender wants to 
transmit. In the case of the chairman's report, the message re\'ol\'es around company 
performance and prospects. The medium is the means of communication. such as a 
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telephone conversation or a letter. In corporate communication the media include 
press releases, shareholder meetings, and the annual report, which is the medium for 
the chairman's report. The channel is the means of communication, such as print. 
mass, electrical, and digital. The channel for the chairman's report is either print (hard 
copy) or digital (Pdf file). The receiver is the person or group for whom the message 
is intended. In the case of the chairman's report this group consists primarily of 
shareholders and secondarily of stakeholders, such as customers, employees, and the 
government. The receiver decodes, i.e. interprets the meaning of the message. 
Feedback entails the transfer of information from the receiver back to the sender. In 
case of the chairman's report this occurs in the form of buying or selling shares. 
In linguistic terms, a chairman's report is a speech event (Levinson 1983). A speech 
event is characterised by the following participants, namely the speaker/writer and the 
addressee/group of addressees. 39 The speaker/writer conveys a message, as 
grammaticalized in the first person singular (1, me, my, mine, myself). An addressee/a 
group of addressees is any of the immediate intended recipients of the 
speaker's/writer's communication, as grammaticalized in the second person (you, 
your, yours, yourselj1yourselves). In the chairman's report the writer is the chairman, 
or hislher representative, and the group of addressees is (primarily) the shareholders. 
In her analysis of the construction of professional and institutional identity by means 
of pronoun use in speeches Van De Mieroop (2006: 4, in press) points out that "the 
wejorm is quite often used to refer to an institutional referent, thus positioning the 
speaker as a representative of the organization, while the I-form can reflect the 
presence of the speaker in his speech through which he may present himself as an 
exper t . " 
The use of first person pronouns (/ and we) is similar in chairman' s reports. The first 
person singular (/, me. mine. myself) is used sparingly in chairmen's reports. It is used 
in the context of actions undertaken by the writer in hislher professional tunction as a 
chairman/chairwoman. as demonstrated by Example 1. 
39 In her study on the writer-reader association in business prose Jameson (2004) poin~s ou~ that t~e I 
and the YOII in the text do not refer to 'real people', but rather represent "the te~"'(tllal Identifies o/the 
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Example 1: Use of first person singular 
... on behalf of the Board I would like to thank all my colleagues throughout the Group ... 
(Barratt Developments PLC 2002). 
Key: Words in bold refer to pronoun use demonstrated by example 
The investigation of the sample of chairman's reports used in this study indicates that 
the first person plural (we, us, our, ours, ourselves) predominates in UK chairman's 
reports. In the English language, the first person plural can be either used in an 
inclusive or in an exclusive way. The inclusive use of the first person plural refers to a 
group including both the speaker and the addressee/group of addressees, \vhile an 
exclusive use of the first person plural refers to a group including the speaker, but not 
the addressee/group of addressees. 
In the chairman's report the exclusive use of the first-person plural prevails. It is used 
in the context of actions undertaken by the writer as part of an institutional entity, i.e. 
either the board of directors, management or the company as a kind of 'plural 
personality', including the board of directors, management, and staff. This is 
demonstrated by Example 2. 
Example 2: Use of exclusive first person plural 
Our results for the year to 31 December 2002 show another year of organic growth for [he 
Group, with turnover increasing by 29%. Further substantial progress has been made towards 
the development of Atlantic and expanding our range of increasingly successfitl products. 
(Atlantic Global PLC 2002). 
Key: Words in bold refer to pronoun use demonstrated by example 
The use of the second person plural occurs in the context of actions undertaken by the 
group impacting on the shareholders. This is demonstrated by Example 3. 
CharaCll'f'S implied in the lext" C~28), whom she refers to as 'the implied writer' and 'the implied 
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Example 3: Use of second person 
During my time as your Chairman, the Group has experienced both very good and very bad 
trading conditions and our results have reflected this . ... What 1 can assure you is that your 
Board and the management are absolutely committed to taking whatever actions are necessary to 
restore shareholder value. (Cookson Group PLC 2002). 
Key: Words in bold refer to pronoun use demonstrated by example 
The use of the third-person singular and plural, i.e. references to 'others', occurs 
mainly in the context of describing the actions of members of the management team 
or board of directors. This is demonstrated by Example 4. 
Example 4: Use of third person 
Richard Haythornthwaite, a non-Executive Director since 1999, is also retiring from the Board 
at the same time. We thank him most sincerely for his able and committed contribution. ... 1 
would like to conclude by paying a particular tribute to all our people, management and staff 
alike. They have responded with professionalism and vigour to downsizing, rapid changes and 
tough decisions. (Cookson Group PLC 2002). 
Key: Words in bold refer to pronoun use demonstrated by example 
2.10.3 The authorship of the chairman's report 
When chairman's reports are analysed, it is natural to ask whether the results reflect 
the motives of the chairman, of management, i.e., company executives, of internal 
corporate communication departments or of outside agencies, such as public relations 
agencies, management consultants, and design and image agencies which are often 
involved in the preparation of annual reports. 
First, it needs to be noted that the content of the annual report is the chairman' s 
responsibility. This is due to the fact that the chairman is responsible for the 
governance of the company (Clarke and Murray 2000) which involves running the 
board. Slhe thus plays a significant role in company matters reserved to the board, 
reader' . 
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such as approving strategy, acquisitions and disposals, dividend and financing policy 
and the annual report (Davison 2001). 
In the context of this study, the assumption is that the chairman's report carries the 
stamp of management, rather than that of the chairman or of outside agencies. 
Findings from prior research show that management exerts considerable influence on 
both its content and style during the entire writing process. 
Clarke and Murray'S (2000) survey of the perceptions of UK investment trust 
chairmen on the role of the chairman's report in corporate communications policy 
shows that although only 14 percent of chairmen are solely responsible for writing the 
chairman's report, internal staff, rather than outside agencies tend to be responsible 
for preparing the chairman's report. In fact, of those chairmen who do not write the 
report themselves, 94 percent receive help from management. What is more, 88 
percent of chairman's reports are prepared as a draft by management and 
subsequently amended and approved by chairmen. 
In fact, twelve percent of chairman's reports in the sample of the present study show 
the direct influence of management by means of constituting either (1) a combined 
report by the chairman and the CEO or (2) a combined chairman's report and review 
of operations. The latter is a reflection of chairman/CEO duality (see section 5.1.3). 
The chairman's report can thus be regarded as part of the company's corporate 
communications policy which reflects the views of both the board and management 
regarding firm performance and prospects. The involvement of senior management in 
the preparation of the annual report is confirmed by Ogden and Clarke (2005: 318-
319) who interview the senior executives of six UK water companies in order to 
determine the role of the annual report as an impression management vehicle. 
Typically, the chief executive officer (CEO) initiated the process of preparation, requiring 
contributions from fellow executive directors about their areas of responsibilities. These 
would undergo several iterations as they were combined into a coherent whole by the CEO 
and the executive management team. Further iterations followed the consideration of the draft 
report by the full board of directors before it was finally signed off and sent for printing. 
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This means that both chairmen and management spend a good deal of time reviewing 
and changing the text, before the chairman's report is released to the public. 
However, even if corporate communication departments or outside agencIes are 
involved, there are two reasons for believing that this is not an important problem in 
terms of authorship. First, any good corporate communications department, public 
relations agency or design consultant knows how to produce words and images that 
feel appropriate and comfortable to the corporate client. 40 
Moreover, studies in both management and psychology have successfully used texts 
with multiple authorships for the analysis of underlying motives. Winter (1987) and 
House et al. (1991) find the inaugural speeches of US presidents, which are the result 
of input by both speech writers and presidents, useful indicators of leader appeal, 
leadership success, and leader characteristics.41 
As stated previously, the reading difficulty of narrative annual reports sections can be 
either attributed to managerial manipulation by means of reading ease manipulation or 
to 'bad writing'. Whereas the former represents a deliberate effort on part of 
management to mislead readers about firm performance and prospects and thus 
constitutes impression management, the latter is due to lack of skill on part of the 
writer. 
Since it is impossible to differentiate between the two, it is necessary to make certain 
assumptions about the composition of narrative corporate report sections. In the 
context of this study it is assumed that narrative corporate report sections are written 
by either skilled writers or individuals experienced in corporate reporting. This is due 
to the fact that narrative annual reports are important corporate communication 
documents which are used for marketing and investor relation purposes. Considering 
the adverse effect of a badly executed annual report in terms of money and reputation, 
it can be assumed that companies spend both time and care ensuring that they 
40 ronnan and Argenti's (2002) research report on corporate communication within five large US ~rms 
shows the strong link between corporate communication departments and top management, especially 
the CEO. They find that corporate communication departments provide "sophisticated assistance to ... 
eEOs in the crajiing of their 'Voice and images" (11). 
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communicate exactly what the companIes want them to communicate. In fact, 
research indicates that companies take a lot of care on their narrative annual report 
documents (Clarke and Murray 2000; Forman and Argenti 2002). 
2.11 Summary and conclusions 
Previous accounting research focusing on impression management has almost 
exclusively focused on an agency theory concept of impression management which 
regards narrative corporate report sections as vehicles for influencing the perceptions 
and decisions of outside parties regarding firm performance and prospects. What is 
more, both the managerial motivation to engage in impression management and 
impression management strategies in corporate narrative documents are based on 
agency theory explanations of managerial behaviour. Thus, impression management 
is regarded as originating from managerial incentives to maximise economic benefits. 
However, an analysis of impression management under behavioural finance 
assumptions of managerial and investor behaviour shows impression management to 
fit into the framework of 'moody investing' which is based on the assumption of 
rational managers using both affective and cognitive strategies to manipulate the 
perceptions of irrational investors regarding firm performance and prospects. 
Previous accounting research has identified four manifestations of impression 
management in narrative corporate report sections, namely the obfuscation of 
negative organizational outcomes, the attribution of performance, performance 
comparisons, and choice of earnings number. 
The first of these, namely the obfuscation of negative organizational outcomes, has 
been examined in four manifestations, namely reading ease manipulation, rhetorical 
manipUlation, thematic manipulation, and narrative disclosure. Reading ease 
manipulation obfuscates bad news by making the prose more difficult to read. 
Rhetorical manipulation obfuscates bad news by means of persuasive language. 
41 I would like to thank Robert Ellis from the School of Business at the University of Northern British 
129 
Thematic manipulation manipulates the amount of positive and negative content in 
the text. Narrative disclosures obfuscate bad news by means of theme selection. 
Obfuscation of negative organisational outcomes also occurs by means of disclosing 
biased accounting numbers in the narrative corporate report sections. 
It has been shown in this chapter that social psychology can provide additional 
insights into managerial impression management in a financial reporting context in 
terms of providing (1) a wider concept of impression management, (2) non-economic 
reasons for individuals to engage in impression management, and (3) additional 
strategies adopted by individuals engaging in impression management. It provides an 
analysis of the circumstances prompting impression management by means of 
accountability theory which regards impression management as resulting from the 
accountability relationship between management and shareholders. This leads 
managers to engage in impression management in order to win rewards and avoid 
sanctions. And last, but not least, social psychology research provides a framework 
for analysing the impression management behaviour of individuals dependent on the 
expected reaction - either approval or disapproval - of a relevant other party. Since 
managerial impression management is presumed to provide biased or distorted 
representations of firm performance and prospects, research on dissimulation provides 
important insights and new methods for detecting impression management in 
narrative corporate report sections. 
This study is based on the assumption that the mixed and inconclusive results from 
previous studies examining the association between impression management and firm 
performance are due to the questionable reliability and validity of measures of 
impression management, particularly readability measures. Chapter three which is 
devoted to the measurement of impression management in the form of (1) reading 
ease manipulation and (2) self-presentational dissimulation by means of linguistic 
indicators addresses this issue. 
Columbia for pointing out research in this area. 
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Chapter 3: MEASUREMENT OF IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT 
This chapter introduces new methodologies from linguistics and social psychology 
that may be applied empirically to the measurement of impression management in 
narrative corporate report sections. This thesis breaks new ground in this respect not 
only by using measures of reading difficulty that are more robust than others that have 
been employed to date,42 but also by applying other contemporary language-based 
methods to the analysis of impression management in the form of self-presentational 
dissimulation. Whilst this chapter provides an outline of the three methodologies that 
are proposed, together with a discussion of how they may be applied to corporate 
reports, their empirical application will be presented later in chapter six. 
3.1 Content analysis 
The analysis of narrative corporate report sections necessitates a methodology capable 
of analyzing text in a systematic way. Previous impression management research in 
accounting has used content analysis which is a textual analysis technique developed 
by the social sciences and has only recently been applied in accounting research . 
... it is a methodology that categorises narrative segments. Once sample narrative segments (i.e. 
words, sentences, paragraphs, etc.) are placed into categories and frequency counts for each 
category are developed, conclusions can be drawn about thematic content. (Tennyson et a1. 1990: 
394) 
Its objective is to "extract and analyse themes inherent within the message" (Jones 
and Shoemaker: 1994: 143). The advantage of using content analysis is that it allows 
the quantification of thematic content by means of a content score, which can then be 
statistically related to underlying economic circumstances (Tennyson et al. 1990: 
395). The focus of content analysis in accounting research from an impression 
management perspective is on examining the association between thematic content 
and financial performance. It strives to uncover 'hidden messages and themes' within 
the narrative sections. 
42 See Appendix IX for an exaplanation of all the linguistic terminology arising in the context of the 
discussion of the cohesion-based approach of measuring reading difficulty. 
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Research is carried out by either researcher-based specification of themes and 
subsequent manual categorisation or by means of computerized text analysis 
programs. The choice between the two involves a trade-off between objectivity and 
psychological and linguistic validity. Computerized text analysis programs guarantee 
complete objectivity, but the process of analysis and classification is completely 
mechanical, which can lead to a decrease in psychological and linguistic validity. 
Manual content analysis is more subjective, but the results might be more valid, since 
researchers are able to use their judgment for analysis and classification. 
3.1.1 Thematic and syntactic content analysis 
Accounting research distinguishes between two different approaches, namely 
syntactic content analysis, which 'Jocus[ es] on analysing the readability of the text 
using syntactical features" and thematic content analysis, which is interested in 
"identt&[ing] specific trends, attitudes or content categories from the text and then 
draw inferences from them" (Jones and Shoemaker 1994: 143). The objective of the 
former is to "analyse and quantify the cognitive difficulty of reading the message", 
whereas that of the latter is to "extract and analyse themes inherent within the 
message" (Jones and Shoemaker: 1994: 143). 
Whereas thematic content analysis entails the examination of the content of texts, 
syntactic content analysis involves the investigation of the linguistic aspects of texts. 
The former is used to investigate both the obfuscation of negative organisational 
outcomes in the form of (1) narrative disclosure and (2) thematic manipulation, and 
impression management in the form of performance attributions and use of 
performance referents. The latter is used to investigate obfuscation in the form of 
reading ease manipulation. 
Thematic content analysis 
To conduct thematic content analysis, the text is broken down, or coded, into 
manageable categories on a variety of levels, i.e. either words, phrases, sentences, or 
themes. It follows that content analysis may be categorized into 'form-oriented', 
which focuses on occurrences of narrative segments. and 'meaning-oriented'. which 
focus~s more specifically on thematic content (Smith and Taffler 2000: 627). The 
fom1er involves the routine counting of words or phrases and the latter focuses more 
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specifically on analyzing underlying themes, where the research objective is to 
"extract and analyse themes inherent within the message" (Jones and Shoemaker: 
1994: 143). In impression management in accounting, the term 'thematic content 
analysis' is used in this context, where the main concern is the analysis of the 
information content of texts. 
The advantage of using content analysis is that it allows the quantification of thematic 
content by means of a content score, which can then be statistically related to 
underlying economic circumstances (Tennyson et al. 1990: 395). The research 
objectives of the existing accounting studies using this methodology have ranged from 
comparing the thematic content of the reports of companies with increasing and 
declining performance (narrative disclosure) and examining positive and negative 
organizational outcomes (thematic manipulation) to uncovering management's 
performance explanations (attribution) (See Appendix III for a an overview of the 
thematic content analysis approaches undertaken by previous impression management 
studies). 
Table 3.1 categorises these three types of impression management into form- and 
meaning-oriented studies: 
Table 3.1. Overview of impression management studies using thematic content analysis 
Narrative disclosure 
Thematic 
manipulation 
Attribution 
Form-oriented 
• Clatworthy & Jones (2006) 
• Abrahamson & Park (1994) 
• Abrahamson & Amir (1996) 
• Bryan (1997) 
• Smith and Taffler (2000) 
• Clatworthy & Jones (2006) 
• Clatworthy & Jones (2003) 
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Meaning-oriented 
• Ingram & Frazier (1980) 
• Frazier et al. (1984) 
• Tennyson et al. (1990) 
• Smith & Taffler (2000) 
• Staw et al. (1983) 
• FioI(1995) 
• Hooghiemstra (2001) 
• Aerts (1994, 2001,2005) 
• Ogden and Clarke (2005) 
In each case, the key issue that has confronted researchers has been the same. As 
Smith and Taffler (1995: 1195) note, the main problem in the development of 
impression management research has concerned the objectivity of the research 
process: 
The information content of accounting narrative statements has remained largely unexplored to 
date because of the absence of an acceptable methodology, capable of analysing content in an 
objective manner. The development of computer software, in recent years, to explore the keyword 
and thematic content of narrative has substantially overcome the problem of investigator 
subjectivity ... 
Another problem with thematic content analysis is the sheer labour-intensity of data 
collection, resulting in relatively small sample sizes: 
First, it is very difficult to develop a reliable coding scheme, even for simple coding 
judgments. Second, when such reliable coding schemes have been developed, it is very 
costly (time-consuming) to code each element of text according to the coding scheme. 
Third, such coding has to be carried out twice in order to calculate inter-coder reliability. 
For these three reasons, most content analysis studies have a small sample size (usually 
less than 100 observations) and are confined to rather simple coding judgments. 
(Abrahamson and Amir 1996: 1163) 
Impression management research has used a variety of computer programs for 
automated content analysis. Table 3.2 provides an overview of content analysis 
programs used in previous impression management research and compares their 
thematic dimension with that of Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, the program used 
in this study (see section 3.4.2 for a more detailed discussion of Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count and Appendix IV for a more detailed discussion of automatic content 
analysis programs used in previous research). 
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Table 3.2: Computerised content analysis programs 
Academic origin Accounting Thematic 
application dimensions 
WORDS Medicine • Frazier et al. No thematic 
(1984) dimensions. 
• Tennyson et al. 
(1990) Key words (based on frequency counts) 
DICTION Linguistics • Sydserff & • Certainty 
Weetman (2001) • Optimism 
• Yuthas et al. • Activity 
(2002) • Realism 
• Commonality 
Oxford Concordance Linguistics • Smith & Taffler No thematic 
Program (2000) dimensions. 
Key words 
Linguistic Inquiry and Psychology (focus • This study • Linguistic 
Word Count on personal dimensions 
narratives) • Psychological 
processes 
• Relativity 
• Personal 
concerns 
(thematic 
dimensions) 
Syntactic content analysis 
Previous accounting research from an impression management perspective has 
successfully employed computerised content analysis to analyze the thematic aspects 
of accounting texts using various thematic content analysis programs, including 
WORD and DICTION. However, due to lack of an appropriate methodology and 
suitable syntactic content analysis programs,43 the linguistic aspects of accounting 
texts, including reading difficulty, have not been systematically explored. 
~J . f The most widely used approach is the use of word processing programs for the computatIon 0 
readability scores. For example. WORD provides the Flesch Reading Ease score via its Tools option. 
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This opens up the field for methodological development in the fonn of syntactic 
content analysis and in the fonn of suitable syntactic content analysis programs. 
Research in corpus linguistics and recent advances in computational linguistics 
provide the building blocks of both a syntactic content analysis methodology and 
computer programs which allow empirical quantitative analysis of the linguistic 
aspects of texts. 
Corpus linguistics constitutes the study of language through corpus-based research. A 
corpus can be defined in the following way: 
A collection of linguistic data, either written texts or a transcription of recorded speech, 
which can be used as a starting-point of linguistic description or as a means of verifying 
hypotheses about a language. (Crystal 1991). 
In the context of this study, the corpus constitutes of 93 chainnan's reports of listed 
UK companies. 
Corpus analysis involves all procedures related to the processing, usage and analysis 
of corpora. It utilizes research from computational linguistics for either automated or 
computer-assisted analysis of the linguistic features of sample texts. For this purpose, 
texts which have been rendered machine-readable need to be annotated with 
additional infonnation in order to allow the speedy and easy retrieval and analysis of 
the linguistic infonnation contained in the corpus. 
Three main areas of corpus-based linguistic study are lexis (e.g. word use, idioms, 
irregular plurals), syntax, i.e. sentence level features (e.g. use of prepositions, verb 
forms, pronouns, agreement), and discourse, i.e. whole-text features (e.g. cohesion, 
discourse markers). The analysis of reading difficulty focuses on discourse level 
phenomena, specifically cohesion, i.e., the interconnection within and between 
sentences. 
Syntactic content analysis programs allow the quantitative analysis of the linguistic 
aspects of texts, such as pronoun use, use of prepositions, discourse markers, and 
cohesion. There are two types of computer programs available, namely (1) automatic 
and (2) user-assisted programs. Whereas automatic programs ones operate in a black-
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box format, i.e. it is not possible to observe the processes involved leading to the 
output, user-assisted programs are interactive and require user-input. The current 
study uses two text analysis programs for analysing reading difficulty, namely (l) 
Coh-Metrix which automatically generates measures of reading difficulty and (2) 
MMAX2 which is a computer-based tool for creating linguistic annotations. They are 
discussed in more detail in section 3.3.4. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the interassociation between impression management in the fonn 
of reading ease manipulation and the methodologies used in this study for its capture, 
measurement, and analysis. 
Figure 3.1: Methodology for analyzing reading difficulty in corporate narrative 
documents 
Variable 
Data source 
Type of data 
Academic disciplines 
Methodology 
Linguistic features 
Text analysis programs 
Reading 
dTCUl1y 
Corporate 
narrative 
documents 
Ling~stic data 
l~us 
linguistics, 
Computational 
IinriStiCS 
Syntactic 
content 
an!'YSiS 
COrSiOn 
Coh-Metrix 
MMAX7 
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3.1.2 Methodological principles of content analysis 
This study adopts a quantitative content analysis approach to the measurement of 
impression management in corporate narrative documents. This entails "objective and 
systematic counting and recording procedures to produce a quantitative description 
of the symbolic content in a text" (Neuman 1997: 273) and is based on the follo\\"ing 
six principles: (1) objectivity/intersubjectivity, (2) a priori design, (3) intercoder 
reliability, (4) validity, (5) generalisability, and (6) replicability (see Neuman 1997). 
Objectivity/intersubjectivity 
Objectivity/intersubjectivity is maximized by selecting a representative sample (see 
section 5.1.2). 
A priori design 
A priori design means that all decisions on variables, their measurement and coding 
must be made before the observation begins (see section 3.3.2). 
Intercoder reliability 
This study uses three approaches for measunng impression management, two of 
which involve automatic content analysis resulting in computer-generated scores of 
reading difficulty (Coh-Metrix) and self-presentational dissimulation. However, as the 
third approach entails the manual coding of text (see section 3.3.2), it needs to be 
ensured that the "obtained ratings are not the idiosyncratic results of one's rather 
subjective judgment" (Tinsley and Weiss 1975: 359). This process is referred to as 
intercoder reliability and entails using two or more coders for a sub-sample of content 
in order to achieve maximum reliability. In this study, the annotation was carried out 
by the author, with a sub-sample of texts (ten percent, i.e. nine randomly chosen 
chairman's reports) being co-coded by a linguistics graduate. 
The statistical procedure for measuring intercoder reliability is Scotf s pi and Cohen's 
kappa, and Krippendorfs alpha which measure agreement for coding nominal 
categories (Lombard et al 2004). However. marking cohesion entails establishing 
links between nouns and noun phrases which is a grouping task. For this purpose. \ve 
can use approaches used in computational linguistics for evaluating the performance 
of computer annotation tools. 
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Interannotator agreement evaluates how well two coders agree in marking cohesi\'e 
relations. "The scoring algorithm generates separate scores for recall (the number of 
correctly identified [cohesive] links over the number of links in the "gold standard" 
or key) and precision (the number of correctly identified links over the number of 
links actually generated in the response)" (Hirschman et al. 1997: 2). Comparing the 
annotation of two coders, coder 1 (key) and coder 2 (response), the pairs of noun 
phrases coder 1 has marked as cohesive are referred to as the key and the pairs of 
noun phrases coder 2 has marked as cohesive are referred to as the response . .l.l In 
comparing the coding of cohesive noun phrases between coder 1 and 2, there are three 
possible scenarios, namely (l) true positive (IP), which refers to the pairs of noun 
phrases both coder 1 and coder 2 have marked as cohesive, (2) false positive (FP), 
which refers to the pairs of noun phrases coder 2 has marked as cohesive. but coder 1 
has not marked as cohesive, and (3) false negative (FN), which refers to the pairs of 
noun phrases coder 2 has not marked as cohesive, but coder 1 has marked as cohesive. 
These three scenarios form the basis of the measures of precision and recall. Precision 
(P) is measured as P = IP/(IP + FP) and recall is measured as R = IP/(IP + FN). 
lnterannotator agreement is then measured by means of the F -statistic, which 
measures the average of precision and recall, expressed mathematically as F = 
l/[(a/P) + (l-a)/R)]. The F-statistic, which measures an average of precision and 
recall, is computed as F = l/[(a/P) + (l-a)/R)]. Alpha (a) allows researchers to weight 
precision and recall. If precision and recall are assigned equal weights, then alpha = 
0.5.45 
44 This comparison can be carried out relatively easily .by mea~s of the Mi\~AX2 Query console: which 
allows the user to detect, browse, and quantify coheSIve relatIOns on preVIOusly annotated texts, The 
'display' command lists all noun phrases marked as cohesive in a given text. Subsequently. the noun 
phrases marked as cohesive by coder 1 and coder 2 can be compared. 
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Formula 1: Measuring interannotator agreement 
1 F=-----I-a 
+ 
a 
p R 
However, the output of its search facility, the MMAX2 Query Console, which provides 
a means for detecting, browsing, and quantifying cohesive relations on previously 
annotated texts, can be used as a basis for computing reading difficulty measures. 
Interannotator agreement, along with details of the intercoder reliability sample. is 
reported in Appendix V. 
Validity 
Validity is gained by thoroughly understanding research objectives. This is done by 
basing measures of reading difficulty on research carried out by linguistics and 
psychology (see section 3.3.1). 
Generalisabili ty 
Generalisability refers to the extent to which research findings can be applied to and 
taken as a measure of target population, i.e. the entirety of UK listed firms. This is 
achieved by a careful sample selection which includes companies from a wide variety 
of industries and sizes (see section 5.1.1.). 
Replicability 
Replicability refers to the ability and degree of difficulty for other researchers to 
replicate the research to challenge the results. This is achie\'ed by pro\'iding full 
45 See Manning and SchUtze (1999) for a detailed discussion of computing interannotator agreement for 
textual links. such as coreference. 
information on the research methodology and procedures (section 3.3.2). It includes 
the following: (1) code book/coding list (section 3.3.2), (2) coding guidelines and 
instructions issued to coders (Appendix VI and VII), (3) method of coding used in the 
case of human coding (Appendix VI and VII), (4) details of software programs used 
(section 3.3.4), and (4) all data supporting conclusions (Appendix V). 
3.2 Conventional approaches to measuring reading difficulty 
The concept of reading difficulty or readability originates in education research where 
it is used for grading primary school texts based on different reading le\'els. 
Accounting research from an impression management perspective has adopted the 
concept of readability and its various measures for investigating the obfuscation of 
negative organizational outcomes in narrative annual report documents by means of 
reading ease manipulation. 
There are three approaches to syntactical difficulty, namely (1) a text-centred 
approach, (2) a user-centred approach, and (3) an integrative approach focusing on 
both aspects. Whereas text-centred approaches regards syntactical difficulty as a 
function of the text itself (readability), user-centred approaches regard it as a function 
of the reader, including their education and background knowledge 
(understandability). The integrative approach is based on both textual aspects and user 
characteristics. 
Table 3.3 provides an overvIew of the varIOUS concepts, units of analysis, 
methodologies, measures and hypotheses underlying the three different approaches to 
reading difticulty used in previous research. 
This research uses a text-centred approach, whereby syntactic complexity is analyzed 
using discourse analysis. The concept of textual complexity which lies at the heart of 
the study is discussed in section 3.3.1. 
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cus 
Concept of 
readability 
Unit of 
analysis 
Methodology 
Metrics 
Hypothesis 
Text-centered components 
Readability 
Sentence level 
• Lix 
• Fog 
• Flesch 
• Word length 
• Sentence length 
• Number of syllables 
per word 
Long words and long 
sentences make a text 
difficult to read 
Textual complexity 
Text level 
Discourse analysis 
• Amount of cohesive ties 
• Cohesion density 
• Association between new and 
given information 
Lack of cohesive devices make a 
text difficult to read 
New measure used for the first time in current research 
User-centred components 
Understandability 
Text level 
Cloze 
Deletion of every nth word 
Lack of background knowledge 
and unfamiliarity with topics and 
terminology make a text difficult 
to read 
he unit of the leve l is the so-called t-unit, which consists of a main clause and all the subordinate clauses attached to it. 
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Integrative approach 
Communicative effectiveness 
Sentence level' 
Texture index 
• Topicality 
• Conjunction 
• Connectivity 
• Situationality 
• Conjunction 
• Shift in info category 
• Intertextuality 
• Specificity 
Lack of communicative effectiveness 
makes a text difficult to read 
3.2.1 Text-centred approach 
Text-centred approaches claim that reading difficulty is a function of the text itself 
, 
i.e., it is based on elements such as word length, sentence length or number of 
syllables per word. Reading difficulty, or readability, is measured by means of so-
called 'readability formulae' or 'scores' which give an indication of the syntactical 
difficulty of text: 46 
[Readability scores are based on] counts of language variables in a written document 
to generate an estimation of reading difficulty. . .. Most measures of readability rely 
on sentence and word length as primary determinants of the reading level of a given 
document. Typically, a mathematical model is used to ascertain the reading level by 
weighing different combinations of variables. (Baker and Kare 1992: 1) 
Readability formulae are therefore "a function of the length of sentences and the si~e 
of words in a text" (Harrison and Bakker 1998: 122). They represent a "single 
summary reading ease score" (Courtis 1995: 6) for a particular text or text passage. 
Readability formulae work by companng a calculated score with "predetermined 
standards of written materials graded according to difficulty" (Courtis 1995: 5), 
ranging from children's comics to scientific articles. They thus represent objective 
and quantifiable methods of measuring comprehension difficulty. 
However, to transfer a methodology originally developed in education research to 
assess the difficulty of reading material for school children to a corporate reporting 
context could lead to potential validity problems. This is for two reasons, namely (1) 
the different ages of the target readers and (2) the fact that there is no yardstick for 
assessing the reading difficulty of narrative corporate report sections since they have 
never been subject to grading. Thus, the application of readability formulae 10 a 
corporate reporting context is highly questionable (Stevens et al. 1992: 371). 
The most commonly used readability formulae in accounting research are the Flesch 
and Lix scores. They are based on counting of sentences, \vords, syllables and 
characters. The counts are subsequently input into a fom1ula which represents the 
46 See Lewis et at. (1986) for a comprehensiYe oven iew of the characteristics of readability 
formulae. including Dale-Chal/, Flesch. Fog. Kwolek. the Fry Graph, and LLt, 
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reading ease of a particular text. Whereas the Flesch score "is related to memon' 
span", the Lix score is associated with the "reader's speed of recognition" (Courtis 
1995: 5). 
Flesch score 
The Flesch score measures sentence length and syllables per 100 words as sho\\JTI in 
Formula 2. The closer the score is to zero, the more incomprehensible is the text 
under investigation. "The underlying assumption is that the longer the sentences and 
the longer the words within these sentences, then the more difficult the text being 
measured" (Sydes and Hartley 1997: 143). The advantage of the Flesch score is that it 
is very simple to apply since it is part of word-processing packages such as Trord. 
Formula 2: Flesch score 
206.835 - 0.846wl- 1.0 16S 
wi = word length = number of syllables per 100 words 
S = average number of words per sentence (= total number of words Ito tal number of sentences) 
Fog score 
The Fog score is similar to the Flesch approach, except that it is based on the 
percentage of words with three or more syllables in a passage. The calculation is 
shown in Formula 3. The measure is a function of sentence length and percentage of 
hard words, i.e. words with three or more syllables. 
Formula 3: Fog score 
0.4 x (S + SW) 
S = average number of words per sentence 
SW = the percentage of words with three or more syllables 
I 
Lix score 
The calculation of the Lix score is shown in Formula 4. A low Lix score indicates a 
high level of readability. 
Formula 4: Lix score 
S+LW 
S = average number of words per sentence 
L W = the percentage of words of seven or more letters 
Kwolek score 
Kwolek measures readability by sentence length and the percentage of hard words, i.e. 
words with more than three syllables. The calculation is shown in Formula 5. 
Formula 5: Kwolek score 
0.593 x (S/2 + SW) 
S = average number of words per sentence 
SW = the percentage of words with three or more syllables 
Dale-Chall score 
Reading difficulty IS conceptualised as a function of sentence length and word 
difficulty. Word difficulty is not based on length of words measured by means of 
letters or syllables, but on familiarity, based on a list of 3,000 words best known by 
eight year olds in the US. The calculation is shown in Formula 6. 
1.+) 
Formula 6: Dale-Chall score 
(0.1579 x UW) + (0.0496 + S) + 3.6365 
UW = percentage of unfamiliar words 
S = average number of words per sentence 
Since readability scores reduce readability to a single measure, they have been 
criticized by accounting, linguistics, and education researchers for being too 
simplistic: 
How easy a text is for an individual to read is the result of the interaction of a number of 
different factors. It is a multifaceted phenomenon, reflecting properties both of texts and 
readers and the interaction between them. (Bailin and Grafstein 2001: 292) 
Readability formulae do not take text features such as lex is, i.e. vocabulary, and 
rhetorical features into consideration, which playa part in rendering a text difficult to 
read. Thus, readability formulae can be regarded as mere predictors of text difficulty: 
Predictors are shortcuts to making tentative decisions in the absence of more 
precise information. This is so, because there is no direct link between estimates (or 
predictions of) text difficulty and reader comprehension. (Fulcher 1997: 501) 
What is more, research has shown readability measures to lack so-called "inter-
formula consistency" (Stevens et al. 1992: 372), as far as judging how easy or difficult 
a particular type of text is to read. This problem is accentuated further by computer 
packages, which have been found to be unreliable in calculating readability scores 
(Sydes and Hartley 1997: 144). Their conclusions after testing four different computer 
packages are: 
(i) ... different readability scores will be obtained from ostensibly the same 
readability measure if different computer packages are used, and (ii) ... this is more 
likely to be the case when programs are used on more difficult texts. 
These findings call into question both the validity and the reliability of readability 
Scores and thus the results of reading ease manipulation studies based on these 
measures. 
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Based on the Flesch score, a program has been developed by Deloitte Consulting in 
order to highlight jargon and obfuscation in corporate communication documents. The 
software attaches itself to the toolbar of Microsoft Word and works in the same way 
as a spell-checker, i.e., it searches documents for jargon and complex language. 
Known as Bulljighter, the program takes conventional readability scores one step 
further by means of constructing a 'bull composite index' which constitutes a 
combination of the Flesch score and certain business jargon (the so-called "bullshit 
words' such as synergy, knowledge capital, and core competencies). Based on this 
index, documents are ranked on a scale of 1 to 10, one representing the lowest and 10 
being the highest in jargon and obfuscation. Deloitte have tested Bullfighter on 
various corporate documents produced by 30 top listed US companies from the Dow 
Jones Industrial Averages (Deloitte 2003). They found an association between clear 
communication and financial performance. When tested on the corporate 
communications of Enron between 1999 and 2001, it showed that Enron 's corporate 
communications were becoming increasingly vague and ambiguous, as the company's 
financial situation began to deteriorate. However, Smith et al. (2005) do not find any 
association between the 'bull composite index' and the financial performance of 277 
Malaysian companies. 
3.2.2 User-centred approach 
User-centred approaches regard reading difficulty as a function of reader 
characteristics, such as background knowledge, interest in the subject of the text under 
investigation, level of general education, and reading speed and strategies (Fulcher 
1997: 501). The limitations posed by lack of reader involvement have been addressed 
in accounting research by means of differentiating between 'readability' and 
'understandability', with readability being text-centred and understandability being 
reader-centred: 
Readability thus measures the textual difficulty of a passage; while ~nderst~ndabilit: 
measures the ability of a reader to gain knowledge from a t.ex,t. and IS contmgent n~t 
only on syntactical difficulty, but also on reader charac,tenstl~s, such, as the reader s 
background, prior knowledge. interest. and general readmg abllIt,Y., DI,tT~rent read~rs 
may, thus, exhibit different levels of understanding because of theIr mdl\,ldual rea?tng 
abilities. The readability or syntactic complexity of a te\t. how,e.\er, IS essentIally 
fixed, Readability is a prerequisite of aggregate unde.rstandabllIty; but does not 
guarantee individual understandability. (Jones, 1997: 105t.) 
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Understandability is measured by means of the cloze test. This requires the deletion of 
words or phrases from a text at either random or fixed intervals. Then, target readers 
are asked to complete the text. Subsequently, a percentage score is calculated which 
indicates the success of readers at guessing the missing words. Thus, the cloze test 
involves the "direct assessment by readers of textual complexity" (Jones 1997: 106). 
Whereas the Flesch and Lix scores measure complexity of display, the cloze score 
measures meaning (Jones 1996: 87). 
In fact, Smith and Taffler (1992a), who compare cloze with Flesch and Lix scores, 
find significant differences for all of them in same text. Only Flesch and Lix scores 
are highly correlated. They also find the level of the cloze score to be dependent on 
the user's level of accounting sophistication. This indicates that different concepts of 
reading difficulty are being measured which leads them to the following conclusion: 
... understandability is related both to complexity of context and to education and 
experience, and constitutes a different measure to readability indices calculated 
independently of either user or context. (Smith and Taftler 1992a: 93) 
Smith and Taffler (1992a) attribute the relatively low cloze scores recorded even for 
sophisticated users of accounting infonnation, such as partners and managers of Big 8 
accounting finns to the comprehension difficulty of the accounting narratives. 
However, these results could also be an indication that the measure itself is flawed. 
Jones' findings (1997: 124) suggest severe shortcomings as far as the cloze test's 
"measurement of comprehension, ... validity, and ... [its} precise meaning" are 
concerned. In fact, what the cloze score is really testing is not comprehension, but 
inference, i.e. the ability of the reader to correctly guess missing words (Jones 1997: 
118). Since text comprehension is a function of cognitive processes, psychology 
proyides more adequate methodologies for measuring understandability than the cloze 
procedure. Studies on text processing focus on recall and recognition which is 
measured by means of questionnaires and multiple-choice tests (Britton and Gulgoz, 
1991; McKeown et al. 1992). 
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Furthermore, due to its reliance on reader participation, the cloze procedure can only 
measure, but not predict readability (Lewis et al. 1986: 202). Another drawback of the 
cloze procedure is its dependency on direct reader involvement through personal 
contact or questionnaires (Lewis et al. 1986: 202), which makes it very time-
consuming and impractical for accounting researchers. Consequently, there are only 
two accounting studies using the cloze procedure (Smith and Taffler 1992a,b). 
What is more, there is a lack of evidence as far as the cloze procedure's suitability for 
all types of texts or genres and age groups is concerned. Like readability measures, 
the cloze score was originally developed by education researchers. Since narrative 
annual report documents differ substantially from elementary school texts, the validity 
of the cloze score is questionable in a financial reporting context. 
Thus, both readability and understandability measures suffer from the drawback that 
their underlying concept of reading is too simplistic. They ignore the purpose of 
reading a particular text and the reading strategies employed: 
Readers use texts for a wide range of reasons: to get an overview of a subject, to answer 
specific questions, to carry out a task, etc. They may read sequentially, or dip into the text 
where they think it might be useful; they may skim read, search for specific information, or 
study in depth. (Harrison and Bakker 1998: 124) 
In fact, a user-centred approach to reading difficulty is unsuitable for the analysis of 
narrative corporate report sections. Research from an impression management 
perspective regards the annual report as being used by a wide, largely undifferentiated 
audience (Stanton and Stanton 2002). This includes user groups with specialized 
financial knowledge, such as institutional shareholders, financial analysts, and 
auditors and user groups with limited understanding of finance and accounting, such 
as small shareholders, the general public. This is especially the case for chairman's 
reports, which form the basis of analysis in this study. Due to their different 
education, background knowledge, and different motivations for reading the annual 
report, these various user groups will show different levels of understandability. For 
this reason, it is impossible to construct a readability measure based on reader-based 
standards. 
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What is more, from a practical point of view, it would be very difficult to assess the 
understandability of these different user groups. Even if an alternative methodology to 
the cloze procedure, such as questionnaires and multiple choice tests, were adopted, 
the practical problems regarding response rates and lengthy application and evaluation 
. 47 
remam. 
What is more, as discussed in section 2.2, the majority of impression management 
research, including this study, focuses on managerial behaviour and is concerned with 
the issue of whether managers attempt to manipulate investor perceptions of firm 
performance and prospects. In the context of reading ease manipulation this entails 
measuring the reading difficulty of narrative corporate report sections. However, an 
approach based on reader responses focuses on investor behaviour and thus does not 
provide the right methodological fit with the implicit or explicit research question 
underpinning impression management research from a managerial behaviour 
perspective. 
For these reasons, this study adopts a text-centred approach for assessing reading 
difficulty (see section 3.3.1). 
3.2.3 Integrative approach 
The texture index (Sydserff and Weetman 1999) constitutes an alternative reading 
difficulty measure which was developed specifically for evaluating the reading 
difficulty of the Operating and Financial Review. It represents an attempt to overcome 
the shortcomings of previous approaches to reading difficulty by means of combining 
both text- and user-centred elements: 
Readability formulae have been criticised as a method for scoring accounting narratives 
because of their focus on word- and sentence-level features and not on whole-text 
aspects, their lack of regard for the interests and motivation of the reader, and their 
inappropriateness for evaluating adult-based and technical accounting narratives. [The 
texture index] addresses these criticisms. (Sydserff and Weetman 1999: 459) 
~' In some respects, Weetman et al. 's (1994) survey of analysts and institutional investors' views on the 
Operating and Financial Review represents research on the relevance aspect of a particular narrative 
annual report document to two specific user groups. 
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The texture index is based on the work of Roseberry (1995) and was originally 
developed as a tool to help writers evaluate the reading difficulty of their texts. In its 
adaptation to a financial reporting context, it consists of seven indexicals which 
represent seven criteria for evaluating texts.48 Five indexicals are text-centred, namely 
(1) topicality, (2) conjunction, (3) connectivity, (4) shift in information category, (5) 
specificity; and two are user-centred, namely (6) intertextuality and (7) situationality. 
Topicality 
Topicality refers to "the degree to which the narrative adheres to the main topic(s) 
and the overall topic frameworlC' (Sydserff and Weetman 1999: 465). This element 
captures a thematic, rather than a syntactic feature in that it checks for the presence or 
absence of pre-defined topics or themes. It is thus related to thematic content analysis. 
As a result, the texture index represents a unique combination of both syntactic and 
thematic features. 
However, since the topics relate specifically to the Operating and Financial Review, 
the texture index cannot be transferred to the analysis of other narrative corporate 
reports. This is especially the case for unregulated narrative corporate documents, 
such as the chairman's report, where companies have complete freedom in choosing 
the content. 
Conjunction 
Conjunction "is concerned with the specific words or phrases ... which function as 
links and bind narratives together" (Sydserff and Weetman 1999: 468), such as and, 
although, after all, etc. 
Connecti vi ty 
Connectivity measures the degree to which each succeeding part of the narrative 
refers to an earlier part by means of creating semantic links from one text-unit to the 
48 The texture index captures similar criteria of communicative effectiveness as those established by a 
panel of five experts in the field of reading/writing research (Fulcher 1997), namely (a) linguistic 
structure, (b) contextual structure (purpose and audience, context of use, information gaps, layout and 
visual support), (c) conceptual structure (degree of familiar and unfamiliar text content, informational 
associations, degree of abstractness, and temporal structure), and (d) reader-writer association (use of 
pronouns, tense and voice). 
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next by means of repetition of words or, phrases. A text unit is defined as a main 
clause with all its dependent sub-clauses. Connectivity refers to the same concept as 
grammatical cohesion which constitutes the basis for the measures of reading 
difficulty developed in section 3.3.1. 
Shift in information category 
Shift in information category refers to the measure of coherence resulting from shifts 
in information category. Consequently, "the measure of topic shift is therefore a 
quantification of how many information categories are contained in the report and 
how frequently the category changes" (Sydserff and Weetman 1999: 471). 
Specificity 
Specificity measures the extent of specific references III a text, l.e. the extent of 
quantified information provided.49 
Intertextuali ty 
Intertextuality "concerns the factors that make use of one narrative dependent upon 
the knowledge of other material" (Sydserff and Weetman 1999: 467). In this 
particular context, it refers to the interconnection of the narrative sections of the 
annual report with the financial statements and notes. 
Situationality 
Situationality tests whether the Operating and Financial Review fits with the rest of 
the annual report. Situationality "is either satisfied or not for the narrative as a whole 
and is therefore not relevant to a unit-by-unit analysis" (Sydserff and Weetman 1999: 
472). 
49 This measure is similar to Krumbholz' s (1994) precision scale and Wiseman's (1982) degree of 
specificity, who use them as a way of quantifying information provided in the narrative sections of 
annual reports, \vith the aim of constructing disclosure indices. The former categorises information 
onto a sliding scale into a) point information, b) interval information, c) comparative information, d) 
additional information or explanation, and e) not classifiable information. Krumbholz (1994) also 
classifies information into a) verbal, b) numerical, and c) mixed. Wiseman (1982) classifies 
information into a) quantitative information, b) specific, but non-quantitative information. and c) items 
referred to in general terms. 
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Scoring 
The unit of analysis is extended beyond the word level and compnses an 
"independent clause with all subordinate clauses attached to i(' (S ydserff and 
Weetman 1999: 463), which is referred to as a text-unit or t-unit. 
Narrative sections are scored for each indexical and the indexical scores are 
subsequently combined to provide a score for texture. The scoring system is a 
categorical score of 0, 1 or 2; zero denoting the absence of a particular characteristic 
and one and two different degrees of presence of this particular feature. The 
methodology is similar to that of a voluntary disclosure index, only that the texture 
index captures components of reading difficulty, whereas the voluntary disclosure 
index measures the amount and type of voluntary information contained a particular 
narrative section of an annual report. 
The advantage of this new approach compared with its predecessors is that it 
constitutes a more complex measure of reading difficulty than conventional 
readability measures. This is reflected in the lack of association between the texture 
index and the Flesch readability score: 
The generality of low correlation coefficients between each indexical and the Flesch 
readability scores ... provides a strong indication that the indexicals offer information 
about the narrative which is not captured in a readability score. (Sydserff and Weetman 
1999:473) 
However, there are a number of methodological problems associated with the texture 
index relating to its (a) subjectivity, (b) unit of analysis and to (c) some its indexicals. 
First of alL the texture index is a very subjective measure whose analysis and scoring 
approach depends entirely on the judgment of the researcher. Secondly, the text unit 
does not extend beyond the sentence which means that the analysis does not pick up 
on phenomena occurring over several sentences. The importance of extending the unit 
of analysis beyond the sentence will become apparent in the discussion of cohesion in 
section 3.3. L which not only occurs within, but also between sentences. 
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We have already discussed the impracticality of a user-centred approach to reading 
difficulty for narrative corporate report sections. What is more, the two user-centred 
indexicals in the texture index are problematic in themselves. 
First of all, the indexical 'intertextuality' refers to the interconnection of information 
in the narrative corporate report sections with information found in other sections of 
the annual report. This only covers one aspect of intertextuality, namely functional 
intertextuality (Devitt 1991), i.e. a particular text is part of a larger macrotext, in this 
particular case the entire annual report. 
However, Devitt (1991) proposes a three-dimensional concept of intertextuality. 
namely (1) referential, (2) functional, and (3) generic, which collectively account for 
the interaction between texts. Generic intertextuality refers to drawing on previous 
texts written in response to similar situations, referential intertextuality refers to the 
use of reference within one text to another, and functional intertextuality refers to a 
particular accounting text as being part of a larger macrotext. In a corporate reporting 
context referential and generic intertexuality mean that a particular Operating and 
Financial Review (or any other narrative corporate document) does not stand on its 
own, but has to be seen and read in the context of corporate reporting in general and 
in the context of other examples of the Operating and Financial Review in particular. 
Secondly, the indexical 'situationality' is misunderstood by Sydserff and Weetman 
(1999). Coined by De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981), it does not refer to whether a 
particular text occurs in the relevant context, but it means that the writer and reader 
must share the same background knowledge for a text to be 'readable' or easily 
understood. 
There are also problems with two of the five text-centered indexicals. The term 
'information category' within the indexical 'shift in information category' is not 
clearly defined and it is hard to reliably differentiate it from the term 'topic' used in 
the indexical "topicality'. What is more, relating to the indexical 'conjunction', th~r~ 
is no linguistic basis supporting Sydserff and Weetman's (1999) claim that additive 
conjunctions are inferior to adversative or causal conjunctions. In fact. when 
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presenting a list of activities or events, additive conjunctions are the only appropriate 
linguistic means to do so. 
Since the Operating and Financial Review (OFR) is regulated by a non-mandatory 
Accounting Standards Board statement which provides a thematic framework and 
gives preference to quantified information, the two indexicals 'topicality' and 
'specificity' constitute specific criteria for the OFR and cannot be transferred to the 
analysis of any other narrative corporate report section. As mentioned previously. 
other narrative corporate report sections, such as the chairman's report, are 
unregulated and thus cannot be assessed in terms of 'topicality' and 'specificity'. 
3.3 Measuring reading difficulty in the current study 
The discussion of conventional reading difficulty measures has shown the basic 
problem underlying the study of reading ease manipulation in corporate reports to be 
a methodological one. Since the investigation of reading ease manipulation In 
narrative corporate report sections entails analyzing the way language is used to 
manipulate the readers' perceptions of firm performance and prospects, it necessitates 
a methodology which (l) incorporates insights from linguistics and psychology on 
crucial aspects of reading difficulty and which (2) allows the empirical quantitative 
analysis of texts. 
3.3.1 A cohesion-based approach to measuring reading difficulty 
The measures proposed in this study are based on a text -centred approach to reading 
difficulty. As discussed in section 3.2.1, text-entered approaches regard reading 
difficulty as a function of the text and not of user-characteristics. This provides a 
better methodological fit with the research focus of this study which is on managerial 
impression management rather than the effectiveness of impression management. so 
50 Text-centred approaches are better suited to exploring the question of whetha managers use 
corporate narrative documents for impression management purposes, whereas user-centred approaches 
are better suited to exploring the issue whether impression management is effective. 
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The two new approaches to measunng reading difficulty proposed in his study 
address two validity problems inherent in conventional concepts and measures of 
readability, namely a linguistic and a psychological one. 
Conventional readability measures suffer from validity problems since "the linguistic 
assumptions underlying readability formulae are problematic ... [in that they] do not 
in fact measure what they were designed to measure" (Bailin and Grafstein 2001: 
298). This is due to the fact that the linguistic criteria "that form the basis for 
readability scores do not constitute a satisfactory basis for assessing reading 
difficulty" (Bailin and Grafstein 2001: 286). 
What makes a text difficult to read and understand goes beyond word and sentence 
length. Undoubtedly, long words takes longer to process since they occur less 
frequently and thus take more time to access and interpret. Long sentences are also 
more difficult to understand, since they make more demands on working memory 
(Graesser et al. 2004: 194). 
This study introduces two objective and quantifiable methods of meaSUrIng 
readability which are based on research carried out by linguistics and psychology. 
They thus overcome the validity problems inherent in readability formulae and cloze 
scores and the subjectivity and methodological problems inherent in the texture index. 
This is achieved by means of (1) basing assumptions of what constitutes text on 
research carried out by discourse analysis,S! a sub-discipline of linguistics, (2) basing 
assumptions of reading difficulty on psychological insights on comprehension 
difficulty, (3) using both manual textual annotation and an automated reading 
difficulty generator developed by research in linguistics and psychology. 
Both approaches of measuring reading difficulty introduced in this study are based on 
cohesion as the central concept of reading difficulty. Cohesion. i.e. the 
interconnection within and between sentences, constitutes a crucial aspect of reading 
51 For the purpose of this study text linguistics and discourse analysis are regarded as o~e and the same 
discipline. Text linguistics or discourse analysis is the linguistic sub-discipline whIch extends the 
difficulty. 52 However, one approach uses manual text annotation, whereas the other 
employs an automatic, computer-based reading difficulty generator developed by 
linguists and psychologists. Both approaches have several advantages and 
disadvantages. Automatic content analysis provides more objectivity, reliability, and 
speed. On the other hand, manual content analysis is superior in terms of validity, 
which is due to the human judgment of cohesive associations within a text. 
The validity of the automatic content analysis approach to reading difficulty can be 
tested by means of a correlation analysis between the reading difficulty measures 
generated by both approaches. Thus, using both manual and computerised content 
analysis allows us to determine which approach is better suited to capturing reading 
difficulty. If we find correlation between the measures of reading difficulty generated 
by the two different approaches, this means that computerised content analysis 
constitutes a substitute for human judgment on cohesion and thus represents the 
superior way of measuring the reading difficulty of narrative corporate report 
sections, due to its speed and ability to handle larger sample sizes. However, if we 
find no correlation between the reading difficulty measures generated by the two 
approaches, this is an indication that computers are not able to adequately capture 
textual cohesion. 
Linguistic validity of cohesion 
Although the limitations of readability measures have been widely recognised by 
accounting researchers, they have been used for the last thirty years 53 for lack of a 
better alternative. 
This study focuses on cohesion54 which has been identified in the education literature 
,,~ 
as a "cornerstone of comprehension" (Graesser et al. 2002: 82): - It has also been 
analysis of written texts beyond the sentence level. It thus provides the means for analyzing the 
complex interassociations between sentences. 
52 The cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty proposed in this study are based on the same 
concept as the indexical 'connectivity' in Sydserff and Weetman's (1999) texture index. 
53 Adelberg (1978) constitutes one of the first studies using readability measures. , . 
,~ 'Cohesion' is discussed in the wider context of what is referred to as 'coherence In psychology 
research 
55 Altho;Jgh lack of cohesion is a crucial aspect of reading difficulty \>h ich has not been ?~~rationalised 
in previous research, it is not the only feature of several features whIch renders a text dlttlcult to read. 
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identified as a crucial aspect of text by linguistics in that it differentiates texts from 
'non-texts' (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 2). This means that texts are not just a 
collection of sentences, but represent a network of both grammatical and semantic 
connections which go beyond the sentence level. 
Typically, in any text, every sentence except the first exhibits some form of [link] with a 
preceding sentence, usually with the one immediately preceding. In other words, every 
sentence contains at least one anaphoric tie [= a word or phrase which refers back to an earlier 
word or phrase] connecting it with what has gone before. (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 293) 
If these interconnections within and between sentences are missing, a text becomes 
difficult to read and comprehend. Thus, linguistically valid measures of reading 
difficulty need to capture in some way the extent to which a text contains connecti\'e 
devices. Conventional readability formulae, which are entirely based on word and 
sentence length, are thus inadequate measures of reading difficulty since they do not 
capture this interrelatedness within and between sentences. 
Cohesion is thus a crucial element of reading difficulty and can be defined in the 
following way: 
[Cohesion] is the network of lexical, grammatical, and other relations which provide links 
between various parts of a text. These relations or ties organize and, to some extent create a 
text, for instance by requiring the reader to interpret words and expressions by reference to 
other words and expressions in the surrounding sentences and paragraphs. Cohesion is a 
surface relation; it connects together the actual words or expressions that we can see or hear 
(Baker, 1992: 180). 
Thus, cohesion refers to the grammatical or lexical associations that connect different 
parts of a text. It establishes continuity between one part of the text and another 
(Halliday and Hasan 1976). This continuity is necessary for the understanding of text. 
If it is missing, i.e. if a text lacks cohesion, a text is difficult to read and understand. 
Thus reading difficulty can be regarded as a function of cohesion. 
Halliday and Hasan (1976) present a taxonomy of two types of cohesi\'e tics or 
relations (1) gran1n1atical and (2) lexical. Grammatical cohesion pro\'ides links 
Others include "word frequencv. concept density. lew! of abstraction. fhl' appropriaf<.!ness of fhe 
. . "J. '''(C rt's199"'6) organisation. coherence alld logical presentation (~/I ea.' ou I . , , 
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between textual elements by means of grammatical ties and lexical cohesion by means 
of vocabulary. 
The concept of cohesion plays an important part in reading difficulty since it provides 
the linguistic cues to how sentences should be related conceptually. If they are 
missing, a text becomes more difficult to read and understand. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the two types of cohesion, the various cohesive devices, and the 
respective linguistic resources available for linking one part of a text to another. The 
cohesive devices which form the basis of the cohesion measures developed in this 
study are rendered in bold. 
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Type of 
cohesion 
Cohesive 
devices 
Lingui stic 
dev ices 
Examples 
Exo 
I/my/mine; 
we/our! 
urs; 
ur! 
yours 
Reference 
Anaphora 
• Pronouns 
• Repetition 
• Synonym 
• Near 
synonym 
he, him, his, 
himself 
Figure 3.2: Types of cohesion 
Grammatical 
cohesion 
Cataphora 
one, the 
same 
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IPSIS 
and, but, 
then, 
because 
Repetition 
Lexical 
cohesion 
Synonym Near synonym 
Grammatical Cohesion 
Grammatical cohesion refers to a set of associations which connect different parts of 
text by means of grammatical devices. Grammatical cohesion can be sub-divided into 
four main groups: (l) reference, (2) substitution, (3) ellipsis. and (4) conjunction. The 
cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty developed in this study (see section 
3.3.2) are based on reference, in particular anaphoric reference. 
Reference 
In Halliday and Hasan's (1976) model of cohesion, reference is used to denote the 
association of identity which exists between two linguistic expressions. Reference is a 
device which allows the reader or hearer to trace participants, entities, e\'ents. etc. in a 
text. 
Example 5: Grammatical cohesion - Reference 
While economic conditions may be no more certain than they were twelve months ago, order 
input levels continue to remain at satisfactory levels (Linx 2002). 
Key: Underlined words/phrases constitute the antecedents; Bold words/phrases constitute the 
anaphoric expressions. 
In Example 5, the pronoun they refers to economic conditions. 
There are two types of reference, namely (1) exophoric or situational reference which 
refers to information outside of the textual world and (2) endophoric or textual 
reference which refers to information within the text. In tum, endophoric reference 
can be subdivided into (a) anaphoric reference which is reference to preceding text 
and (b) cataphoric reference which is reference to following text. Since this study is 
concerned with textual cohesion, only endophoric reference is relevant. 
Exophora 
There are also times when the meaning is not explicit from the text itself. hut IS 
obvious to those in a particular situation. This is called exophoric reference. 
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Example 6: Grammatical cohesion - Exophoric reference 
Lam ple.ased to rep~r.t that ~inx aC~i~ed its stated objective for the year of maintaining 
underlYing profitablltty whlie continuing to invest in the future development of our businesses 
around the world (Linx 2002). 
Key: Underlined words indicate exophoric reference. 
As readers outside of this environment, we do not know who the I being referred to is. 
But, most likely, the people interested in Linx's chairman's report are aware of the 
identity of the person referred to with the first person singular pronoun 1. 
Endophora 
Endophora are expressions whose meaning is explicit from the text itself. 
Example 7: Grammatical cohesion - Endophoric reference 
While economic conditions may be no more certain than they were twelve months ago, order 
input levels continue to remain at satisfactory levels (Linx 2002). 
Key: Underlined words/phrases constitute the antecedents; Bold words/phrases constitute the 
anaphoric expressions. 
Example 7 demonstrates endophoric reference. The pronoun they in the second 
sentence refers back to economic conditions in the first sentence. Reference signals to 
the reader what kind of information is to be retrieved. They, therefore, signals to the 
reader that they need to look back in the text to find its meaning. 
Endophoric reference can be subdivided into anaphoric reference which is reference 
to preceding text and cataphoric reference which is reference to following text. 
Cataphora 
Cataphora refer forward to a later expression. 
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Example 8: Grammatical cohesion - cataphoric reference 
We have no doubt that under its new leadership Poundstretcher will go from strength to strength (Brown & Jackson 2002). 
Key: Underlined words/phrases constitute the expression being referred to; Bold words phrases 
constitute the cataphoric expressions. 
In example 8 the possessive pronoun its refers forward to Poundstretcher. 
Anaphoric reference is based on the concepts of antecedents and anaphors. Anaphors 
refer back to earlier expressions which are called antecedents. Example 5 shows how 
the anaphoric expression they refers back to the earlier expression economic 
conditions, which acts as the antecedent. Following Muller and Straube (2001), 
anaphors include pronouns (Example 5), direct anaphors (Example 9), and 
expressions standing in a conceptual IS-A or hyponym-hyperonym relation specified 
by their antecedent (Example 10): 
In Example 5 the personal pronoun they refers back to economic conditions. 
Anaphoric expressions by means of pronouns are referred to as pronominal anaphors. 
Pronominal anaphors include personal pronouns (they, them, etc.), reflexive pronouns 
(themselves, each other), possessive pronouns (their, theirs), and demonstrative 
pronouns (these, those). 
Example 9: Anaphoric reference by means of direct anaphors 
The Board proposes a final dividend of 5. 6p per share (5. 5p), bringing t~e total for t~e yea~ to 
8.4p per share (8.2p), an increase of 2%. This dividend is covered 3.1 limes by earnings (Ltnx 
2002). . 
Key: Underlined words/phrases constitute the antecedents; Bold words/phrases constItute the 
anaphoric expressions. 
Example 9 shows that, in lay terms, direct anaphors in\'oIH? repetition. Linguistically, 
in direct anaphors the identity of the head of both noun phrases is realized by the same 
noun, namely dividend. Example 19 demonstrates the concepts of noun phrases and 
heads of noun phrases. 
Example 10: Anaphoric reference by means of hyperonym 
In the current year we have ... established afully-fledged distribution operation in the GSA to 
sell and support laser products in that important market (Linx 2002). 
Key: Underlined words/phrases constitute the antecedents; Bold words/phrases constitute the 
anaphoric expressions. 
In Example lOin that important market functions as the hyponym and the USA as the 
hyperonym. Hyponym is a subordinate term, i.e. a word of narrower or more specific 
meaning that comes 'under' another term with a wider or more general meaning. For 
example, rose is the hyponym of flower. Hyperonym is a superordinate term. i.e. a 
word with a broad meaning constituting a category into which words with more 
specific meanings fall. For example, flower is the hyperonym of rose, lily. etc. 
Substitution 
Substitution differs from reference in the respect that another word takes the place of 
the entity that is being discussed. In nominal substitution, the pronoun one is often 
used to substitute for the noun occurring previously in the text. 
Example 11: Grammatical cohesion - Substitution 
The Board remains confident that the market and product choices we have made are the right 
ones. (Network Technology 2002) 
Key: Underlined words/phrases constitute the antecedents: Bold words/phrases constitute the 
anaphoric expressions. 
Example 11 delTIOnstrates how the expression ones in the second part of the sentence 
takes the place of the market and product choices in th~ first part of the sentence. 
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Ellipsis 
Whereas substitution is replacing one word with another, ellipsis involves the absence 
of that word. Ellipsis entails the grammatical structure pointing to an item or items 
that can fill the slot in question. Ellipsis thus requires retrieving specific infonnation 
from preceding information that can be found in the text. 
Example 12: Grammatical cohesion - Ellipsis 
In the current year we have launched important new products in our Linx inkjet and Lin'C ,,\)'mark 
laser businesses ... and [ ] established afully-fledged distribution operation in the USA to sell 
and support laser products in that important market (Linx 2002). 
Key: Underlined words/phrases constitute the antecedents; brackets indicate the ellipsis. 
In Example 12 the phrase we have is ellipted in the second part of the sentence. 
However, based on the cues in the first part of the sentence, there is only one possible 
interpretation, namely we have established a fully-fledged distribution operation in 
the USA to sell and support laser products in that important market. 
Conjunction 
Conjunction links two sentences or clauses together by means of conjunctions, such as 
and, although, because, before, according to, etc. Conjunction thus involves the use 
of formal markers to connect sentences, clauses and paragraphs with each other. 
Unlike reference, substitution, and ellipsis, the use of conjunction does not instruct the 
reader to supply missing information either by looking for it elsewhere in the text or 
by filling structural slots. Instead, conjunction signals the way the writer wants the 
reader to relate what is about to be said to what has been said before. 
Example 13: Grammatical cohesion - Conjunction 
I am pleased to report that Linx achiered its stated o~iect!\'efor the year ofm'~intainin~ 
IIndcr~l'ing profitabililY while continuing to invest in the future dew!opment (~/ Ollr husmesses 
around the wor!d (Linx 2002). 
Key: Bold words constitute conjunctions. 
165 
In Example 13, the two clauses are linked by means of the conjunction while which 
temporally links the two events described in the sentence. 
Lexical cohesion 
Lexical cohesion refers to the role played by the selection of vocabulary in organizing 
relations within a text. A given lexical item cannot be said to have a cohesive function 
per se, but any lexical item can enter into a cohesive relation with other items in a 
text. Thus, lexical cohesion covers any instance in which the use of a lexical item 
recalls the sense of an earlier one. 
Halliday and Hasan (1976) divide lexical cohesion into two main categories, namely 
(1) reiteration and (2) collocation. 56 Reiteration, as the name suggests, involves 
repetition of lexical items. A reiterated item may be (1) a repetition of an earlier item, 
(2) a synonym or near-synonym, (3) a super-ordinate, or (4) a pronoun. 
Example 14: Lexical cohesion by means of reiteration 
We have established a distribution with the purpose of selling 
operation in the UK. our products 
in the UK. 
in Great Britain. 
in that important market. 
there. 
Key: Underlined words/phrases constitute the antecedents; Bold words/phrases constitute the 
anaphoric expressions. 
Reiteration is not the same as reference, however, because it does not necessarily 
involve the same identity of the antecedent and the anaphoric expression. This means 
that the devices repetition, synonyms and near synonyms can be used either 
referentially or non-referentially. In the referential use of repetition grammatical 
cohesion and lexical cohesion co-occur. 
S6 Collocation refers to a customary association of words with other words, such as in the phrases 
innocent bystander, far reaching consequences, etc. 
166 
I 
Example 15: Referential use of repetition 
The Board proposes a final dividend 0[5.6p per share C5.5p),bringing the total for the year to 
8.4p per share (8.2p), an increase of 2%. This dividend is covered 3.1 times by earnings (Linx 
2002). 
Key: Underlined words/phrases constitute the antecedents; Bold words/phrases constitute the 
anaphoric expressions. 
In Example 15, dividend in the second sentence refers to the same extra-linguistic 
entity as dividend in the first sentence, i.e. they have a common referent. 
Example 16: Non-referential use of repetition 
In the current year we have launched important new products in our Linx inkjet and Linx Xymark 
laser businesses[ and} expanded sales of Linx products in China by more than 30% (Linx 2002). 
Key: Underlined words/phrases constitute the antecedents; Bold words/phrases constitute the 
anaphoric expressions. 
However, in Example 16, products in the first and in the second sentence refer to 
different extra-linguistic entities, i.e. they have different referents. Products in the first 
sentence refers to new products, whereas products in the second sentence refers to all 
Linx products. 
Psychological validity 
In order to establish the psychological validity of cohesion as a key factor of reading 
difficulty, the interassociation between cohesion and text processing needs to be 
explored. Research in psychology focuses on investigating the effect of altering 
cohesion on text processing. 
Increasing textual cohesion encourages the connection of ideas in the text with the 
result that as each new idea is introduced, it can be integrated into an ongoing mental 
representation of the text (Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998). Textual cohesion can be 
promoted through referential and causal connecti\'es, which enable readers to 
integrate text information with a minimum of effort, presumably because associations 
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among text ideas are clarified (e.g., Loxtennan et ai. 1994; McKeown et al.. 1992: 
McNamara and Kintsch, 1996). 
High levels of cohesions7 positively influence syntactic processmg and 
comprehension of main ideas by enabling readers to construct referential and causal 
links between adjacent text segments (Campbell 1995; McKeown et aI., 1992). 
There are two types of text processing, namely (l) shallow text processing and (2) 
deep text processing. Shallow text processing refers to the "understanding of verbatim 
text and main ideas ... i.e., what readers actually encounter in a text'. Deep text 
processing refers to "the construction of an integrated representation of the text in 
memory. These representations go beyond shallow processing in that they require the 
reader to integrate all important text information into a holistic representation that 
gives readers the 'big picture '" (Lehman and Schaw 2002: 740). 
Shallow text processIng manifests itself in recall and recognition, which can be 
measured by means of recall of text facts and multiple choice-questions (Britton and 
Gulgoz, 1991; McKeown et al. 1992). Deep text processing is measured by means of 
keyword sorting tasks. 
Studies show that manipulating cohesion results in a positive association between 
high cohesion and shallow text processing, measured by means of recall of text facts 
and multiple choice-questions (Britton and Gulgoz, 1991; McKeown et ai. 1992). 
If increasing textual cohesion results m improved perfonnance on text 
comprehension, this means that the less cohesive a text, the more difficult it is to read. 
Thus, according to the obfuscation hypothesis, impression management by means of 
reading ease manipulation should result in low cohesion of narrative corporate report 
sections. 
57 Cohesion is referred to as 'local coherence' and contrasted with 'global coherence', which refers to 
"(he ('x(ent to which the reader is able to construct textwide inferences and integrate broad text ideas 
into ... a mental representation of the [('xtthat integrates background knowledge H'ith te.xt if?/ormation 
to creale aflill picture of the situation described in the te.·((" (Lehman and Schaw 2002: 738). 
168 
However, understanding written text does not only depend on cohesion, but also on 
other text-processing variables, including world knowledge (McNamara 2001) and 
relevance (Lehman and Schraw 2002). Relevance refers to the extent to which text 
segments are relevant to the reader's goals and purposes. 
McNamara (2001), who examines the interrleationship between cohesion58 and \vorld 
knowledge on text processing, finds that low-knowledge readers find high cohesion 
texts easier to read, whereas the opposite is the case for high-knowledge readers. The 
reason for this phenomenon is that cohesion gaps require the reader to make 
inferences either from world knowledge or from previous textual infonnation. 
When inferences are generated, the reader makes more connections between ideas 
in the text and knowledge. This process results in a more coherent mental 
representation. Hence, cohesion gaps can be beneficial for high-knowledge readers 
because their knowledge affords successful inference making. (Graesser et al. 2004: 
194) 
In the context of the present study, this means that for expert users of narrative 
corporate report sections, such as fund managers and investment analysts, reading 
difficulty should be directly associated with high cohesion, whereas for "naIve' users, 
such as individual shareholders, reading difficulty should be inversely associated with 
high cohesion. 
Lehman and Schraw (2002), who investigate the effect of manipulating cohesion, 
coherence and relevance on both shallow and deep text processing, find cohesion and 
coherence breaks to have few effects on text comprehension. However. relevance, i.e. 
the extent to which text segments are relevant to the reader's goals and purposes, 
impacts both on shallow and on deep text processing. 
What research in psychology shows is that text comprehension is not a simple process 
in that it depends on a variety of factors, including textual aspects, such as cohesion, 
and user characteristics, such as world-knowledge and textual releyance, and on the 
interaction between these factors. 
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3.3.2 Manually generated cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty 
Cohesion analysis focuses on the interassociation between antecedents and 
anaphoric/exophoric expreSSIOns, irrespective of the type of association existing 
between them. Anaphoric/exophoric expressions included in the analysis are (1) 
reference, (2) substitution, and (3) reiteration (repetition, synonyms and near 
synonyms). This framework is loosely based on Biber et al. 's (1998: 110-122) corpus 
linguistics approach to discourse characteristics. 
Examples 17 to 20 illustrate the four concepts used in the cohesion analysis 
introduced in this study, namely (1) cohesive association, (2) cohesive set, (3) noun 
phrase, and (4) potentially cohesive noun phrase. 
Example 17: Interassociation between antecedent and anaphoric expression 
I am pleased to report that Linx achieved its stated objective for the year of maintaining 
underlying profitability while continuing to invest in the future development of our businesses 
around the world. 
Key: Underlined words/phrases constitute the antecedents; Bold words/phrases constitute the 
anaphoric expressions. 
Cohesion analysis is based on the cohesive associations within a text whose function 
is to link different parts of the text by means of grammatical and semantic ties. In 
Example 17 the cohesive association is formed by the anaphoric expression, the 
possessive pronoun its, which refers back to Linx, its antecedent. 
The antecedent with all its connected anaphoric/exophoric expressions is referred to 
as a cohesive set. Example 18 consists of a cohesive set consisting of the anaphor a 
final dividend of 5. 6p per share and two anaphoric expressions, namely this dividend 
and the dividend: 
58 In psychology research 'coherence' is used in the same sense as 'cohesion', namel: as "the extent to 
which the assoc:ialions betwecn ideas and text are explicit" (McNamara 2002: 51). 
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Example 18: Cohesive set 
The Board proposes a final dividend 0{5. 6p per share ... This dividend is covered 3.1 
times by earnings. If approved at the Annual General Meeting, The dividend will be paid 
on 22 November 2002 ... (Linx 2002). 
Key: Underlined words/phrases constitute the antecedents; Bold words/phrases constitute the 
anaphoric expressions. 
The cohesion analysis introduced in this study is limited to the interassociations 
between noun phrases. A noun phrase is a word or group of words functioning in a 
sentence exactly like a noun, with a noun or pronoun as head. A noun phrase can be a 
noun or pronoun alone, but is frequently a noun or pronoun with pre- and/or post-
modification. Semantic interassociations between verbs, adjectives and adverbs. such 
as to profit and profitable or to progress and progressively are ignored. 
Example 19 contains sentences illustrating the different types of noun phrases which 
commonly occur in texts. Noun phrases are underlined, heads of noun phrases are 
shown in italics, and anaphoric expressions are rendered in bold. 
Example 19: Noun phrases 
While [economic conditionsl may be no more certain than alleyl H'ere [twelve monthsl ago, 
[order input levelsl continue to remain at [satisfactory levels!, 
Key: Words in brackets indicate noun phrases; underlined words constitute the heads of noun 
phrases; Bold words/phrases constitute anaphoric expressions. 
The concept of potentially cohesive noun phrases is central to the calculation of the 
cohesion measures used in this study (see section 3.3.2). It refers to noun phrases 
which could stand in a cohesive association with other noun phrases. Potentially 
cohesive noun phrases fonn the so-called cohesi\'e level of a text. 
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Example 20: Potentially cohesive noun phrases (cohesive level) 
I am pleased to report that Linx achieved its stated objective for the year ofmaintaining 
underlying profitability ... (Linx 2002) 
Key: ynderlined words/phrase~ constitu~e potentially cohesive noun phrases; Bold words, phrases 
constItute the noun phrases whIch stand In a cohesive association to one another. 
Example 20 contains four potentially cohesive noun phrases, two of which stand in a 
cohesive association with one another, namely Linx, which acts as the antecedent. and 
its stated objective, which acts as the anaphoric expression with its referring back to 
Linx. 
Cohesion provides grammatical and semantic links within and between sentences. 
Earlier the important role of cohesion in text creation and in text comprehension was 
demonstrated. We can thus conclude that texts lacking cohesion are difficult to read 
and understand. 59 The three measures of reading difficulty introduced in the following 
sections are based on cohesion, namely (1) amount of cohesive ties within a given 
text, (2) cohesion density, and (3) association between new and given information. 
They represent a text-centred approach to textual difficulty and thus an alternative to 
conventional readability scores, such as Lix, Fog and Flesch. In order to reflect the 
whole-text aspect of reading difficulty, the term "reading difficulty' is replaced by 
'textual complexity' in the context of cohesion analysis. 
Amount of cohesive ties 
This simple measure of textual complexity is based on the amount of cohesive ties in 
a given text. As has been pointed out, texts lacking cohesive ties are difficult to read 
and comprehend. Thus, the measure "an10unt of cohesive ties' is based on the 
following assumption: The fewer cohesil'e ties, the more difficult a text is to read and 
59 This is based on the assumption of a unifonn readership across the entire sample. How~\er, as 
discussed earlier there is research suggesting that the direction of association between coheSIOn and 
reading difficul~ might be a function of differential reading strate.gi~s depending on. bac~g:ound 
knowledge (McNamara 2001). Results regarding the direction of assocJatlOn between readmg dl~tlcult) 
measured in terms of Flesch Reading Ease and in terms of cohesion-based measures (Co/r-,\h'trL,,() ~nd 
firm size suggest that the perceived target readership is dependent on firm size (set' chaptt'r 6, sl.:ctlOn 
6.2.3). 
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comprehend. The measure is expressed as percentage of total number of cohesive 
noun phrases per total number of potentially cohesive noun phrases. 
Cohesion density 
Cohesion density reflects the fact that overlapping terms make a text more cohesive 
and thus easier to process and read (Graesser et al. 2003). A lack of overlapping terms 
means that the reader needs to infer the association between two pieces of information 
in a given text. 
In Example 21 cohesion is achieved by means of the overlapping term dividend which 
occurs in all three sentences. 
Example 21: Overlapping terms 
[The Board] proposes fa final dividend 0{5. 6p per share, bringing [the total for the year] to 
[8.4p per share], [an increase of2%). [This dividend] is covered 3.1 times by [earnings). 
if approved at [the Annual General Meeting} [the dividend] will be paid on [22 November 2002] 
to [shareholders] on [the register] at [the close of business] on [1 November 2002] (Linx 2002). 
Key: Underlined words/phrases constitute the antecedents; Bold words/phrases constitute the 
anaphoric expressions 
The measure of cohesion density reflects this aspect of cohesion by means of 
measuring the number of references, substitutions and reiterations associated with a 
particular antecedent. We can therefore postulate that cohesion density is a function of 
the number of anaphoric expressions associated with a particular antecedent. Thus, the 
measure of cohesion density is based on the following assumption: The less anaphoric 
expressions associated with the antecedents in a given text, the more difficult a text is 
to read and comprehend. 
Cohesion density can be set at various levels, dependent on the extent of overlap to be 
measured, namely as the percentage of cohesive sets with either (a) two or more, (b) 
three or more, or (c) four or more cohesive ties per total number of cohesive sets in a 
given text. In the context of this study, cohesion density is measured as the percentage 
of cohesive sets with two or more anaphoric expressions per total number of cohesive 
sets. 
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Proportion of given vs. information 
Following Biber et al. (1998) the status of information plays a role in determining 
textual complexity. The status of information is expressed in a dichotomous 
association of new vs. given information, where non-cohesive noun phrases and 
antecedents are classified as new information and anaphoric expressions as given 
information. The proportion of new and given information is then used as a measure 
of textual complexity. 
The textual complexity inherent in the proportion of new and given information is 
related to memory span. The more given information a text contains, the smaller the 
memory span needed to process the text. This is the reason why the proportion of new 
vs. given information varies widely between spoken and written genres. Figure 3.3 
demonstrates that spoken text, such as conversation, has a lot more given information 
as opposed to new information than, e.g., academic prose. This is due to the fact that 
readers can refer back to information presented earlier in the text, whereas listeners 
cannot. 
Figure 3.3: Frequency of given versus new referring expressions 
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expressions 30 
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Source: Biber et al. (1998) 
• Given references 
o New references 
W therefore posit the following: The higher the proportion of new vs. given 
iJ?iOrmalion, the more difficult a text is to read and comprehend. 
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New information is measured as the total number of non-cohesive noun phrases plus 
the total number of antecedents. Given information is measured as the total number of 
anaphoric expressions. 
Table 3.4 summarises three measures of reading difficulty applied in this paper. 
Table 3.4: Measures of textual complexity 
1. Percentage of cohesive noun phrases per total number of potentially cohesive noun phrases. 
2. Percentage of total number of cohesive sets containing two or more anaphoric expressions 
per total number of cohesive sets. 
3. Percentage of total number of anaphoric expressions per total number of non-cohesive noun 
phrases plus total number of antecedents 
The first step in the manual calculation of cohesion-based reading difficulty measures 
is to mark all potentially cohesive noun phrases and annotating all antecedents, 
anaphoric expressions, and cohesive sets of the 93 Chairman's Reports with the aid of 
MMAX2 (see section 3.3.4). Subsequently, the MMAX2 Query Console can be used to 
calculate the building blocks for the three measures of textual complexity.6o 
Table 3.5 lists how the MMAX2 Query Console 'statistics' commands, which provide 
counts for the noun phrases previously annotated as cohesive, correspond to the noun 
phrases needed for calculating the three measures of textual complexity: 
60 Appendix IV provides an example of an annotated chairman's report. Appendix V lays out the 
coding scheme used in this study and provides a detailed explanation on the procedures involved in 
using ,\IAtA.\2 for annotating cohesive relations. 
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Table 3.5: Building blocks for measures of textual complexity in MMAX2 
Noun phrase type Query Calculation 
(1) All potentially cohesive noun phrases ST A TISTICS npchunks; 
(2) All non-cohesive noun phrases ST A TISTICS npchunks 
(coreC class= {empty} ); 
(3) All cohesive noun phrases (1)-(2) 
(4) All antecedents STATISTICS npchunks 
(coreCclass = {initial} ); 
(5) All anaphoric expressions (3) - (4) 
(6) All cohesive noun phrases in an n- STATISTICS npchunks None 
member set (coreC class = {n}); 
Table 3.6 lists the three cohesion-based concepts of textual complexity. the measures 
used, the noun phrase types needed for calculating the three measures, the codes used 
for analysis and the direction of association with textual complexity. 
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Table 3.6: Overview of MAt4X2-based measures of textual complexity 
Concept Measure Calculation Code Direction of 
association 
Amount of cohesive Cohesive noun phraseslPotentially (Total number of potentially cohesive noun TIES Negative 
ties cohesive noun phrases phrases - total number of empty noun 
phrases )/total number of potentially cohesive 
noun phrases 
Coh~')ion density Cohesive sets with 2: 2 cohesive Total number of cohesive sets with 2: 2 DENSITY Negative 
associations/Cohesive sets cohesive associations/total number of 
cohesive sets 
Association between Given information/new information Total number of anaphors/(Total number of GIVNEW Negative 
given and new antecedents + total number of empty noun 
information phrases) 
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3.3.3 Automatically generated cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty 
Coh-Metrix's key reading difficulty measures are based on cohesion. In Coh-Metrix 
the category 'referential cohesion' takes account of the role of cohesion in reading 
difficulty. Coh-Metrix contains four referential cohesion measures, namely (1) 
adjacent argument overlap, (2) argument overlap, (3) adjacent stem overlap, and (4) 
stem overlap (see Table 3.7). Whereas the first two are based on the cohesion between 
nouns, pronouns, and noun phrases, the latter two are based on cohesion between 
words sharing common stems, including nouns (profit(s) , profitability), adjectives 
(profitable), and verbs (to profit). 
Table 3.7 defines these four cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty and shows 
how they are calculated. For argument overlap and stem overlap this is not possible 
within the confines of a table, since they entail measuring cohesion between all 
sentences in a paragraph. 
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Table 3.7: Four referential cohesion measures in Coh-Metrix 
Cohesion measure Description 
Adjacent argument overlap Proportion of adjacent sentences that share one or more 
arguments (i.e. noun, pronoun, noun-phrase) 
2 Argument overlap Proportion of all sentence pairs in a paragraph that share one 
or more arguments (i.e. noun, pronoun, noun phrase) 
3 Adjacent stem overlap Proportion of adjacent sentences that share one or more word 
stems 
4 Stem overlap Proportion of all sentence pairs in a paragraph that share one 
or more word stems 
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Calculation 
Number of adjacent sentences containing a cohesive 
relationship between nouns, pronouns, or noun-phrases 
I(Total number of sentences -1) 
Number of adjacent sentences containing a cohesive 
relationship between nouns, pronouns, or noun-
phrases/[total number of sentences x (total number of 
sentences -1 )]/2 
Number of adjacent sentences containing a cohesive 
relationship between word stems/(Total number of 
sentences -1) 
Number of adjacent sentences containing a cohesive 
relationship between word stems/[total number of 
sentences x (total number of sentences -1 )]/2 
Cohesive relationships are measured (1) between two different types of textual units 
and (2) across two different types of distance or cohesive span in a given text.61 
Textual units are defined in terms of (a) arguments and (b) stems. Argument refers 
nouns
62 
and noun phrases and stem to morphological units within words, including 
nouns (profit(s), profitability), adjectives (profitable), and verbs (to profit). Argument 
overlap occurs when a noun or noun-phrase in one sentence is in a cohesive 
relationship with a noun or noun-phrase in another sentence. Stem overlap occurs 
when a stem in one sentence is in a cohesive relationship with a stem in another 
sentence. As indicated in Table 3.7, adjacent argument overlap and argument overlap 
are based on the cohesion between nouns and noun phrases, adjacent stem overlap and 
stem overlap are based on cohesion between words sharing common stems, including 
Example 21 (section 3.3.2) demonstrates referential cohesion between nouns and 
noun phrases. Cohesive span refers to either (a) adjacent or (b) all sentences in a given 
text. Adjacent sentences are successive sentences. For example, if a text consists of 
four sentences, then the adjacent sentences would be sentences 1-2, 2-3, and 3_4.63 In 
contrast, all sentences are all possible pairs of sentences: 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, 1-3, 1-4, and 2-
4.64 As indicated by Table 3.7, adjacent argument overlap and adjacent stem overlap 
measure cohesion between adjacent sentences, whereas argument overlap and stem 
overlap measure cohesion between all sentences. 
Strictly speaking, stem overlap does not measure referential relations, but lexical 
cohesion in a wider sense. Although the measures are referred to as referential 
cohesion measures, they effectively capture both grammatical and lexical cohesion, as 
the computer is unable to distinguish between referential use of repetition and non-
referential use of repetition. Whereas referential use of repetition involves a reference 
61 See http://l41.225.14.26/CohMetrixWeb2/HelpFile2.htm. 
62 A noun is a type of word that names a person or thing. Common nouns name persons or things which 
are not peculiar to one example, i.e. are of a general nature (director, balance sheet), whereas proper 
nouns name persons or things of which there is only one example (Asia, Enron). Concrete nouns refer 
to physical things (jactory, annual report), and abstract nouns to concepts (prudence, dish~nesty). 
6.1 For the calculation of the ratios involved in the measures based on adjacent sentences this means that 
in a text ofN sentences the denominator is always N-l. . 
64 For the calculation of the ratios involved in the measures based on all sentences this means that In a 
text ofN sentences the denominator is always [N x (N-I )]/2. 
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to the same extra-linguistic entity, non-referential use of repetition involves reference 
to different extra-linguistic entities.65 
The drawback of the four measures of referential cohesion is that they capture the 
interassociation of sentences solely on a morphological basis. This means that they 
only capture the interrelatedness between nouns and noun phrases sharing the same 
stem. This means that they capture cohesion by means of direct anaphors and 
repetition, such as illustrated in examples 9 (page 163), 15 (page 167), and 16 (page 
167), but not cohesion by means of pronoun, hyperonym, synonym. and super-
ordinate, such as illustrated in examples 5 (page 161), 10 (page 164), and 14 (page 
166). 
3.3.4 Computer programs 
The current study uses two text analysis programs for computing reading difficulty 
measures, namely (1) Coh-Metrix which automatically generates measures of reading 
difficulty and (2) MMAX2 which is an annotation tool for marking, storing, retrieving, 
and quantifying textual elements which subsequently form the basis of reading 
difficulty measures. 
Coh-Metrix66 
Coh-Metrix is a web-based automated computer tool developed by the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Memphis, Tennessee67 for the analysis of reading 
difficulty which computes reading difficulty measures at various levels of language 
and world knowledge. It thus functions as an alternative to conventional readability 
formulae. It has a maximum processing capacity of about 15,000 words per document. 
Coh-Metrix computes 44 readability scores based on vanous levels of linguistic 
analysis. By applying research in computational linguistics and linking it to research 
65 Referential use of repetition: The Board proposes a final dividend of5. 6p per share (5. 5pl, bringing 
the total for the year to 8.4p per share (8.2p), an increase of 2%. This dividend is covered 3.1 times by 
earnings (Linx 2002). 
Non-referential use of repetition: In the current year we have launched important !lew products in our 
Linx inkjet and Linl; ,rvmark laser businesses [and} expanded sales of Linx products in China by more 
than 30% (Linx 2(02): 
b6 This study uses the 1.-l version of Coh-Metrix 
67 htt II h' h' d p. :co metnx.memp IS.e u. 
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in discourse analysis, psycholinguistics, and education, the methodology is both 
linguistically and psychologically valid and objective (McNamara et al. 2002). 
Incorporating both text-based and reader-based aspects of reading difficulty, Coh-
Metrix takes insights from research in linguistics and psychology on board. 
Readability is viewed as an interaction between a text and a reader~s cognitive 
aptitudes (Kintsch, 1994; Miller and Kintsch, 1980; McNamara et al. 1996). Coh-
Metrix adjusts the output based on the anticipated readers' knowledge, language 
skills, and other cognitive aptitudes by means of five Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) 
space options, namely (1) college level, (2) science, (3) narrative, (4) encyclopedia, 
and (5) physics. The LSA space captures the world knowledge needed to understand 
specific texts and is based on comparisons with corpora of specific genres. Thus, the 
resulting LSA scores provide a statistical representation of world knowledge which 
captures judgments and intuitions of humans (McNamara et al. 2002). 
After setting the parameters representing the amount of the anticipated readers' 
education and background knowledge, Coh-Metrix automatically generates a score for 
each reading difficulty measure. Just as any other content analysis program, it has the 
drawback of entering text into" ... a veritable black box from which output emerges" 
(Neuendorf, 2002, 129). However, it has the advantage of being easy to apply, 
objective, reliable, and fast, thus facilitating larger sample sizes than manual 
approaches, such as the texture index. 
MMAX2 
MMAX2 is a "highly customizable [text] annotation tool for creating, browsing, 
visualizing and querying linguistic annotations" (MUller 2004: 2). It has been 
specifically developed for the annotation of linguistic features extending beyond the 
sentence level, including anaphoric relations, which form the basis of textual 
cohesion, the main feature of the reading difficulty measures developed in this study 
(see section 3.3.1).68 The advantage of using MMAX2 over completely automated 
corpus analysis programs, such as Coh-Metrix, is that it provides an interactive 
68 It has been developed by the European Media Laboratory GmbH (httpIeml-r.\ illa-b?sch.de ). It is 
written in Java and processes XML-encoded texts which make use of standoff annotation. It uses an 
XML parser and XSL stylesheet processor. 
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approach to textual analysis, which allows the input of the researcher and thus results 
in greater linguistic validity. 
Unlike Coh-Metrix, MMAX2 does not compute reading difficulty measures. Howeyer. 
it contains a search facility, the MMAX2 Query Console, which serves as a means of 
detecting, browsing, and quantifying cohesive relations on previously annotated texts. 
The 'statistics' command provides counts for the noun phrases previously annotated 
as cohesive. These counts can be used as a basis for computing reading difficulty 
measures.
69 See section 3.3.2 on the application of the MMAX2 Query Console in 
relation to the cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty developed in this study. 
3.4 Measuring self-presentational dissimulation 
Since impression management in a corporate reporting context entails presenting 
"information in a manner that is intended to distort readers' perceptions of corporate 
achievements" (Godfrey et al. 2003: 96), it constitutes self-presentational 
dissimulation, i.e. constructing a public image of firm performance and prospects 
which is inconsistent with the way management may see firm performance and 
prospects. Although self-presentational dissimulation has been recognized as one 
aspect of impression management (Courtis 2004a: 292; Huang 2004: 19), it has not 
been analysed in a systematic way. Thus, by developing a methodology based on 
linguistic markers of self-presentational dissimulation, the current study contributes to 
the literature. 
3.4.1 Linguistic markers of self-presentational dissimulation 
In social psychology there is a growing body of research on the automated linguistic 
analysis of dissimulation. It is concerned with identifying linguistic cues which are 
associated with dissimulation. Research has established four types of linguistic cues 
which differentiate true from false stories, namely (l) word counts, (2) pronoun use. 
69 What is more, the output of the Query console can also be used as a basis f~r calculating intercoder 
reliability statistics, i.e. interannotator agreement. See section 3.3.3 and Appendix III. 
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(3) words pertaining to feelings and the senses, and (4) exclusive terms (Burgoon et 
al. 1996; Burgoon et al. 2003; Newman et al. 2003; Pennebaker et al. 2003). 
These linguistic cues "are the result of anxiety, negative emotional states, and 
cognitive demand" (Carlson et al. (2004: 7) occurring during self-presentational 
dissimulation. In this respect, the methodology constitutes a 'verbal polygraph test'; 
instead of detecting and recording changes in physiological characteristics, such as a 
person's pulse and breathing rates, it is based on changes in language use when 
engaged in deceptive communication. Unlike the use of impression management 
strategies, such as the obfuscation of negative organisational outcomes or the 
attribution of performance, these changes are entirely unconscious. This means that 
they are hard to influence and control and thus provide a good indication of whether 
impression management has taken place. 
Word count 
DePaulo et al. (2003), Burgoon et al. (2003) and Vrij (2000) find lying to be 
associated with less detail, thus resulting in shorter communication. However, Zhou et 
al. (2004) find the opposite when investigating dissimulation in a computer-mediated 
communication setting. Hancock et al. (2004) argue that verbosity, i.e. the amounts of 
words used, is dependent on the communicative context. Deceivers use fewer words 
in interrogative contexts in order to avoid contradicting earlier statements. In more 
conversational contexts, individuals engaging in dissimulation "produce more words 
in order to provide additional evidence" (Hancock et al. 2004: 2) to support their 
pretence. 
Self-reference 
Newman et al. (2003) find that individuals who construct public images which are 
inconsistent with their self-image use less first person singular pronouns (1. me, mine. 
and my) than individuals who construct public images that are a reflection of their 
self-image. According to Newman et al. (2003: 666), the use of self-references in the 
form of first-person is a "subtle proclamation of one's ownership of {[ statement", 
Consequently, individuals engaged in self-presentational dissimulation tend to ayoid 
the use of self-references as a way of distancing themselyes from their stories and or 
avoiding responsibility for their behaviour. 
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References to others 
Evidence for the use of second and third person pronouns is contradictory. Whereas 
Newman et al. (2003) find individuals engaged in self-presentational dissimulation to 
use fewer second and third person pronouns, DePaulo et al. (2003) and Zhou et al. 
(2004) find the opposite. 
Emotion words 
Newman et al. (2003) and Vrij (2000) find negative emotions words to be directly 
associated with self-presentational dissimulation. Newman et al. (2003: 666) point out 
that "individuals engaged in impression management may feel guilty either about 
lying or about the topic they are discussing." This discomfort is reflected in the use of 
more words reflecting negative emotions, such as difficult, disappointing. or loss. 
Burgoon et al. (2003) and Zhou et al. (2004) find that individuals engaging in self-
presentational dissimulation show more expressiveness both in the use of positive and 
negative emotion words. 
Cognitive complexity 
Finally, Newman et al. (2003: 666) point out that "the process of creating a false story 
should consume cognitive resources ... leading [individuals engaged in self-
presentational dissimulation] to tell less complex stories." Prior social psychology 
research shows complexity to be reflected in the use of exclusive words, such as 
except, but, and without. 
Table 3.8 summarIzes the association between the linguistic markers and self-
presentational dissimulation. 
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Table 3.8: Association between linguistic markers and self-presentational dissimulation 
Linguistic cues Examples Reason Prior research findings: 
Association with 
dissimulation 
1) Word count ? Direct/inverse 
2a) Pronoun use 1 sl person Dissociation Inverse 
(References to self) singular: 1, me, from statement 
2b) Pronoun use 
my, mine 
3 rd person: sf he, ') Insignificant/inverse 
(References to they, his, them, 
others) etc. 
3) Emotion words Exciting, win, ? Insignificant/direct 
difficult 
3a) Positive emotion Exciting, win Insignificant/direct 
words 
3b) Negative emotion Difficult, Negative Direct 
words disappointng, loss, emotional state, 
guilt, discomfort 
4) Markers of But, except, Cognitive Inverse 
cognitive without demand 
complexity 
Some aspects of self-presentational dissimulation have been investigated previously, 
albeit in isolation and with different assumptions. Rutherford (2005) examines self-
reference, but only in the form of the word company and not in the form of first-
person pronouns. Positive and negative emotion words have been studied both in 
context of the 'Pollyanna principle' (Hildebrandt and Snyder 1981 ~ Clatworthy and 
Jones 2003; Rutherford 2005) and in impression management research focusing on 
thematic manipulation (Abrahamson and Park 1994; Abrahamson and Amir 1996; 
Smith and Taffler 2000). The 'Pollyanna principle' describes an impression 
management strategy based on the attempt of firms to present themselves in the best 
possible light which manifests itself in the predominant use of positive words, 
regardless of their financial performance. Thematic manipulation is based on the 
assumption that management conceals negative organizational outcomes by not 
reporting them or by not reporting them to the same extent as they report positive 
organizational outcomes. 
Cognitive complexity has been studied in the context of reading ease manipulation (in 
the sense that reading difficulty is a function of cognitin: complexity). The more 
cognith'cly complex a tcxt is, the more difficult it is to read and understand. llowl'\cr. 
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the assumptions underlying reading difficulty and .. 
cogmtIve complexity are 
diametrically opposed. Whereas the obfuscation hypothesis predicts reading difficulty 
to be directly related to 'bad news', self-presentational dissimulation by means of 
cognitive complexity predicts an association in the opposite direction. Self-
presentational dissimulation is assumed to take up a substantial amount of cognitive 
resources resulting in less cognitive complexity in texts. 
However, the focus of studies in social psychology on linguistic-based cues of 
dissimulation is on interpersonal communication between one speaker/writer and one 
addressee involving personal topics (see Table 3.9). 
Table 3.9:Text types used in dissimulation studies 
Setting Nature Spoken Written 
Newman et al. (2003) Laboratory Personal Monologues, Essays 
dialogues 
Hancock et al. (2003) Laboratory Personal Dialogues 
Frank et al. (2004) Laboratory Personal Monologues 
Zhou et al. (2004) Laboratory Personal E-mail 
Hancock et al. (2004) Laboratory Personal Messaging 
As Zhou et al. (2004: 83) point out, "language expression changes along "with 
situational factors, such as speech community, register, genre, text and discourse 
type." This observation is consistent with linguistic research on differences between 
speech events or genres. A genre represents a particular type of text such as a 
chairman's report, a newspaper article, or a novel. which represents the "linguistic 
realization of some social activity" (Connor 1996: 126). All texts belonging to a 
particular genre therefore share a "particular structure, style. content, and intended 
audience" (Swales 1990: 58). 
This means that written texts exhibit different types of linguistic features than spoken 
communication. What is more, narrative corporate report Sl,ctions not only Jifkr from 
academic papers, newspaper articles. but also from other types of corporate 
communication, such as press releases and interim statements. 
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In order to provide evidence for linguistic differences between genres, the mean 
values across the 82 dimensions of Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count. the text 
analysis program used for the analysis of dissimulation, are used as proxies for genre 
characteristics. A comparison of the mean values of chairmen's reports with four 
genres, namely (1) Emotion Writing, (2) Control Writing, (3) Books, and (-+) 
Taiking70 shows that they differ considerably across the majority of dimensions. 7) 
This is evidence of genre-dependent linguistic differences. The contradictory results 
of previous studies on linguistic cues of dissimulation could be due to these genre 
differences. 
Genre-dependent linguistic differences have implications for adopting a methodology 
developed for particular communicative situations and types of text to the analysis of 
narrative corporate report sections. The chairman's report constitutes a speech event 
characterised by one writer (company chairman) and a group of addressees 
(shareholders) (see chapter two, section 2.10). This results in a specific pronoun use. 
The first person singular (1, me, mine, myself) is used sparingly in chairmen's reports. 
It is only used in situations referring to actions taken by the chairman himself, e.g. "In 
last years report I stated my belief' (Heart of Midlothian 2002), "1 am delighted to 
welcome both Michael Stevens and John Hemingway to the Board as non-executive 
Directors" (Artisan 2002), and "I would like to thank my management team and all 
our employees" (AEA 2002). 
In chairman's reports the exclusive use, i.e., a group including the speaker, but not the 
addressee, of the first person plural (we, us, our, ours, ourselves) predominates. It is 
used to refer to actions taken by the board of directors, management or the company 
as an entity with a plural personality including the board of directors, management, 
and staff, e.g. "The progress we made in the first ha(f of this financial year" (.\EA 
2(02), ., We lIsed £236, 000 of shareholders' funds to huy in shares in the markel" 
70 Emotion writing studies require participants to write about their emo~ions an~ thoughts about 
personally relevant topics. Control Writing involves writing about non-emotIOnal t?PICS. such as plans 
for the day or descriptions of ordinary objects or events. Books refers. to a senll-:andom sa~pl~ of 
pages from the 30 best-selling fiction books of 1995. Talking files co~e from tr.anscnpts collectuj trom 
indi\iduals who are talking in non-experimental settings (i.e .. correlatIOnal studIes). 
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(Christie 2002), "We took a decision to write down the carrying values of Rugby and 
Clandon" (Blooms of Bressingham 2002). 
The third person singular and plural (he, she they etc.) is used to refer to individuals 
within the company, either board members or employees, e.g. "His [Nicholas 
Wrigley, non-executive director] experience of the City has been of great value to us" 
(4Imprint 2002), "Our record results would not have been achieved H'ithout their 
[employees] hard work, enthusiasm and skill" (Barratt 2002), and "/ am grateful to 
the entire Board for their support" (Medical Solutions 2002). 
For this reason, the linguistic profile of dissimulation needs to be altered to reflect 
these genre-dependent differences of pronoun use. The linguistic elements 
constituting references to 'self' are changed from first person singular pronouns to 
references to the company in the form of (a) first person plural pronouns (we. liS. our, 
ours, and ourselves), (b) the name of the company, and (c) the Group. The linguistic 
elements constituting references to 'other' are changed from third person singular and 
plural to references to competitors in the form of the industry. the sector, and 
competitors. 
The chairman's report constitutes a written medium which is available by means of 
various channels (print, pdf). What is more, the chairman's report falls into the 
category of • technical ' or 'professional' writing and is thus inherently different from 
personal communication (in the form of video footage and essays) on which research 
on dissimulation is based. 
These characteristics impact on the linguistic cues associated with 'cognitive 
complexity'. Since the chairman's report constitutes technical writing, 'cognitive 
complexity' is not regarded as being represented by exclusive terms (such as but. 
except, and lI'ithout) and motion words (such as l1'alk, mon', and gu). but as being a 
product of complex sentence structure. Exclusive terms and motion \\'ords are more 
common features of infonllal and spoken communication, In \\Tittcn communication 
cognitive complexity can be regarded as a function of complex sentence structure. 
, I 
See Appendix VI for table of differences between genres, 
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Complex sentence structure is achieved by means of conjunctions such as but. after, 
and although which link sentences together in terms of meaning. 
Following Burgoon et al. (2003) and Zhou et al. (2004), we expect self-presentational 
dissimulation in chairmen's reports to be associated with more expressiveness not 
only in the use of negative, but also in the use of positive emotion words. The 
following examples illustrate the use of positive and negative emotion words in the 
sample of chairman's reports: "I look forward to the future with confidence" 
(Bizspace 2002), "We are pleased to report that the Group has made excellent 
progress during the year ended 31 March 2002" (Clarity Commerce Solutions 2002), 
"I am shocked and very disappointed by this result" (Bailey 2002), and "The Group's 
disappointing performance resulted mainly from a failure to adapt expeditiously to 
changing market conditions" (Brown and Jackson 2002). 
Table 3.10 outlines the linguistic markers for chairmen's reports, their abbreviation, 
data source, measurement, and their expected association with 'bad news'. 
Three models of self-presentational dissimulation are used which differ in terms of 
level of decomposition of the marker emotion words. The level 1 model contains the 
category emotion (affect) in general and the level 2 model decomposes emotion into 
subcategories positive emotion (posemo) and negative emotion (negemo). Table 3.10 
indicates which linguistic markers are used in the two different models. 
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Table 3.10: Linguistic markers in chairmen's reports 
Model Linguistic markers Abbreviation Examples Data source Measurement Association 
with 'bad news' 
I 2 Word count WC LIWC total word count in 
text 
1 2 References to self Self 1 st person plural: we, us, our, Custom dictionary % of total word count 
ours, ourselves + the Group + in text 
name of the company 
I 2 References to others Other Industry, sector, Custom dictionary % of total word count i.s./-
competitor(s), rival(s) in text 
Emotion words Affect Exciting, win, difficult LIWC: Affect % of total word count i.s'/+ 
in text 
2 Positive emotion words Posemo Exciting, win LIWC : Positive emotions % of total word count i.s'/+ 
in text 
2 Negative emotion Negemo Difficult, loss LIWC: Negative emotions % of total word count + 
words in text 
I 2 Marker,> of cognitive CogComplex Conjunctions: And, but, after, Custom dicitonary % of total word count 
complexity although, despite in text 
Modell = level I model (emotion words); Model 2 = level 2 model (positive/negative emotion words) 
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3.4.2 Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) is a text analysis program deyeloped by 
psychologists which not only allows the analysis of linguistic features and content. but 
also stylistic aspects of language use across a wide range of contexts. Since 
"understanding linguistic style reveals rich psychological information about a person. 
reflecting their underlying organizational guides of thinking and beha-riour" 
(Niederhoffer 2003), LIWC is a valuable tool for analyzing impression management. 
LIWC has been used in numerous studies to reveal reliable linguistic fingerprints for 
psychological phenomena such as personality (Gill and Oberlander 2003: Pennebaker 
and King 1999), emotion (Gill and Oberlander 2003; Pennebaker and King 1999), and 
deception (Newman et al. 2003; Hancock et al 2004). 
LIWC exammes written language and classifies it along up to 82 language 
dimensions, including (a) 17 standard language categories (e.g. articles, prepositions. 
pronouns - including first person singular, first person plural, etc.), (b) 25 word 
categories representing psychological processes (e.g. positive and negatiye emotion 
categories, cognitive processes, such as use of causation words, self-discrepancies), 
(c) 10 dimensions related to relativity (e.g. time, verb tense, motion, space), and (d) 
19 traditional content dimensions (e.g. occupation, home, money). The LIWC 
dimensions are hierarchically organized. For example, the word 'optimistic', falls into 
five categories, namely 'optimism', 'positive emotion', 'overall affect: 'words longer 
than six letters' and 'adjective'. 
The program analyzes text files on a word-by-word basis, calculating the number of 
words that match each of the 82 LIWC dimensions, expressed as percentages of total 
words in the text, and records the data into one of 82 preset dictionary categories. The 
L11J'(' dictionary comprises over 2,300 words and stems. Each category is composed 
of a list of dictionary words. See Appendix IX for dictionary categories and sample 
words. 
SCYl?ral sources (e.g. natural language of conyersing adults. \\Titten diaries. speeches. 
a thesaurus, and an English dictionary) were used to form the dictionary. The program 
classifies about 80 percent of the language used by people. Ln,"(" s external \'alidity 
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was tested by comparing LIWC scales and judges' ratings, which were found to be 
highly correlated. This means that LIWC is a good research tool for measuring (a) 
psychological processes, (b) cognitive strategies, (c) thematic content, and (d) various 
linguistic features. 
3.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has provided an overview of the measurement and methodologies used to 
analyze impression management by means of reading ease manipulation and self-
presentational dissimulation. 
The weaknesses of prevIOUS research lies both in the linguistic characteristics 
associated with the measures of reading difficulty and the methodologies chosen to 
analyze them. 
The methodologies proposed in this study have two major advantages over traditional 
approaches. First of all, they are based on linguistic and psychological research, which 
provides them with content validity. Discourse analysis is the linguistic discipline 
focusing on whole-text aspects, such as the interconnection within and between 
sentences. It thus provides the basis for measures for reading difficulty in the form of 
textual complexity. These measures have been provided with psychological validity 
by research carried out into text processing. The linguistic markers in narrative 
sections are based on research in psychology on word use associated with self-
presentational dissimulation. Thus, the linguistic characteristics of obfuscation 
provided in this study possess psychological validity. 
Secondly, the investigation of impression management is carried out by means of 
computerised text analysis programs, which are based on recent advances in corpus 
and computational linguistics. They not only have the advantage of being fast, 
objective. and allowing the analysis of large amounts of data, but also provide 
linguistic validity and easy replicability. Coh-Mefrix, a web-based tool automatically 
generates measures of reading difficulty. MJ.\i4.)(J, a text analysis program developed 
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by linguistics, is based on an interactive approach. LIWC, a text analysis program 
developed by social psychology, carries out a completely automated text analysis. 
This chapter has provided an in-depth discussion of the measurement of impression 
management (dependent variable). The following chapter deals with the research 
methodology adopted in this study. It involves the selection of sample companies 
chosen to analyse the use of impression management, the measurement of company 
characteristics (independent variables) hypothesized to influence the use of 
impression management, namely 'goodlbad news' , firm size, and industry 
classification, the hypothesized direction of association between impression 
management and the company characteristics, and the statistical methods chosen to 
analyse the association between impression management and the company 
characteristics. 
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Chapter 4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The study analyzes the use of impression management in UK chairman's reports and 
the company characteristics influencing its use. The majority of previous impression 
management research is based on the view that "annual reporting [is] an exercise in 
obfuscation. Sections of the reports are allegedly managed so as to present 
management in as favourable light as possible ... For a corporation with poor or 
indifferent performance, there is opportunity to create an impression at variance with 
an overall reading of the report" (Stanton and Stanton 2004: 57). 
This view has given rise to the obfuscation hypothesis which examines the association 
between impression management and firm performance. It is based on the assumption 
of an information incongruity between the narrative corporate report sections and the 
financial accounts. If management has not engaged in impression management, the 
information provided by the financial accounts and the narrative statements on the 
firm's performance and prospects are consistent (assuming no earnings management 
has taken place). If, however, the information in the financial accounts is not 
consistent with the information in the narrative statements, we can assume that 
management may have used the narrative statements to manipulate the impressions 
and decisions of annual report users. 
The current study investigates the use of impression management in UK chairman's 
reports since their characteristics make them likely vehicles of impression 
management (see chapter two, section 2.1 0). Specifically, the study examines 
impression management in the form of obfuscation of negative organisational 
outcomes by means of (1) reading ease manipulation and (2) self-presentational 
dissimulation. 
Following the majority of prior impression management research, the current study is 
based on agency theory explanations of managerial behaviour, on which the majority 
of impression management studies are based. Four hypotheses are tested. The first 
tests chairman's reports for evidence of impression management in the form of (1) 
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reading ease manipulation and (2) self-presentational dissimulation. The second 
hypothesis predicts an association between impression management (in the form of 
reading difficulty or self-presentational dissimulation) and accounting • goodlbad 
news' (the obfuscation hypothesis). The remaining two hypotheses concern the 
association between impression management and firm size and industry classification. 
4.1 Impression 
manipulation 
management . In the form of reading ease 
Since "management is not neutral in its presentation of accounting narratives" 
(Courtis 1998: 466), it tends to obfuscate negative organizational outcomes (Adelberg 
1979: 187). Reading ease manipulation entails the obfuscation of negative 
organisational outcomes by means of rendering corporate narrative report documents 
difficult to read. Thus reading difficulty is used as a proxy for obfuscation. 
Using a variety of measures of reading difficulty and a range of narrative annual 
report sections, previous research has found corporate narrative report documents 
difficult to read (Lewis et al. 1986; Courtis 1986). We thus expect chairman's reports 
to be difficult to read. The hypothesis for testing is: 
H1a: Narrative corporate report sections are difficult to read. 
4.1.1 Association between reading difficulty and accounting 'good/bad news' 
The prior literature has established a link between financial performance and reading 
difficulty by arguing that the obfuscation of negative organisational outcomes is 
especially pronounced when bad news is reported. Courtis (2004: 300) states that in 
such circumstances "obfuscation as a writing technique", i.e. reading ease 
manipUlation, is used in order to "cloud issues and add obliqueness seeks to sidetrack 
the attention of all but the most determined reader." 
This inverse association between reading difficulty and firm performance has been 
confim1ed by previous research, i.e. poorly performing firms have been shown to 
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engage more In reading ease manipulation than well-performing firms (Adelberg 
1979; Smith and Taffler 1992a; Subramanian et al. 1993; Sydserff and Weetman 
2002). 
We thus expect the narrative annual sections of companies with accounting 'bad 
news' to be more likely to show evidence of reading ease manipulation than the 
narrative corporate report sections of companies reporting accounting 'good news'. It 
is hypothesized that reading ease manipulation is directly associated with accounting 
'bad news' and inversely associated with accounting 'good news'. We test the 
hypothesis that the narrative corporate report sections of companies reporting 
accounting 'good news' are easier to read than those with accounting 'bad news'. 
Hlb: Narrative corporate report sections of companies reporting accounting 'good 
news' are easier to read than those with accounting 'bad news '. 
4.1.2 Association between reading difficulty and firm size 
The literature contains conflicting arguments regarding the direction of association 
between impression management and firm size. Table 4.1 summarises the various 
hypotheses underlying the arguments, their explanation, and predicted direction of 
association between reading difficulty and firm size. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of association between reading difficulty and firm size 
Hypothesis Argument Study Explanation Predicted 
association 
withfirm sb! 
Impression 'Public eye' • Courtis Intention to deflect Direct 
management argument (1998) attention by means of 
obfuscation 
Impression Monitoring • Abrahamson Intention to deflect Inverse 
management hypothesis and Park attention to avoid 
(1994) sanction for poor 
performance 
Impression Political cost Intention to deflect Inverse 
management hypothesis attention from 'good 
news' 
Reflection of Complexity of • Jones (1988) Complex issues lead Direct 
organisational operations • Rutherford to complex language 
complexity (2003) 
Writing A vailability of • Baker and Communication Inverse 
expertise comm un i cati on Kare (1992) specialists are able to 
specialists • Courtis communicate more 
(1995) clearly than 
management 
Courtis (1998) VIews obfuscation by means of reading ease manipulation to be 
directly related to press coverage, which can be regarded as a proxy for firm size. He 
argues that companies in the public eye aim "to reduce the chances of interference 
from investors, government and regulatory agencies" (462) by means of confusing 
their readership by obfuscating negative organisational outcomes. Thus, he argues that 
finn size is directly associated with reading difficulty. 
However, this explanation of managerial behaviour runs contrary to agency theory 
explanations of managerial behaviour, on which the majority of impression 
management studies are based. The managerial aim to maximise economic (and 
psychological benefits) forms part of the positive accounting theory hypotheses 
(bonus plan hypothesis) of the accounting behaviour of organisations (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986, 1990). The political cost hypothesis claims that firms in the public 
eye, such as large firms, do not want to attract attention to high profitability since this 
can result in new taxes or regulations. It thus follows that large firms ha\'e no 
mcenti\'es to engage III impression management bv obfuscating negatl\'e 
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organisational outcomes, since they do not want to portray their financial performance 
in the best possible light. Applying the political cost hypothesis, it thus follows that 
large firms are less likely to engage in impression management than small firms. 
Therefore, reading ease manipulation is inversely related to firm size. 
What is more, the monitoring hypothesis states that increased monitoring by outside 
shareholders, governmental bodies, analysts, etc. decreases the opportunity for 
management to engage in impression management since it increases the chances of 
being found out and sanctioned (Abrahamson and Park 1994). Since large firms are 
under more scrutiny from the public, the financial community, and from analysts, they 
have less opportunity and incentives to engage in impression management. Thus, 
reading ease manipulation is hypothesized to be inversely associated with firm size. 
Jones (1988) and Rutherford (2003) also regard impression management (in the form 
of obfuscation as manifested by reading ease manipulation) and firm size to be 
directly related by arguing that larger firms have more complex operations which 
results in syntactically more complex narratives. This hypothesis is confirmed by 
Jones's (1988) results. He finds reading difficulty to be directly related to firm size. 
However, this could equally be attributed to the limited validity of the Flesch 
readability score, which is the proxy of impression management used by Jones (1988). 
However, other studies propose an inverse association between reading difficulty and 
finn size, by arguing that large firms have more funds at their disposal to produce 
annual reports which are clearly written. They have in-house PR departments which 
produce the company's annual reports or employ outside agencies to do so (Baker and 
Kare 1992; Courtis 1995). For this reason, their narrative sections should contain less 
reading difficulty than those of small companies. 
It has to be noted that both the 'complexity of operations' and the 'a\'ailability of 
communication specialists' argument provide explanations for a link between reading 
difficulty and firm size, but not for a link between reading ease manipulation and finn 
size. It may be true that complex operations lead to more complex language than 
simple operations and that conlmunication specialists are able to \\Tite more clearly 
than management. Howeyer, this is an argument for the link between firm size and 
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writing style and not firm size and impression management by means of reading ease 
manipulation. In section 2.3.1 it was argued that reading difficulty as a result of bad 
writing is due to a lack of skill on part of the writer and does not constitute impression 
management. However, reading difficulty which is used deliberately to obfuscate 
negative organisational outcomes constitutes reading ease manipUlation since it is 
used to influence outsiders' perceptions and decisions of firm performance. 
As a matter of fact, the availability of communication specialists should lead to a 
direct association between reading difficulty and firm size, since professional writers 
should be more skilled at impression management by linguistic means. 
In line with the agency theory framework underlying this study, we adopt a political 
cost hypothesis and argues that reading ease manipulation is inversely related to firm 
size, since large companies are more reluctant to obfuscate negative organisational 
outcomes, as they do not want to draw too much attention to positive financial 
performance. Thus, we hypothesize that large companies are less likely to engage in 
reading ease manipulation than small companies which makes the narrative corporate 
report sections of large companies easier to read than those of small companies. 
Hie: Narrative corporate report sections of large companies are easier to read than 
those of small companies. 
4.1.3 Association between reading ease manipulation and industry 
Courtis (1995) finds no difference in the reading difficulty of chairman's reports 
between different sectors. We do not expect to find any difference in the impression 
management behaviour of firms belonging to different industrial sectors. We thus 
expect consumer cyclical, industrial, and technology companies to sho\\' the same 
strength and direction of associations between reading difficulty and 'goodlbad news' 
and firm size. 
Hid: There is no difference between sectors in the strength and direction of 
association between the reading difficult)' of corporate narralil'e report 
documents and (i) accounting 'good/bad news' and (iiJ the' si:e of/inns. 
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4.2 Impression management in the form of self-presentational 
dissimulation 
Previous impression management studies have not analysed narrative corporate report 
documents for evidence of self-presentational dissimulation. However. since 
"management is not neutral in its presentation of accounting narratives" (Courtis 
1998: 466), corporate narrative report documents are likely to involve presenting a 
public image of firm performance and prospects inconsistent with the way 
management may see firm performance and prospects. This means that corporate 
narrative report sections are likely to contain self-presentational dissimulation. 
Research on the psychological aspects of word use has identified five linguistic 
markers which are indicative of self-presentational dissimulation, namely word count, 
self-reference, references to others, use of emotion words, and cognitive complexity. 
We thus posit that the narrative corporate report sections of companies will show 
evidence of linguistic markers. 
H2a: Companies use self-presentational dissimulation in their corporate narrative 
documents which manifests itself in (1) a low word count, (2) few self-
references, (3) few references to others, (4) a high number of emotion words, in 
particular a high number of negative emotion words, and (5) few markers of 
cognitive complexity. 
4.2.1 Association between linguistic markers and 'goodlbad news' 
In line with the obfuscation hypothesis we argue that firms reporting "bad news' in 
their financial statements are more likely to present a public image of finn 
performance and prospects which is inconsistent with how management may see finn 
performance and prospects (i.e. engage in self-presentational dissimulation) than 
firms reporting 'good news'. Thus, self-presentational dissimulation is expected to be 
directly associated with "bad news'. 
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H2b: Narrative corporate report sections of companies reporting accounting 'bad 
news' contain more linguistic markers of self-presentational dissimulation (i. e. 
(1) a lower word count, (2) fewer self-references, (3) fewer references to others. 
(4) a higher number of emotion words, in particular a higher number of negative 
emotion words, and (5) fewer markers of cognitive complexity) than those of 
companies reporting accounting 'good news '. 
4.2.2 Association between linguistic markers and firm size 
Following the political cost hypothesis outlined in section 4.1.2, we expect smaller 
companies to contain more evidence of dissimulation than larger companies. This is 
due to the fact that large companies do not want to attract public attention by means of 
highlighting positive financial performance. They thus feel less inclined to engage in 
impression management by means of obfuscating negative organisational outcomes. It 
is thus hypothesized that firm size is inversely associated with linguistic markers. 
H2c : Narrative corporate report sections of small companies contain more linguistic 
markers of self-presentational dissimulation (i.e. (1) a lower word count, (2) 
fewer self-references, (3) fewer references to others, (4) a higher number of 
emotion words, in particular a higher number of negative emotion words, and 
(5) fewer markers of cognitive complexity) than those of large companies. 
~.2.3 Association between linguistic markers and industry 
We do not expect to find any difference in dissimulation of firms belonging to 
different industrial sectors. We thus expect consumer cyclical, industriaL and 
technology companies to show the same strength and direction of associations 
between the linguistic markers and 'good/bad news' and firm size. 
H2d: There is no difference between sectors in the strength and direction of 
association between linguistic markers of self-presentational in corporate 
report documents and accounting 'good/bad news' and the si:e of firms. 
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4.3 Summary and conclusions 
This study examInes four hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that narrative 
corporate report sections will show evidence of impression management in the fonn 
of reading ease manipulation and self-presentational dissimulation. Furthennore, 
impression management in the form of reading ease manipulation and self-
presentational dissimulation is hypothesized to be directly associated with accounting 
'bad news' and inversely associated with finn size. We expect there to be no 
difference in the use of impression management between companies from different 
industrial sectors. 
Chapter five is devoted to discussing the measurement of accounting 'good/bad news' 
and firm size. Four measures of' good/bad news', two of which have not been used in 
impression management research before and incorporate industry comparators and 
time-series aspects of firm performance, are presented. 
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Chapter 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter lays out the processes involved in selecting a representative sample of 
firms for analysis, discusses the measurement of independent variables which have 
been hypothesized to impact on the use of impression management, introduces the 
statistical analysis used to examine the association between impression management 
and company characteristics, and presents the hypothesized direction of association 
between these variables. 
5.1 Population and selection of sample 
Chairman's reports of UK listed companies are analysed in this study. The population 
of listed companies is identified from which a sample comprising three industry 
sectors, varying in size, is selected for analysis. 
5.1.1 Population 
The companies are selected from the subscription-based Thomson One Banker-
Analytics database (http://banker.thomsonib.com/) and the population from which the 
sample is selected comprises all UK companies (UK domicile) listed on the London 
Stock Exchange on 30 April 2004 (1,983 companies). 
5.1.2 Sample 
The aim of sample selection in this study is to derive a sample comprising a variety of 
industries and firm sizes. The companies were first grouped into sectors, based on the 
Dow Jones Market Sector classifications. In order to generate a large enough sample. 
the three sectors with the highest number of companies were selected for analysis 
(Financial Services companies are excluded due to their unique features). The three 
resulting sectors are Consumer Cyclical (eyC; n = 359). Technology (TEe; n = 176). 
and Industrial (lDU: n = 397). 
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The base year for analysis is 2002. Companies are eliminated from the population for 
three reasons. First of all, companies with missing values for end of year market 
capitalization for 2002 are deleted since this forms the basis of the measurement of 
firm size. Secondly, companies with large changes in year end market capitalization 
between 2001 and 2002 are deleted as this signifies major capital restructuring. 
Finally, since the financial measures need to be comparable across the whole sample. 
they need to cover the same length of time. For this reason, companies with missing 
values for end of fiscal year date for 2001 and/or 2002 are deleted and companies 
with less than 11 and more than 13 months between fiscal year end dates of 2001 and 
2002 are deleted. This leaves the 324 Consumer Cyclical companies, 164 Technology 
companies, and 369 Industrial companies (see Table 5.1). 
Traditionally, statistical texts point to a mInImUm sample SIze of 30 random 
observations, which is based on simulation studies involving the Central Limit 
Theorem. For correlation analysis, the general rule of thumb is the sample should 
comprise no less than 50, and that 30 per variable would be sufficient to obtain 
acceptable power in multivariate regressions (Cohen 1988). For analysis of variance. 
which detects differences among groups, the usual rule of thumb is that the number of 
observed cases that are needed to maintain an adequate power is 30 per cell. Thus, a 
sample size of 90 firms would be adequate, either if there are no more than three 
independent regression variables, or similarly, a sample size of 90 firms would be 
adequate, if there are no more than three ANOVA groups. 
Thus, once the industry sectors were identified, a sample of 31 companies from each 
sector was selected using systematic sampling to ensure heterogeneity of firm sizes. 
For this purpose, the companies in each sector are ranked according to size (end of 
year market capitalization 2002 in fmillion) and sample members are chosen at 
regular intervals. The sampling interval is the ratio N/n, i.e. where N represents the 
population and n the desired sample size, i.e. 31. As a result. the sample consists of 93 
companies from three sectors, each covering the full range of finn sizes72 (see Table 
5.1 ), 
7~ Since some of the very small companies originally inc\ud.ed in t~e sample do not ~ave a webs-,ite or 
provide annual reports to the Thomson .4l1a~l'tics database, It was ImpossIble to obtam annual reports 
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Table 5.1: Sample selection 
Consumer Technology Industrial Total 
cyclical 
Total in sector 359 176 397 932 
Eliminations 
Market capitalisation not available/large 342 171 389 902 
change in market capitalisation 
Missing values 337 171 378 886 
Non-calendar years 334 171 371 876 
Final in sector 324 164 369 857 
Sample selected 31 31 31 93 
Appendix I lists the 93 companies in the sample indicating the industry sector and size 
for each company. 
5.1.3 Data collection 
Financial variables 
The database Thomson One Banker-Analytics is used to download all the financial 
variables from 1999 to 2003, including end of year market-capitalisation, total assets, 
total sales (turnover), income before taxation and interest (pre-tax income), and fiscal 
year-end date. 
In order to verify the financial information downloaded from the Thomson One 
Banker-Analytics database, two accounting numbers, namely turnover and pre-tax 
income, which form the basis of the 'goodlbad news' measures introduced in section 
5.2.1. and which are most commonly disclosed in chairman's reports, were cross-
checked against the financial accounts and the chairman's reports of the annual 
reports of all the sample companies. 
Annual reports 
Chairman's reports were obtained by downloading the 2002 annual reports in pdf 
format from the company websites and, if not a\'ailable there. from 
http://wvvw.northcote.co.uk. If not available from these two sources. they \\cre 
for four of the originally selected companies. This necessitates substituting them by the company either 
above or below them in ranking by firm size, depending on data availability. 
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obtained via Thomson One Banker-Analytics, which provides scanned annual reports 
in pdf format. 
Seven companies (Exel, Robert Wiseman Dairies, Sopheon, Springhealth, Staff'ware, 
Stylo, and Superscape)73 provide a combined chairman's report and chief executi\'e's 
review, one company (Know Technology Solutions)74 only provides a chief 
executive's review, and three companies provide a combined chairman's report and 
review of operations (Smart Approach, Venturia, and Wetherspoon)75. Since they are 
very similar in both style and coverage of topics to conventional chairman's reports, 
they are taken as substitutes thereof. 
5.1.4 Data preparation 
Converting documents into machine-readable format 
Photographs and their captions, images, charts, graphs, and tables are deleted from the 
chairman's reports. If present, form of address (Dear shareholder) and greeting 
(Yours faithfully) are also deleted from the text. 
The conversion of chairman's reports from pdf to text format is carried out by copying 
and pasting the text into Word. Conversion from scanned annual reports in pdf fonnat 
is more laborious, since it entails printing the chairman's reports, rescanning them and 
converting them into text format (Word document) using Textbridge. 
73 Exel does not provide narrative annual report sections in the conventional format, but presents 
documents endorsed by both the chairman and the chief executive. The document entitled 
'performance' is analysed in lieu of the chairman's report since it covers the same topics as 
conventional chairman's reports. Robert Wiseman Dairies provides a statement from both the chairman 
and the managing director which covers the same topics as conventional chairman's statements. 
Springhealth provides a document entitled 'chairman's and chief executive's review' which covers the 
same topics as conventional chairman's reports. Staffware and Stylo have a combined chairman and 
chief executive and provide documents entitled 'chairman's and chief executive's statement' and 
'chairman's statement and operating review' which are similar in both style and content to 
conventional chairman's reports. Superscape provides a document entitled 'statement from the 
~hairman and chief executive' which covers similar topics to the conventional chairman's statement. 
~ . . 
I\now Tl!chnology solutions does not have a chairman, but only a chief executive, whose revIew IS 
\cry much in the same format and covers the same content as the chairman's reports of the other 
companies in the sample, 
71 In all three cases, the chairman is an executive chairman and provides a combined chairman's 
statement and review of operations covering similar topics as conventional chairman's statements. 
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Using Coh-Metrix 
We set the parameters representing the amount of the anticipated readers' education 
and background knowledge to the default setting 'college level' which is based on the 
Touchstone Applied Science Associates, Inc. (TASA) corpus. It contains files 
covering novels, newspaper articles, and other information. This captures the fact that 
narrative annual report sections not only contain financial information, but also 
information about the specific nature of the business in which the company is 
engaged, e.g. construction, publishing or football. 
After pasting each text into a window, Coh-Metrix automatically generates a score for 
each of the four reading difficulty measures and presents the output in the form of an 
Excel spreadsheet. 
Converting text documents into MMAX2 format 
Before MMAX2, the computerized annotation tool used to analyse the texts for 
cohesion, can be run, the text documents have to be converted into MMAX2 format. In 
addition, in order for the cohesion analysis to be carried out, all noun phrases have to 
be identified. Both tasks are carried out by the software provider. 76 
The coding manual (see Appendix VII), which is based on guidelines produced by 
research in computational linguistics regarding coreference annotation,77 provides 
more detailed information on post-edit procedures within MMAX2 and text 
annotation. 
Previous studies test whether the use of impression management is dependent on a 
multitude of company characteristics, such as firm size, industry classification, listing 
status, various corporate governance factors (board composition, managerial share 
76 Converting the texts into MMAX2 fonnat requires the following procedure: First, all text documents 
have to be converted from plain text fonnat into XML code. XML stands for eXtensible Markup 
Language. It involves embedding the structure and classification system of infonnation inside the 
document itself. XML is a way for the document to carry infonnation about itself. Documents thus 
describe the infonnation they contain. As a result, texts encoded in XML do not only hold the text itself. 
but also the structure and even classification of the information inside the document by means of tags. 
Identification of noun phrases is carried out automatically by means of a noun phrase chunker (NP-
Chunker), which involves recognizing the chunks of text consisting of noun phrases (NPs). 
n 
See the website of the i h Message Understanding Conference (MUC-7) 
http://www.itl.nist.gov/iaui/894.02/related~rojects/muc/proceedings/co_task.html. 
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ownership, institutional share ownership, etc.), and others. This study focuses on two 
company characteristics, namely firm size and industry classification. Figure 5.1 
illustrates the research model used in this study. 
Impression management 
Impression management 
• Reading ease manipulation 
• Cohesion (MMAX2) 
• Cohesion (Coh-Metrix) 
• Self-presentational 
dissimulation (LIWC) 
Figure 5.1: The research model 
5.2 Measurement of 'good/bad news' 
Firm characteristics 
Accounting 'good/bad news' 
• Positive/negative earnings 
• Increasing/declining 
earnings 
• Sales increase/decrease 
relative to industry 
• Positive/negative finn 
owth relative to indus 
Firm size 
• Market capitalisation 
Industry 
• Consumer Cyclical 
• Technology 
• Industrial 
Previous studies have found impression management to vary according to financial 
performance in the sense that poorly performing companies sho\\" more c\'idence of 
impression management than well-performing companies (Abrahamson and Park 
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1994; Adelberg 1979; Aerts 1994; Hooghiemstra 200; Short and Palmer 2003; Smith 
and Taffler 1995, 2000; Sydserff and Weetman 2002; Tennyson et al. 1990). 
5.2.1 Previously used measures 
Previous studies use two different research designs, name I y (l) . goodlbad news' in 
the form of sample selection and (2) 'good/'bad news' as an independent variable. In 
addition, measures of financial performance on which 'goodlbad news' is based yary. 
'Good/bad news' in the form of sample selection 
This approach has the advantage of establishing a clear differentiation between ' good 
news' and 'bad news' firms. It involves either (l) selecting the top and bottom firms 
in a sample, ranked by increasing/declining performance (Courtis 1998; Clatworthy 
and Jones 2001a, b; Sydserff and Weetman 2002) or (2) a sample composed of failed 
and non-failed companies, matched by size and industry (Smith and Taffler 1992a, b, 
1995, 2000; Tennyson et al. 1990). 
'Good/bad news' as an independent variable 
This involves comparing financial performance over a time-period of at least two 
years. For example, a company can be said to be reporting 'good news'. if its 
perfonnance has improved from one year to the next. By contrast, a company can be 
said to be reporting 'bad news', if its financial performance has deteriorated from one 
year to the next (Frazier et al. 1984; Baker and Kare 1992; Subramanian et al. 1993: 
Courtis 1995; Hooghiemstra 2001; Rutherford 2003). 
Thus, 'goodlbad news' involves a relative measure of financial performance. 
reflecting positive change in performance for 'good news' and negative change in 
perfonnance for 'bad news'. This results in a sample division into (l) companies 
reporting 'good news' (increase in performance from Yo to Y\) and (2) companies 
reporting 'bad news' (decrease in performance from Yo to Y\). 
The two most commonly used financial performance measures are (1) net income 
(Subramanian et al. 1993; Hooghiemstra 200L (2) profit before taxation (Courtis 
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1998; Clatworthy and Jones 2001, 2006). Others include return on assets (ROA) 
(Aerts 1994; Courtis 1995) and return on equity (ROE) (Aerts 1994). 
Aerts (2005: 505) argues that using relative measures of financial performance (i.e. 
positive vs. negative percentage change in performance) is more meaningful in the 
context of impression management since "corporate narrative explanations usually 
focus on changes in performance rather than on absolute performance levels." 
5.2.2 Measures used in this study 
This study uses four measures of 'good/bad news', namely (1) positi ve/negati ve 
earnings (PE), (2) positive/negative earnIngs growth (PEl), (3) relative 
positive/negative sales growth (RSI), and (4) relative positive/negative long-term firm 
growth (RG). 
Positive/negative earnings (PE) measures whether earnings (income before tax) are 
positive/negative in absolute terms in the year of analysis (2002). Positive/negative 
earnings growth (PEl) measures the positive/negative change in earnings between two 
years (2001-2002). Relative positive/negative sales growth (RSI) measures the 
positive/negative growth in sales (measured as total sales) of a company relative to its 
industry78 between two years (2001 and 2002). Relative positive/negative long-term 
firm growth (RG) measures the growth of a company (averaged over sales and total 
assets) relative to its industry over four years (1999-2003).79 Each variable is a 
dummy variable, with a value of 0 if the measure is negative, and a value of 1 if 
positive. 
Table 5.2 provides an overview of the four measures of' good/bad news' used in this 
study. 
'8 In RSI and RG industry measures are calculated by including the total number of firms in the 
population which belong to the industry in question. As indicated in section 5.1.2, this includes 359 
Consumer Cyclical companies, 176 Technology companies, and 397 Industrial companies. 
79 Slope coefficient on the logarithmic change from a seemingly unrelated panel regression. 
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Table 5.2: Measurement of 'goodlbad news' 
Proxy measure 
(I) Positive/negative earnings 
(2) Positive/negative earnings 
growth 
(3) Relative positive/negative 
sales growth 
(4) Relative positive/negative 
long-term firm growth 
Abbrev. 
PE 
PEl 
RSI 
RG 
Definition 
Positi ve earnings = 2:0 in Y I; 
Negative earnings = < 0 in Y I 
Positive earnings change = earnings 
increase from Yo to Y I; 
Negative earnings change 
earnings decrease from Yo to Y I 
Relative positive sales growth = 
Sales growth from Yo to Y I IS 
above industry; 
Relative negative sales growth = 
Sales growth from Yo to Y I is 
below industry 
Relative positive long-term firm 
growth = growth in sales and assets 
from Y-2 to Y2 is above industry; 
Relative negative long-term firm 
growth = growth in sales and assets 
from Y-2 to Y 2 is below industry 
Measurement 
Positive = I; 
negative = 0 
Positive = I; 
negative = 0 
Positive = 1; 
negative = 0 
Positive = 1; 
negative = 0 
Whereas positive/negative earnings (PE) and positive/negative earnings growth (PEl) 
are based on financial performance measures used in previous research, relative 
positive/negative sales growth (RSI) and relative positive/negative long-term firm 
growth (RG) constitute an extension of previously used measures of financial 
performance. The first two measures (positive/negative earnings and positive/negative 
earnings growth) are concerned with financials and measure company-specific 
'good/bad news'. The latter two measures (relative positive/negative sales growth and 
relative positive/negative long-term firm growth) are concerned with fundamentals 
and measure 'good/bad news' as relative to industry. Industry-relative measures of 
'good/bad news' reflect the reality that investment decisions are driven by financial 
performance relative to competitors. Economic conditions might be such that an entire 
industry suffers a downturn. In such a case, 'good news' for a particular company 
might mean a smaller loss than its competitors. 
Research in earnings management has provided substantial evidence concernmg 
benchmark beating in firms. In this study it is assumed that obfuscation of negatiye 
organizational outcomes in narrative corporate report sections is intended to influence 
the perception of a shortfall when such targets are missed. In this context. it is 
generally assumed that managers seek firstly to report a profit and not a loss (Hayn, 
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1995), and secondly to report results that improve upon last year's perfonnance 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999),80 However, annual earnings 
may be influenced by a number of non-contemporaneous factors, such as corrections 
to past valuations and the prudent recognition of current value-increasing activities 
whose income effect is deferred until its eventual certain realization in future periods. 
Therefore, we also consider a broader accounting-based indicator of perfonnance that 
provides a global measure of current activities, i.e. sales. In this context, it is assumed 
that negative nominal sales growth and lower sales growth than the finn's competitors 
represent missed targets. 
5.3 Measurement of firm size 
Previous research shows finn size (Jones 1988; Baker and Kare 1992; Courtis 1995; 
Short and Palmer 2003; Aerts 2005) to be an important factor in explaining 
impression management behaviour. 
Cooke (1991: 176) argues that size can be measured in a number of different ways 
and there is no overriding theoretical reason to select one rather than another. 
Previous impression management studies have used (1) market capitalization (Courtis 
1995), (2) total assets/log total assets (Baker and Kare 1992; Aerts 1994, 2001, 2005: 
Smith et al. 2005), (3) turnover/log turnover (Jones 1988; Aerts 1994, 2001), (4) 
number of employees (Short and Palmer 2003), and (5) number of common shares 
outstanding (Baker and Kare 1992). 
In this study finn size is measured in tenns of 2002 end of year market capitalization 
(thousand pounds), i.e., the value of a company obtained by multiplying the number 
of its issued ordinary shares by its market price. In order to achieve a more normal 
distribution of values, the log value is taken. 
80 A further earnings target that is commonly researched is that of meeting or beating consensus 
analysts' earnings forecasts - see Burgstahler and Eames (1999); Payne and Robb (2000); Pop.e et al. 
(2001). However, the availability of consensus forecasts requires a strong analyst stock follOWIng. As 
this would stratify the sample for the present study, due to the lack of available forecasts for smaller 
finns in the UK, this benchmark is not considered here. 
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Appendix I lists the size (in thousand pounds sterling) for each of the companies in 
the sample. 
5.4 Measurement of industry classification 
Courtis (1995) does not find impression management in the form of reading ease 
manipulation to be associated with industry differences. However, Aerts (2005) finds 
a direct association between impression management in the form of performance 
attribution and industry sector. 
The sample contains three industry groups, namely Consumer Cyclical (CYC), 
Technology (TEe), and Industrial (IDU), based on the Dow Jones Market Sector 
classifications. Appendix I identifies the industry sector for each company in the 
sample. 
5.5 Predicted response of impression management to firm 
characteristics 
The prIor literature has established a link between financial performance and 
impression management by arguing that the obfuscation of negative organisational 
outcomes is especially pronounced when 'bad news' is reported. This inverse 
association between reading difficulty and firm performance has been confirmed by 
previous research, i.e. poorly performing firms have been shown to engage in more 
impression management than better-performing firms (Abrahamson and Park 1994: 
Adelberg 1979; Aerts 1994; Frazier et al. 1984; Hooghiemstra 2001; Short and 
Palmer 2003; Smith and Taffler 1992a, 2000; Subramanian et al. 1993; Sydserff and 
Weetman 2002; Tennyson et al. 1990). 
Previous hypotheses are not consistent on the direction of association between 
Impression management and firm size. The monitoring hypothesis states that 
Increased monitoring by outside shareholders, governmental bodies, analysts, etc. 
decreases the opportunity for management to engage in impression management since 
214 
it increases the chances of being found out and sanctioned (Abrahamson and Park 
1994). Since large firms are under more scrutiny from the public. the financial 
community, and from analysts, it is hypothesized that they have less opportunity and 
incentives to engage in impression management. 
However, Courtis (1998) views obfuscation by means of reading ease manipulation to 
be directly related to press coverage, which can be regarded as a proxy for size. He 
argues that companies in the public eye aim "to reduce the chances of interference 
from investors, government and regulatory agencies" (462) by means of confusing 
their readership by obfuscating. Jones (1988) and Rutherford (2003) also regard 
impression management in the form of obfuscation and size to be directly related by 
arguing that larger firms have more complex operations which results in syntactically 
more complex narratives. 
However, in keeping with agency theory explanations of managerial behaviour, on 
which the majority of impression management studies are based, the direction of 
association between impression management and firm size adopted in this study is 
based on the political cost hypothesis (see chapter four, section 4.1.2). The political 
cost hypothesis claims that firms in the public eye, such as large firms. do not want to 
attract attention by high profitability since this can result in new taxes or regulations. 
It thus follows that large firms have no incentives to engage in impression 
management by obfuscating negative organisational outcomes, since they do not want 
to portray their financial performance in the best possible light. Applying the political 
cost hypothesis, it thus follows that large firms are less likely to engage in impression 
management than small firms. Therefore, impression management is assumed to be 
inversely related to firm size. 
Previous research does not find industry classification to be related to impression 
management differences (Courtis 1995). For this reason, it will be assumed that there 
is no association between impression management and industry classification. 
In summary, impression management is hypothesized to be directly related to 
'goodlbad ne\ys·. since managers of underperforming fim1S haye higher incenti\cs to 
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hide infonnation from outsiders. Impression management is hypothesized to be 
inversely associated with size since large finns face higher political costs if they 
portray finn perfonnance in the best possible light. Industry is hypothesised to make 
no difference on the impression management behaviour of companies. Table 5.3 
summarizes the hypothesized direction of association between impression 
management and 'good/bad news', finn size and industry. 
Table 5.3: Hypothesized direction of association between impression management, 'good/bad news', 
firm size, and industry classification 
Variable Proxy measure Name Definition Direction of 
association 
Good/bad news Earnings PE Good news = I; Bad news = 0 Direct 
Earnings growth PEl Good news = I; Bad news = 0 Direct 
Relative sales growth RSl Good news = 1; Bad news = 0 Direct 
Relative long-tenn RG Good news = 1; Bad news = 0 Direct 
finn growth 
Company size Log Market logSlZE Number of its issued ordinary Inverse 
capitalization shares x their market price 
Industry Dow Jones industry lND eye, IOU, TEe None predicted 
classification 
5.6 Statistical analysis 
Previous impression management research uses correlation analysis (Baker and Kare 
1992; Smith and Taffler 1992a; Subramanian et al. 1993), regression analysis (Jones 
1988: Rutherford 2003), and ANOV A (Aerts 2005; Clatworthy and Jones 200 1 b) to 
examine the association between impression management and various company 
characteristics. 
This study uses bivariate and multivariate analysis to analyse impression management 
in chairman's reports. The bivariate analysis examines the association bet\\ccn 
impression management and finn size by means of ordinary least square regression 
analysis (OLS) and the association between impression management and "good/bad 
news' by means of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The muItiyariate analysis 
examines the association between impression management and . goodlbad news' and 
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flrm size by means of the general linear model (GLM). GLM extends Al\OV A by 
means of adding firm size as a covariate while preserving the difference bet\\een the 
two means and allows for interaction between the variables. 
In order to examIne potential industry differences, the bivariate and multiyariate 
analysis is first carried out for the whole sample and then for each industry sector 
separately. 
5.7 Summary and conclusions 
After discussing the measurement of impression management in chapter four. chapter 
five has provided an overview of the research methodology used to examine the use 
of impression management in chairman's reports. This has comprised (1) sample 
selection, (2) measurement of 'goodlbad news' and firm size, (3) predicted response 
of impression management on 'good/bad news' and firm size, and (4) statistical 
analysis techniques used to examine the use of impression management and its 
association with 'good/bad news' and firm size. 
Chapter six presents the results of these statistical tests and interprets them. It thus 
provides answers to the research questions asked in this study, namely (1) whether 
chairman's reports are used for impression management purposes and (2) whether the 
use of impression management is dependent on 'good/bad news' and varies according 
to firm size and industry. 
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Chapter 6: RESULTS 
This chapter reports the results of the statistical analysis of impression management in 
chairman's reports. The first section describes the sample of companies reporting 
favourable or unfavourable outcomes and the size of the firms in the sample. The 
second and the third section evaluate the obfuscation hypothesis by means of 
examining the association between impression management in the form of (1) reading 
difficulty and (2) self-presentational dissimulation and 'goodlbad news' and firm size. 
The second section considers reading difficulty, where conventional readability scores 
(Flesch Reading Ease) are calculated together with two additional approaches to 
measuring reading difficulty based on textual cohesion that are new to accounting 
research. The first approach is annotation-based (MMAX2) and calculates three 
measures of textual cohesion and the second uses a web-based automatic generator of 
reading difficulty measures (Coh-Metrix) and calculates four measures of textual 
cohesion. The third section gives the test results when the linguistic markers of self-
presentational dissimulation are employed in order to evaluate the obfuscation 
hypothesis. 
6.1 Measures of firm performance and firm size 
For the statistical tests carried out in this study, the reporting of either good or bad 
news is treated as a 0, 1 dummy variable, and is measured in four different ways. 
Classification as 'bad news' depends on whether (1) the earnings figure is negative 
(PE == 0), (2) the growth in earnings is negative (PEl = 0), (3) sales growth relative to 
the sector is negative (RSI = 0), and (4) the longer-term growth of the firm relative to 
the sector is negative (RG = 0). 
The dummy variable is scored as 1 for good news, and 0 otherwise. Although there 
are instances of break-even outcomes in the population as a whole, and of no change 
in earnings, sales or assets from one year to the next, there are no such occurrences in 
the sample. Also, when outcome relative to the sector is calculated, there arc no 
instances where an individual firm's performance is exactly the same as the sector 
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average. Therefore, for each of the four measures of 'goodlbad news', good news 
always represents a positive outcome and bad news a negative outcome. 
Table 6.1 shows the number of companies in the sample reporting positive and 
negative organizational outcomes across the four proxy measures of accounting 
'good/bad news' . 
Table 6.1: Measures of good and bad news 
'Good news' 'Bad news' Total 
No. No. No. 
(1) Positive/negative earnings (PE) 52 41 93 
(2) Positive/negative earnings growth (PEl) 55 38 93 
(3) Positive/negative relative sales growth (RSI) 57 36 93 
(4) Positive/negative relative longer-term firm growth (RG) 59 34 93 
It can be seen that there is a roughly 3:2 split into 'good news' and 'bad news' 
companies across all four measures. 
In addition, controls are added to each main effects estimation in order to allow for 
differences in reporting that are attributable to firm size or industry membership. For 
this purpose, firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalisation in 
2002, and industry sub-samples are based on the Dow Jones market classification. 
Table 6.2 shows that sample selection has resulted in heterogeneity regarding firm 
size. 
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Table 6.3 shows that none of the four measures of 'goodlbad news' is strongly 
correlated with firm size. This means that firm size does not create a bias in the 
reporting of either good or bad news. 
Table 6.3: Correlation between measures of good/bad news and 
firm size 
PE PEl RSI RG 
PEl 0.407 
0.000 
RSI 0.273 0.327 
0.008 0.001 
RG 0.450 0.277 0.680 
0.000 0.007 0.000 
SIZE 0.378 0.059 0.008 0.029 
0.000 0.577 0.938 0.780 
Cell Contents: Correlation 
(P-Value) 
6.2 Measures of reading difficulty 
6.2.1 Descriptive statistics of measures of reading difficulty 
For this study reading difficulty is measured using two new methodologies which 
both treat reading difficulty as a function of textual cohesion. The first approach uses 
three measures of cohesion-based reading difficulty which are the result of manual 
text annotation (by means of MMAX2) and the second approach uses four cohesion-
based measures of reading difficulty which are automatically generated by means of a 
web-based tool (Coh-Metrix). The resulting seven new measures of reading di fficulty 
are compared to two traditional reading difficulty measures, namely the F/(!sch 
Reading Ease Score and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level (See descripti\'e statistics in 
Table 6.4). 
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Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics of traditional reading difficulty measures 
Variable N 81 Mean Median StDev Min Max Ql Q3 
Flesch Reading Ease 88 42.8lO 43.466 7.834 22.404 60.659 39.599 47.328 
Flesch-Kincaid 88 11.524 12.000 0.892 7.026 12.000 11.294 12.000 
Due to lack of benchmarks for the new cohesion-based reading difficulty measures. 
the reading difficulty of chairman's reports can only be assessed in tenns of the two 
traditional readability measures namely Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch Kincaid 
Grade Level.82 
The Flesch Reading Ease measure rates text on a 100-point scale. The higher the 
score, the easier it is to understand the document. A score of 60 to 70 is considered 
optimal for easy comprehension. The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level fonnula converts 
the Reading Ease score to a U.S. grade-school level. The higher the number, the 
harder it is to read the text. Grade levels range from 0 to 12. 
Table 6.4 shows the descriptive statistics of the readability scores for the chainnan' s 
reports examined in this study. With a mean value of 42.8 for the Flesch Reading 
Ease score and a mean value of 11.5 for the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Lel'el fonnula, 
chairman's reports are considered difficult to read. This is in accordance with 
previous research (Lewis et al. 1986; Courtis 1986). 
The first approach is based on three cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty 
that are computed following text annotation (by means of MMAX2, a computerised 
textual annotation tool), namely (1) the number of cohesive ties in a given text. (2) the 
cohesion density of a given text, and (3) the proportion of new versus gIven 
information in a given text. (See descriptive statistics in Table 6.5).83 
81 Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid scores are computed \\ith Coh-,\ft!/:ir \\ hich .has a 
maximum processing capacity is about 15,000 words per document. This resulted In ~ reductIon of 
sample size from 95 to 88 firms when calculating the Flesch Reading Ease, the Flesch-KinCaid, and the 
four cohesion-based reading difficulty scores generated by Coh-Metrit (see Table 6.6). 
12 The results for the Flesch Reading Ease measure and the Flesch-Kincaid Grad!! LI..'\·t!l measure are 
based on Coh-Me(riy output. 
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Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics of annotation-based measures of reading difficulty pHl4X2) 1 
Variable N Mean Median StDev Min Max Ql Q3 i. 
Cohesion 
Density 93 0.323 0.333 0.088 0.000 0.500 0.278 0.389 
Cohesive 
Ties 93 0.353 0.467 0.176 0.073 0.593 0.1"78 0.515 
Given v. New 
Information 93 0.500 0.712 0.375 0.038 1.120 0.122 0.825 
The second approach is based on the output estimates obtained from Coh-.\/etrix. a 
web-based tool which computes four referential measures of reading difficulty. 
namely (1) adjacent argument overlap, (2) argument overlap, (3) adjacent stem 
overlap, and (4) stem overlap. (See descriptive statistics in Table 6.6). 
Table 6.6: Descriptive statistics of computer-generated measures of reading difficulty 
(Coh-Metrix) 
Variable N Mean Median StDev Min Max Ql Q3 
Adjacent 
Argument Overlap 88 0.459 0.461 0.144 0.000 0.809 0.365 0.552 
Argument Overlap 88 0.285 0.258 0.099 0.069 0.610 0.217 0.341 
Adjacent 
Stem Overlap 88 0.494 0.503 0.136 0.112 0.882 0.405 0.592 
Stem Overlap 88 0.308 0.279 0.110 0.065 0.666 0.242 0.388 
6.2.2 Correlation between measures of reading difficulty 
Before testing the obfuscation hypothesis using the measures described abo\"e as 
indicators of reading difficulty, the correlation between these \arious indicators is 
examined, for two reasons. The first is to determine whether the ne\\" measures 
introduced in this study capture a different aspect of reading difficulty, i.e. lack of 
cohesion, to the conventional reading difficulty measures which are based on word 
83 Interannotator agreement is 7500 which suggests that the annotation oftc\tual cohesion is based o~ 
objective criteria and does not reflect "the idiosvncratic results or one's rather suhjccfI\·t? Judgml!nl 
(Tinsley and Weiss 1975: 359). See Appendix V tor detailed results of the reliability statistics. 
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and sentence length. The second is to detennine whether the cohesion-based measur('~ 
of reading difficulty that are computer-generated with Coh-Jfetrix are substitutes for 
the cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty that are calculated based on manual 
text annotation. 
First, the correlation between the two traditional reading difficulty measures (the 
Flesch Reading Ease Score and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Leve!) and the three 
annotation-based measures of cohesion introduced in this study (the number of 
cohesive ties, the cohesion density, and the proportion of given vs. new information) 
is examined (see Table 6.7). Then, the correlation between two traditional reading 
difficulty measures and the four Coh-Metrix measures (adjacent argument overlap. 
argument overlap, adjacent stem overlap, and stem overlap) is examined (see Table 
6.8). 
We would expect a negative correlation between the Flesch Reading Ease ,Score and 
the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level. This is due to their different scoring approaches. 
Whereas texts with a low Flesch Reading Ease Score are difficult to read, texts with a 
low Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level are easy to read. Table 6.7 shows a strong 
correlation between the two indices, which is negative as expected (-0.679). The 
strong correlation is due to the fact that both reading difficulty measures are based on 
similar metrics involving average sentence length and average number of syllables by 
word. 
As far as the correlation between the three annotation-based cohesion measures is 
concerned, the proportion of given vs. new information and the number of cohesive 
ties are highly correlated (0.991) and can thus be used as substitutes for each other. 
This is not surprising, since they are both based on the number of grammatical and 
lexical connections in a text. However, cohesion density is neither correlated with the 
proportion of given vs. new information nor with number of cohcsin? ties and thus 
constitutes a separate cohesion measure. This is due to the fact that cohesion density is 
not concerned with grammatical and lexical interrelationships throughout the text. but 
with information overlap. 
Table 6.7: Correlation between annotation-based cohesion measures and traditional 
readability scores 
Cohesion Cohesive Given v. New Flesch Reading 
Density Ties Information Ease Score 
Cohesive 0.011 
Ties 0.917 
Given v. New 0.006 0.991 
Information 0.956 0.000 
Flesch Reading -0.195 0.048 0.071 
Ease Score 0.069 0.660 0.513 
Flesch-Kincaid 0.264 -0.041 -0.058 -0.679 
Grading Level 0.013 0.701 0.593 0.000 
Cell Contents: Correlation 
(P-Value) 
The fact that there is no correlation between any of the three cohesion-based measures 
and both the Flesch Reading Ease Score and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level suggests 
that the new annotation-based measures constitute different measures of reading 
difficulty. This is due to the fact that conventional readability formulae are word- and 
sentence-based measures which act as proxies for memory span and speed of 
recognition, whereas cohesion measures are text-based and represent the 
interconnection of ideas in a given text which aids the construction of meaning. 
It can therefore be concluded that the three annotation-based measures introduced in 
this study are distinct from conventional readability scores and can thus be used as 
alternatives for assessing reading difficulty on a whole-text level. 
Table 6.8 gives the estimates of the correlation between two conventional readability 
measures and Coh-Metrix's four referential reading difficulty measures, namely (1) 
adjacent argument overlap, (2) argument overlap. (3) adjacent stem overlap. and (4) 
stem overlap. It shows the four Coh-l\/etrix measures to be strongly correlated with 
each other (ranging from 0.500 to 0.923). This means that they measure more or less 
the same aspect of cohesion, namely infonnation overlap within and between 
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paragraphs. However, overall, there is weaker correlation between the four referential 
measures and the traditional reading difficulty measures. This implies that they 
measure different textual properties. What is more, we observe a negative correlation 
between the Flesch Reading Ease Score (low scores equal low reading difficulty) and 
the four Coh-Metrix measures (low scores equal high reading difficulty) (p-values = 
0.005; 0.000, 0.00 1; 0.000) and a positive correlation between the Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade Level (low scores equal high reading difficulty) and the four Coh-Metrix 
measures (p-values = 0.000; 0.000; 0.000; 0.000) suggests that chairman's reports 
which are difficult to read when measured in terms of traditional reading difficulty 
scores are easy to read when measured in terms of Coh-Metrix referential reading 
difficulty measures. 
Table 6.8: Correlation between computer-generated cohesion measures (Coh-Metrix) 
and traditional readability scores 
Adjacent Adjacent Flesch 
Argument Argument Stem Stem Reading 
Overlap Overlap Overlap Overlap Ease Score 
Argument 0.686 
Overlap 0.000 
Adjacent Stem 0.858 0.781 
Overlap 0.000 0.000 
Stem 0.500 0.923 0.741 
Overlap 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Flesch Reading -0.300 -0.460 -0.350 -0.457 
Ease Score 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Flesch-Kincaid 0.421 0.529 0.501 0.534 -0.679 
Grade Level 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cell Contents: Correlation 
(P-Value) 
The weak correlation between traditional readability scores (Flesch Reading Ease 
Score and Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level) and the se\"en new cohesion-based measures 
of reading difficulty indicates that that both the annotation-based (cohesion density, 
cohesive ties, and proportion of gi\"en and new information) and the computer-
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generated measures (adjacent argument overlap, argument overlap, adjacent stem 
overlap, and stem overlap) capture different aspect of reading difficultv. namely 
textual complexity, i.e. missing links within and between sentences. 
It is useful at this stage to illustrate these outcomes with examples from the sampled 
reports. Across the four Coh-Metrix referential cohesion measures, Tolent's 
chainnan's report (see Example 22) is either the most difficult or the second most 
difficult to read from the whole sample. The report contains only very few 
overlapping nouns, noun phrases or stems between sentences and paragraphs, as can 
be seen from the extract (the first three paragraphs) in Example 22. 
Example 22: Tolent's chairman's report 2002 
I am pleased to report another year of record profits. In 2002 there was a substantial reduction 
in office fit-out work due to the level of financial activity in London. 
However the Talent Group was able to improve profitability albeit on a lower turnover base with 
a wide range of other construction work at better margins. Once again a high percentage of 
turnover represented repeat business and negotiated work. 
Construction in 2002 included an oriental spa facility at Seaham, a football academy at 
Sunderland, distribution units in Doncaster and Manchester, a leisure club at Dartford and the 
commencement of a large office development on Tynes ide. 
Key: bold words constitute cohesive devices 
The chairman's report that emerges as the easiest to read overall across all four Coh-
Metrix referential cohesion measures is that of Telecom Plus. Example 23 provides 
the first two paragraphs. 
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Example 23: Telecom Plus' chairman's report 2002 
I am pleased to report a year of significant progress in the development of Telecom plus as a 
multi-service utility company providing a broad range of essential household services. 
Turnover and pre-tax profits for the year exceeded £32.6 million (2001: £28. 1m) and £4m (2001: 
[2.5m) respectively, reflecting a strong performance within our virtual network business coupled 
with a reduced loss within our distribution business. The increase in new customer applications 
during the Autumn, and in the average number of services taken by each customer which 1 
reported in November, has been sustained, accompanied by a steady increase in the number of 
both new and active distributors promoting our services. 
Key: bold words constitute cohesive devices 
A comparison between examples 22 and 23 shows that Telecom Plus chairman's 
report contains considerably more occurrences of shared nouns, noun phrases, and 
word stems across adjoining sentences and paragraphs than Talent's chairman's 
report. These provide a red thread for the reader to follow and thus make text 
comprehension easier. 
Table 6.9 gives the estimates of the correlation between the three annotation-based 
measures of reading difficulty developed in the study (by means of MMAX2), namely 
(1) number of cohesive ties, (2) cohesion density, and (3) proportion of given and new 
information and the four computer-generated referential cohesion measures (by means 
of Coh-Metrix), namely (1) adjacent argument overlap, (2) argument overlap, (3) 
adjacent stem overlap, and (4) stem overlap. The reason behind this is to determine 
whether the four computer-generated measures of reading difficulty can be used as 
substitutes for the three annotation-based measures of reading difficulty or whether 
they capture different aspects of textual cohesion. 
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Table 6.9: Correlation between manual cohesion measures (MMAX2) and c t d 
. ompu er-generate 
cohesIOn measures (Coh-Metrix) 
Adjacent Adjacent 
Argument Argument Stem Stem Cohesion Cohesi\ e 
Overlap Overlap Overlap Overlap Density Ties 
Argument 0.686 
Overlap 0.000 
Adjacent Stem 0.858 0.781 
Overlap 0.000 0.000 
Stem 0.500 0.923 0.741 
Overlap 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cohesion 0.293 0.188 0.268 0.181 
Density 0.006 0.080 0.012 0.092 
Cohesive 0.077 0.050 0.034 0.056 0.011 
Ties 0.476 0.644 O. ':'50 0.602 0.91-
Given v. New 0.049 0.027 0.002 0.029 0.006 0.991 
Information 0.653 0.801 0.983 0.785 0.956 0.000 
Cell Contents: Correlation 
(P-Value) 
Across all variables, there is low correlation between annotation-based and computer-
generated measures of cohesion. This means that computer-generated measures of 
cohesion cannot be used as substitutes for cohesion measures resulting from manual 
text annotation. Since annotation-based and computer-generated measures of reading 
difficulty differ in respect to cohesive relationships based on pronominal reference, 
hyperonyms, synonyms and near synonyms, which are only included in annotation-
based but not in computer-generated measures, we conclude that human judgment is 
essential for interpreting the grammatical and lexical ties within and between 
sentences. It thus follows that cohesive relationships based on pronominal reference. 
hyperonyms, synonyms and near synonyms capture additional aspects of textual 
complexity. 
6.2.3 Association between reading difficulty and 'goodlbad news' and firm size 
The association tests carried out in this section assess whether reading difficulty 
measured by means of (i) Flesch Reading Ease and (ii) by the se\'en new cohesion-
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based measures of reading difficulty, including (1) cohesion density. (2) cohesi\"e ties. 
(3) proportion of given vs. new information on the one hand, and (-+) adjacent 
argument overlap, (5) argument overlap, (6) stem overlap, and (7) adjacent stem 
overlap on the other hand, is associated with 'goodlbad news' and firm size. In 
addition, it is also tested whether industry classification has an impact on results. 
If reading difficulty is found to be directly related to 'bad news', this supports the 
obfuscation hypothesis which claims that the management of poorly performing 
companies obfuscates negative organisational outcomes by means of rendering them 
difficult to read. Thus, a direct association between reading difficulty and 'bad news' 
can be interpreted as an indication of impression management in the form of reading 
ease manipulation. 
If reading difficulty is found to be inversely related to firm size, this is also interpreted 
as evidence of impression management in the fonn of reading ease manipulation. 
Based on the political cost hypothesis, it is argued that large finns have fewer 
incentives to engage in impression management since they do not seek to attract press 
attention or governmental intervention by means of introducing positive bias. 
Testing the obfuscation hypotheses in relation to a conventional readability measure 
(Flesch Reading Ease) and the new cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty 
introduced in this study allows us to assess the findings of previous reading ease 
manipulation studies in comparison with different reading difficulty measures, in 
relation to four measures of 'good/bad news', and in relation to possible interaction 
effects between 'good/bad news' and finn size. 
The statistical methods employed in this section include bivariate and multi\"ariate 
procedures. The bivariate analysis entails examining the association of impression 
management in the form of reading ease manipulation (dependent \"ariable) with 
either (l) finn size or (2) 'good/bad news . (independent \"ariables). This is carried out 
by means of either ordinary least square regression (OLS) or one-way analysis of 
\'ariance (ANOY A). The multivariate analysis, which involves an in\"cstigation of the 
association between in1pression management and "good/bad news' and tirm size 
simultaneously. is carried out by means of a general linear model (GL\l). GL:--'1 
constitutes an extension of ANOVA. The advantage of GLM is that it allows the 
addition of covariates within a factor structure and also permits the detection of 
interaction effects between variables, and, therefore, provides the framework within 
which to test more complex hypotheses. 
6.2.3.1 Flesch Reading Ease 
The Flesch Reading Ease score has been used in the vast majority of reading ease 
manipulation studies (see Table 2.2 in chapter two). It measures sentence length and 
syllables per 100 words (see chapter three, section 3.2.1 for calculation). The closer 
the score is to zero, the more incomprehensible is the text under investigation. It thus 
constitutes a good basis for replicating the association tests of previous research. 
The first step in the analysis is to establish whether reading difficulty, when measured 
by the Flesch Reading Ease score, varies systematically across the firms in the 
sample84 with regard to their size, regardless of the good or bad news conveyed in the 
financial statements. Table 6.10 indicates that the Flesch Reading Ease score 
increases with firm size, which is significant at the one percent level (p = 0.003).85 In 
other words, reading difficulty measured in terms of the Flesch Reading Ease score 
decreases as the extent and volume of company operations become greater. This is 
consistent with hypothesis H ic which states that the corporate narrative sections of 
large companies are easier to read than those of small companies. 
Table 6.10: Regression of Flesch Reading Ease on firm size 
Constant 
SIZE 
Coef 
38.395 
1.162 
S.E. 
1.628 
0.374 
t-stat p-value 
23.58 <0.000 
3.11 0.003*** 
84 Since the Flesch Reading Ease score was calculated by means of the Coh-Metrix computer 
application, the sample size is 88. . . . ' 
8. Throughout this chapter, the significance levels that are highlIghted for the estimated maIn and 
interaction effects are as follows: 
t greater than Probability p Significance 
1.644 0.100 10% • 
1.960 0.050 
,,0, 
•• 0 •• 
2.576 0.010 1% ••• 
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The second step in the analysis concerns the likelihood of differences in reading 
difficulty measured in terms of the Flesch Reading Ease score, when the financial 
results convey either a positive or a negative message regarding the profitability of the 
firm (PE, PEl) or its growth relative to its competitors (RSI, RG). Table 6.11 indicates 
that the Flesch Reading Ease score increases with 'good news' in the form of positiye 
earnings (PEl = 1). This is significant at the five percent level (p = 0.025). This result 
is consistent with hypothesis Hlb which states that the corporate report sections of 
companies reporting 'good news' in the financial statements are easier to read than 
those of companies reporting 'bad news'. This thus provides evidence for the 
obfuscation hypothesis which states that firms reporting 'bad news' in the financial 
statements tend to engage in impression management by means of reading ease 
manipulation, i.e. their corporate narrative documents are more difficult to read than 
those of companies reporting 'good news'. These results confirm findings from 
previous reading ease manipulation studies. 
Table 6.11: ANOV A results/or Flesch Reading Ease (main effects) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
SS MS F t-stat p-value 
PE 0 157.100 157.100 2.61 1.61 0.110 
PEl 0 303.200 303.200 5.18 2.28 0.025** 
RSI 0 4.700 4.700 0.08 -0.27 0.784 
RG 0 0.100 0.100 0.00 0.04 0.972 
Key: Numbers in italics are derived from univariate GLM analysis. 
1 Difference between means. 
2 Sum of standard error of univariate GLM. 
Mean 
40.6300 
44.3910 
3.76101 
40.6300 
44.3910 
3.7610 
43.0930 
42.6220 
-0.-1710 
42.7710 
42.8330 
0.0620 
SO 
8.2300 
7.2080 
15.438rY 
8.2300 
7.2080 
15.-1380 
9.0620 
6.9930 
16.0550 
8.1840 
7.6940 
15.8780 
I 
The third step in the analysis is designed to assess - across firms of difTerent sizes -
the consistency of any association that may appear to exist between the reading 
difficulty of the chairman's report on the one hand, and the good or bad news that is 
com·eyed by the financial statements on the other. 
The last two columns in Table 6.12 report a 'mean effect' and a 'size effect'. The 
mean effects are each given as an average reading difficulty score after controllino for 
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size, first in the case of 'bad news' (PE, PEl, RSI, RG = 0) and then in the case of 
'good news' (PE, PEl, RSI, RG = 1).86 For example, in the case of the variable PEL 
where positive (negative) earnings growth signals good (bad) news, the adjusted mean 
score for the Flesch Reading Ease score is greater (38.141 + 2.411 = 40.5520 as 
opposed to 38.141 - 2.411 = 35.7300) when there is an earnings increase (PEl = 1) 
than when there is an earnings decrease (PEl = 0). Although this positive coefficient 
on the 0,1 PEl factor (2.411.) suggests that a fast-growth firm is likely to produce a 
more readable report than a slow-growth firm, the p-value of 0.139 in fact indicates 
that the 'good news/bad news' coefficient is not statistically significant in this case. 
Thus, the direct association that was observed between the Flesch Reading Ease score 
and 'good news' in the form of positive earnings growth (PEl = 1) no longer remains 
as a strong result when firm size is interacted with 'good/bad news' . 
The size effect is the increase or decrease in the Flesch Reading Ease score as a 
function of firm capitalisation. As with the mean ('goodlbad news') effect described 
above, the 'firm size' x 'good/bad news' interaction term is estimated as an 
incremental coefficient, and the significance of the difference (2 x the coefficient) can 
be evaluated with the estimated t-statistic. 87 For example, in the case of earnings 
growth, the t-statistic of 0.44 (p-value 0.658) indicates that the difference in size 
effects when news is good or bad is statistically insignificant. If on the other hand that 
were not the case, it could be concluded that the expected value of the Flesch Reading 
Ease score would be expected to decrease with firm size when firms report positive 
earnings growth (the size coefficient is 0.9928 when PEl = 1) and increase with size 
When they report negative earnings (the size coefficient is 1.3230 when PEl = 0). 
However, this result is not significant, and the analysis provided above is included 
only in order to demonstrate how inferences may be drawn from the model output. 
86 The coefficient is estimated using MINIT AB. In the tables reported here, the size-adjusted meJn. for 
'bad news' (0) is obtained by adding the estimated coefficient from the constant, whereas the slze-
adjusted mean for 'good news' (\) is the result of subtracting the estimate. 
Table 6.12: GLM results for Flesch Reading Ease (interactions with firm size) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
Term Coef StDev t-stat p-value PE=O PE = 1 
Constant 38.655 1.776 21.76 <0.000*** 
PE -0.484 1.776 0.27 0.786 38.1710 39.1390 Mean effect 
SIZE 1.077 0.408 2.64 0.010*** 
SIZE*PE 0.008 0.408 -0.02 0.985 1.0690 1.0846 Size effect 
PEl = 0 PEl = 1 
Constant 38.141 1.612 23.66 <0.000*** 
PEl 2.411 1.612 1.5 0.139 35.7300 40.5520 Mean effect 
SIZE 1.158 0.372 3.11 0.003*** 
SIZE*PEI -0.165 0.372 0.44 0.658 1.3230 0.9928 Size effect 
RSI = 0 RSI = 1 
Constant 38.542 1.678 22.96 <0.000*** 
RSI 0.748 1.678 -0.45 0.657 39.2900 37.7940 Mean effect 
SIZE 1.135 0.384 2.96 0.004*** 
SIZE*RSI 0.145 0.384 -0.38 0.706 0.9901 1.2805 Size effect 
RG=O RG = 1 
Constant 38.758 1.783 21.74 <0.000*** 
RG 0.862 1.783 -0.48 0.630 
39.6200 37.8960 Mean effect 
SIZE 1.065 0.416 2.56 0.012** 
SIZE*RG 0.232 0.416 -0.56 0.580 
0.8331 1.2961 Size effect 
To summarise, these results may be interpreted as follows. When only the mam 
effects are considered, the Flesch Reading Ease score is shown to average 44.3910 for 
companies reporting 'good news' in the form of positive earnings growth (PEl = 1). 
and significantly less at 40.6300 for firms reporting 'bad news' in the form of 
negative earnings growth (PEl = 0). However, when size effects are taken into 
consideration, the adjusted means of the cohesion density scores narrow to 40.5520 
and 35.7300 respectively, a difference that is no longer statistically significant. It can 
be concluded that there is no difference in the Flesch Reading Ease score of 
chainnan's reports of companies reporting 'good news' and those of companies 
reporting 'bad news'. Thus, results for Flesch Reading Ease do not provide any 
support for hypothesis HI b (obfuscation hypothesis) which states that firms reporting 
'good news' are less likely to engage in reading ease manipulation by rendering their 
corporate narrative documents difficult to read than firms reporting 'bad news'. 
However. we observe a significant difference between the Flesch Reading Ease score 
of large and small companies. which persists when . goodlbad ne\vs' is interacted \\i th 
87 In the tables presented here, subtracting the 'firm size' x . good bad news' interaction term from the 
firm size coefficient oives the size effect in the case of' good news' (1) and adding the interaction term 
. 0 
gives the size effect in the case of 'bad news' (0). 
firm size. Results suggest that the chainnan's reports of large companies are easier to 
read than those of small companies. This is consistent with hvpothesis H which 
• Ie 
states that large companies, due to their public visibility, are less inclined to draw 
attention to positive financial perfonnance and are thus less likely to obfuscate 
negative organisational outcomes by means of rendering their corporate narrative 
sections difficult to read. 
The next two sections repeats the association tests between reading difficulty and 
'good/bad news' and firm size, but this time using the cohesion-based measures of 
reading difficulty which have been introduced in this study. We first report the 
association tests regarding the three manually generated cohesion-based measures of 
reading difficulty (MMAX2) and subsequently regarding the four automatically 
generated cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty (Coh-Metrix). 
6.2.3.2 MMAX2 cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty 
Cohesion provides grammatical and semantic links within and between sentences. 
Texts lacking cohesion are thus difficult to read and understand. This section is based 
on three MMAX2 cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty, that are computed 
following text annotation, namely (1) the cohesion density, (2) the number of 
cohesive ties in a given text, and (3) the proportion of given versus new information 
in a given text. 
(1) Cohesion Density 
Cohesion density reflects the fact that overlapping terms make a text more cohesive 
and thus easier to process and read. Since overlapping tenns provide interconnections 
between ideas a lack thereof means that the reader needs to infer the association , 
between two pieces of infonnation in a given text. Cohesion density is measured as 
the percentage of cohesive sets with two or more anaphoric expressions per total 
number of cohesive sets in a given text. 
The first step in the analysis is to establish whether reading difficulty, \vhen measured 
by cohesion density, varies systematically across the finns in the sample \\ith regard 
to their size, regardless of the good or bad news conveyed in the financial statements. 
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As shown in Table 6.13, although the estimated response coefficient is positiye 
(0.000; unrounded value 0.0002), there is no evidence of a significant association 
between cohesion density and firm size. In other words, reading difficulty measured 
in terms of cohesion density does not increase or decrease as the extent and volume of 
company operations become greater. 
Table 6.13: Regression of cohesion density on firm size 
Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Coef 
0.322 
0.000 
S.E. 
0.019 
0.004 
t-stat 
17.04 
0.04 
p-value 
<0.001 
0.965 
The second step in the analysis concerns the likelihood of differences in reading 
difficulty measured in terms of cohesion density, when the financial results convey 
either a positive or a negative message regarding the profitability of the firm (PE, PEl) 
or its growth relative to its competitors (RSI, RG). Table 6.14 indicates that the 
cohesion density measure increases with 'good news' in the form of relative positive 
long-term firm growth (RG = 1). This is significant at the one percent level (p = 
0.008). This result is consistent with hypothesis HI b which states that the corporate 
report sections of companies reporting 'good news' in the financial statements are 
more cohesive and thus easier to read than those of companies reporting · bad news'. 
This thus provides evidence for the obfuscation hypothesis which states that firms 
reporting 'bad news' in the financial statements tend to engage in impression 
management by means of reading ease manipulation, i.e. their corporate narrative 
documents are more difficult to read than those of companies reporting' good news' . 
Table 6.14: ANOVA results for cohesion density (main effects) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
SS MS F t-stat p-value Mean SO 
PE 0 0.008 0.008 1.05 1.03 0.308 0.3120 0.0992 
0.3309 0.0782 
0.0189 
-0.0184 
PEl 0 0.002 0.002 0.19 -0.43 0.667 0.3273 0.0912 
0.3193 0.0865 
-0.0081 -0.018-
RSI 0 0.017 0.017 2.27 1.51 0.135 0.3054 0.0884 
1 0.3334 0.0868 
0.0281 -0.0186 
RG 0 0.053 0.053 7.25 2.69 0.008*** 0.2912 0.0899 
0.3406 0.0824 
0.0494 -0.0183 
The third step in the analysis is designed to assess - across firms of different sizes -
the consistency of any association that may appear to exist between the reading 
difficulty of the management report on the one hand, and the good or bad news that is 
conveyed by the financial statements on the other. Table 6.14 indicates that the direct 
association that was observed between cohesion density and 'good news' in the form 
of relative positive long-term firm growth (RG = 1) no longer remains significant 
when firm size is interacted with' good/bad news' . 
Table 6.15: GLM results for cohesion density (interactions with firm size) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
Tenn Coef StDev t-stat p-value PE-O PE = 1 
Constant 0.324 0.020 15.88 <0.001 *** 
PE 0.004 0.020 -0.20 0.841 0.3276 0.3194 Mean effect 
SIZE 0.001 0.005 0.30 0.765 
SIZE*PE -0.004 0.005 0.84 0.403 -0.0053 0.0025 Size effect 
PEl =0 PEl = 1 
Constant 0.325 0.019 16.94 <0.001 *** 
PEl 0.021 0.019 -1.10 0.273 0.3462 0.3039 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.001 0.004 -0.14 0.892 
SIZE*PEI -0.005 0.004 1.02 0.309 -0.0051 0.0039 Size effect 
RSI = 0 RSI = 1 
Constant 0.321 0.019 16.65 <0.001 *** 
RSI -0.006 0.019 0.29 0.774 0.3151 0.3262 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.000 0.004 -0.07 0.941 
SIZE*RSI -0.002 0.004 0.50 0.615 -0.0025 0.0019 Size effect 
RG=O RG = 1 
Constant 0.319 0.020 15.99 <0.001 *** 
RG -0.018 0.020 0.90 0.373 0.3015 0.3373 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.001 0.005 -0.20 0.842 
SIZE*RG -0.002 0.005 0.39 0.701 -0.0027 0.0009 Size effect 
To summarise, these results may be interpreted as follows. When only the main 
effects are considered, the cohesion density score is shown to average 0.3406 for 
companies reporting 'good news' in the form of relative positive long-term firm 
growth (RG = 1), and significantly less at 0.2912 for firms reporting 'bad news' in the 
fonn of relative negative long-term firm growth (RG = 0). However, when size effects 
are taken into consideration, the adjusted means of the cohesion density scores narrow 
to OJ373 and 0.3015 respectively, a difference that is no longer statistically 
significant. It can be concluded that there is no difference in the cohesion density of 
chainnan's reports of companies reporting 'good news' and those of companies 
reporting 'bad news'. Thus, results for cohesion density do not provide any support 
for hypothesis HI b (obfuscation hypothesis) which states that firms reporting . good 
news' are less likely to engage in reading ease manipulation by rendering their 
corporate narrative documents difficult to read than firms reporting 'bad news'. \\ 'hat 
is more, we also do not observe any significant difference between the cohesion 
density of large and small companies. This means, these results also do not support 
hypothesis HIe which states that the corporate narrative documents of small firms are 
more difficult to read than those of large firms. 
(2) Cohesive Ties 
This measure is based on the amount of cohesive ties in a given text and is expressed 
as percentage of total number of cohesive noun phrases per total number of potentially 
cohesive noun phrases. 
First, we examIne whether reading difficulty when measured by the amount of 
cohesive ties in a given text varies systematically across the firms in the sample with 
regard to their size. As shown in Table 6.16, although the estimated response 
coefficient is positive (0.0134), there is no evidence of a significant association 
between cohesive ties and firm size. This means that reading difficulty measured in 
terms of cohesive ties does not increase or decrease as the extent and volume of 
company operations become greater. 
Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Table 6.16: Regression of cohesive ties on firm size 
Coef 
0.301 
0.013 
S.E. 
0.037 
0.009 
t-stat p-value 
8.09 <0.001 
1.58 0.118 
Secondly, we seek to establish whether the likelihood of differences in the amount of 
cohesive ties in a chairman's report is dependent on the positive or negative message 
conveyed by the financial statements. Table 6.17 indicates that although the 
association between cohesive ties and 'good news' is positive for three out of four 
measures of 'good news', it is not statistically significant. This means that the 
chairman's reports of companies reporting 'good news' do not contain significantly 
more cohesive ties - and are thus easier to read - than those of companies reporting 
'bad news'. 
Table 6.17: ANOV A results for cohesive ties (main effects) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
SS MS F t-stat p-value Mean SO 
PE 0 0.007 0.007 0.21 0.46 0.650 0.3431 0.1795 
0.3599 0.1743 
0.0168 -0.3431 
PEl 0 0.002 0.002 0.07 0.26 0.797 0.3468 0.1815 
1 0.3564 0.1734 
0.0096 -0.3468 
RSI 0 0.000 0.000 0.01 -0.10 0.924 0.3547 0.1784 
1 0.3511 0.1758 
-0.0036 -0. 35·r 
RG 0 0.012 0.012 0.40 0.63 0.529 0.3372 0.1760 
1 0.3612 0.1767 
0.0240 -0.3372 
Finally, we assess whether any association that seems to exist between the amount of 
cohesive ties and 'good/bad news' is consistent across firms of different sizes. The 
interaction between 'good/bad news' and firm size is documented in Table 6.18. As 
noted above, the last two columns in the table report the 'mean effect' and the 'size 
effect', both of which are not significant. This means that neither 'good/bad news' nor 
finn size play a significant role in determining the amount of cohesive ties of 
chairman's reports. 
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Table 6.18: GLM results for cohesive ties (interaction with firms size) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
Term Coef StDev t-stat p-value PE=O PE = 1 
Constant 0.299 0.038 7.86 <0.000*** 
PE 0.014 0.009 l.58 0.117 0.3130 0.2852 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.014 0.038 -0.36 0.717 
SIZE*PE 0.003 0.009 0.32 0.748 
-0.0110 
-0.0167 Size effect 
PEl =0 PEl = 1 
Constant 0.299 0.038 7.86 <0.000*** 
PEl 0.014 0.009 1.58 0.117 0.3130 0.2852 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.014 0.038 -0.36 0.717 
SIZE*PEI 0.003 0.009 0.32 0.748 
-0.0110 -0.0167 Size effect 
RSI = 0 RSI = 1 
Constant 0.306 0.038 7.98 <0.000*** 
RSI 0.012 0.009 1.39 0.169 0.3184 0.2941 Mean effect 
SIZE 0.025 0.038 0.65 0.5l7 
SIZE*RSI -0.006 0.009 -0.68 0.495 0.0190 0.0310 Size effect 
RG=O RG = 1 
Constant 0.308 0.041 7.55 <0.000*** 
RG 0.011 0.010 1.13 0.263 0.3186 0.2971 Mean effect 
SIZE 0.010 0.041 0.25 0.802 
SIZE*RG -0.006 0.010 -0.59 0.556 0.0046 0.0159 Size effect 
In summary, the amount of cohesive ties as a measure of reading difficulty is not 
found to be associated to either firm size or 'goodlbad news'. This suggests that 
management does not engage in reading ease manipulation by means of decreasing 
the cohesive ties in corporate narrative documents in order to render them more 
difficult to read. 
(3) Proportion of given vs. new information 
The status of information plays a role in determining textual complexity. The status of 
infonnation is expressed in a dichotomous association of new vs. given information. 
the assumption being that the higher the proportion of new information compared to 
given information in a given text, the more difficult it is to read. 
First, we aim to establish whether the proportion of given to new information varies 
systematically across the films in the sample with regard to their size. Table 6.19 
indicates that the score for the proportion of given \'s. ne\v information increases with 
firm size, which is significant at the ten percent level (p = 0.098). This is consistent 
with hypothesis HIe which states that the corporate narrative sections of large 
companies are more cohesive and thus easier to read than those of small companies. 
Table 6.19: Regression of given/new info on firm size 
Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Coef 
0.384 
0.030 
S.E. 
0.079 
0.018 
t-stat p-value 
4.85 <0.001 
1.67 0.098* 
Second, we examine the likelihood of differences in the proportion of given to nev; 
information when the financial results convey either good or bad news. Table 6.20 
indicates that although the association between the proportion of given vs. new 
information and 'good news' is positive for three out of the four measures of 'good 
news', it is not statistically significant. This means that the proportion of given vs. 
new information is not statistically different between the chairman's reports of 
companies reporting 'good news' and those reporting 'bad news'. 
Table 6.20: ANOVA results for given/new info (main effects) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
SS MS F t-stat p-value Mean SO 
PE 0 0.020 0.020 0.14 0.38 0.708 0.4836 0.3716 
0.5132 0.3812 
0.0296 -0.4836 
PEl 0 0.006 0.006 0.04 0.21 0.834 0.4903 0.3818 
0.5070 0.3741 
0.0167 -0.4903 
RSI 0 0.001 0.001 0.01 -0.07 0.942 0.5038 0.3916 
0.4979 0.3682 
-0.0059 -0.5038 
RG 0 0.078 0.078 0.55 0.74 0.459 0.4620 0.3748 
0.5222 0.3770 
0.0602 0.0022 
Finally, we interact 'goodlbad news' with firm size in order to assess whether any 
association which seems to exist between the proportion of gi\"en to new infomlation 
and 'goodlbad news' is consistent across firms of different sizes. The interaction 
between 'goodlbad news' and firm size is documented in Table 6.21. As noted abon? 
the last two columns in the table report the 'mean effect' and the 'size effecf. Once 
again, the mean effects are not significant. This means that the chairman' s reports of 
companies reporting 'good news' do not contain a significantly higher proportion of 
given vs. new information than those of companies reporting 'bad news'. 
However, with regard to the size effect, there is a significant estimate in the case of 
'goodlbad news' in the form of positive/negative earnings (PE), which is equal to 
0.034 and weakly significant at the ten percent level (t=1.72, p=0.090). This indicates 
that the expected score for 'given/new information' is greater (0.0534 as opposed to 
0.0143) when there is a profit (PE = 1) than when there is a loss (PE = 0). This means 
that large firms reporting losses produce less cohesive chairman's reports than large 
firms reporting profits. However, this result is only weakly significant. 
Table 6.21: GLM results for given/new information (interactions with firm size) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
Term Coef StDev t-stat p-value PE=O PE = 1 
Constant 0.356 0.086 4.15 <0.001 *** 0.4418 0.2710 Mean effect 
PE 0.085 0.020 -0.99 0.841 
SIZE 0.034 0.020 1.72 0.090* 0.0143 0.0534 Size effect 
SIZE*PE -0.020 0.005 0.99 0.403 
PEl = 0 PEl = 1 
Constant 0.381 0.081 4.70 <0.001 *** 0.3574 0.4041 Mean effect 
PEl -0.023 0.019 0.29 0.273 
SIZE -0.001 0.004 -0.14 0.892 0.0362 0.0262 Size effect 
SIZE*PEI 0.005 0.004 -0.27 0.309 
RSI = 0 RSI = 1 
Constant 0.393 0.082 4.80 <0.001 *** 0.4347 0.3511 Mean effect 
RSI 0.042 0.019 -0.51 0.774 
SIZE 0.028 0.019 1.51 0.135 0.0182 0.0382 Size effect 
SIZE*RSI -0.010 0.004 0.54 0.615 
RG=O RG = 1 
Constant 0.396 0.087 4.56 <0.001 *** 0.4086 0.3829 Mean effect 
RG 0.013 0.020 -0.15 0.373 
SIZE 0.025 0.020 1.23 0.220 0.0143 0.0360 Size effect 
SIZE*RG -0.01 1 0.005 0.53 0.701 
In summary. for this measure of reading difficulty, the main effects models pro\ide 
evidence that appears to be inconsistent with the findings for cohesion density. 
suggesting a significant association with company size but not with any of the four 
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aspects of the financial results that have been simplified as signals of good and bad 
88 
news. 
The three-step analysis shows that there is some evidence that the chairman' s reports 
of large companies contain a higher proportion of given vs. new information and thus 
are easier to read than those of small companies. This is in line with the political cost 
hypothesis which states that large companies are more reluctant to obfuscate negative 
organisational outcomes by means of reading ease manipulation, since they do not 
want to draw too much attention to positive financial performance. 
Summarising the results of the three cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty 
derived from textual annotation (Coh-Metrix), namely (1) cohesion density, (2) 
cohesive ties, and (3) proportion of given vs. new information, we observe the 
following: The direction of association between reading difficulty and . good/bad 
news' is as hypothesized, however, we only obtain significant results in the case of 
cohesion density and relative long-term firm growth (RG) which are found to be 
directly related. This suggests that the chairman' s reports of firms outperforming their 
competitors in terms of long-term growth are more cohesive and thus easier to read 
than those of firms growing more slowly than the sector. However, GLM results 
indicate that this association is not consistent across firms of different sizes. For this 
reason, hypothesis H 1b, namely that poorly performing firms are more likely to 
obfuscate organisational outcomes by means of rendering their corporate narrative 
documents difficult to read than well-performing companies (obfuscation hypothesis). 
is not supported by our findings. 
Further. the direction of association between reading difficulty and firm size is as 
hypothesized. however, we only obtain significant results in the case of proportion of 
given versus new information. Nevertheless, this direct - albeit \\'eak - association 
between reading difficulty in the form of proportion of given versus ne\\ information 
and fim1 size persists when firm size is interacted with "goodlbad news'. Thus. it may 
be concluded (albeit cautiously, due to the weak significance of the results of the main 
RR The results for cohesive ties and proportion of given vs. new information are very similar ~oth in 
regards to the direction and strength of association observed in the main effects models and In the 
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effect and the interaction model) that the chairman's reports of large companies are 
more cohesive and thus easier to read than those of small companies. This is 
consistent with hypothesis HIe which is based on the political cost hypothesis arId 
states that large companies have fewer incentives to engage in impression 
management by means of obfuscating negative organisational outcomes in their 
corporate narrative documents since they want to avoid the political costs associated 
with drawing public attention to them. 
The next section repeats the association tests between reading difficulty arId 
'good/bad news' and firm size, but this time based on the four cohesion-based 
measures of reading difficulty which have been automatically generated (Coh-
Metrix). 
6.2.3.3 Coh-Metrix cohesion measures 
This section uses the four referential cohesion measures computed by Coh-Metrix, a 
web-based automatic generator of reading difficulty measures, namely (1) adjacent 
argument overlap, (2) argument overlap, (3) adjacent stem overlap, arId (4) stem 
overlap. Whereas the first two are based on the cohesion between nouns, pronouns, 
and noun phrases, the latter two are based on cohesion between words sharing 
common stems, including nouns (profit(s), profitability), adjectives (profitable), arId 
verbs (to profit). 
(1) Adjacent argument overlap 
Adjacent argument overlap is based on the proportion of adjacent sentences that share 
one or more arguments (i.e. noun, pronoun, noun-phrase). 
First of all, we examIne whether reading difficulty, when measured by adjacent 
argument overlap, varies systematically across the firms in the sample with regard to 
their size, regardless of the good or bad news conveyed in the financial statements. :\s 
shown in Table 6.22, the estimated response coefficient is negative (-0.0040). 
Howe\'t?f, there is no significant association between adjacent argument overlap and 
finn size. In other words, reading difficulty as measured by adjacent argument o\crlap 
interaction model. This is due to the strong correlation between the two measures of reading dinicult~ 
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does not increase or decrease as the extent and volume of company operations become 
greater. 
Table 6.22: Regression of adjacent argument overlap on firm size 
Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Coef 
0.474 
-0.004 
S.E. 
0.032 
0.007 
t-stat p-value 
15.07 <0.001 
-0.55 0.586 
Secondly, we investigate the likelihood of differences in reading difficulty in tenns of 
adjacent argument overlap when the financial results convey either a positive or a 
negative message. In this case, Table 6.23 indicates that the adjacent argument 
overlap measure increases with 'good news' in the fonn of relative positive sales 
growth (RSI = 1) and relative positive long-tenn finn growth (RG = 1). This is 
significant at the ten percent (p = 0.052) and at the five percent (p = 0.037) level. This 
means that the chairman's reports of finns reporting 'good news' in the fonn of a 
relative positive sales growth and a relative positive long-term finn growth tend to be 
more cohesive and thus less difficult to read than those of firms with 'bad news' in the 
form of relative negative sales growth and relative negative long-term finn growth. 
This is consistent with hypothesis Hlb which states that the corporate narrative 
sections of companies reporting 'good news' are more cohesive and thus easier to 
read than those of companies reporting 'bad news'. 
lsee section 6.2.2, Table 6.6). 
Table 6.23: ANOVA results for adjacent argument overlap (main effects) 
Bad news= 0 Good news = 1 
SS MS F t-stat p-value Mean SO 
PE 0 0.029 0.029 1.43 1.20 0.235 0.4389 0.1349 
0.4757 0.1499 
0.0368 0.-+389 
PEl 0 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.01 0.991 0.4592 0.1295 
0.4595 0.1547 
0.0003 0.-159 :} 
RSI 0 0.078 0.078 3.89 1.97 0.052* 0.4228 0.1384 
0.4836 0.1435 
0.0608 O. -J:}:}8 
RG 0 0.089 0.089 4.48 2.12 0.037** 0,4183 0.1350 
0.4840 0.1445 
0.0657 0.-+183 
Finally, we assess the consistency of any association that may appear between the 
reading difficulty of chairman's reports and 'goodlbad news' in the financial 
statements across firms of different sizes. Table 6.24 shows that the direct association 
between adjacent argument overlap and 'good news' in the form of relative positive 
sales growth (RSI = 1) and relative positive long-term firm growth (RG = 1) does not 
persists when firm size is interacted with 'good/bad news'. Although the positive 
coefficient on the 0, 1 RSI factor (0.004) suggests that a firm with above-sector sales 
growth is likely to produce a more cohesive chairman's report than a below-sector 
sales growth firm, the p-value of 0.906 indicates that the good/bad news coefficient is 
not statistically significant in this case. By contrast, the negative coefficient on the 0, 
I RG factor (-0.011) suggests that a firm with above-sector sales growth is likely to 
produce a less cohesive chairman's report than a below-sector sales growth firm, the 
p-value of 0.740 indicates that the good newslbad news coefficient is not statistically 
significant in this case. 
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Table 6.24: GLM results for adjacent argument overlap (interactions with size) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
Tenn Coef StDev t-stat p-value PE=O PE= 1 
Constant 0.478 0.034 14.16 <0.001 *** 
PE 0.005 0.034 0.16 0.877 0.4830 0.4725 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.007 0.008 -0.92 0.358 
SIZE*PE -0.008 0.008 -1.02 0.313 -0.0150 0.0007 Size effect 
PEl =0 PEl = 1 
Constant 0.471 0.032 14.73 <0.001 *** 
PEl -0.027 0.032 -0.86 0.393 0.4431 0.4980 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.003 0.007 -0.38 0.706 
SIZE*PEI 0.007 0.007 0.97 0.336 
0.0044 
-0.0099 Size effect 
RSI =0 RSI = 1 
Constant 0.474 0.032 15.04 <0.001 *** 
RSI 0.004 0.032 0.12 0.906 0.4774 0.4699 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.005 0.007 -0.74 0.464 
SIZE*RSI -0.009 0.007 -1.24 0.219 
-0.0142 0.0036 Size effect 
RG=O RG = 1 
Constant 0.476 0.034 14.18 <0.001 *** 
RG -0.011 0.034 -0.33 0.740 
0.4645 0.4868 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.007 0.008 -0.83 0.412 
SIZE*RG -0.006 0.008 -0.73 0.466 
-0.0122 -0.0007 Size effect 
In summary, when only the main effects are considered, the adjacent argument 
overlap score is shown to average 0.4836 for companies reporting 'good news' in the 
form of relative positive sales growth (RSI = 1) and 0.4840 for firms reporting' good 
news' in the form of relative positive long-term firm growth, and significantly less at 
0.4228 and 0.4183 for firms reporting 'bad news' in the form of relative negative 
sales growth (RSI = 0) and relative negative long-term firm growth (RG = 0). 
However, when size effects are taken into consideration, the adjusted means of the 
adjacent argument overlap scores narrow significantly to 0.4699 and 0.-+77-+ for 
relative sales growth and 0.4868 and 0.4645 for relative long-term growth. a 
difference which is no longer statistically significant. Thus, results suggest that there 
is no significant difference in the amount of adjacent argument overlap in the 
chairman's reports of companies reporting • good news' and those reporting 'bad 
news'. Thus, hypothesis Hlb (obfuscation hypothesis), which states that 1irms 
reporting 'bad news' are more likely to engage in reading ease manipulation by means 
of rendering their corporate narrative documents less cohesi\"e than 1imls reporting 
'good news', is not supported. What is more, results suggest that tirm size also has no 
significant effect on the amount of adjacent argument o\"erlap of chaimlan's reports. 
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Thus, hypothesis HIe which states that there the chairman's reports of large finns are 
more cohesive and thus contain more adjacent argument overlap, is also not 
supported. 
(2) Argument overlap 
Argument overlap is based on the proportion of all sentence pairs in a paragraph that 
share one or more arguments (i.e. noun, pronoun, noun phrase). 
Again, the first step of the analysis is to examine whether reading difficulty, when 
measured by argument overlap, varies systematically across the firms in the sample 
with regard to their size, regardless of the good or bad news conveyed in the financial 
statements. As shown in Table 6.25, the estimated response coefficient is negative (-
0.015) and there is a strongly significant association between argument overlap and 
firm size (t = -3.12 and p = 0.002). This means that reading difficulty in the fonn of 
argument overlap is inversely related to firm size. In other words, the chainnan' s 
reports of larger companies are more likely to be less cohesive and thus more difficult 
to read than those of smaller companies. This is contrary to Hypothesis H Ie which 
states that large firms are less likely to engage in impression management (in the fonn 
of reading ease manipulation) since they do not want to attract public and 
governmental attention by means of showing firm performance and prospects in a 
positive light. 
Table 6.25: Regression of argument overlap on firm size 
Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Coef 
0.341 
-0.015 
S.E. 
0.021 
0.005 
t -stat p-value 
16.57 <0.001 
-3.12 0.002*** 
The second step of the analysis is to investigate whether the reading difficulty in the 
foml of argument overlap of chairman's reports varies, depending on whether firms 
report good or bad news in their financial statements. Table 6.26 indicates that 
argument overlap is directly associated with . good news' in the fornl of rclative 
positive sales growth (RSI = 1) and relative posith'c long-ternl finn gro\\1h (RG = 1) 
which is significant at the five percent (t = 0.56 and p = O.O~O) and at thc ten rcn.:l'nt 
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level (t = 1.88 and p = 0.064). This means that the chainnan's reports of firms 
reporting 'good news' in the form of relative positive sales gro\\th and relative 
positive long-term firm growth are more likely to be more cohesive and thus easier to 
read than those of firms reporting 'bad news' in the fonn of relative negative sales 
growth and relative negative long-tenn finn growth. This is consistent with 
hypothesis Hlb which states that the corporate narrative sections of companies 
reporting 'good news' are more cohesive and thus easier to read than those of 
companies reporting 'bad news' . 
Table 6.26: ANOVA results for argument overlap (main effects) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = I 
SS MS F t-stat p-value Mean SO 
PE 0 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.02 0.981 0.2848 0.0929 
0.2853 0.1046 
PEl 0.0005 0.0214 
0 0.003 0.003 0.31 0.56 0.578 0.2781 0.0835 
0.2901 0.1095 
RSI 0.0120 0.0215 
0 0.052 0.052 5.59 2.36 0.020** 0.2551 0.0982 
0.3049 0.095.+ 
0.0497 0.0210 
RG 0 0.034 0.034 3.53 1.88 0.064* 0.2599 0.0867 
0.3002 0.1036 
0.0404 0.0215 
The third step of the analysis assesses the consistency of association that may appear 
between reading difficulty and 'good/bad news' across firms of different sizes. Table 
6.27 shows that the association between 'good/bad news' and argument overlap is no 
longer significant when 'good/bad news' is interacted with firm size. In fact, the 
negative coefficient on the 0, 1 RG factor (-0.042) suggests that a slow growth firm is 
likely to produce a more cohesive chairman's report than a fast-growth firm, which is 
the opposite direction of the main effect model. However, the size effect shows that in 
all four measures of 'good/bad news' argument overlap decreases as firm 
capitalisation increases. The t-statistics of -3.33 (p-value = 0.001), -2.95 (p-\alue = 
0.004), -3.07 (p-value = 0.003), and -2..+ 1 (p-value = 0.018) indicate that the 
difference in size effects when the news is good or bad is statistically signi ficant at the 
one percent (PE. PEL RSI) and at the five percent level (RG). This means that the 
expected value of the argument overlap score decreases with firm size when fim1s 
make profits, increase their profits, when their sales grow faster than those of the 
sector and when firms' long-term growth is greater than that of the industry. 
Table 6.27: GLM results for argument overlap (interactions with firm size) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
Term Coef StDev t-stat p-value PE=O PE = 1 
Constant 0.349 0.022 15.64 <0.001 *** 
PE -0.015 0.022 -0.69 0.491 0.3332 0.3641 Mean etTect 
SIZE -0.017 0.005 -3.33 0.001 *** 
SIZE*PE 0.001 0.005 0.11 0.915 -0.0165 -0.0176 Size effect 
PEl =0 PEl = I 
Constant 0.338 0.021 16.21 <0.001 *** 
PEl -0.022 0.021 -1.03 0.307 0.3169 0.3598 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.014 0.005 -2.95 0.004*** 
SIZE*PEI 0.004 0.005 0.78 0.435 
-0.0105 -0.0180 Size effect 
RSI = 0 RSI = 1 
Constant 0.335 0.021 16.3 <0.001 *** 
RSI -0.028 0.021 -1.34 0.183 
0.3072 0.3623 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.014 0.005 -3.07 0.003*** 
SIZE*RSI 0.001 0.005 0.18 0.857 
-0.0135 -0.0152 Size effect 
RG=O RG = 1 
Constant 0.327 0.022 14.93 <0.001 *** 
RG -0.042 0.022 -1.93 0.056* 
0.2846 0.3693 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.012 0.005 -2.41 0.018** 
SIZE*RG 0.006 0.005 1.13 0.260 
-0.0065 -0.0181 Size effect 
In summary, the results can be interpreted in the following way. Although the main 
effects model seems to suggest that the chairman's reports of companies reporting 
'good news' about fundamentals, i.e. relative positive sales growth and relative 
positive long-term firm growth, have more argument overlap and are thus easier to 
read than those of firms reporting 'bad news' about fundamentals, i.e. relati\e 
negative sales growth and relative negative long-term firm growth. this association is 
not consistent when 'goodlbad news' is interacted with firm size. In fact, we observe 
that the chairman's reports of large firms have less argument overlap and are thus less 
cohesive than those of small firms. This is in contrast to hypothesis HIe \\hich states 
that large firms are less likely to engage in impression management (in the fom1 of 
reading ease manipulation) since they do not want to attract public and governmental 
attention by means of showing firm performance and prospects in a positive light. 
2~O 
Q) Adjacent stem overlap 
Adjacent stem overlap is based on the proportion of adjacent sentences that share one 
or more word stems. 
First, we evaluate whether reading difficulty in the form of adjacent stem overlap 
varies systematically across the sample firms in respect to firm size. Table 6.28 
indicates that the estimated response coefficient is negative (-0.0058). Ho\\'ever. there 
is no significant association between adjacent stem overlap and firm size. This means 
that reading difficulty measured in terms of adjacent stem overlap does not increase or 
decrease with firm market capitalisation. 
Table 6.28: Regression of adjacent stem overlap on firm size 
Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Coef 
0.516 
-0.006 
S.E. 
0.030 
0.007 
t-stat p-value 
17.40 <0.001 
-0.85 0.398 
Secondly, the likelihood of differences in reading difficulty measured in terms of 
adjacent stem overlap is investigated, depending on whether firms reporting good or 
bad news. Table 6.29 indicates that adjacent stem overlap is directly associated with 
'good news' in the form of profits, relative sales increases. and relative positive long-
term firm growth which is significant at the ten percent level (t = 1.69 and p = 0.095), 
at the five percent level (t = 2.56 and p = 0.012), and at the five percent level (t = 2.50 
and p = 0.014). This means that the chairman's reports of firms reporting profits. 
relative sales increases and relative positive long-term firm growth are more cohesive 
and thus easier to read than those reporting losses, relative negative sales gro\\1h and 
relative negative long-term firm growth. This is consistent with hypothesis Hlb \\'hich 
states that the corporate narrative sections of companies reporting 'good news' are 
more cohesive and thus easier to read than those of companies reporting 'bad n~ws·. 
Table 6.29: ANOVA results for adjacent stem overlap (main effects) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
SS MS F t-stat p-value Mean SD 
PE 0 0.051 0.051 2.85 1.69 0.095* 0.4666 0.1349 
0.5153 0.1339 
0.0487 0.0288 
PEl 0 0.002 0.002 0.08 0.29 0.774 0.4888 0.1344 
0.4973 0.138 
0.0085 0.0295 
RSI 0 0.114 0.114 6.55 2.56 0.012** 0.4495 0.1462 
0.5229 0.1211 
0.0734 0.0287 
RG 0 0.109 0.109 6.26 2.50 0.014** 0.4484 0.1374 
0.5210 0.1284 
0.0726 0.0290 
Finally, the consistency of any association that may appear between reading difficulty 
and 'good/bad news' is assessed across firms of different sizes. Table 6.30 shows that 
the direct associations that were observed between adjacent stem overlap and 'good 
news' in the form of profits (PE = 1), relative positive sales growth (RSI = 1) and 
relative positive long-term firm growth (RG = 1) is no longer statistically significant 
when firm size is interacted with 'good/bad news' (the respective p-values are 0.627, 
0.854, and 0.764). This means that the average adjacent stem overlap score (after 
controlling for firm size) is not significantly different for firms reporting good and bad 
news. What is more, there is also no significant difference in the amount of adjacent 
stem overlap between large and small firms. 
Table 6.30: GLM results for adjacent stem overlap (interactions with firm size) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
Term Coef StDev t-stat p-value PE =0 PE = 1 
Constant 0.527 0.032 16.76 <0.001 *** 
PE -0.015 0.032 -0.49 0.627 0.5120 0.5427 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.011 0.007 -1.49 0.139 
SIZE*PE -0.005 0.007 -0.65 0.520 -0.0154 -0.0061 Size effect 
PEl =0 PEl = 1 
Constant 0.514 0.030 17.01 <0.001 *** 
PEl -0.016 0.030 -0.54 0.589 0.4972 0.5300 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.005 0.007 -0.77 0.445 
SIZE*PEI 0.003 0.007 0.44 0.659 -0.0023 -0.0084 Size effect 
RSI = 0 RSI = 1 
Constant 0.5l3 0.029 17.55 <0.001 *** 
RSI -0.005 0.029 -0.18 0.854 0.5075 0.5183 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.007 0.007 -1.04 0.303 
SIZE*RSI -0.008 0.007 -1.22 0.226 -0.0151 0.0012 Size effect 
RG=O RG = 1 
Constant 0.518 0.031 16.61 <0.001 *** 
RG -0.009 0.031 -0.30 0.764 
0.5089 0.5277 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.009 0.007 -1.22 0.226 
SIZE*RG -0.007 0.007 -0.98 0.331 
-0.0160 -0.0018 Size effect 
In summary, when only the main effects are considered, the adjacent stem overlap 
score is shown to average 0.5229 for companies reporting 'good news' in the form of 
relative positive sales growth (RSI = 1) and 0.5210 for firms reporting 'good news' in 
the form of relative positive long-term firm growth, and significantly less at 0.4495 
and 0.4484 for firms reporting 'bad news' in the form of relative negative sales 
growth (RSI = 0) and relative negative long-term firm growth (RG = 0). However. 
when size effects are taken into consideration, the adjusted means of the adjacent stem 
overlap scores narrow significantly to 0.5075 and 0.5183 for relative sales growth and 
0.5089 and 0.5277 for relative long-term firm growth, a difference which is no longer 
statistically significant. Thus, it may be concluded that there is no significant 
difference in the amount of adjacent stem overlap in the chairman's reports of 
companies reporting 'good news' and those reporting 'bad news'. This means that 
hypothesis HI b (obfuscation hypothesis) which states that firms reporting 'bad news' 
are more likely to engage in reading ease manipulation by means of rendering their 
corporate narrative sections less cohesive than firms reporting 'good news'. has to be 
rejected. What is more, results suggest that the chairman's reports of large companies 
do not contain significantly more adjacent stem overlap than those of small 
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companies. For this reason, hypothesis HIe, which states that the chainnan's reports of 
large finns are more cohesive and thus contain more adjacent stem overlap, is also not 
supported. 
(4) Stem overlap 
Stem overlap is based on the proportion of all sentence pairs in a paragraph that share 
one or more word stems. 
Again, our first step is to establish whether reading difficulty, when measured in tenns 
of stem overlap, varies systematically across finns in the sample with regard to their 
size. Table 6.31 indicates that the estimated response coefficient is negative (-0.016). 
This means that stem overlap is inversely associated with finn size. This is significant 
at a one percent level (t = -3.06 and p = 0.003). Thus, the chainnan's reports of large 
companies are less likely to contain stem overlap and are thus more difficult to read 
than those of small companies. As we observed in the case of argument overlap~ the 
direction of association is contrary to Hypothesis HIe which states that large finns are 
less likely to engage in impression management (in the fonn of reading ease 
manipulation) since they do not want to attract public and governmental attention by 
means of showing finn perfonnance and prospects in a positive light. 
Table 6.31: Regression of stem overlap on firm size 
Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Coef 
0.369 
-0.016 
S.E. 
0.023 
0.005 
t-stat p-value 
16.14 <0.001 
-3.06 0.003*** 
Our second step is to investigate the likelihood of differences in reading difficulty in 
the form of stem overlap when the financial results contain either good or bad news. 
Table 6.32 indicates that stem overlap is directly related to • good news' in the fonn of 
relative positive sales growth (RSI = 1) and relative positive long-tenn finn gro\\1h 
(RG = 0.088). This is significant at the five percent (t = 2.37 and p = 0.020) and at the 
ten percent level (t = 1.73 and p = 0.088). This suggests that the chainnan' s reports of 
finns reporting 'good news' about fundamentals contain more stem overlap and are 
thus easier to read than those of finns reporting 'bad news' about fundamentals. This 
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is consistent with hypothesis Hlb which states that the corporate narrative sections of 
companies reporting' good news' are more cohesive and thus easier to read than those 
of companies reporting 'bad news' . 
Table 6.32: AN OVA results for stem overlap (main effects) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
SS MS F t-stat p-value Mean SO 
PE 0 0.000 0.000 0.01 0.21 0.914 0.3095 0.1002 
0.3070 0.1180 
-0.0025 0.0239 
PEl 0 0.001 0.001 0.04 0.21 0.836 0.3052 0.0938 
0.3102 0.1211 
0.0050 0.0239 
RSI 0 0.065 0.065 5.63 2.37 0.020** 0.2748 0.1041 
0.3301 0.109 
0.0553 0.0233 
RG 0 0.035 0.035 2.99 1.73 0.088* 0.2823 0.0902 
0.3236 0.1182 
0.0413 0.0239 
Our third step is to examine the consistency of any association that might appear 
between reading difficulty and 'good/bad news' across firms of different sizes. Table 
6.33 shows that the association between 'good/bad news' and argument overlap is no 
longer significant when 'good/bad news' is interacted with firm size. In fact, the 
negative coefficients on the 0, 1 RSI (-0.028) and RG (-0.044) factors suggest that a 
firm whose sales are growing more slowly than the sector and whose overall long-
term growth is slower than the sector is likely to produce a more cohesive chairman's 
report than a firm whose sales are growing faster than the sector and whose overall 
long-term growth is faster than the sector, which is the opposite direction of the main 
effect model. However, the size effect shows that in all four measures of 'good/bad 
news' argument overlap decreases as firm capitalisation increases. The t-statistics of -
3.22 (p-value = 0.002), -2.94 (p-value = 0.004), -3.03 (p-value = 0.003), and -2.38 (p-
value = 0.019) indicate that the difference in size effects when the news is good or 
bad is statistically significant at the one percent (PE, PEl, RSI) and at the five percent 
level (RG). This means that the expected value of the argument overlap score 
decreases with firm size when firms make profits, increase their profits, when their 
sales grow faster than those of the sector and when firms' long-term growth is greater 
than that of the industry. 
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Table 6.33: GLM results for stem overlap (interactions with size) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
Term Coef StDev t-stat p-value PE=O PE = 1 
Constant 0.377 0.025 15.19 <0.001 *** 
PE -0.017 0.025 -0.69 0.492 0.3601 0.3944 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.018 0.006 -3.22 0.002*** 
SIZE*PE 0.001 0.006 0.2 0.841 -0.0172 -0.0195 Size effect 
PEl = 0 PEl = 1 
Constant 0.368 0.023 15.77 <0.001 *** 0.3562 0.3792 Mean 
PEl -0.012 0.023 -0.49 0.624 Effect 
SIZE -0.016 0.005 -2.94 0.004*** -0.0138 -0.0178 Size 
SIZE*PEI 0.002 0.005 0.38 0.706 Effect 
RSI = 0 RSI = 1 
Constant 0.363 0.023 15.89 <0.001 *** 
RSI -0.028 0.023 -1.22 0.226 
0.3349 0.3905 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.016 0.005 -3.03 0.003*** 
SIZE*RSI 0.000 0.005 0.04 0.971 
-0.0156 -0.0160 Size effect 
RG=O RG = 1 
Constant 0.355 0.025 14.51 <0.001 *** 
RG -0.044 0.025 -1.78 0.079 
0.3112 0.3982 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.014 0.006 -2.38 0.019** 
SIZE*RG 0.006 0.006 1.05 0.299 
-0.0076 -0.0196 Size effect 
In summary, the results can be interpreted in the following way. Although the main 
effects model seems to suggest that the chairman's reports of companies reporting 
'bad news' about fundamentals, i.e. relative negative sales growth and relative 
negative long-term firm growth, have more argument overlap and are thus easier to 
read than those of firms reporting 'good news' about fundamentals, i.e. relative 
positive sales growth and relative positive long-term firm growth, this association is 
not consistent when 'good/bad news' is interacted with firm size. In fact, we observe 
that the chairman's reports of large firms have less argument overlap and are thus less 
cohesive than those of small firms. This is in contrast to hypothesis Hie which states 
that large firms are less likely to engage in impression management (in the form of 
reading ease manipulation) since they do not want to attract public and goyernmental 
attention by means of showing firm performance and prospects in a positive light. 
Overall, the results of our three-step analysis involving the association between all 
four cohesion-based Coh-Metrix reading difficulty measures namely (1) adjacent 
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argument overlap, (2) argument overlap, (3) stem overlap, and (4) adjacent stem 
overlap, and 'goodlbad news' and firm size, show a discernable pattern. 
First of all, all four measures of cohesion-based reading difficulty are inversely related 
to firm size; however, this association is only statistically significant in the case of 
argument overlap and stem overlap. This inverse association is contrary to 
expectations. Hypothesis HIe predicts cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty 
to be directly related to firm size, since large firms are under more public scrutiny and 
thus face higher political costs if they engage in impression management. 
Secondly, all four cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty are inversely related 
to good news about fundamentals, i.e. relative sales increase and relative positive 
long-term sales growth. This suggests that the chairman's reports of companies 
reporting 'good news' about fundamentals are more cohesive and thus easier to read 
than those of companies reporting 'bad news' about fundamentals. This result is in 
line with hypothesis HI b (obfuscation hypothesis) which states that managers of 
companies with negative organisational outcomes engage in impression management 
in the form of reading manipulation. Thus, based on the results of the main effect 
model alone, the chairman's reports of companies reporting 'bad news' in the form of 
negative relative sales growth and negative relative long-term firm growth are 
rendered difficult to read by means of reducing cohesion. This means the chairman's 
reports of badly performing companies contain fewer grammatical and lexical ties 
within and between sentences and thus less of a 'red thread' to guide the reader 
through the text than those of better-performing companies. 
However, this direct association between reading difficulty and 'bad news' is not 
consistent when 'goodlbad news' is interacted with firm size. However, what we do 
find is that in those cases where the association between reading difficulty and firm 
size is significant (i.e. in the case of argument overlap and stem overlap), fin11 size 
emerges as the determining factor in the GLM model. This means that firm size and 
not "goodlbad news' is the determining factor in differences in the reading difficulty 
of chairman's reports. We find that the chairman's reports of large companies are less 
cohesive and thus more difficult to read than those of small companies. This inverse 
association is contrary to hypothesis HIe which, based on the political cost hypothesis. 
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predicts cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty to be directly related to firm 
size, since large firms are under more public scrutiny and thus face higher political 
costs if they engage in impression management. 
However, the observed direction of association between reading difficulty and firm 
size is consistent with 'the public eye argument' (Courtis 1998) and 'the complexity 
of operations' argument (Jones 1988; Rutherford 2003). 'The public eye argument' 
states that the corporate narrative documents of large firms are more difficult to read 
than those of small firms since they try to deflect the public's attention away from 
them by means of obfuscation. 'The complexity of operations' argument states that 
large companies have more complex operations to report on than small companies 
which renders their corporate narrative documents more difficult to read than those of 
small companies. Whereas 'the public eye argument' interprets textual complexity as 
an indication of impression management, the 'complexity of operations' argument 
regards textual complexity as a reflection of the complexity of content of the 
corporate narrative documents of large organisations. 
The explanation of managerial behaviour inherent in 'the public eye argument' runs 
contrary to agency theory explanations of managerial behaviour, on which the 
majority of impression management studies are based. The political cost hypothesis 
claims that firms in the public eye, such as large firms, do not want to attract attention 
by high profitability since this can result in new taxes or regulations. Consequently, 
large firms have no incentives to engage in impression management by obfuscating 
negative organisational outcomes, since they do not want to portray their financial 
performance in the best possible light. However, our findings do not support agency 
theory explanations of impression management, but suggest that large firms are more 
likely to engage in impression management in the form of reading ease manipulation 
than small firms. For this reason, it seems more likely that the inverse association 
between cohesion and firm size can be attributed to the fact that large firms have more 
complex operations to report and thus produce more complex corporate narratives. 
For this reason, we interpret the inverse association between cohesion and firm size 
not a sign of impression management, but as a function of the complexity of the 
content of chairman's reports 
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6.2.3.4 Industry specific results 
The results of association tests between reading difficulty and . goodlbad news' and 
firm size for consumer cyclical, industrial, and technical companies, show that each 
industry sector behaves very similarly to the whole sample, with consumer cyclical 
and industrial companies most closely mirroring whole sample results (see Tables A 1-
A4 in Appendix II). 
This is consistent with hypothesis HId which states that there is no difference in the 
strength and direction of association between the reading difficulty of corporate report 
documents and accounting 'good/bad news' and firm size in the consumer cyclical, 
industrial and technical sectors. 
6.2.3.5 Summary 
Section 6.1 shows conventional readability measures (Flesch Reading Ease), 
annotation-based measures of reading difficulty (MMAX2) and cohesion-based 
measures reading difficulty (Coh-Metrix) as uncorrelated and thus capturing different 
aspects of reading difficulty. Thus, it is not surprising that they yield different results. 
These differences between conventional, annotation-based, and automatically 
generated measures of reading difficulty are also reflected in different results when 
their association is tested with regard to 'goodlbad news' and firm size. Whereas the 
Flesch Reading Ease score and the MMAX2 cohesion-based measures of reading 
difficulty are related directly to firm size (strongly significant in the case of Flesch 
Reading Ease and only weakly significant in the case of proportion of given and new 
information), the Coh-Metrix measures are inversely related to firm size (strongly 
significant in the case of argument overlap and stem overlap). 
However, the direction of association between reading difficulty and 'goodlbad news' 
is consistent across the Flesch Reading Ease score, MMAX2 and Coh-.\1etrix 
measures of reading difficulty. We observe that firms reporting negati\'e earnings 
growth have significantly (five percent level) lower Flesch Reading Ease scores than 
finns reporting positive earnings growth. This confirms the findings of pr~\"ious 
reading ease manipUlation studies which find a direct association between reading 
difficulty in the form of Flesch Reading Ease and a decrease in earnings 
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(Subramanian et al. 1993; Courtis 2004a). This result supports the obfuscation 
hypothesis which states that the narrative sections of firms reporting negative 
organisational outcomes are more difficult to read than those reporting positive 
organisational outcomes. 
However, this association does not persist when 'good/bad news' is interacted with 
firm size. This means that results are driven by firm size which is inversely associated 
with reading difficulty in the form of Flesch Reading Ease. This means that the 
chairman's reports of small companies contain longer words and sentences and are 
thus more difficult to read than those of large companies. Since previous reading ease 
manipulation studies do not test for interaction effects, this result means that the 
findings of previous studies might not be indicative of an association between reading 
difficulty and negative firm performance, but rather between reading difficulty and 
firm size. 
However, in the case of cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty, we observe 
that firms reporting 'bad news' in the form of fundamentals (i.e. relative negative 
sales growth and relative negative long-term firms growth) have less cohesive and 
thus more difficult chairman's reports than those reporting 'good news' in 
fundamentals (Le. relative positive sales growth and relative positive long-term firm 
growth). This association is observed across all four Coh-Metrix measures of reading 
difficulty. However, this association is only significant in the case of cohesion 
density, i.e. one out of three MMAX2 measures of reading difficulty, and then only in 
relation to relative long-term firm growth (RG). We thus conclude that the Coh-
Metrix measures constitute more powerful cohesion-based measures of reading 
difficulty. 
Results indicate that reading difficulty measured in terms of textual complexity by 
means of the four Coh-Metrix based measures is directly associated with 'bad news' 
in the form of losses, sales growth below industry sector, and long-term firm gro\'Y1h 
below industry sector. However, this association does not persist when . goodlbad 
news' is interacted with firm size. This means that results are driven by firm size 
which is directly associated with textual complexity in the form of cohesion. As a 
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result, the chairman's reports of large companies are less cohesive and thus more 
difficult to read than those of small companies. 
These findings do not support hypothesis Hlb (obfuscation hypothesis) which claims 
that firms reporting 'bad news' obfuscate negative organisational outcomes by means 
of rendering their corporate narrative documents difficult to read. However, results 
suggest an association between reading difficulty and firm size, albeit in opposite 
directions on the case of conventional and cohesion-based measures of reading 
difficulty. We observe a direct association between the Flesch Reading Ease score 
and firm size and an inverse association between the four Coh-Metrix scores and finn 
size. Results regarding Flesch Reading Ease confirm hypothesis Hie which states that 
large firms are less likely to engage in reading ease manipulation than small finns, 
whereas results regarding Coh-Metrix measures are in contradiction to hypothesis HIe. 
We argued that due to associated political costs large firms have fewer incentives to 
obfuscate negative organisational outcomes by means of rendering their corporate 
narrative documents difficult to read than small firms. For this reason, we interpreted 
this direct association between reading difficulty and firm size in the case of Coh-
Metrix measures not as a sign of impression management in line with the 'public eye' 
argument, but in line with 'the complexity of operations' argument as an indicator of 
the complexity of content inherent in the content of the chairman's reports of large 
companIes. 
However, in the light of research in psychology on text processing (see chapter three, 
section 3.3.1) the contradictory results regarding the association of conventional 
measures of reading difficulty (Flesch Reading Ease score) and cohesion-based 
measures of reading difficulty (Coh-Metrix) and firm size can be interpreted as an 
indication that firms do not obfuscate negative organisational outcomes by means of 
rendering their corporate narrative documents difficult to read, but actually do the 
opposite, namely they tailor their corporate narrative documents to the specific 
reading strategies of their target readership groups. 
McNamara (2001), who examines the interrelationship betv,:een cohesion and world 
knowledge on text processing, finds that low-knowledge readers henefit from high 
cohesion, whereas high-knowledge readers benefit from lo\\·-cohesion. The reason for 
261 
this phenomenon is that cohesion gaps require the reader to make inferences either 
from world knowledge or from previous textual information. In the context of the 
present study, this means that expert users of narrative corporate report sections, such 
as fund managers and investment analysts, should find highly cohesive texts difficult 
to read, whereas the opposite should be true for 'naIve' users, such as indi\'idual 
shareholders. 
Our results show that large firms produce chairman's reports which contain shorter 
words and sentences (and thus easier to read for specific groups of readers), but which 
are less cohesive (and thus more difficult to read for specific groups of readers) than 
those of small firms. This might be an indication that large and small firms target their 
texts at different readerships. Results suggest that large firms cater more to 
professional investors by leaving more cohesion gaps in their corporate narrative 
documents, whereas small firms cater more to naIve investors by rendering their 
corporate narrative documents more cohesive. What is more, the information 
contained in the chairman's reports of large companies is more likely to be public 
knowledge by the time the annual report is published than that of small companies. 
This provides an alternative explanation of the finding that large firms are more likely 
to provide low-cohesion texts which suit the reading strategies of high-knowledge 
readers than small firms. 
Further, results also indicate that there are no major differences in results regarding 
the association between reading difficulty and 'goodlbad news ~ and firm size when 
the companies of the three industrial sectors are looked at separately. This is in line 
with hypothesis HId which states that there is no difference in strength and direction 
of association between the reading difficulty of corporate narrative documents and 
'good/bad news' and firm size of firms in the consumer cyclical. industriaL and 
technological sectors. 
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6.3 Self-presentational dissimulation 
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics of linguistic markers 
Impression management in the form of self-presentational dissimulation is measured 
by means of five linguistic markers, which consist of (1) low word count (We), (2) 
low use of self-reference (Self), (3) low use of reference to others (Other), (4) high 
use of emotion words (Affect), especially negative emotion words (Negemo), and (5) 
low use of cognitive complexity (CogComp). 
Table 6.34 outlines the distribution of values for the five linguistic markers of 
dissimulation across the sample, namely (1) word count (WC), (2) self-reference 
(Self), (3) reference to others (Other), (4) use of emotion words (Affect), and (5) 
cognitive complexity (CogComp). Use of emotion words is further subdivided into 
two subcategories, namely positive emotion words (PosEmotion) and negative 
emotion words (Negemotion). 
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Table 6.34: Descriptive statistics of linguistic markers of dissimulation 
Variable N Mean Median TrMean StDev SE Mean Minimum Maximum Ql Q3 
LogWC 93 6.713 6.692 6.715 0.629 0.065 5.081 8.243 6.273 7.153 
Self (I) 93 3.692 3.800 3.683 1.460 0.151 0.600 7.770 2.785 4.775 
Other (2) 93 0.240 0.190 0.215 0.256 0.027 0.000 1.460 0.000 0.355 
Affect (3) 93 4.137 4.010 4.084 1.135 0.118 2.190 8.640 3.380 4.810 
PosEmotion (31) 93 3.314 3.340 3.280 1.117 0.116 1.060 7.720 2.480 3.985 
NegEmotion(32) 93 0.857 0.730 0.810 0.572 0.059 0.000 3.180 0.460 1.125 
CogCompl (4) 93 5.051 5.070 5.068 0.974 0.101 2.480 7.200 4.375 5.560 
Key: LogWC = log of total number of words; all others % of total word count in text 
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Table 6.34 shows marked differences in mean values (1) between references to self 
(3.6920/0) and references to others (0.2400/0) and (2) between positi\'e emotion words 
(3.314%) and negative emotion words (0.857%). This means that. on average. 
chairman's reports tend to contain fifteen times as many references to self than 
references to others and four times as many positive emotion words (e.g. exciting. 
win) than negative emotion words (e.g. difficult, disappointing, loss). 
Differences in mean values between references to self and references to others are in 
line with previous research on performance explanations in narrative corporate report 
sections. Short and Palmer (2003) find that 85.4 percent of references in shareholder 
letters involve internal referents (comparison with past performance), whereas only 
14.6 percent involve external referents (comparison with industry performance). What 
is more, 52.9 percent of all shareholders letters exclusively use internal referents. This 
is an indication that managers have the tendency not to compare company 
performance with that of competitors. 
The fact that chairmen's reports contain more positive emotion words than negative 
emotion words can be interpreted as a result of the managerial tendency of . gilding 
the lily' (Guardian, April 17, 2004, p. 27) in narrative sections. The phenomenon that 
"positive, affirmative words are used more often than negative words" (Hildebrandt 
and Snyder 1981: 6) has also been referred to as the 'Pollyanna effect'. This is in line 
with Rutherford (2005: 371) who observes the majority of what he refers to as 
Icharged words' carrying a positive charge. What is more, behavioural finance 
theories suggest that managers may have the tendency to introduce both cognitive and 
affective bias into narrative corporate report sections in order to influence external 
parties' perceptions of firm performance (see chapter two section 2.6.3). 
Table 6.35 compares the use of emotion words in chairman's reports compared to four 
non-corporate genres, namely (1) emotion writing, (2) control writing. (3) books. and 
(4) talking. 89 It is interesting to note that chairman's reports show a high overall use of 
emotion words. particularly positive emotion words, compared to other genres. 
89 A comparison of the other three markers of dissimulation across g\?nres is not possibk since they 
Were defined through custom dictionaries. 
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considering that the chairman's report belongs to a genre of technical or professional 
writing which are characterised by information rather than persuasion. This means 
that chairman's reports are highly emotive documents. 
Table 6.35: Comparison of mean frequency of emotion words across genres 
Dimensions Examples Emotion Control Books Talking Chairman's 
writing writing reports 
Affective or 
emotional 
processes 
Positive 
emotions 
Negative 
emotions 
Exciting, win, 
difficult 
Exciting, win 
Difficult, loss, 
disappointing 
5.3 
2.7 
2.6 
2.3 3.9 4.0 
1.7 2.2 2.7 
0.6 1.6 1.3 
Emotion writing = writing about emotions and thoughts about personally relevant topics. 
4.0 
.., ") J._ 
0.8 
Control writing = writing about non-emotional topics, such as plans for the day or descriptions of 
ordinary objects or events. 
Books = a semi-random sample of pages from the 30 best-selling fiction books of 1995. 
Talking = transcripts collected from individuals who are talking in non-experimental settings. 
What is particularly striking is that chairman's reports score the highest in the use of 
positive emotion words across all five genres, particularly in the category optimism 
and energy, one of the sub-dimensions of positive emotion words. This is a 
particularly striking result, considering that one of the genres explicitly deals with 
writing about emotions in relation to personally relevant topics, such as abortion. 
What is more, chairman's reports score the second lowest on the use of negative 
emotion words. The predominance of positive emotion words compared to negative 
emotion words suggests that the primary purpose of chairman's reports is to adopt an 
'up-beat' message about the company. 
6.3.2 Association between linguistic markers and 'good/bad news' and firm size 
The association tests carried out in this section test whether impression management 
in the form of self-presentational dissimulation measured by means of five linguistic 
markers, namely (1) word count, (2) self-reference, (3) references to others. (4) use of 
emotion words, and (5) cognitive complexity is associated with 'gooci;bad news' and 
firm size. It is also tested whether industry classification has an impact on results. 
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If impression management in the form of self-presentational dissimulation is found to 
be directly related to 'bad news', this supports the obfuscation hypothesis which 
claims that the management of poorly performing companies tends to obfuscate 
negative organisational outcomes. In the case of self-presentational dissimulation this 
manifests itself in the subconscious use of linguistic markers which "are the result of 
anxiety, negative emotional states, and cognitive demand" (Carlson et al. 2004: 7) 
occurring during self-presentational dissimulation. If the five linguistic markers are 
found to be associated with 'good/bad news' in the directions hypothesized in chapter 
four, section 4.2.1, this suggests that managers may use corporate narrative documents 
for impression management purposes. 
If the linguistic markers are found to be inversely related to firm size, this is also 
interpreted as evidence of impression management in the form of self-presentational 
dissimulation. Based on the political cost hypothesis, it is argued that large firms have 
fewer incentives to engage in impression management since they do not seek to attract 
press attention or governmental intervention by means of introducing positive bias. 
The statistical methods employed in this section are the same as in section 6.2. 
6.3.2.1 Word Count 
Word Count proxies text length. Dissimulation tends to contain less detail, resulting in 
shorter texts (DePaulo et al. 2003; Burgoon et al. 2003; and Vrij 2000). 
The first step of the analysis is to establish whether self-presentational dissimulation, 
when measured by Word Count, varies systematically across the firms in the sample 
with regard to their size, regardless of the good or bad news conveyed in the financial 
statements. As shown in 6.36, although the estimated response coefficient is positive 
(0.0189), there is no evidence of a significant association between Word Count and 
firm size. Put differently, Word Count does not increase or decrease as the extent and 
volume of company operations become greater. 
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Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Table 6.36: Regression of Word Count on firm size 
Coef 
6.641 
0.019 
S.E. 
0.135 
0.031 
t-stat p-value 
49.34 <0.000 
0.62 0.5390 
The second step of the analysis is concerned with the likelihood of differences in self-
presentational dissimulation in the fonn of Word Count when the financial results 
convey either a positive or a negative message. In this case, Table 6.37 indicates that 
Word Count increases with 'good news' in the fonn of profits (PE = 1), relatiye 
positive sales growth (RSI - 1), and relative positive long-tenn finn growth (RG = 1). 
This is significant at the ten percent (p = 0.067), at the one percent (p = 0.002), and at 
the five percent level (p = 0.031). This is consistent with hypothesis H2b which states 
that the corporate narrative sections of companies reporting 'good news' contain a 
higher Word Count than those of companies reporting 'bad news'. 
Analysed in more detail, results indicate that chainnan' s reports are longer when 
positive earnings (PE = 1) are reported, than otherwise. However, this effect is only 
weakly significant (p = 0.067). The analysis of variance shows that the mean for 
companies reporting positive earnings (PE = 1) is 6.8194 and for companies reporting 
negative earnings (PE = 0) is 6.5788. Thus, the difference in means is 0.2406. This 
means that, if a finn makes a profit, the estimated association is that (log) Word Count 
will be greater by 0.2406. The predicted increase in report length is therefore equal to 
02406· 27 1 I h . , d e . , I.e. . percent onger, w en pOSItIve earnmgs are reporte . 
The average chainnan's report length is 823 words (logWC = 6.71). Since the mean 
logWC for companies reporting positive earnings is 6.8194 and for companies 
. h . , rt I th' 6.8194 
reportmg negative earnings is 6.5788, the average c aInnan s repo eng IS e 
(916 words) when a profit is reported and e6.5788 (720 words) otherwise. 
There is a more marked association between Word Count and 'good/bad news'. when 
relative sales growth (RSI) and relative long-tenn finn growth (RG) are considered as 
main effects. the estimates being significant at the one percent le\'t~1 (p = 0.002) and at 
the the percent leyel (p = 0.031). If sales increase relative to the sector. \\'ord Count 
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is predicted to be 49.9 percent (e°.4045 -1) higher. Thus, the average \Vord Count in 
case of a positive relative sales growth is 962 words (e6.8699) and 642 words (e646:'4) 
otherwise. Similarly, if the firm is growing at a faster rate than the sector. Word Count 
is predicted to be 33.7 percent (eO.290 -1) higher. This means that average \~/ord Count 
in case of positive relative long-term firm growth is 916 words (e6.8196) and 685 
(e6.5290) otherwise. 
Table 6.37: ANOVA results for Word Count (main effects) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
SS MS F t-stat p-value Mean SD 
PE 0 1.328 1.328 3.450 1.86 0.067* 6.5788 0.6180 
6.8194 0.6226 
0.2406 0.1296 
PEl 0 0.426 0.426 1.080 1.04 0.302 6.6319 0.5957 
6.7696 0.6501 
0.1377 0.1326 
RSI 0 3.611 3.611 10.030 3.17 0.002*** 6.4654 0.6308 
1 6.8699 0.5800 
0.-10-15 0.0639 
RG 0 1.821 1.821 4.800 2.19 0.031 ** 6.5290 0.5776 
6.8196 0.6371 
0.2906 0.1327 
The third step of the analysis is designed to assess the consistency of any association 
across firms of different size that may appear to exist between Word Count in the 
chainnan's report and the good or bad news conveyed by the financial statements. As 
6.38 shows, the direct association which was observed between Word Count and 
'good news' in the form of profits (PE = 1), relative positive sales growth (RSI = 1), 
and relative positive long-term firm growth (RG = 1), no longer remains a strong 
result when firm size is interacted with' good/bad news'. 
Table 6.38 shows that although chairman report length also seems to increase with 
finn size, this is not to a significant extent when estimated as a main effect. Ho\ve\"er. 
Table 6.38 indicates that when an earnings increase (PEl = 1) is reported by larger 
finns, the change in Word Count is positive and significant at the five percent level (p 
::: 0.034). The PEl - SIZE slope differentiator is -0.066. This implies that \\'ord Count 
increases less (-0.0624 as opposed to 0.0701) \\'ith firm size when there is an earnings 
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decrease (PEl = 0), than when there is an earnings increase (PEl = 1) 90 Thi 
. s means 
that large firms reporting earnings decreases (PEl = 0) publish s"fi I h 19ru lcant y sorter 
chairman's reports than large firms reporting earnings increases (PEl = 1). 
Term 
Constant 
PE 
SIZE 
SIZE*PE 
Constant 
PEl 
SIZE 
SIZE*PEI 
Constant 
RSI 
SIZE 
SIZE*RSI 
Constant 
RG 
SIZE 
SIZE*RG 
Table 6.38: GLM results for Word Count (interactions with firm size) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
Coef StDev t-stat p-value PE=O PE = 1 
6.668 0.143 46.55 0.000*** 
0.018 0.143 0.13 0.898 6.6863 6.6495 Mean effect 
0.000 0.033 0.01 0.993 
-0.037 0.033 
-1.13 0.262 -0.0368 0.0375 Size effect 
PEl = 0 PEl = 1 
6.678 0.134 50.02 0.000*** 
0.184 0.134 1.37 0.173 6.8611 6.4941 Mean effect 
0.004 0.031 0.13 0.900 
-0.066 0.031 
-2.15 0.034** -0.0624 0.0701 Size effect 
RSI =0 RSI = 1 
6.609 0.132 50.12 0.000*** 
-0.150 0.132 -1.14 0.259 6.4590 6.7586 Mean effect 
0.015 0.030 0.51 0.612 
-0.014 0.030 -0.45 0.652 0.0017 0.0290 Size effect 
RG=O RG = 1 
6.671 0.143 46.56 0.000*** 
0.000 0.143 0.00 0.999 6.6711 6.6715 Mean effect 
0.000 0.034 0.00 0.997 
-0.038 0.034 -1.13 0.259 -0.0380 0.0383 Size effect 
In summary, chairman's reports are significantly longer when firms report positive 
earnings (PE = 1), when firm sales grow faster than the sector (RSI = 1), and when 
firms grow faster than the sector (RG = 1). However, this effect does not persist when 
'good bad news' is interacted with firm size. However, large firms reporting earnings 
~ Note that the average size of the firms in the sample is £45.8m (LnSIZEm = 3.8), with an 
mterquartile range between £ 11.3m and £223.6m (lnSIZEm 2.42-5.41) (see Table 6.2). The estimated 
association is that an increase of one unit of (log) Size results in a (log) Word Count that is 0.132 (i.e. -
0.066 x - 2) greater. To interpret this coefficient, take a situation where one firm is double the size of 
another. In this case, InSIZEm is greater by In(2), or 0.6931. It follows that for profit-increasing firms 
that d b . . h' h b 0.132S,,0.6931·1· rts e 96°1 are ou Ie the size of others, the Word Count IS Ig er y e , I.e. repo ar . 10 
longer. 
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decreases (PEl = 0) publish significantly shorter chainnan' s reports than large firms 
reporting earnings increases (PEl = 1). 
6.3.2.2 Self-reference 
Self-reference is a "subtle proclamation of one's ownership of a statement" (Ne\\man 
et al. 2003: 666). For this reason, individuals engaged in impression management in 
the form of self-presentational dissimulation tend to avoid the use of self-references as 
a way of distancing themselves from their stories and of avoiding responsibility for 
their behaviour. 
First of all, we aIm to establish whether self-presentational dissimulation, when 
measured in the fonn of self-reference, varies systematically across sample firms with 
regard to finn size, regardless of the good or bad news conveyed by the financial 
statements. Table 6.39 shows that self-reference increases significantly with firm size 
(p = 0.013). This suggests that the chairman's reports of large firms contain more self-
reference than those of small firms. 
Table 6.39: Regression of self-reference on firm size 
Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Coef 
3.022 
0.175 
S.E. 
0.304 
0.069 
t-stat p-value 
9.990 <0.000 
2.530 0.013** 
Secondly, we investigate the likelihood of differences in self-reference as a marker of 
self-presentational dissimulation when the financial results convey either good or bad 
news. Table 6.40 shows the direction of association between self-reference and all 
four measures of 'good/bad news' to be consistent, i.e. self-reference is directly 
associated with all four measures of 'good news'. However. this association is only 
significant in the case of relative positive sales gro\\1:h (RSI = 1) and relatiyc positivc 
long-term firm growth (RG = 1), at a ten percent (p = 0.071) and at a fiyc percent (p = 
0.048) level. This means that the chairman's reports of firms \\"hosc sales increase 
faster compared to the sector and \vhose long-term grov,1h is faster than that of the 
sector contain more self-references. 
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The estimated increment in the self-reference score is 0 5602 'h' h' . . -
. ,\\ lC IS sIgmfIcant at 
the 10 percent level (p = 0.071). The average score when th' . ere IS no sales Increase 
relative to the sector is 3.349, compared to 3.902 when th' I' ere IS a sa es Increase 
relative to the sector. Thus, on average self-reference is 16 7 P t h' h ~ , . ercen Ig er lor finns 
whose sales grow faster than the sector than otherwise What . h' 
. IS more, t ere IS also 
more self-reference, when a firm is growing faster than the sector (RG = 1), the 
difference between the two groups now being 0 6201 (p = 0 048)' f . " an Increment 0 
18.8 percent. 
Table 6.40: ANOV A results for self-reference (main effects) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
SS MS F t-stat p-value Mean SO 
PE 0 2.910 2.910 1.37 1.17 0.245 3.493 1.537 
3.849 1.391 
0.3560 0.30-1 
PEl 0 4.620 4.620 2.2 1.48 0.142 3.424 1.568 
3.877 1.364 
0.4530 0.306 
RSI 0 6.920 6.920 3.33 1.83 0.071 * 3.349 1.513 
3.909 1.395 
0.5600 0.30" 
RG 0 8.290 8.290 4.02 2.00 0.048** 3.299 1.510 
3.919 1.393 
0.6200 0.309 
Finally, we interact "good/bad news' with finn size in order to assess whether the 
association that seems to exist between self-reference and 'goodlbad news' is indeed 
consistent across firms of different sizes. Table 6.41 shows that although self-
reference is greater when there is 'good news', it also increases significantly with finn 
size. For example, when the estimates account for an interaction bet\\een 'good ne\\'s' 
and size, self-reference increases by 60 percent when a finn reports an earnings 
increase (i.e. without taking size into account, there is an incremental change of 
0.13608 in average scores from 2.2455 to 3.6063). The estimated association is that an 
increase of one unit of (log) size results in a self-reference score that is 0.3205 greater. 
but this is all but cancelled out (-0.252 = 0.126 x -2) \\'hen there is an earnings 
increase. In other words. larger firms make more sel f-referencc~ regardless of whethl~r 
they report 'good news' or "bad news', \\hereas smaller firms' ~e1frefcn:nce is dri\cn 
by the 'good nc\\'s' being reported. The same pattern emergcs in the comhination of 
272 
firm size and 'bad news' in the form of relative sales decrease (RSI = 0) d . an relatl\c 
negative long-term firm growth (RG = 0). 
Table 6.41: GLM results for self-reference (interactions with firm size) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
Term Coef StDev t-stat p-value PE-O PE = 1 
Constant 3.060 0.330 9.28 0.000*** 
PE -0.092 0.330 -0.28 0.780 2.9680 3.1524 Mean effect 
SIZE 0.167 0.076 2.20 0.030** 
SIZE*PE 0.013 0.076 0.17 0.863 0.1797 0.1535 Size effect 
PEl = 0 PEl = 1 
Constant 2.926 0.301 9.72 0.000*** 
PEl -0.680 0.301 -2.26 0.026** 2.2455 3.6063 Mean effect 
SIZE 0.195 0.069 2.80 0.006*** 
SIZE*PEI 0.126 0.069 1.81 0.074* 0.3205 0.0690 Size effect 
RSI = 0 RSI = 1 
Constant 2.891 0.304 9.51 0.000*** 
RSI -0.631 0.304 -2.08 0.041 ** 
2.2597 3.5219 Mean effect 
SIZE 0.194 0.069 2.79 0.007*** 
SIZE*RSI 0.093 0.069 1.34 0.185 
0.2863 0.1008 Size effect 
RG=O RG= 1 
Constant 2.758 0.321 8.59 0.000*** 
RG -0.763 0.321 -2.38 0.020** 1.9950 3.5208 Mean effect 
SIZE 0.226 0.075 3.00 0.004*** 
SIZE*RG 0.123 0.075 1.63 0.106 
0.3483 0.1027 Size effect 
In summary, chairman's reports of large firms contain more self-references in the 
fonn of we, the Group, and the company name than those of small firms. What is 
more, chairman's reports of firms reporting 'good news' about fundamentals, i.e. with 
sales growing faster than the sector and with firms growing faster than the sector, also 
contain more self-references. This is in line with hypotheses H2b and H2c that fim1S 
reporting 'bad news' and small firms are more likely to use self-referential 
dissimulation (marked by less self-references) in order to obfuscate negative 
organisational outcomes than large firms and firms reporting 'good news'. These 
results support hypotheses H2b and H 2c and thus confirm findings from social 
psychology that individuals engaged in dissimulation a\'oid the use of self-references 
as a way of distancing themselyes from their stories and of avoiding responsibility for 
their beha\'iour (Newman et al. 2003). 
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What is more, the chairman's reports of large firms show less evidenc~ of 
dissimulation (in the form of more self-reference) than those of small firms. regardless 
of whether they report "good news' or 'bad news'. However, the chairman's reports of 
small firms show more evidence of dissimulation (marked by less-self-refer~nces). 
when they have "bad news' to report. These findings support hypothesis H2c (the 
political cost hypothesis) which states that large firms are less likely to engage in 
impression management, since they want to avoid the political costs associated with 
portraying firm performance in the best possible light. 
6.3.2.3 References to others 
The third marker of self-presentational dissimulation is references to others, \\"hich in 
a financial reporting context entails references to competitors. 
First, we examine whether references to others varies systematically across the sample 
with respect to size, regardless of the good or bad news reported in the financial 
statements. As Table 6.42 indicates, there is an inverse association between references 
to others and firm size, however it is not statistically significant. 
Table 6.42: Regression of reference to others on firm size 
Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Coef 
0.286 
-0.012 
S.E. 
0.055 
0.013 
t-stat p-value 
5.24 <0.000 
-0.95 0.343 
Secondly, we analyse the likelihood of differences to references to others depending 
on the good or bad news conveyed by the financial statements. As Table 6.43 
indicates, apart from relative sales growth (RSI), there is a direct association between 
references to others and 'bad news'. This is the opposite direction as stated by 
hypothesis H2a, however, findings in social psychology research regarding reference 
to others are contradictory. Whereas Newman et al. (2003) find individuals engaged 
in dissimulation to use fewer references to others. DePaulo et al. (2003) and Zhou et 
al. (200-+) find the opposite. 
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However, this is only weakly significant (p = 0.089) in the case of "bad news' in the 
form of earnings decreases (PEl = 0). This means that chairman's reports of 
companies reporting 'bad news' in the form of negative earnings growth contain more 
references to others than those of companies reporting • good news' in the form of 
positive earnings growth. 
Table 6.43: ANOVA results for references to others (main effects) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
SS MS F t-stat p-value Mean SO 
PE 0 0.159 0.159 2.48 -1.57 0.119 0.2868 0.3052 
0.2035 0.204 
-0.0833 0.2868 
PEl 0 0.189 0.189 2.96 -1.72 0.089* 0.2945 0.305 
0.2027 0.2098 
-0.09/8 0.29-15 
RSI 0 0.011 0.011 0.17 0.41 0.681 0.2264 0.227 
0.2489 0.2737 
0.0225 0.2-190 
RG 0 0.056 0.056 0.86 -0.93 0.356 0.2726 0.2506 
0.2215 0.2586 
-0.0511 0.2735 
Finally, we assess the consistency of any association that may exist between 
references to others as a marker of self-presentational dissimulation and "good/bad 
news' across firms of different sizes. Table 6.44 shows that the direct association 
between references to others and 'bad news' in the form of earnings decreases (PEl = 
0) does not persists when firm size is interacted with • goodlbad ne\\"s·. This means 
that the average score for reference to others (after controlling for firm size) does not 
significantly differ between companies reporting 'good news' and those reporting 
'bad news'. 
'17-
- ) 
I 
I 
Overall, there is no strong indication of any association between dissimulation in the 
fonn of references to others and firm size and 'good/bad news'. This can be either 
attributed to (1) the computerised content analysis adopted for the analysis of 
chairman's reports not adequately capturing references to competitors by means of the 
specified keywords (the industry, the sector, competitors) or (2) references to others 
not being a linguistic marker in chairman's reports. 
The second explanation is in line with Newman et al.'s (2003: 666) original 
methodology regarding the linguistic indictors of dissimulation which includes se1f-
reference, but not references to others. 
6.3.2.4 Emotion words 
The fourth marker of self-presentational dissimulation is the use of emotion words 
which are interpreted as a sign of the discomfort experienced by indi\'iduals engaged 
in self-presentational dissimulation (Newman et al. 2003). 
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The use of emotion words as a linguistic marker of self-presentational dissimulation is 
tested on two levels of decomposition, namely (1) use of all emotion words and (2) a 
decomposition of emotion words into (i) positive emotion words and (ii) negative 
emotion words. The aim is to detennine whether self-presentational dissimulation in 
chainnan's reports is driven by the use of emotion words in general as found by 
Burgoon et al. (2003) and Zhou et al. (2004) or specifically by negative emotion 
words as predicted by Newman et al. (2003) and Vrij (2000). If the latter is the case, 
we want to determine whether negative emotion words in general or a specific type of 
emotion words is used in dissimulative chairman's reports. 
First, we investigate whether the use of emotion words varies systematically across 
the finns in the sample as far as firm size is concerned. As Table 6.45 indicates, there 
is no statistically significant association between the use of emotion words and finn 
. Slze. 
Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Table 6.45: Regression of emotion words on firm size 
Coef 
3.866 
0.071 
S.E. 
0.241 
0.055 
t-stat p-value 
16.02 <0.000 
1.28 0.202 
Secondly, we test for the likelihood of differences in the use of emotion words, 
dependent on the good or bad news being reported in the financial statements. Table 
6.46 shows that the direction of association between the use of emotion words and 
'goodlbad news' is not consistent across all four measures. There is weak (p = 0.07) 
direct association between the use of emotion words and "bad news' in the fonn of 
relative negative long-tenn finn growth (RG = 0) which suggests that the chainnan's 
reports of firms reporting 'bad news' in the fonn of relative negative long-tenn finn 
growth (RG = 0) contain more emotion words than those of finns reporting · good 
news' in the form of relative positive long-term firm growth (RG = 1). However. due 
to the inconsistency of the direction of association across all four measures of 
'gOOd/bad news' and a statistical significance at the ten percent level. the result is 
Weak. 
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Table 6.46: ANOVA results for emotion words (main effects) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
SS MS F t-stat p-value Mean SO 
PE 0 2.950 2.950 2.32 1.52 0.131 3.937 1.03~ 
4.295 1.193 
0.3580 3.9366 
PEl 0 2.720 2.720 2.14 1.46 0.147 3.931 0.995 
4.279 1.211 
0.3480 3.9313 
RSI 0 0.530 0.530 0.41 -0.64 0.522 4.233 1.061 
1 4.077 1.185 
-0.1560 4.2325 
RG 0 4.210 4.210 3.35 -1.83 0.07* 4.417 1.164 
3.976 1.096 
-0.4410 4.4r4 
Finally, we assess whether the association that seems to exist between emotion words 
and 'good/bad news' is consistent across firms of different sizes. Table 6.47 shows 
that the direct association between use of emotion words and 'bad news' in the fonn 
of relative negative long-term firm growth (RG = 0) does not persist when finn size is 
interacted with 'good/bad news'. However, when firm size is interacted with 
'good/bad news', the use of emotion words is directly associated with 'good news' in 
the fonn of positive earnings (PE = 1). This effect is only significant at the ten percent 
level (p = 0.055). 
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Since the direct association between use of emotion words and 'bad news' in the form 
of relative negative long-term firm growth (RG = 0) is weak (p = 0.07) and does not 
persist when firm size is interacted with . goodlbad news' and the direct association 
between the use of emotion words and 'good news' in the form of positive earnings 
(PE = 1) is only weakly significant when firm size is interacted with 'goodlbad 
news', it can be concluded that the use of emotion words in general is not a linguistic 
marker of self-presentational dissimulation in chairman's reports. Therefore, the next 
step is to decompose emotion words into positive and negative emotion words and to 
test separately for the association between positive and negative emotion words and 
'goodlbad news' and firm size. 
Positive emotion words 
Positive emotion words in the context of chairman's reports include words such as 
exciting and H'in. First, we test the association between the use of positin? emotion 
words and firm size. Table 6.48 shows that the use of positi\'e emotion words 
increases with fiml size. This effect is significant at the fi\'e percent len?l (p = 0.040). 
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r Table 6.48: Regression of positive emotion words on firm size 
Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Coef 
2.887 
0.112 
S.E. 
0.234 
0.053 
t-stat p-value 
12.340 <0.000 
2.090 0.040** 
Secondly, we test whether the use of positive emotion words differs in regard to good 
and bad news. Table 6.49 indicates that the use of positive emotion words is directly 
associated with 'good news'. However, this is only statistically significant in the case 
of 'good news' about financials, i.e. positive earnings (PE = 1) and positi\'e earnings 
increases (PEl = 1), the estimates being significant at the one percent level (p = 0.000 
and p = 0.002). This means that the chairman's reports of firms reporting profits and 
earnings increases contain more positive emotion words than those of firms reporting 
losses and earnings decreases. 
Table 6.49: ANOV A results for positive emotion words (main effects) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
SS MS F t-stat p-value Mean SO 
PE 0 14.980 14.980 13.67 3.70 0.000*** 2.862 0.939 
1 3.670 1.124 
0.808 0.2/9 
PEl 0 11.780 11.780 10.41 3.23 0.002*** 2.886 0.886 
3.609 1.170 
0. 723 O~2.j 
RSI 0 2.010 2.010 1.62 1.27 0.206 3.129 1.059 
3.431 1.145 
0.302 0.23-
RG 0 0.390 0.390 0.31 0.56 0.577 3.228 1.110 
3.363 1.127 
0.135 0.2-11 
Finally, we interact 'goodlbad news' with firm size in order to test whether the 
association that seems to exist between the use of positi\'e emotion words anJ 
'goodlbad news' is consistent across firms of different sizes. Table 6.50 indicates that 
the use of positive emotion words increases significantly \\'ith both 'good news' and 
timl size. For example, when the estimates account for an interaction between 'good 
news' and size, the use of posith'e emotion words increases by 75 percent when a 
fi .... h ak' . . to 'WI'olmt there i~ an Inn reports an earnlOgs lOcrease (l.e. WIt out t 109 slze III u...... , 
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incremental change of 0.8218 in average scores from 2.4378 to 3.2596). The 
estimated association is that an increase of one unit of (log) size results in a positi\e 
emotion score that is 0.1218 greater. 
Thus, the direct association between the use of positive emotion words and . good 
news' in the form of positive earnings (PE = 1) and positive earnings increases (PEl = 
1), which is observed when estimated as a main effect (see Table 6.49), persists when 
'goodlbad news' is interacted with firm size (see Table 6.50), the estimates being 
significant at the five percent (p = 0.037) and at the ten percent level (p = 0.074). 
What is more, the direct association between the use of positive emotion words and 
firm size which is observed as a main effect in table 6.49, also persists with finns 
reporting earnings increases (PEl = 1), relative sales increases (RSI = 1), and relative 
positive long-term firm growth (RG = 1), when 'goodlbad news' is interacted \\'ith 
firm size (see Table 6.50). This effect is significant at the five percent level (p = 
0.047; P = 0.045; p = 0.047) and indicates that large firms use more positive emotion 
words than small firms. 
Table 6.50: GLM results for positive emotion words (interactions with firm size) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
Tenn Coef StDev t-stat p-value PE=O PE = 1 
Constant 3.133 0.242 12.96 0.000*** 2.6215 3.6439 Mean effect 
PE 
-0.511 0.242 -2.11 0.037** 
SIZE 0.044 0.056 0.79 0.430 0.0823 0.0058 Size effect 
SIZE*PE 0.038 0.056 0.69 0.493 
PEl = 0 PEl = I 
Constant 2.849 0.227 12.55 0.000*** 2.4378 3.2596 Mean effect 
PEl 
-0.411 0.227 -1.81 0.074* 
SIZE 0.105 0.052 2.01 0.047** 0.1218 0.0890 Size effect 
SIZE*PEI 0.016 0.052 0.31 0.755 
RSI = 0 RSI = 1 
Constant 2.855 0.240 11. 91 0.000*** 2.7017 3.0073 Mean effect 
RSI 
-0.153 0.240 -0.64 0.525 
SIZE 0.111 0.055 2.03 0.045** 0.1122 0.1103 Size effect 
SIZE*RSI 0.001 0.055 0.02 0.986 
RG=O RG = 1 
Constant 2.835 0.257 11.04 0.000*** 2.6849 2.9853 \1ean effect 
RG 
-0.150 0.257 -0.59 0.560 
SIZE 0.121 0.060 2.02 0.047** 0.1451 0.0975 Sill' efkct 
L SIZE*RG 0.024 0.060 0.40 0.694 
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In summary, chairman's reports of large firms contain more positive emotion words 
than those of small firms. What is more, chairman' s reports of firms reporting . good 
news' about financials, i.e. firms reporting profits and profit increases, also contain 
more positive emotion words than those of firms reporting 'bad news' about 
financials, i.e. firms reporting losses and profit decreases. This is in contradiction to 
the hypotheses that large firms and firms reporting 'good news' use less dissimulation 
(in the form of less positive emotion words) since they have less incentives to engage 
in impression management than small firms and firms reporting 'bad news' . 
Negative emotion words 
Negative emotion words in the context of chairman's reports include words such as 
disappointing and loss. First, we test the association between the use of negative 
emotion words and firm size. Table 6.51 indicates that negative emotion words and 
firm size are inversely related, however this is not statistically significant. 
Table 6.51: Regression of negative emotion words on firm size 
Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Coef 
0.961 
-0.027 
S.E. 
0.122 
0.028 
t-stat p-value 
7.88 <0.000 
-0.98 0.331 
Secondly, we examine the likelihood of differences in the use of negative emotion 
words in the chairman's report, depending on the good or bad news conveyed by the 
financial statements. Table 6.52 shows a consistent positive association between 
negative emotion words and all four measures of 'bad news'. which is significant at 
the one percent level (p = 0.000). This means that firms reporting 'bad news' about 
both financials and fundamentals use more negative emotion words than firms 
reporting' good news'. 
Table 6.52: ANOV A results for negative emotion wo d ( . a r s maID e eets) 
Bad news = 0 good news = 1 
SS MS F t P Mean SO 
PE 0 4.404 4.404 15.620 -3.95 0.000*** 1.102 0.63~ 
0.664 0.-B6 
0.-138 0.111 
PEl 0 3.275 3.275 11.120 -3.33 0.001*** 1.083 0.644 
1 0.701 0.460 
0.382 0.11-1 
RSI 0 4.041 4.041 14.130 -3.76 0.000*** 1.119 0.644 
0.691 0,454 
O.-IlS 0.11-1 
RG 0 6.528 6.528 25.230 -5.02 0.000*** 1.206 0.685 
0.656 0.373 
0.550 0.110 
Finally, we assess the consistency of association that may appear between the use of 
negative emotion words and 'goodlbad news' across firms of different sizes by means 
of interacting 'good/bad news' with firm size. Table 6.53 shows that the direct 
association between the use of negative emotion words and 'bad news' \\hich \\as 
observed as a main effect (see Table 6.52), only persists in the case of negatin~ 
relative long-term firm growth (RG = 0). 
Although the use of negative emotion words in chairman's reports also seems to 
decrease with firm size, this is not to a significant extent when estimated as a main 
effect (see Table 6.51). However, when a loss (PE = 0) is reported by larger firms, the 
change in negative emotion words is positive and significant (see Table 6.53). The PE 
- SIZE slope differentiator is 0.066. This implies that the use of negative emotion 
words increases more (0.0724 as opposed to -0.0580) \\'ith firm size when there is a 
loss (PE = 0), than when there is a profit (PE = 1). This effect is significant at the fin: 
percent level (p = 0.018). This means that large firms reporting losses publish 
chairman's reports containing significantly more negative emotion words than Ltrt;c 
firms reporting profits. 
l 
Table 6.53: GLM results for negative emotion words (interactio 'th fi . ns WI Irm size) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
Tenn Coef StDev t-stat P-value PE-O PE= 1 
Constant 0.906 0.120 7.59 0.000*** 
PE -0.021 0.120 -0.17 0.862 0.8854 0.9270 Mean effect 
SIZE 0.008 0.027 0.29 0.770 
SIZE*PE 0.066 0.027 2.41 0.018** 0.0742 
-0.0580 Size effect 
PEl = 0 PEl = 1 
Constant 0.954 0.117 8.16 0.000*** 
PEl 0.057 0.117 0.49 0.625 1.01 13 0.8965 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.015 0.027 -0.56 0.575 
SIZE*PEI 0.035 0.027 1.28 0.203 0.0194 -0.0498 Size effect 
RSI = 0 RSI = 1 
Constant 0.992 0.117 8.48 0.000*** 
RSI 0.145 0.117 1.24 0.217 1.1375 0.8469 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.023 0.027 -0.85 0.399 
SIZE*RSI 0.018 0.027 0.67 0.506 
-0.0048 -0.0405 Size effect 
RG=O RG = 1 
Constant 1.014 0.119 8.54 0.000*** 
RG 0.257 0.119 2.17 0.033** 
1.2708 0.7564 Mean effect 
SIZE -0.022 0.028 -0.78 0.438 
SIZE*RG 0.004 0.028 0.16 0.877 
-0.0173 -0.0260 Size effect 
In summary, as predicted by hypothesis H2b (obfuscation hypothesis), the chairman's 
reports of companies reporting 'bad news' contain more negative emotion words than 
those of companies reporting 'good news'. What is more, the chairman's reports of 
large firms reporting losses use more negative emotion words than those of large 
finns reporting profits. We can thus state that self-presentational dissimulation in 
chairman's reports is driven by the use of negati ve emotion words and not by the use 
of emotion words in general. This confirms Newman et a1. 's (2003) and Vrij's (2000) 
findings. 
A comparison of results regarding the use of positive emotion words and negative 
emotion words shows that their direction of association with 'goodlbad news' is 
diametrically opposed. Whereas the use of positive emotion words is in\'\~rs~ly 
associated with 'bad news', the use of negative emotion words is directly associated 
with 'bad news'. This means that the chairman's reports of companies reporting 'bad 
news' in their financial statements are more likely to contain less positive emotil)n 
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words and more negative emotion words than those of companies reporting 'good 
news'. This pattern of association is not as hypothesized (H2b) and thus suggests that 
positive and negative emotion words are not linguistic markers of self-presentational 
dissimulation. 
However, the observed pattern of word use pattern also does not fit with the Pollyanna 
principle, which provides an alternative explanation regarding the use of words with 
positive and negative connotations. It describes an impression management strategy 
based on the attempt of firms to present themselves in the best possible light which 
manifests itself in the predominant use of positive words, regardless of their financial 
performance. However, results regarding the Pollyanna principle are mixed. 
Hildebrandt and Snyder (1981) find no difference between the use of words with 
positive connotations between profitable and unprofitable companies. Rutherford 
(2005) finds no difference between the use of 'charged words', i.e. words carrying 
positive or negative connotations, between profitable and unprofitable companies. 
However, he finds that loss-making firms use more negatively charged words. By 
contrast, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) find that both profitable and unprofitable 
companies emphasize 'good news' by means of words with positive connotations. 
The assumptions underlying the Pollyanna principle are in contrast with impression 
management research by means of thematic manipulation. Abrahamson and Park 
(1994) and Abrahamson and Amir (1996) find words with negative connotations to be 
associated with poor performance. Smith and Taffler (2000) find positive keywords to 
be associated with 'good news' and negative keywords to be associated with 'bad 
news'. The observed direct association between the use of positive emotion words 
and 'good news' and negative emotion words and 'bad news' in this study thus 
confirm insights from thematic manipulation studies that .. the unaudited managerial 
disclosures provided in the chairman's statement contain important in/ormation 
associated lI'ilh the firm's future financial state" (Smith and Taffler 2000: 639). The 
observed pattern of associations thus confirms Abrahamson and Amir's (1996: 1159) 
conclusion that management does not use narratiYe corporate report sections "to 
reduce the (:fleet of bad news or to smooth the effect of good nell'S" (1159). In other 
Words, results indicate that the chairman's report is used by management . to tell it as 
it is'. 
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6.3.2.5 Cognitive Complexity 
The final marker of self-presentational dissimulation is cognitiye comple:-.;ity. 
Newman et al. (2003: 666) point out that ""the process of creating a false story should 
consume cognitive resources [which should result in individuals engaged in self-
representational dissimulation] to tell less complex stories." 
First, we investigate whether cognitive complexity varies systematically across finns 
in the sample regarding their size, irrespective or whether they are reporting good or 
bad news. Table 6.54 indicates that there is a direct association between cognitive 
complexity and firm size; however this is not statistically significant. 
Table 6.54: Regression of Cognitive Complexity on firm size 
Predictor 
Constant 
SIZE 
Coef 
4.963 
0.023 
S.E. 
0.209 
0.048 
t-stat p-value 
23.78 <0.000 
0.48 0.631 
Secondly, we investigate the likeliness of differences in cognitive comple:-.;ity, 
depending on the financial statements containing good or bad news about the financial 
performance of the company. Table 6.55 indicates that (apart from "good/bad news in 
the form of profits/losses) cognitive complexity is inversely related to "bad news'. 
However, this is only statistically significant (five percent level, p = 0.041) in the case 
of 'bad news' in the form of sales decreases relative to the sector (RSI = 0). This 
means that the chairman's reports of companies reporting 'bad news' in the form of 
relative negative sales growth are less cognitively complex than those of companies 
reporting" good news' in the form of relative positive sales growth. This is in line with 
hypothesis H~b. 
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Table 6.55: ANOV A results for Cognitive Complexity (main effects) 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 
SS MS F t-stat p-value Mean SO 
PE 0 0.092 0.092 0.10 
-0.31 0.758 5.0866 1.0670 
5.0233 1.9041 
0.0633 0.:044 
PEl 0 0.057 0.057 0.06 0.24 0.807 5.0213 0.9865 
5.0718 0.9742 
0.0505 0.2066 
RS1 0 3.922 3.922 4.28 2.07 0.041 ** 4.7928 1.1178 
5.2144 0.8415 
O. 4~ 16 0:038 
RG 0 0.254 0.254 0.27 0.52 0.608 4.9824 0.975 
5.0908 0.9799 
0.1084 0.2106 
Finally, we interact 'good/bad news' with firm size in order to assess whether the 
association that seems to exist between cognitive complexity and . goodlbad news' is 
consistent across firms of different sizes. Although the cognitive complexity of 
chainnan's reports seems to increase with firm size, this is not to a significant extent 
when estimated as a main effect (see Table 6.54). However. when a relative sales 
increase (RSI = 1) is reported by larger firms, the change in cognitive complexity is 
negative and highly significant (see Table 6.56). The RSI - SIZE slope ditTerentiator 
is 0.122. This implies that cognitive complexity decreases less (0.1696 as opposed to -
0.0740) with firm size when there is a relative sales decrease (RSI = 0). than when 
there is a relative sales increase (RSI = 1). This means that large firms reporting 
relative sales increases publish significantly more cognitively complex chairman' s 
reports than large firms reporting relative sales decreases. What is more, the same 
pattern is also observed regardless of firm size, i.e. firms reporting relatin~ sales 
increases publish more cognitively complex chairman' s reports than firms reporting 
relati\'e sales decreases. 
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Table 6.56: GLM results for cognitive complexity (interactions with firm size 
Bad news = 0 Good news = 1 ) 
Tenn Coef StDev t-stat p-value PE-O PE= 1 
Constant 4.926 0.227 21.69 0.000*** 
PE 0.076 0.227 0.34 0.738 5.0018 4.8492 Mean effect 
SIZE 0.034 0.052 0.65 0.520 
SIZE*PE -0.005 0.052 -0.09 0.929 0.0291 0.0384 Size effect 
PEl =0 PEl = 1 
Constant 4.956 0.2l3 23.22 0.000*** 
PEl -0.057 0.2l3 -0.27 0.789 4.8982 5.0130 Mean effect 
SIZE 0.024 0.049 0.49 0.624 
SIZE*PEI 0.009 0.049 0.19 0.851 0.0335 0.0150 Size effect 
RSI=O RSI = 1 
Constant 4.823 0.203 23.75 0.000*** 
RSI -0.675 0.203 -3.33 0.001 *** 4.1479 5.4987 Mean effect 
SIZE 0.048 0.046 1.03 0.306 
SIZE*RSI 0.122 0.046 2.62 0.010*** 0.1696 -0.0740 Size effect 
RG=O RG= 1 
Constant 4.847 0.227 21.32 0.000*** 
RG -0.298 0.227 -1.31 0.193 
4.5484 5.1446 Mean effect 
SIZE 0.051 0.053 0.96 0.341 0.1159 
SIZE*RG 0.065 0.053 1.22 0.226 
-0.0139 Size effect 
In summary, the chairman's reports of firms with sales growing more quickly than the 
sector (RSI = 1) contain more cognitive complexity than those with sales growing 
more slowly than the sector (RSI = 0). This is in line with the hypothesis that 
dissimulation in the form of less cognitively complex sentence structure, indicated by 
the use of conjunctions, such as although, since, despite, and because, is associated 
with 'bad news' 
However, the chairman's reports of large firms with sales growing faster than the 
sector contain less cognitive complexity. This is in contradiction to the hypothesis that 
large finns use less dissimulation (in the form of high cognitive complexity) due to 
increased political costs. 
6.3.2.61ndustry-specijic results 
Results for association tests between linguistic markers of self-presentational 
dissimulation and 'good/bad news' and firm size for consumer cyclical. technical and 
industrial companies indicate that the individual industry sectors behave very 
Similarly to the full sample, with results from consumer cyclical and industrial 
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companieS mIrronng full sample results most closely (see Tables AS to A8 in 
Appendix I). This is consistent with hypothesis H2d which states that there is no 
difference in the strength and direction of association between the linguistic markers 
of self-presentational dissimulation in corporate report documents and accounting 
'goodlbad news' and firm size in the consumer cyclical, industrial and technical 
sectors. 
6.3.2.7 Summary 
One branch of impression management research is based on the assumption that finns 
reporting 'bad news' are more likely to engage in the obfuscation of negative 
organisational outcomes than firms reporting 'good news' . We examine the 
obfuscation of negative organisational outcomes in the form of self-presentational 
dissimulation which manifests itself in unconscious verbal cues identified by 
psychology research as differentiating true from false stories (see chapter three. 
section 3.4.1). We hypothesized (H2a) that impression management in the fonn of 
self-presentational dissimulation is characterised by the following linguistic markers. 
namely (1) a low word count, (2) few self-references, (3) few references to others, (4) 
a high number of emotion words, especially negative emotion words, and (5) 10\\' 
cognitive complexity. This means that the chairman's reports of companies reporting 
'bad news' in the financial statements would contain (1) a lower word count, (2) 
fewer self-references, (3) fewer references to others, (4) more emotion words, 
especially negative emotion words, and (5) less cognitive complexity than those of 
companies reporting 'good news' in the financial statements (hypothesis H2b). We 
further hypothesized (H2c) that the chairman's reports of small companies contain (1) 
a lower word count, (2) fewer self-references, (3) fewer references to others, (4) more 
emotion words, especially negative emotion words, and (5) less cognitive complexity 
than those of large companies. Finally, we hypothesised (H2d) that there is no 
difference in the strength and direction of association between the linguistic markers 
and 'goodlbad news' and firm size of companies belonging to different industry 
classification. 
'J./c tind a significant association between three out of the five linguistic markcrs of 
self .. presentational dissimulation and 'bad news'. More specifically. we find sclf-
rdl'[enc~. positive emotion words, and cognitive complexity to be in\"crsely 
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associated with 'bad news' and negative emotion words to be dl'rectl\" as . d . h 
• SOC late \\It 
'bad news'. This is the case across firms of different sizes. \Vhereas self-reference. 
negative emotion words, cognitive complexity are associated with' goodlbad news' as 
predicted by hypothesis H2b (obfuscation hypothesis) and thus suggest that firms 
engage in impression management in the form of self-presentational dissimulation. the 
direction of association between positive emotion words and 'goodlbad news' is 
opposite to hypothesis H2b. 
A comparison of results regarding the use of positive emotion words and negative 
emotion words shows that their direction of association with 'goodlbad news' is 
diametrically opposed. Whereas the use of positive emotion words is inversely 
associated with 'bad news', the use of negative emotion words is directly associated 
with 'bad news'. This means that the chairman's reports of companies reporting 'bad 
news' in their financial statements are more likely to contain less positive emotion 
words and more negative emotion words than those of companies reporting 'good 
news'. This pattern of association is not as hypothesized (H2b) and thus suggests that 
positive and negative emotion words are not linguistic markers of self-presentational 
dissimulation. 
The fact that the use of positive emotion words is directly associated with 'good 
news' and the use of negative emotion words is directly associated with 'bad news' 
suggests that these two linguistic markers are not indicative of impression 
management in the form of self-presentational dissimulation, but constitute a different 
phenomenon observed in the impression management literature, namely that "the 
unaudited managerial disclosures provided in the chairman's statement contain 
important information associated with the firm's future financial stare" (Smith and 
Tamer 2000: 639). The observed direct association of positive emotion \vords with 
'good news' and of negative emotion words with 'bad news' confirms Abrahamson 
and Park's (1994), Abrahamson and Amir's (1996), and Smith and Taftler's (2()()O) 
findings that words with positive connotations are associated with good perfl)rJl1anCe 
and words with negative connotations with poor perfom1ance. 
This pattern of \yord use suggests that firms do not use their COrpl)ratc narrative 
documents for impression management purposes, but to . tell it as it is'. For this 
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reason, despite their association with 'goodlbad news' in the expected direction, self-
reference and cognitive complexity are not interpreted as linguistic markers of self-
presentational dissimulation, but as markers of different psychological processes. In 
fact, psychology research based on word use has found word categories, such as 
pronouns, emotion words, and cognitive words to be indicative of a variety 
psychological processes and types of behaviour. For example, studies on word use as 
an indicator of gender differences finds that first-person singular self-references can 
either be an expression of power or a sign of increased self-awareness and reflective 
ability (GIeser et al. 1959; Mulac et al. 2001; Mehl and Pennebaker 2003).91 This 
means that self-reference and cognitive complexity in chairman's reports do not 
necessarily have to be interpreted as linguistic markers of self-presentational 
dissimulation, but can be regarded as indicative of other psychological phenomena. 
Thus, the increased use of self-references in the case of 'good news' (about 
fundamentals) can be interpreted as a sign of the self-confidence experienced by 
companies reporting 'good news'. This interpretation also fits with our findings that 
self-reference is directly associated with firm size. Large companies report on their 
organisational outcomes from a position of power and self-confidence which 
manifests itself in a more frequent use of self-references in the chairman's statements 
than is the case with small companies. What is more, since the majority of self-
references are expressed in the first-person plural (we, us, our, ours, ourselves) which 
has been identified as a marker of institutional identity which is associated with the 
achievements of the company by linguistics research (VanDe Mieroop 2006), it is not 
surprising that companies reporting 'good news' focus on their achievements and thus 
use more self-references than companies reporting 'bad news'. 
91 Incidentally, in her discussion of qualitative content analysis Macnamara (2003: .17) list~ e.ight 
COmmonly used key textual elements including (1) pronoun use, (2) adjectives used In des~nptlOns 
U>?sitive and negative) which give strong indications of a speaker's/writer's attitud~ (e.g. It was a 
'disgusting' thing to do), (3) active or passive voice, (4) viewpoint of the narrator (I.e. first. person, 
second person third person etc) (5) tonal qualities such as aggressiveness, sarcasm, flippancy, 
. ' " d "1 d (8) context emotIonal language etc (6) visual imagery in text (7) use of metaphors an simi es use , . 
factors such as the ~osi;ion and credibility of spokespersons or sources quoted which affects mean~ng 
taken from the text (e.g. if one message is presented by a high profile expert it will generall?' outw~~gh 
a non-expert opinion). This is an indication that features, such as pronoun use and words With pOSltl\ ~ 
and n' . ,. 'fti d" a \'ariet\' of contexts for lhl: egat\ve connotatIOns are used 10 a varIety of dl erent stu les, an • ' 
analysis of a variety of different phenomena. 
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We also find cognitive complexity to be directly associated with 'good news' in the 
form of relative positive sales increase. This can be attributed to the fact that 
management (a) primarily focuses on good news and (b) that some types of d 
. goo 
news requires more complex explanation than others. Since good news about 
fundamentals (i.e. relative positive sales increase and relative positive long-term firm 
growth) is not immediately obvious from the financial statements, it requires more 
complex explanation than news about financials (i.e. profits and earnings increases). 
This, in tum, requires more complex language to explain, manifesting itself in more 
complex sentence structures requiring conjunctions. such as and, but, if. although, etc. 
This might be the reason why 'good news' concerning sales growing faster than those 
of the sector and not 'good news' regarding profits or earnings increases is directly 
associated with cognitive complexity. 
Further, we find self-reference and positive emotion words to be directly associated 
with firm size. This is the case even if firm size is interacted with 'good/bad news'. 
As discussed above, this association can be interpreted as an indication of their greater 
market dominance and associated greater self-confidence. This results in the use of 
more self-references and positive emotion words in the chairman's reports of large 
compared to those of small companies. 
Finally, results indicate that the association between self-referential dissimulation and 
'goodlbad news' and firm size of consumer cyclical, industrial and technical 
companies mirror those of the whole sample. This is in line with hypothesis H2d which 
states that there is no difference in the strength and direction of association between 
the linguistic markers and 'good/bad news' and firm size between the three sectors. 
6.4 Discussion of chapter results and conclusion 
This chapter has reported the findings of t\\"o manifestations of impression 
. . I' d ('1) self-presentational management, namely (1) readmg ease malllpu atlOn an _. -
dissimulation. Results suggest that companies ncith~r engag~ in impression 
. . I' " renderin p their COIT'\\r.Jlc 
management in the form of readmg ease manlpu atIOn, l.\.:. ~ 
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narrative documents difficult to read, nor in the form of self . 
-presentatIOnal 
dissimulation, i.e. presenting a public image of firm performance and prospects which 
is inconsistent with the way management may see firm performance and prospects. In 
fact, results suggest that the opposite might be the case, i.e. firms use their corporate 
narrative documents (1) to cater for the specific reading strategies of their target 
readers and (2) to provide an unbiased report of their financial performance and 
prospects. 
In our investigation of impression management by means of reading ease 
manipulation, we find direct associations between reading difficulty both in the fonn 
of long sentences and long words (Flesch Reading Ease) and in the form of lack of 
cohesion (MMAX2 and Coh-Metrix) and 'bad news'. However, when 'good/bad news' 
is interacted with firm size, this association disappears both in the case of 
conventional and cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty. We thus conclude 
that finn size is the major driver of reading difficulty. What is more, we find reading 
difficulty to be inversely associated with firm size in the case of the Flesch Reading 
Ease score and directly associated with firm size in the case of the four Coh-A/ctrix 
reading difficulty measures. Based on research in psychology regarding the different 
text processing strategies of high-knowledge and low-knowledge readers, we interpret 
this as a sign that large and small firms target their corporate narrative documents to 
different groups of readers. Large firms seem to cater more to professional investors 
who prefer cohesion gaps which help them process information by means of making 
inferences either from their previous knowledge or from previous textual infonnation, 
whereas small firms seem to cater more to individual investors who prefer highly 
cohesive texts which aid comprehension by providing links between different parts of 
the text. 
In our investigation of impression management by means of self-presentational 
diSSimulation, the observed associations between the linguistic markers and . good/bad 
news' and finn size suggest an alternative explanation to impression management. \\'e 
tind positive emotion words to be directly associated with 'good news' and negative 
emotion words to be directly associated with 'bad news'. This suggests that 
chairman's reports 'tell it as it is', or, as Abramamson and Amir (1996: 1159) put it. 
management does not seem to use narrative corporate report sections "IV reduce the 
'9"" .:. j 
effect of bad news or to smooth the effect of good news" (1159), i.e. for impression 
management purposes. 
This pattern of associations suggests that the linguistic markers are not indications of 
self-presentational dissimulation, but of other psychological processes. The finding 
that self-reference is both directly associated with 'good news' and firm size leads us 
to conclude that it can be interpreted as a sign of power and self-confidence. Thus, 
large firms and finns reporting 'good news' (in the form of profits and earnings 
increases) are more self-confident about their results than small firms and firms 
reporting 'bad news' (in the fonn of losses and earnings decreases). This self-
confidence manifests itself in the increased use of self-references. Further, we find 
cognitive complexity to be directly related to 'good news' (in the form of relative 
positive sales increases). In the light of previous explanations regarding observed 
associations, we interpret this association as a sign of the nature of the 'good news' 
being reported, i.e. more complex 'good news' (i.e. good news which is not 
immediately apparent from the financial statements) requires more complex sentence 
structures manifesting itself in an increased use of conjunctions, such as and, but, if, 
although, etc. 
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Chapter 7: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
OF RESEARCH 
This chapter summarizes the contributions of the current study to the understanding of 
impression management, presenting the objectives and findings of the research study 
in the context of previous research and suggesting appropriate avenues for future 
research. 
7.1 Objectives and summary of research 
This study constitutes an exploration of impression management in narrative 
corporate report sections. The aims are (i) to establish what constitutes impression 
management behaviour in a financial reporting context, (ii) to determine which 
circumstances are conducive to managerial impression management behaviour, and 
(iii) to examine chairman's reports for evidence of impression management. 
Impression management may be regarded as the introduction of cognitive and 
emotional bias into publicly issued statements in order to influence perceptions of 
finn performance and prospects. Impression management in corporate narrative 
documents thus entails bias and selectivity in the disclosure and presentation of 
information, and can be differentiated from executive hyperbole, ego-centrism and 
self-deception (i.e. managerial optimism, or hubris).92 
In the context of this thesis, impression management is studied in the form of the 
obfuscation of negative organisational outcomes, specifically in the form of (1) 
reading ease manipulation, i.e. rendering narrative corporate report sections more 
difficult to read when the news is bad and (2) self-presentational dissimulation, i.c. 
Q~ In behavioural finance, impression management is viewed as the attempt by rational mana~ers to 
exploit irrational investor behaviour, which involves deliberate manipulation of investor perceptIOns of 
finn performance. This thesis does not include an assessment of investor behaviour. and is concerned 
with the nature of the evidence for impression management within corporate report narrati\es. 
portraying a public image that is inconsistent with the way in which insiders may see 
the firm. 
For this purpose, three new measurement techniques based on research in linguistics 
and psychology are employed, namely the exploration of reading ease manipulation 
by means of both annotation-based (cohesive ties, cohesion density and proportion of 
given vs. new information) and computer-generated (adjacent argument overlap, 
argument overlap, adjacent stem overlap, and stem overlap) cohesion-based measures 
of reading difficulty and the investigation of self-presentational dissimulation by 
means of five linguistic markers (word count, self-reference, reference to others, use 
of emotion words, and cognitive complexity). 
With regard to the new cohesion-based methods to measunng reading difficulty 
introduced in this study, these have not been employed previously in accounting 
research, and they address the validity concerns inherent in conventional approaches. 
The measurement of self-presentational dissimulation by means of linguistic markers 
also constitutes a new approach to measuring impression management. It is based on 
the linguistic characteristics individuals display when they attempt to present 
themselves in a way which is inconsistent with their self-image. In a corporate 
reporting context, such self-presentational dissimulation would entail presenting an 
image of the firm to outsiders that is inconsistent with the way management may see 
the firm and its performance. 
The investigation of impression management both by means of reading ease 
manipulation and by means of self-presentational dissimulation involves testing the 
obfuscation hypothesis which states that firms reporting negative organisational 
outcomes ('bad news') are more likely to engage in impression management than 
those reporting positive organisational outcomes ('good news'). Thus, the use of 
impression management is hypothesised to be directly related to 'bad news'. Further, 
it is hypothesized that firm size also plays a role in the use of impression 
management. Due to the political costs associated with positiye reporting bias, large 
firms are hypothesized to be less likely to engage in impression management than 
small firms. Industry membership is hypothesized to haye no bearing on the use of 
Impression management. 
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The study confirms that the chairman's reports of UK listed companies are in general 
difficult to read, which is consistent with prior research. However. there is little 
evidence for reading ease manipulation. None of the state-of-the-art indices 
considered here differs significantly between 'bad news' and 'good news' firms. 
Using both annotation-based and computer-generated measures to capture different 
aspects of reading difficulty, the invariable outcome is that, as a general rule, 
companies do not appear to obfuscate negative organisational outcomes by rendering 
their chairman's report more difficult to read. 
Although reading difficulty initially seems to be directly related to 'bad news', this 
association is not consistent when 'good/bad news' is interacted with firm size. This 
pattern is observed both with conventional readability scores and cohesion-based 
reading difficulty measures. 
On the other hand, firm size is found to have an impact on reading difficulty. This 
association persists in the case of conventional (Flesch Reading Ease score) and 
cohesion-based (Coh-Metrix) measures of reading difficulty when firm size is 
interacted with 'goodlbad news'. However, the association is in opposite directions. 
The Flesch Reading Ease score is found to be directly associated with firm size, 
whereas cohesion-based measures are inversely related to firm size. We interpret 
these contradictory results as an indication that firms do not obfuscate negative 
organisational outcomes by means of rendering their corporate narrative sections 
difficult to read. In fact, results seem to suggest that the opposite is the case, namely 
finns seem to tailor their corporate narrative documents to the reading strategies of 
their target readership groups. Large firms seem to cater more to the needs of high-
knowledge readers, i.e. professional investors or readers who are already familiar with 
the information contained in the chairman's statement. who prefer low cohesion texts. 
whereas small firms seem to cater more to the needs of low-kno\\'ledge readers. i.e. 
individual investors or readers who are largely unfamiliar with the information 
contained in the chairman's statement, who prefer high cohesion texts. 
'].97 
With regard to self-presentational dissimulation, the evidence suggests significant 
associations between firm performance, firm size and linguistic markers, notably self-
reference and cognitive complexity. Self-reference is significantly higher \\"hen 
profitability increases, and both self-reference and cognitive complexity are greater to 
a significant extent when there is good news about the sales and gro\\th drivers of 
profitability. Whilst the use of emotion words appears to be unconnected in general 
with performance outcomes, when we discriminate between positive and negative 
emotion words, these are significantly associated with good and bad news 
respectively, as may be expected. These mixed results lead us to conclude not that 
linguistic markers are indicative of impression management by means of self-
presentational dissimulation, but that other processes relating to the nature of firm 
operations may be attributable. These results and inferences are discussed in greater 
detail below. 
7.2 Summary of results and comparison with previous research 
findings 
7.2.1 Reading ease manipulation 
We examine whether companies engage in reading ease manipulation, i.e. whether 
management uses corporate narrative documents to obfuscate negative organisational 
outcomes by means of rendering them difficult to read. For this purpose. we test the 
association of seven new cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty - three of 
which are annotation-based (cohesion density, amount of cohesive ties. and 
proportion of given vs. new information) and four of which computer-generated 
(adjacent argument overlap, argument overlap, adjacent stem overlap. and stem 
overlap) - and 'good/bad news' and firm size. We further test whether there is any 
difference in the strength and direction of association according to industry 
classification. 
7.2.1.1 Reading difficulty measures 
Both annotation-based (A/MAX2) and computer-generated (Coh-.\/i.!lrix) measures of 
reading difficulty are found to be distinct from conventional reading difficulty 
198 
measures, such as the Flesch Reading Ease score and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade 
Level. This means that they measure different concepts of reading difficulty and can 
thus be used as alternative research tools in future reading ease manipUlation studies. 
What is more, annotation-based and computer-generated measures of reading 
difficulty are also found to constitute separate measures of reading difficulty, which 
suggests that they measure different aspects of reading difficulty and cannot be used 
as substitutes for one another. 
7.2.1.2 Association between reading difficulty and 'goodlbad news', firm size, and 
industry classification 
Although we find reading difficulty measured by means of conventional readability 
scores (Flesch Reading Ease) and by means of five out of the seven cohesion-based 
measures to be directly associated with 'bad news', this association is not consistent 
across firms of different sizes. For this reason, results do not provide evidence that 
finns obfuscate negative organisational outcomes by means of reading ease 
manipulation. This result confirms the findings of Courtis (1986, 1995, 1998), Jones 
(1988); Subramanian et al. (1993), Clatworthy and Jones (2001), Sydserff and 
Weetman (2002), and Rutherford (2003) who find no association between reading 
difficulty and firm performance. This is in contrast to Adelberg (1979), Baker and 
Kare (1992), Smith and Taffler (1992a, 1992b), and Courtis (2004a) who observe a 
direct association between reading difficulty and negative firm performance. 
However, none of these studies test for interaction effects between firm performance 
and firm size. This means that the association they observe might be driven by firm 
. 
size. 
However, we observe a significant inverse association between the Flesch Reading 
Ease score and firm size and a significant direct association between two measures of 
reading difficulty (argument overlap and stem overlap) and firm size which both 
persist when firm size is interacted with . goodlbad news'. The direct association 
between the cohesion-based measures and firm size is in the opposite direction than 
hypothesised. It suggests that the chairman's reports of large companies are less 
cohesive (and thus more difficult to read) than those of small companies. This is in 
line with Jones (1988) and in contrast to Baker and Kare (1992) \\'ho tind an inverse 
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association between reading difficulty and firm size and Courtis (1995. 2004a) and 
Rutherford (2003) who find no association. 
In isolation, this direct association between the cohesion-based measures of readina 
c 
difficulty and firm size could be interpreted in line with (Jones 1988: Rutherford 
2003) as a function of the complexity of operations of large companies resulting in 
more complex narratives. However, in combination with the findings regarding the 
inverse association between reading difficulty measured in terms of the Flesch 
Reading Ease score and firm size, we interpret the results in the context of research in 
psychology on the different reading strategies of high-knowledge and low-knowledge 
readers. Whereas the former find low cohesion texts easier to read than hioh cohesion c 
text, the opposite is true for low-knowledge readers. In the context of corporate 
reporting this can be interpreted as an indication that firms might tailor their corporate 
narrative documents to their target readers, i.e. large firms seem to cater to the needs 
of high-knowledge readers, such as professional investors, whereas small firms seem 
to cater to the needs of low-knowledge readers, such as individual investors. What is 
more, there is more information publicly available for large companies than for small 
companies prior to the publication of the annual report. This means that the readership 
of the chairman's reports of large firms is more familiar with the information content 
of the chairman's report and thus finds low-cohesion texts easier to read, whereas the 
opposite is the case for the readership of the chairman's reports of small firms who 
thus find high-cohesion texts easier to read. 
Findings thus suggest that firms do not obfuscate negative organisational outcomes by 
rendering corporate narrative documents difficult to read, but seem to indicate that the 
opposite might be the case, i.e. firms seem to tailor their corporate narrative sections 
to the specific needs of their target readerships. 
We also find that both annotation-based (J\1ALiX2) and computer-generated (Coh-
.\/etrix) measures of reading difficulty of consumer cyclical, technology, and 
industrial companies show very similar associations with . good 'bad news' and tirm 
size to the whole san1ple. This indicates that industry classification does not make a 
difference to the impression management behaviour of companies. Thi~ is in line with 
Courtis (1995) who finds no association between reading difficulty and industry. 
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The mixed results of prevIOUS studies regarding the obfuscation of negatiye 
organisational outcomes by means of reading ease manipUlation can be attributed to 
various factors, namely (1) the different measures of reading difficulty and the 
predominantly short-term and firm-specific measures of positive and negative finn 
perfonnance used by researchers, (2) the different corporate narrati\'es examined for 
evidence of reading difficulty, (3) the different countries of origin of the companies 
studied, and (4) a mixture of these factors. However, an alternative explanation for the 
contradictory findings of previous studies might be that none of the studies which find 
a significant association between reading difficulty and 'goodlbad news' or finn size 
check whether these associations remain constant across firms across various sizes by 
means of interacting 'good/bad news' and finn size. 
The conclusion we come to after examining the association between reading difficulty 
and 'goodlbad news' and firm size using seven measures of reading difficulty and 
four measures of 'good/bad news' and subsequently testing whether any observed 
associations between variables remain after interacting 'goodlbad news' and finn size 
is that the results do not support the obfuscation hypothesis. What is more, these 
results are consistent across three industry sectors. This suggests that companies do 
not obfuscate negative organisational outcomes by means of rendering their corporate 
narrative documents difficult to read. In fact, results suggest that the opposite might 
be the case, i.e. firms seem to tailor their corporate narrative documents to the 
particular reading strategies of their target readerships. 
7.2.2 Self-presentational dissimulation 
We examine whether companies engage III self-presentational dissimulation. i.e. 
whether they use their corporate narrative documents to create a public image of finn 
performance and prospects which is inconsistent with how management may see firm 
performance and prospects. For this purpose, we test the association between five 
linguistic markers (word count, self-reference, reference to others. emotion words. 
and cognitiye complexity) and 'goodlbad news' and firm size. We further test \\hether 
there is any difference in the strength and direction of association according to 
industry classification. 
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7.2.2.1 Linguistic markers 
The analysis of linguistic markers shows chairman's reports to be characterised by a 
comparatively high use of self-references as compared with references to others 
(competitors). In fact, they contain, on average, fifteen times as many references to 
themselves than to competitors, which can be interpreted as a sign that firms do not 
tend to use competitors for benchmarking performance in their narratiYe corporate 
93 
reports. 
Chairman's reports also contain, on average, four times as many positive emotion 
words compared with negative emotion words. This indicates that firms have a 
tendency to introduce positive bias into narrative reporting. What is more, compared 
with non-business genres, chairman's reports show the highest use of positive 
emotion words and the second lowest on the use of negative emotion words. This 
suggests that the primary purpose of chairman's reports is to adopt an 'up-beat' 
message about the company. 
7.2.2.2 Association between linguistic markers and 'goodlbad news', firm size, and 
industry classification 
We find self-reference, positive emotion words, and cognitive complexity to be 
inversely associated with 'bad news' and negative emotion words to be directly 
associated with 'bad news'. We further find self-reference and positive emotion words 
to be directly associated with firm size. These associations are consistent when 
'goodlbad news' is interacted with firm size. Apart from the association between 
positive emotion words and 'bad news', all associations are in the expected directions. 
What is more, we find the strength and direction of associations not to vary 
considerably between industry sectors. 
Results for impression management in the form of self-presentational dissimulation 
are more difficult to compare with those of previous studies because impression 
management has not been studied in this form before in a corporate reporting context. 
93 In this context, it is interesting to note that the use of impression manage~ent is found. to be.,direc.tly 
related with 'bad news' measures based on the finn perfonnance of competitors (see section 7._.2), I.e. 
negative relative sales growth (RSI = 0) and long-tenn negative relathe finn gro\\th (RG = 0). T.his 
suggests that finns obfuscate negative organisational outcomes since they do not want to draw attention 
to the fact that they are perfonning worse than their competitors. 
"'0'1 
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However, the five individual linguistic markers have been investigated in different 
impression management contexts before, albeit with slightly different assumptions. 
As indicated in chapter six, section 6.3.2.4, the use of words with positive and 
negative connotations has been studied in the context of the Pollyanna principle 
(Hildebrandt and Snyder 1981; Clatworthy and Jones 2003; Rutherford 2005) which 
states that firms predominantly use positive emotion words, regardless of their 
financial performance and in the context of thematic manipulation (Abrahamson and 
Park 1994; Abrahamson and Amir 1996; Smith and Taffler 2000). However. results 
regarding the Pollyanna principle are mixed. Hildebrandt and Snyder (1981) find no 
difference between the use of words with positive connotations between profitable 
and unprofitable companies. Rutherford (2005) finds no difference between the use of 
'charged words', i.e. words carrying positive or negative connotations, between 
profitable and unprofitable companies. However, he finds that loss-making firms use 
more negatively charged words. By contrast. Clatworthy and Jones (2003) find that 
both profitable and unprofitable companies emphasize . good news' by means of 
words with positive connotations. 
The results of the current study regarding the use of positive and negative emotion 
words are in line with the findings from studies focusing on thematic manipulation. 
Abrahamson and Park (1994) and Abrahamson and Amir (1996) find words with 
negative connotations to be associated with poor performance. Smith and Taffler 
(2000) find positive keywords to be associated with 'good news' and negative 
keywords to be associated with 'bad news'. The observed direct association between 
the use of positive emotion words and . good news' and negative emotion words and 
'bad news' in this study thus confirm insights from thematic manipulation studies that 
"the unaudited managerial disclosures provided in the chairman's statement contain 
important information associated with the firm's future finanCial state" (Smith and 
Taffler 2000: 639). This suggests that management does not use narrative corporate 
report sections "to reduce the effect of bad news or to smooth the effect of good news" 
(Abrahamson and Amir 1996: 1159), i.e. for impression management purposes. 
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Rutherford (2005) examines self-reference, but only in the form of the word company 
and not in the form of first-person pronouns. He finds no association between self-
reference and 'good/bad news'. In contrast, we find self-reference to be directly 
related to 'good news' which is in the hypothesized direction. Howeyer. taken in 
context with the pattern of association observed between positiye and negative 
emotion words and 'good/bad news' we do not interpret this as a sign of self-
presentational dissimulation (individuals portraying an image inconsistent with their 
self-image tend to distance themselves from what they are saying by means of using 
less self-reference), but as a sign of the greater sense of power and self-confidence of 
companies reporting 'good news' rather than 'bad news'. This explanation fits also 
with the direct association observed between self-reference and firm size in the sense 
that large companies have more clout and thus signal their power and self-confidence 
by means of more self-references than small companies. 
Last, but not least, cognitive complexity has been studied in the context of reading 
ease manipulation (in the sense that reading difficulty is a function of cognitive 
complexity). The more cognitively complex a text is. the more difficult it is to read 
and understand. However, the assumptions underlying reading difficulty and 
cognitive complexity are diametrically opposed. Whereas the obfuscation hypothesis 
predicts reading difficulty to be directly related to 'bad news', self-presentational 
dissimulation by means of cognitive complexity predicts an association in the 
opposite direction. Self-presentational dissimulation is assumed to take up a 
substantial amount of cognitive resources resulting in less cognitive complexity in 
texts. The results of the current study support this assumption in that we find 
cognitive complexity to be directly related to 'good news' in the form of relative 
positive sales growth. 
However, this association is interpreted as an indication of the tendency of firms to 
talk more about 'good news' than 'bad news', in particular 'good ne\\s' regarding 
fundamentals (i.e. relative positive sales growth and relative positiye long-term fiml 
growth). This is due to the fact that 'good news' about fundamentals is not 
immediately apparent from looking at the financial statements. but requires more 
complex explanations. This, in turn. manifests itself in more comple~ sentence 
structures characterised by conjunctions. such as and. hut. if although. etc. Thus. the 
direct association between cognitive complexity and 'good news' in the fonn of 
relative positive sales growth can be interpreted as a function of the nature of the 
'good news' . 
Industry classification is not found to make a difference in terms of the association 
between the linguistic markers of self-presentational dissimulation and . goodlbad 
news' and firm size. 
Results thus suggest that finns do not obfuscate negative organisational outcomes by 
means of self-presentational dissimulation, i.e. they do not portray an image of the 
firm and its perfonnance which is incongruent with the way insiders might see the 
firm and its perfonnance. In fact, results suggest that finns use their corporate 
narrative documents to provide an unbiased account of firm performance and 
prospects. 
7.3 Implications of research findings 
The results of the current study do not support the obfuscation hypothesis. i.e. finns 
do not seem to obfuscate negative organisational outcomes by means of rendering 
corporate narrative documents difficult to read or by portraying a public image of the 
firm and its perfonnance which is incongruent with the way insiders may see the firm 
and its perfonnance. In fact, results suggest that the opposite might be the case. Firms 
seem to tailor their corporate narratives to the reading strategies of their target 
readerships. Finns also seem to portray an unbiased view of their financial 
performance and prospects. 
These findings do not imply that companies do not engage in impression management 
in their corporate narrative documents; it simply means that the obfuscation of 
negative organisational outcomes by means of reading ease manipulation and self-
presentational dissimulation do not seem to be preferred impression management 
mechanisms. 
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The lack of evidence found supporting the obfuscation hypothesis might be attributed 
to the limited psychological validity of the obfuscation hypothesis in general or of 
obfuscation by means of reading ease manipulation and self-presentational 
dissimulation in particular. The obfuscation hypothesis, which forms the basis of our 
investigation, is derived from an agency theory concept of impression management 
which is based on (a) assumptions of efficient markets and rationality assumptions of 
managerial and investor behaviour and (b) strictly economics-based assumptions of 
managerial motivations and strategies. However, as discussed in chapter two (sections 
2.6 and 2.7), alternative concepts of impression management which are derived from 
theories in behavioural finance and social psychology, indicate that traditional finance 
explanations of impression management might have limited explanatory power. What 
is more, the concept of reading difficulty originates in education research, ho\vever, 
economics-based theories of reading difficulty do not exist. 
Thus, accounting research focusing on impression management could benefit from 
insights from behavioural finance and social psychology. Behavioural finance 
provides a better understanding of impression management in a corporate reporting 
context by means of incorporating notions of irrationality and affect into managerial 
and investor behaviour. Social psychology not only provides alternative explanations 
for the incentives of managers to engage in impression management (see chapter two, 
section 2.7.2), but also suggests alternative ways of how impressions are constructed 
which entails "choosing the kind of impression to create" and "deciding how [to] go 
about doing so" (Leary and Kowalski 1990: 35-36). Accounting research has already 
adopted one impression management strategy identified by social psychology 
research, namely performance attributions (see chapter two, sections 2.3.4 and 2.4.4). 
However, as indicated in chapter two, section 2.7.2, there are numerous possibilities 
for applying insights from social psychology research in a corporate reporting context. 
Suggestions for further research regarding the tactics and strategies employed to 
create a desired impression are discussed in section 7.5.2.1 of this chapter. 
Comparing the results of the current study with previous findings suggests that there 
are several critical factors \vhich have an impact on results. namely (1) the way in 
which impression management is measured. (2) the \\'ay financial perfonnance is 
measured. and (3) the way association tests are carried out. It would be interesting to 
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apply the cohesion-based reading difficulty measures introduced in the current study 
to different corporate narratives (e.g. press releases, management forecasts, takeover 
documents, etc.) and to corporate narratives from non-UK companies in order to test 
these measures in different corporate reporting contexts. Due to the ease and speed of 
application of the computer-generated cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty 
(Coh-Metrix), this would provide an interesting research opportunity. 
What is more, SInce the main effects model provides evidence for significant 
associations between reading difficulty measures/linguistic markers and . goodlbad 
news' in the form of relative sales growth (RSI) and relative long-tem1 growth (RG), 
this suggests that future research needs to include not only firm performance measures 
focusing on financials, but also on fundamentals. This means that measures of firm 
performance need to encompass both short-term firm-specific measures of firm 
performance (such as earnings and earnings growth), industry comparators (such as 
relative sales growth and long-term relative firm growth) and long-term measures of 
performance (such as long-term relative firm growth). 
Finally, results from the current study suggest that the association that appears to exist 
between reading difficulty and 'bad news' is not consistent across firms of different 
sizes. This suggests that it is important to test for interaction effects between 
'goodlbad news' and firm size. 
7.4 Limitations of research 
Due to the time-consuming aspect of data preparation (i.e. converting texts into 
computer-readable format) and the labour-intensity of the annotation-based approach 
to measuring reading difficulty (MMAX2) the investigation of impression 
management by means of three different methodologies is restricted to one type of 
corporate narrative document (i.e. the chairman~s report) and a relatively small 
sample size (Le. 93 companies). For this reason, caution needs to be applied in 
generalising results. 
307 
Since the analysis of impression management is restricted to the supply-side. it is 
impossible to say whether impression management - if evidence of it is found - is 
effective. What is more, without establishing managerial intentions, e.g. by means of 
analysing the subsequent selling of shares by management as pioneered by 
Abrahamson and Park (1994), evidence of impression management could equally be 
attributed to managerial optimism (hubris). 
7.5 Suggestions for further research 
The majority of prior impression management research in a corporate reporting 
context focuses solely on managerial behaviour and does not address subsequent 
investor responses. In particular, considerable effort is expended in finding evidence 
of impression management, especially in annual reports. Two broad questions are 
paramount: (1) Why do managers engage in impression management? and (2) Are 
investors influenced by impression management? These have received relatively less 
attention by comparison with efforts to measure impression management. Increasing 
availability of technology is making measurement of impression management easier. 
This will allow researchers to apply more focus to these two questions. 
7.5.1 Theoretical perspectives 
Four manifestations of impression management have been identified in this study (see 
chapter two, section 2.2). They are either explicitly (obfuscation of negative 
organisational outcomes, perfonnance comparisons, choice of earnings number) or 
implicitly (attribution of perfonnance) based on agency theory assumptions of 
managerial behaviour, i.e. managers are assumed to opportunistically engage in 
impression management to maximise their own benefit. Agency theory is not without 
its limitations and drawbacks (see, e.g. Roberts et al. 2005). There are many other 
theoretical perspectives which explain managerial behaviour. Only two others (in 
addition to agency theory) have been applied in impression management research: 
signalling theory which is used in conjunction with agency theory. and legitimacy 
theory. Accordingly. alternative perspectives might be invoked in moving research 
paradigms forward. 
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In connection with corporate annual reports research, Stanton and Stanton (2002) 
identify additional perspectives including those from marketing (which would be \"ery 
appropriate for impression management research), political econom\ and 
accountability. As pointed out in chapter two, section 2.1. previous research has 
almost exclusively focused on one aspect of impression management in a corporate 
context, namely the manipulation of perceptions of finn perfonnance and prospects. 
The application of alternative perspectives allows the analysis of the manipulation of 
impressions of corporate events, such as demutualization, mergers or acquisitions, 
factory closures, etc. (legitimacy and political economy), ideas, such as capitalism 
(political economy). Impression management also features in political research, which 
may offer new insights to financial reporting researchers. 
7.5.2 Impression management and the firm 
Impression management is a function of managerial incentives, organisational 
influences, environmental forces and regulatory responses. This begs further 
questions. This section considers future research opportunities from a fiml and 
management perspective. 
What are the tactics and strategies (or creating desired impressions? 
The whole area of impression construction requires further research. In particular. 
what is it in annual reports that fosters desired impressions? What are the tactics and 
strategies for reducing the effect of negative impressions? 
Two types of impression management behaviours have been identified - ingratory 
and other-enhancement behaviour and self-enhancement beha\'iour. What influences 
these two behaviour patterns? Aerts' (2005) call for more research into differing 
attributional profiles depending on whether the infonnation item is a re\'enue. cost or 
profit, constitutes another avenue for future impression management research. 
Impression management has tended to concentrate on disclosures in annual reports. 
with more recent research including disclosures in press releases. \' oluntary 
disclosures through another disclosure media such as \H?bsites and conference call~. 
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presents an opportunity to expand impression management research to these 
electronic means of communication with investors. 
What are the motivations for impression management? 
What are the critical motives for impression management behaviour? Do managers 
attempt to misrepresent, or do they try and communicate truthfully? Is impression 
management a harmless ritual or does it have results? Is impression management 
marketing-based or communications-based? What do management expect to achieve 
when they engage in impression management? 
Prior literature fails to address whether the application of the linguistic techniques 
required to manipulate the reading difficulty of texts are executed consciously or 
unconsciously. It is possible that impression management takes place both on a 
conscious and on an unconscious level, depending on the level of awareness of these 
techniques on part of the writer. Corporate communication professionals may use the 
linguistic techniques aimed at impression management more consciously than 
management. This suggests differences in the use of impression management by 
management and corporate communication professionals. 
What are the opportunities and risks of engaging in impression management? 
Perceived opportunity is an important element in the impression management process. 
What are the perceived opportunities to manage impressions effectively? More 
research around managers' perceptions around this issue is needed. Perceived 
opportunity moderates the influence of impression motivation on impression 
management behaviours. It is likely that motivations for impression management and 
opportunities are related although research has provided little evidence on this point. 
Also relevant are the probable costs and benefits of impression management 
behaviour. The benefits are related to the percei\"ed probability of impression 
management behaviour being successful. The costs relate to the perceived risks of 
engaging in impression management. Thus, management's perceived ability to 
accurately access the appropriateness or acceptability of impression management. 
judgement of the likelihood of success of managing impressions and willingness to 
incur the perceived risks of doing so will to a large extent determine perception of 
opportuni ty. 
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All of these questions involve management assessing whether a situation is favourable 
when determining whether to engage in impression management. In this context. 
recent corporate scandals provide an opportunity to test situational favourableness 
(more favourable before the scandals) and the extent to which impression 
management is engaged in. Impression management in a sample of company annual 
reports before the scandals could be compared with the same annual reports after the 
scandals. 
Who exercises impression management? 
How are impression management choices made within organisations? By whom are 
the choices made - managers, public relations advisors, the board (executive or non-
executives)? In this context, Schaffer's (2002) analysis of the differences in 
evaluation of managerial performance by inside and outside directors provides some 
insights into boardroom dynamics in regards to managerial impression management 
behaviour. He argues that inside and outside directors face different cognitive and 
social constraints which inhibit their ability to effectively evaluate managerial 
performance during times of negative organisational outcomes. For inside directors 
these constraints consist of (a) loyalty to the CEO and members of top management 
and (b) fear of retaliation. Outside directors face (a) informational constraints, (b) 
time constraints, and have (c) lower levels of commitment to the company. These 
constraints "may cause board members to use either incomplete or distorted 
information to make assessments" (Schaffer 2002: 98). Thus, it would be interesting 
to investigate the potential effects of these different constraints on the impression 
management behaviour/susceptibility of inside and outside directors. 
What is more, it is not clear who prepares corporate reports. Abramhanson and Park 
(2004) find some evidence that influence groups such as accountants, some types of 
shareholders and outside directors prompt impression management. This avenue of 
inquiry is worth re-visiting. Should impression management research be based at the 
level of the firm, senior management, professional writers, or public relations 
companies? We need to better understand the process of assembling annual reports 
narrative sections. Work of the style of Gibbins, Richardson and \Vaterhouse (1990) 
would be useful in this respect. This necessitates directly engaging \vith fim1s in the 
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form of interviews and questionnaires. Milner (2007), who adopts this approach, finds 
the compilation of annual reports to be a very complex process, involYing a yariety of 
inside and outside parties, including management and public relations firms. 
What is more, is the firm and management one and the same thing? Are there 
differences in the way in which managers portray themselves versus their portrayal of 
the firm? How do the personal characteristics of managers influence impression 
management? Are there any links between impression management and managerial 
dominance, especially CEO dominance? Insights from the takeover literature might 
provide more insights on the links between managerial characteristics and firm 
behaviour (Jensen and Zajac 2004; Brown and Sarma 2006). 
What are management's perceptions orusers' impressions? 
Levantis and Weetman (2004) suggest that management providing second language 
annual reports offers insights into managerial perceptions of readership as a 
significant explanation of management voluntary disclosure and impression 
management practices. So and Smith (2002) point to the importance of matching 
methods of presentation of information to the characteristics of the decision maker, 
and to the interactions thereof. As well as understanding more about managers' 
perceptions of the effects of impression management, we also need to know more 
about managers' perceptions of the impressions of users. While the effects of 
impression management and perceptions of how users' impressions are formed are 
related, useful additional nuanced insights can be gained by considering them 
separately. 
Is impression management influenced by the disclosure vehicle? 
The majority of studies analyse narrative disclosures from annual reports or parts 
thereof. Courtis (2004a) extends to interim reports and prospectuses. Are there 
variations in impression management between periodic reports such as annual reports 
and interim reports, and prospectuses and takeover documents? Claims in takeover 
documents could be compared with those in the immediately preceding and following 
annual reports. It has been well-established that defending against a takeover bid is 
significantly more likely to result in a price increase (Brennan 1999). The 
persuasiveness of the takeoyer defence document may influence the outcome (failure 
of the bid: increase in bid price) of the bid, especially any resulting price increase. 
'1'"' 
-' -
Takeover presents an opportunity to research the effects of impression management 
where the market reaction might be easier to measure. The association between 
impression management and takeover premiums could also be tested. 
What other factors influence impression management? 
Future research should examine individual and contextual influences in a variety of 
situations. The impression management literature is replete with studies that 
demonstrate the effect of isolated factors on impression management. What is the 
association between situational influences and impression management? How do 
these factors act in combination, and interact? Are there variations in impression 
management arising from differing cultural influences? In relation to attributional 
behaviour, and the tendency towards defensive explanations, Aerts (2005) 
acknowledges variations in behaviour internationally, with more evidence of 
attributional defensiveness in US compared with UK annual reports. Cultural issues 
may influence impression construction strategies and self-presentation behaviours. 
Replication of studies in different cultural settings is worthy of future research. 
Are earnings management and impression management related? 
As was stated earlier in this study (Chapter two, section 2.1.3), earnings management 
and impression management are cognate research streams. Are companies that engage 
in earnings management also likely to engage in impression management? Courtis 
(2004a) asks whether impression management is a consequence of rhetorical 
polishing or spin, or whether it reflects more serious misrepresentation whose 
intention is to mislead and disguise the true state of affairs. If an association is found 
between earnings management and impression management, this would point to 
deliberately misleading behaviour by management rather than spin. Godfrey et al. 
(2003) investigate earnings management and impression management in graphs 
around CEO changes. Examining earnings and impression management together 
provides an opportunity for distinguishing between alternative explanations of these 
practices. However, their results are mixed. Continuing this combination of earnings 
and impression management using alternative impression management measures 
might add insights to our understanding of the interrelation and interactions between 
these two practices. 
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7.5.3 Reactions to impression management 
The previous section has considered impression management from a firm/manager 
perspective. This leaves the whole question of what happens in response to 
impression management. According to Ogden and Clarke (2005: 340) there are limits 
to what impression management can achieve in terms of persuading users as to the 
sentiments being expressed in annual reports. 
How are users' impressions formed? 
We need to more fully understand how impressions are formed. How are specific 
impressions (e.g. management credibility, organisational effectiveness) created? How 
are impressions developed or formed? Once formed, how can impressions be 
managed thereafter? What creates positive and negative impressions of credibility? 
What is the relation between impression management tactics and positive and 
negative impressions of credibility? 
Mercer (2005) finds that managerial reporting credibility differs in the long- and in 
the short-term. In the short-term credibility is a function of cognitive processes, 
whereas in the long-term, it is a function of affective processes. This results in short-
term credibility depending on managerial forthcomingness (i.e. the accuracy, 
completeness, and timeliness of disclosures), especially in the case of negative news 
disclosure decisions and long-term credibility depending on the valence of the news 
disclosed, regardless of the managerial forthcomingness of the news. This means that 
managers who report good news are deemed more credible than those reporting bad 
news. 
These findings suggest that impression management (entailing a manipulation of 
either the accuracy or the completeness of information) is not likely to be successful 
in the short term, especially if it entails the obfuscation of negati\'e organisational 
outcomes. This is due to the fact that attribution theory predicts disclosures which are 
at odds with management's personal incentives to be more likely to be attributed to 
personal characteristics, such as honesty and trustworthiness than disclosures which 
are consistent with management's incentives (Mercer 2005: 727). Howc\'er. 
impression managenlent has a much greater chance of succeeding in the long-term. 
since the deciding factor of managerial reporting credibility in this case is not 
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forthcomingness, but the valence of news disclosed. Since good ne\ys disclosures are 
more credible in the long-tenn than bad news disclosures, this means that the 
obfuscation of negative organisational outcomes should not affect managerial 
reporting credibility in the long-tenn. 
How do users' personal characteristics influence impressions formation? 
It is possible that different personal characteristics influence impression management 
receptiveness. There are a whole variety of factors that could influence differences in 
users' receptiveness to impression management, including users' cognitive style, their 
level of work experience, cultural background, personality and tolerance for 
ambiguity. In the context of reading difficulty, the results of this study suggest that 
reading difficulty is a function of the level of financial expertise. Firms appear to cater 
to the reading strategies of their perceived target readership. i.e. large firms catering to 
the needs of high-knowledge readers, such as institutional investors and financial 
analysts, and small finns catering to the needs of low-knowledge readers, such as 
individual investors. This suggests that impression management might have different 
impacts on expert users of corporate documents, such as financial analysts, than 
'naIve' users, such as individual shareholders. 
However, there might be more differences between different types of user and 
impression management, e.g., individual users, institutional investors, analysts, males 
versus females, etc. Users of corporate reporting documents might be asked to rate 
examples of different impression management tactics on a Likert scale. A number of 
studies have attempted to examine through experiment the influence of impression 
management on perceptions of users (Taylor and Anderson 1986; Beattie and Jones 
2002; So and Smith 2002; Stanton et al. 2004). These studies use impression 
management in graphs. Future research might extend to textual material. 
What is the likelihood ofsuccess of impression management? 
There is little evidence on whether impression management influences impressions 
and on the effectiveness of different impression management behaviours and 
techniques. Is impression management self-deception/hubris or genuinely misleading 
behaviour? Insights from the takeover literature might provide important insights on 
managerial overconfidence, especially CEO overconfidence (Hayward and Hambrick 
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1997; Malmendier and Tate 2004; Brown and Sarma 2006). If managers score highly 
in terms of managerial overconfidence, reporting bias in corporate documents can be 
interpreted as self-deception/hubris, rather than impression management, i.e. 
manipulation of reader perceptions. 
What is more, we do not know whether impression management has intrinsic as well 
as symbolic substance. We do not know whether readers of corporate reports detect or 
see through impression management, including obfuscation. Following from this, there 
is little evidence on whether impression management makes any difference to 
investors' perceptions of companies and to their decision making. We do not know 
whether impression management has economic consequences. 
Huang (200S: 113) argues that 'puffery', i.e. statements issued by companies which 
are "vague, promotional, or hyperbolic", has the ability to "engender or generate 
implied meanings, not only cognitively, but also emotionally" (115). This suggests 
that impression management can influence (i) mood formations, (ii) investor 
perception formation, (iii) investor judgments. How does verbal communication help 
investor comprehension, pinpoint attention, help shape impressions about corporate 
health or determine investment decision making? Does impression management 
backfire when perceived as lacking credibility by users? Research in social 
psychology shows that information must be credible to avoid unintended negative 
reactions (Burgoon and Miller 1985). 
7.5.4 Implications for policy makers 
Impression management may also be a function of regulatory responses. This begs a 
number of questions: Is it possible to regulate impression management? Do regulators 
pay enough attention to the more subtle aspects of financial reporting such as 
impression management? Huang (200S) distinguishes between two types of 
impression management, namely (1) impression management entailing \'ague 
statements, such as "we are bullish on this company's future prospects" (11S), and 
impression management which induces 'false implied meanings that are thus 
deceptive, misleading, and can be disproved' (115). He argues that only the second 
type should be legally actionable, since the first type "is unlikely to induce any false 
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implied meanings that directly affect investors' beliefs concerning that company's 
securities." 
In this vein, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) question whether auditors' work should 
extent beyond the financial statements to include narrative disclosures in annual 
reports. This line of inquiry around the role of auditors, and of regulators, around 
impression management could be developed. Is it practical to expect auditors and 
regulators to take action in relation to such a subtle activity? 
7.6 Discussion and conclusions 
Impression management constitutes an important factor in the impairment of financial 
reporting quality which has been - at least compared with earnings management - a 
relatively neglected area of accounting research. This thesis has filled a gap by means 
of providing a comprehensive account of impression management in a financial 
reporting context, including its theoretical background, manifestations, mechanisms, 
and measurement and by means of subsequently applying the insights gained from it 
to the analysis of a set of chairman's reports of UK listed companies. 
Thus, this thesis answers the call in prior literature for theoretical, methodological and 
empirical advances in impression management research (Courtis 1998, 2004; 
Rutherford 2003; Smith et al. 2005). It contributes to the literature (1) introducing 
insights from various disciplines, including behavioural finance, social psychology. 
and linguistics, (2) by developing two new approaches to measuring reading 
difficulty, (3) by presenting a new methodology for analysing self-presentational 
dissimulation in narrative corporate reports. (4) by introducing four measures of 
'good/bad news~ for testing the obfuscation hypothesis, and (5) by testing for 
interaction effects between independent variables and thus showing that the 
association between reading difficulty and "bad ne\\'s' is not consistent across firms or 
different sizes, and (6) by providing statistically significant results refuting the 
obfuscation hypothesis. 
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First of all, insights from behavioural finance, social psychology. and linguistics have 
been introduced to assist researchers in examining impression management in a 
corporate reporting context. 
Secondly, the two automated approaches to measuring impression management 
introduced in this study are particularly attractive to researchers, since they not only 
satisfy validity, reliability, and objectivity concerns, but are also neither labour-
intensive nor time-consuming in their application. They also have the advantage of 
being both generic in their application while allowing specific adaptation to a 
particular genre. 
Coh-Metrix combines the speed and ease of use of conventional readability measures 
with linguistic and psychological validity. Measuring self-presentational dissimulation 
by means of linguistic markers with the help of LIWC constitutes a new approach to 
measuring impression management in a corporate reporting context. 
Furthermore, the introduction of four measures of 'goodlbad news' which are based 
on both financial and fundamental aspects of financial performance allow researchers 
to test the obfuscation hypothesis in context with 'good/bad news' measures 
incorporating both industry-comparators and long-term aspects of financial 
performance. 
Empirical results suggest that it is important to test for interaction effects between 
independent variables in order to determine whether any association that may appear 
to exist between impression management and . goodlbad news' is consistent across 
firms of different sizes. 
Finally, the empirical results indicate that companies do not engage in impression 
management in the form of reading ease manipulation and self-presentational 
dissimulation. Although we observe a significant association between reading 
difficulty and "bad news'. this association does not persist when . goodlbad news' is 
interacted with firm size. Thus, we find no evidence to support the obfuscation 
hypothesis which claims that firms obfuscate negative organisational outcomes by 
rendering their corporate narrative documents difficult to read. 
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However, reading difficulty is found to be associated with fim1 size. albeit in opposite 
directions for conventional and cohesion-based measures of reading difficulty. \\'e 
interpret these contradictory results as an indication that firms may not use their 
corporate narrative sections to obfuscate negative organisational outcomes. but to 
cater for the specific reading strategies of their target readers. Large firms seem to 
tailor their corporate narratives to the reading strategies of high-knowledge readers, 
such as professional investors or readers largely familiar with the information content 
of corporate narrative report sections, who find low-cohesion texts easier to read. 
whereas small firms adopt the opposite approach to cater for the reading strategies of 
low-knowledge readers, such as individual investors or readers largely unfamiliar 
with the information content of corporate narrative report sections, who find high-
cohesion texts easier to read. 
In the case of impression management by means of self-presentational dissimulation, 
the observed associations between the linguistic markers and . goodlbad news' and 
firm size suggest an alternative explanation to impression management. The finding 
that self-reference is both directly associated with . good news' and firm size suggests 
that the linguistic markers are not indications of self-presentational dissimulation. but 
as a sign of power and self-confidence. Thus, large firms and firms reporting . good 
news' (in the form of profits and earnings increases) are more self-confident about 
their results than small firms and firms reporting' bad news' (in the form of losses and 
earnings decreases). Thus, results suggest that firms do not obfuscate negative 
organisational outcomes by portraying a public image of the firm and its performance 
inconsistent with the way insiders might see the firm and its performance. In fact. the 
observed direct associations between positive emotion words and 'good news' and 
negative emotion words and 'bad news' suggest that firms provide an unbiased vie\\" 
of firm performance and prospects. 
Research into impression management is at an embryonic stage of development. 
Because of its subtle, more qualitative nature it may not attract as many researchers as 
(say) earnings management. However, so many questions remain unanswcrcJ that it 
represents a fertile opportunity for a wealth of researchers looking for an under-
researched field with rich potential. 
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Appendix I: List of sample companies 
The following table lists the 93 sample companies. They have been taken from a 
population of all UK companies listed at the London Stock Exchange in June 2004. It 
provides information about their industry classification according to the Dow Jones 
Market Sector (Worldscope) and year end market capitalization in 2002 (£ thousand). 
List of sample companies 
Company name Dow Jones Market YrEnd Market 
Sector Cap2002 (£ thousand) 
1 Future Internet PLC TEC 356,252 
2 Alibi Communications PLC CYC 651,450 
3 Toye & Company PLC CYC 989,120 
4 Mercury Recycling Group PLC IDU 1,632,670 
5 Netcall PLC TEC 1,814,513 
6 Media Square PLC IDU 2,149,684 
7 Network Technology PLC TEC 2,369,999 
8 Sheffield United PLC CYC 2,481,660 
9 Surface Technology Systems PLC TEC 2,983,077 
10 Albion PLC CYC 3,000,000 
11 Bailey (CH) PLC IDU 3,448,202 
12 Know Technology Solutions PLC TEC 3,876,300 
13 Springhealth Leisure PLC CYC 4,566,776 
14 ID Data PLC TEC 4,935,083 
15 Advanced Technology PLC IDU 4,979,526 
16 Radamec Group PLC TEC 5,046,223 
17 Spring Grove Prop PLC IDU 5,061,450 
18 Slimma PLC CYC 5,473,091 
19 Atlantic Global PLC TEC 6,255,432 
20 EQ Group PLC CYC 6,386,879 
21 Jourdan PLC IDU 6,424,074 
22 Tolent PLC IDU 6,737,129 
23 Heart Of Midlothian PLC CYC 7,896,022 
24 Manpower Software PLC TEC 7,964,115 
25 Universe Group RFD PLC TEC 8,015,200 
26 Bizspace PLC IDU 
9,067,788 
27 Advanced Power Companion PLC IDU 
9,075,547 
28 4 Imprint Group PLC CYC 
9,618,773 
29 Superscape VR PLC TEC 
9,813,825 
30 Clarity Commerce Solutions PLC TEC 
1 0,4-l5 ,551 
31 Christie Group PLC IDU 
10,663,225 
32 Sopheon PLC TEC 
10,781.330 
33 Jasmin PLC TEC 
10,991.55-l 
3-l Sherwood Group PLC CYC 
11.094,118 
35 Tanfield Group PLC IOU 
12,2-l1,683 
36 Easyscreen PLC TEC 
13,469,646 
37 Blooms Of Bressingham Holdings PLC CYC 
13.750,922 
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List of sample companies (continued) 
Company name Dow Jones Market YrEnd Market 
Sector Cap2002 (£ thousand) 
38 Vega Group PLC TEC 14,343,609 
39 Medical Solutions PLC TEC 15,483,632 
40 Oatamonitor PLC IOU 15,834,699 
41 SOL PLC TEC 16,233,766 
42 Whittard Of Chelsea PLC CYC 16,400,927 
43 Stylo PLC CYC 19,364,615 
44 Northamber PLC TEC 20,614,640 
45 Caffe Nero Group PLC CYC 20,954,690 
46 Artisan (United Kingdom) PLC IOU 21,165,957 
47 Corporate Services Group PLC IOU 22,614,695 
48 NSB Retail Systems PLC TEC 23,485,717 
49 Urbium PLC CYC 24,582,658 
50 Montpellier Group PLC IOU 26,060,066 
51 Tadpole Technology PLC TEC 28,510,832 
52 IFX Group PLC CYC 30,946,325 
53 Staffware PLC TEC 34,461,725 
54 Cosalt PLC IOU 34,496,140 
55 Austin Reed Group PLC CYC 40,085,260 
56 Alumasc Group PLC IOU 40,909,726 
57 Linx Printing Technology PLC TEC 42,772,101 
58 Home Entertainment PLC CYC 45,490,337 
59 PSD Group PLC IOU 46,488,028 
60 Telecom Plus PLC TEC 53,235,211 
61 Volex Group PLC IOU 60,065,538 
62 Wireless Group PLC CYC 62,932,160 
63 Bell Group PLC TEC 65,525,903 
64 Chemring Group PLC IOU 68,041,211 
65 Royalblue Group PLC TEC 73,838,692 
66 Fisher (James) & Sons PLC IOU 79,623,312 
67 Brown & Jackson PLC CYC 84,579,782 
68 Robert Wiseman Dairies PLC TEC 90,602,401 
69 Fenner PLC IOU 99,248,317 
70 Bloomsbury Publishing PLC CYC 110,333,87'+ 
71 Surfcontrol PLC TEC 120,616,704 
72 Autologic Holdings PLC IOU 124,117,751 
73 Countryside Properties PLC CYC 137,429,119 
74 Spirent PLC TEC 158,577,139 
75 Reliance Security Group PLC IOU 180,393,991 
76 House Of Fraser PLC CYC 198,076,464 
77 Enodis PLC IOU 202.nS,l21 
78 Crest Nicholson PLC CYC 221,842,012 
79 AEA Technology PLC TEC 234.320,169 
80 Rotork PLC IOU 252,756,759 
81 Isoft Group PLC TEC 339.635,987 
82 Westbury PLC CYC 350,255.5'+3 
83 Cookson Group PLC IOU 383,059.57,+ 
84 Mytravel Group PLC eye '+0.+.568,989 
85 Meggitt PLC IOU 509,099,5'+0 
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List of sample companies (continued) 
Company name Dow Jones Market YrEnd Market 
Sector Cap2002 (£ thousand) 
86 Wetherspoon (JD) PLC CYC 608,438,347 
87 Premier Farnell PLC IDU 743,226,925 
88 Barratt Developments PLC CYC 989,571,721 
89 Cobham PLC IDU 1,035,204,977 
90 Matalan PLC CYC 1,612.392,715 
91 Exel PLC IDU 2,033,850,000 
92 Hilton Group PLC CYC 2,607,380,599 
93 GUS PLC CYC 7,066,767,710 
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Appendix II: Results of association tests by industry 
1. Results for reading difficulty by industry classification 
Table AI: ANOV A results for consumer cyclical companies 
Bivariate Reading difficulty measure 0 1 
variable Mean Mean t-stat p-value 
PE Cohesion Density 0.3326 0.0318 -OA3 0.671 
Cohesive Ties 0.3061 0.3775 1.01 0.320 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.4163 0.5540 0.91 0.372 
Adjacent argument overlap 0.4401 0.4823 1.07 0.296 
Argument overlap 0.2728 0.2745 0.05 0.961 
Adjacent stem overlap 0.4649 0.5175 1.30 0.204 
Stem overlap 0.3161 0.2979 -0.50 0.620 
PEl Cohesion Density 0.3240 0.3223 -0.05 0.959 
Cohesive Ties 0.3410 0.3630 0.32 0.752 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.4845 0.5254 0.28 0.784 
Adjacent argument overlap 0.4789 0.4621 -0.44 0.666 
Argument overlap 0.2906 0.2632 -0.84 OAI0 
Adjacent stem overlap 0.5161 0.4906 -0.65 0.524 
Stem overlap 0.3370 0.2833 -1.65 0.111 
RSI Cohesion Density 0.2644 0.3509 2.99 0.006*** 
Cohesive Ties 0.3224 0.3697 0.66 0.332 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.4319 0.5466 0.75 0.458 
Adjacent argument overlap 0.4226 0.4943 1.95 0.062* 
Argument overlap 0.2556 0.2841 0.86 0.400 
Adjacent stem overlap 0.4481 0.5298 2.19 0.038** 
Stem overlap 0.2836 0.3149 0.89 0.379 
RG Cohesion Density 0.2592 0.0613 3.71 0.001*** 
Cohesive Ties 0.3106 0.3786 0.99 0.332 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.4042 0.5675 1.11 0.277 
Adjacent argument overlap 0.4310 0.4931 1.70 0.102 
Argument overlap 0.2563 0.2854 0.89 0.381 
Adjacent stem overlap 0.4569 0.5289 1.93 0.64* 
Stem overlap 0.2869 0.3147 0.80 0.428 
Key: Shaded areas indicate matching results with whole sample. 
Table A2: ANOVA results for technology companies 
Bivariate Reading difficulty measure 0 1 
variable Mean Mean t-stat p-value PE Cohesion Density 0.3047 0.3325 0.83 O.of 14 
Cohesive Ties 0.3744 0.3591 
-0.25 0.807 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.5439 0.4964 
-0.37 0.718 
Adjacent argument overlap 0.4632 0.4522 
-0.16 0.874 
Argument overlap 0.3150 0.2811 
-0.90 0.377 
Adjacent stem overlap 0.4865 0.4900 0.06 0.949 
Stem overlap 0.3362 0.3040 
-0.68 0.499 
PEl Cohesion Density 0.2987 0.3292 0.91 0.370 
Cohesive Ties 0.3784 0.3604 
-0.29 0.774 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.5583 0.4992 -0.46 0.652 
Adjacent argument overlap 0.4485 0.4661 0.26 0.798 
Argument overlap 0.2878 0.3098 0.58 0.569 
Adjacent stem overlap 0.4680 0.5034 0.66 0.513 
Stem overlap 0.3012 0.3384 0.79 0.434 
RSI Cohesion Density 0.3187 0.3147 -0.12 0.907 
Cohesive Ties 0.4182 0.3317 -1..fof 0.161 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.6231 0.4525 -1.35 0.188 
Adjacent argument overlap 0.4473 0.4658 0.27 0.790 
Argument overlap 0.2795 0.3142 0.91 0.372 
Adjacent stem overlap 0.4563 0.5092 0.99 0.331 
Stem overlap 0.2894 0.3441 1.17 0.252 
RG Cohesion Density 0.2972 0.3322 1.06 0.297 
Cohesive Ties 0.3824 0.3561 -0.43 0.672 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.56l3 0.4933 -0.53 0.601 
Adjacent argument overlap 0.4249 0.4841 0.88 0.387 
Argument overlap 0.2754 0.3194 1.17 0.250 
Adjacent stem overlap 0.4443 0.5215 1.49 0.147 
Stem overlap 0.2895 0.3473 1.25 0.220 
Key: Shaded areas indicate matching results with whole sample . 
., 1 -
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Table A3: ANOVA results for industrial companies 
Bivariate Reading difficulty measure 0 1 
variable Mean Mean t-stat p-value 
PE Cohesion Density 0.3063 0.3443 1.16 0.254 
Cohesive Ties 0.3282 0.3398 0.18 0.862 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.4520 0.4778 0.18 0.858 
Adjacent argument overlap 0.4389 0.4757 1.20 0.235 
Argument overlap 0.2848 0.2853 0.02 0.981 
Adjacent stem overlap 0.4666 0.5153 1.69 0.095* 
Stem overlap 0.3095 0.3070 
-0.11 0.914 
PEl Cohesion Density 0.3591 0.3062 -1.66 0.108 
Cohesive Ties 0.3204 0.3454 0.38 0.709 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.4275 0.4954 0.47 0.639 
Adjacent argument overlap 0.4592 0.4595 1.20 0.991 
Argument overlap 0.2781 0.2901 0.56 0.578 
Adjacent stem overlap 0.4888 0.4973 0.29 0.774 
Stem overlap 0.3052 0.3102 0.21 0.836 
RSI Cohesion Density 0.3236 0.3319 0.25 0.806 
Cohesive Ties 0.3160 0.3486 0.49 0.627 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.4398 0.4866 0.33 0.747 
Adjacent argument overlap 0.4228 0.4836 1.97 0.052* 
Argument overlap 0.2551 0.3049 2.36 0.020** 
Adjacent stem overlap 0.4495 0.5229 2.56 0.012** 
Stem overlap 0.2748 0.3301 2.37 0.020** 
RG Cohesion Density 0.3212 0.3323 0.28 0.782 
Cohesive Ties 0.2996 0.3494 0.69 0.493 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.3782 0.5033 0.81 0.425 
Adjacent argument overlap 0.4183 0.4840 2.12 0.037** 
Argument overlap 0.2599 0.3002 1.88 0.064* 
Adjacent stem overlap 0.4484 0.5210 2.50 0.014** 
Stem overlap 0.2823 0.3236 2.37 0.088* 
Key: Shaded areas indicate matching results with whole sample. 
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Table A4: Regression results for firm size 
Coef StDev t-stat p-value CYC Cohesion Density 
-0.0086 0.0071 
-1.20 0.238 
Cohesive Ties 0.0286 0.0150 1.91 0.066* 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.0609 0.0321 1.90 0.068* 
Adjacent argument overlap 0.0034 0.0086 0.40 0.693 
Argument overlap 
-0.0152 0.0067 
-2.26 0.032** 
Adjacent stem overlap 
-0.0021 0.0089 
-0.24 0.813 
Stem overlap 
-0.0189 0.0068 -2.76 0.010*** 
TEC 
Cohesion Density 
-0.0010 0.0080 -0.11 0.916 
Cohesive Ties 0.0020 0.0165 0.12 0.905 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.0101 0.0345 0.29 0.772 
Adjacent argument overlap 
-0.0096 0.0178 -0.54 0.592 
Argument overlap 
-0.0125 0.0098 -1.28 0.212 
Adjacent stem overlap 
-0.0118 0.0139 -0.85 0.405 
Stem overlap 
-0.0172 0.0120 -1.43 0.163 
IDU 
Cohesion Density 0.0087 0.0080 1.09 0.283 
Cohesive Ties 0.0167 0.0159 1.05 0.303 
Proportion of given vs. new info 0.0328 0.0345 0.95 0.350 
Adjacent argument overlap 
-0.0040 0.0072 -0.55 0.586 
Argument overlap 
-0.0147 0.0047 -3.12 0.002*** 
Adjacent stem overlap 
-0.0058 0.0068 -0.85 0.398 
Stem overlap 
-0.0161 0.0053 -3.06 0.003*** 
Key: Shaded areas indicate matching significance with whole sample. 
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2. Results for self-presentational dissimulation by industry classification 
Table A5: ANOVA results for consumer cyclical companies 
Bivariate variable Linguistic marker 0 
Mean Mean t-stat p-value 
PE Word count 6.7145 6.8051 0.38 0.710 
Self-reference 3.2500 3.6440 0.65 0.521 
Reference to others 0.2390 0.1971 
-0.48 0.638 
Emotion words 4.3180 4.3450 0.05 0.959 
Positive emotion 3.3120 3.7870 1.01 0.322 
Negative emotion 1.1020 0.6637 
-3.95 0.000*** 
Cognitive complexity 5.0866 5.0233 
-0.31 0.758 
PEl Word count 6.8015 6.7597 
-0.18 0.858 
Self-reference 3.2040 3.7140 0.88 0.385 
Reference to others 0.2492 0.1863 -0.75 0.460 
Emotion words 4.2730 4.3760 0.20 0.839 
Positive emotion 3.3650 3.8030 0.97 0.341 
Negative emotion 1.0826 0.7009 -3.33 0.001*** 
Cognitive complexity 5.0213 5.0718 0.24 0.807 
RSI Word count 6.4350 6.9409 2.30 0.029** 
Self-reference 3.1560 3.6890 0.88 0.384 
Reference to others 0.2100 0.110 0.01 0.991 
Emotion words 4.680 4.173 -0.98 0.334 
Positive emotion 3.7210 3.5920 -0.27 0.789 
Negative emotion 1.1192 0.6912 -3.76 0.000*** 
Cognitive complexity 4.9824 5.0908 2.07 0.041 ** 
RG Word count 6.4350 6.9633 2.46 0.020** 
Self-reference 3.1450 3.7220 0.98 0.334 
Reference to others 0.2182 0.2065 -0.14 0.893 
Emotion words 4.7780 4.093 -1.38 0.178 
Positive emotion 3.755 3.5670 -0.40 0.691 
Negative emotion 1.2059 0.6558 -5.02 0.000*** 
Cognitive complexity 4.9824 5.0908 0.52 0.608 
Key: Shaded areas indicate matching results with whole sample. 
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Table A6: ANOV A results for technology companies 
Bivariate variable Linguistic marker 0 
Mean Mean t-stat p-value 
PE Word count 6.5853 6.8500 1.19 0.242 
Self-reference 3.5340 4.6220 1.86 0.073* 
Reference to others 0.3617 0.1992 
-1.31 0.200 
Emotion words 3.8130 4.4720 1.74 0.92* 
Positive emotion 2.8539 3.6831 2.39 0.024** 
Negative emotion 1.1000 0.8254 
-1.18 0.246 
Cognitive complexity 4.8961 4.9654 0.20 0.841 
PEl Word count 6.5928 6.7710 0.79 0.434 
Self-reference 3.4650 4.3690 1.52 0.139 
Reference to others 0.4131 0.2072 -1.69 0.101 
Emotion words 3.7540 4.3320 1.51 0.142 
Positive emotion 2.7369 3.5372 2.29 0.030** 
Negative emotion 1.1838 0.8411 -1.50 0.145 
Cognitive complexity 4.9546 4.9039 -0.15 0.883 
RSI Word count 6.6652 6.7187 0.24 0.815 
Self-reference 3.2380 4.5340 2.28 0.030** 
Reference to others 0.2346 0.3361 0.81 0.427 
Emotion words 3.9980 4.1550 0.39 0.696 
Positive emotion 2.8790 3.4340 1.52 0.140 
Negative emotion 1.2523 0.7917 -2.08 0.046** 
Cognitive complexity 4.7362 5.0617 0.97 0.341 
RG Word count 6.6818 6.7082 0.12 0.907 
Self-reference 3.3260 4.5370 2.12 0.042** 
Reference to others 0.3164 0.2747 -0.33 0.743 
Emotion words 4.1940 4.0040 -0.48 0.632 
Positive emotion 3.0940 3.2900 0.52 0.606 
Negative emotion 1.2443 0.7712 -2.17 0.039** 
Cognitive complexity 4.9436 4.9100 -0.10 0.992 
Key: Shaded areas indicate matchingresults with whole sample. 
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Table A 7: ANOV A results for industrial companies 
Bivariate variable Linguistic marker 0 1 
Mean Mean t-stat p-value 
PE Word count 6.4654 6.8141 1.46 0.155 
Self-reference 3.6220 3.5310 
-0.23 0.821 
Reference to others 0.2200 0.2l39 
-0.10 0.920 
Emotion words 4.3180 4.3450 0.05 0.959 
Positive emotion 3.3120 3.7870 1.01 0.322 
Negative emotion 1.0170 0.5910 
-2.77 0.010*** 
Cognitive complexity 4.9340 4.8662 
-0.19 0.850 
PEl Word count 6.5144 6.7788 1.09 0.285 
Self-reference 3.5850 3.5570 -0.07 0.946 
Reference to others 0.2177 0.2156 -0.04 0.972 
Emotion words 4.2730 4.3760 0.20 0.839 
Positive emotion 3.3650 3.8030 0.97 0.341 
Negative emotion 0.9442 0.5921 -2.31 0.028** 
Cognitive complexity 5.0008 4.8168 -0.54 0.592 
RSI Word count 6.2933 6.9384 2.98 0.006*** 
Self-reference 3.6080 3.5410 -0.17 0.868 
Reference to others 0.2308 0.2061 -0.41 0.684 
Emotion words 4.6800 4.1730 -0.98 0.334 
Positive emotion 3.7210 3.5920 -0.27 0.789 
Negative emotion 0.9810 0.6081 -2.36 0.025** 
Cognitive complexity 4.6380 5.0071 1.06 0.299 
RG Word count 6.4062 6.7749 1.42 0.167 
Self-reference 3.4430 3.6200 0.41 0.687 
Reference to others 0.2711 0.1941 -1.21 0.237 
Emotion words 4.7780 4.0930 -1.38 0.178 
Positive emotion 3.7550 3.5670 -0.40 0.691 
Negative emotion 1.0436 0.5550 -3.43 0.002*** 
Cognitive complexity 4.6436 5.0225 1.11 0.275 
Key: Shaded areas indicate matching results with whole sample. 
Table A8: Regression results for firm size 
CYC Coef StDev t-stat p-value 
Word count 
-0.0325 0.0531 
-0.61 0.545 
Self-reference 0.3301 0.1203 2.74 0.010*** 
Reference to others 0.0013 0.0195 0.07 0.946 
Emotion words 0.0842 0.1148 0.73 0.469 
Positive emotion 0.1401 0.1026 1.37 0.183 
Negative emotion 
-0.0640 0.0363 
-1.76 0.088* 
Cognitive complexity 
-0.0368 0.0783 
-0.47 0.642 
TEC 
Word count 
-0.0031 0.0601 
-0.05 0.960 
Self-reference 0.3615 0.1493 2.42 0.022** 
Reference to others 
-0.0064 0.0337 -0.19 0.852 
Emotion words 0.0776 0.1045 0.74 0.464 
Positive emotion 0.0477 0.1003 0.48 0.638 
Negative emotion 0.0695 0.0616 1.13 0.268 
Cognitive complexity 0.17219 0.0846 2.03 0.051 * 
IDU 
Word count 0.0913 0.0579 1.58 0.126 
Self-reference 0.0248 0.0973 0.25 0.801 
Reference to others 
-0.0157 0.0144 -1.09 0.283 
Emotion words 0.0489 0.0864 0.57 0.575 
Positive emotion 0.1195 0.0921 1.30 0.205 
Negative emotion 
-0.0283 0.0540 -0.52 0.604 
Cognitive complexity 
-0.0619 0.0939 -0.66 0.515 
Key: Shaded areas indicate matching results with whole sample. 
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Appendix III: Thematic content analysis approaches in impression management studies 
The following table provides an overview of the impression management studies using thematic content analysis, listing their research objective, 
thematic categories, units of analysis, coding method (i.e. manual or computerised) and coding dimensions. 
Thematic content analysis approaches in impression management studies 
(a) Narrative disclosure 
Ingram & Frazier ( 1980) 
Frazier et al.( 1984) 
Tennyson d al. (1990) 
Clatworthy & Jones 
(2001 a) 
I Rccoding unit (Jones 1994). 
Research objective 
Examine the association 
between content of 
narrative environmental 
disclosures and 
en vironmental 
performance 
Examine the content of 
M D&A and performance 
Decision usefulness of 
narrative content of 
President's letter to 
shareholders and MD&A 
to predict bankruptcy 
Determine whether there 
are systematic differences 
between profitable and 
unprofitable companies 
Categories 
20 categories: monetary, 
past, specific, public 
interest, regulatory 
compliance, etc. 
Derived by means of 
computer analysis 
Five thematic constructs 
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Unit of analysis l Coding method Coding dimensions 
Sentence 
Whole text 
Whole text 
Manual 
Computer 
(WORDS) 
Computer 
(WORDS) 
(a) Evidence 
(b) Time 
(c) Specificity 
(d) Theme 
Derived by means of 
computer analysis 
Derived by means of 
computer analysis 
Thematic content analysis approaches in impression management studies (continued) 
Research objective Categories Unit of analysis Coding method Coding dimensions 
(b) Thematic manipulation 
Abrahamson & Park (1994) Examine whether and Negative organizational Whole text, Manual & Relative number of 
under which outcomes paragraph computer negative words 
circumstances 
management conceals 
negative organizational 
outcome 
Smith & Taffler (2000) Decision usefulness of Positive/negative (a) Evaluative 
narrative content of organizational outcomes (beneficial/adverse) 
chairman's report to (b) Potency 
predict bankruptcy (tangible/intangible) 
(c) Activity 
(dynam ic/static) 
(d) Manageability 
( expected/unexpected) 
Clatworthy & Jones Examines whether Positi ve/negati ve Whole text Manual (a) Length 
(200 I a) profitable and organizational outcomes (b) Key financial 
unprofitable companies indicators 
have differential (c) Quantitative references 
reporting patterns (d) Personal references 
(e) Future orientation 
(f) Good news 
Clat\\orthv & Jones (2003) Examines whether Performance explanations Sentence Manual (a) Classification of news 
profitable and (good/bad/neutral) 
unprofitable companies (b) Attribution 
report positive and (internalle xternal) 
negative organizational 
outcomes in different 
ways 
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Thematic content analysis approaches in impression management studies (continued) 
(c )Attribution 
Staw et al. (1983) 
Aerts ( 1 994 ) 
Research objective 
Presence of self-serving 
attributions in narrative 
corporate report sections 
Categories Unit of analysis Coding method Coding dimensions 
Performance explanations Phrase/sentence 
( cause-effect) 
Manual (a) Locus of causality 
( company, industry, 
environment) 
(b) Direction of cause-
effect 
(c) Past/future orientation 
(d) Implicit/explicit 
causation 
Presence of accounting Performance explanations Phrase /sentence 
( cause-effect) 
Manual (a) Locus of causality 
(internal! external) bias in narrative corporate 
report sections 
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(b) Valence of the effect 
and of the causal 
factor 
( favourable/unfavoura 
ble) 
(c) Nature of explanation 
(technical accounting 
terminology and logic 
or not) 
(d) Expression of cause 
and effect (expressed 
in accounting terms or 
not) 
-------_._-------------------------' 
Thematic content analysis approaches in impression management studies (continued) 
Research objective Categories Unit of analysis Coding method Coding dimensions 
(c) Attribution cont. 
Aerts (2001) Investigation of the Performance explanations Phrase/sentence Manual (a) Locus of causality 
change in performance (cause-effect) (internal/external) 
attributions in narrative (b) Valence ofthe effect 
annual report documents and of the causal 
over time factor 
(favourable/unfavoura 
ble) 
(c) Nature of explanation 
(technical accounting 
terminology and logic 
or not) 
(d) Expression of cause 
and effect (expressed 
in accounting terms or 
not) 
lIooghit:mstra (2001) Comparison of Performance explanations Phrase, sentence Manual (a) valence of effect 
performance attributions (causal (pos it i ve/negati ve) 
of US and Japanese statements) (b) locus of causality 
companies (internal/external) 
(c) direction of callst:-
effect association (due 
to/despite of) 
(d) language of causal 
statement (causal 
language/accounting 
language) 
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Thematic content analysis approaches in impression management studies (continued) 
Attribution conI. 
Aerts (2005) 
Research objective Categories 
Presence of accounting Perfonnance explanations 
bias in narrative 
corporate report sections 
Unit of 
analysis 
Phrase 
/sentence 
( cause-effect) 
Coding method Coding dimensions 
Manual (a) Explained effects: 
• Nature of content 
• Valence of the effect 
(negative/positive) 
• Time orientation (past, 
present, future) 
• Expression 
( quantitative/qualitative 
• Organisational level 
(division, business unit, 
legal entity, group) 
(b) Explaining factors: 
• Type of explanation 
• Direction of influence 
(direct/opposite) 
• Causality locus 
(internal! external) 
• Explicitness 
• Expression 
(quantitative/qualitative) 
-- -- ---- -- - ---- - - ------------------------
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Thematic content analysis approaches in impression management studies (continued) 
Research objective Categories Unit of Coding method Coding dimensions 
analysis 
(d) Performance 
comparisons 
Short & Palmer (2003) Examines the way CEOs Perfonnance referents Clause2 Manual (a) Focus (internal = past vs. 
compare perfonnance (comparators used to measure external = competitors) 
organizational perfonnance) 
2 Sec Appendix VII for {l de<,cription of this and other linguistic terms used in the paper. 
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Appendix IV: Computerised thematic content analysis programs 
This appendix provides an overview of computer programs for automated thematic 
content analysis currently used in impression management research in accounting, and 
also outlines the features of Linguistic InqUiry and Word Count, the program used in 
this study. 
Computerised thematic content analysis programs 
WORDS 
Academic origin Accounting 
Medicine 
application 
• Frazier et al. 
(1984) 
• Tennyson et al. 
(1990) 
Thematic dimensions 
No thematic dimensions. 
Key words (based on 
frequency counts) 
WOR?~ is a computer-assisted content analysis system developed by medical researchers, which "derives statistical 
assocIatIOns between and among narrative words which are descriptive of central themes in the text" (Frazier et al. 1984: 
3I8pp). The advantage of using WORDS is its objectivity. Tennyson et al. (1990: 398) describe the WORDS system as 
follows: "This procedure differs from other forms of content analysis in that thematic constructs are developed from the data 
without the need for prior specification of categories or the need for judges to score the data" Thus, the procedure is relatively 
objective, as it relies upon interassociations in the data rather than subjective decisions by readers to identify content. 
DICTION Linguistics • 
• 
Sydserff & 
Weetman (200 I) 
Yuthas et al. 
(2002) 
• Certainty 
• Optimism 
• Activity 
• Realism 
• Commonality 
DICTION is a computerised content analysis program developed by applied linguistics that examines a text for verbal tone 
across five variables, namely (I) certainty, (2) optimism, (3) activity, (4) realism, and (5) commonality. It is not a thematic 
content analysis per se, but is more suited to analysing texts for rhetorical features, mood, or intent. The software contains a 
series of built-in dictionaries that search text documents for the semantic features reflected by the five variables and 35 sub-
features (including tenacity, blame, ambivalence, motion, and communication). After a text is analyzed, DICTION compares 
the results for each of the 40 dictionary categories to a 'normal range of scores' which is based on more than 20,000-item 
sample of texts. Users can compare their text to either a general normative profile of all 20,000 texts or to any of seven 
specific sub-categories of texts (business, daily life, entertainment, journalism, literature, politics, scholarship) that can be 
further divided into 36 distinct types (e.g., financial reports, computer chat lines, music lyrics, newspaper editorials, novels 
and short stories, political debates, social science scholarship). In addition, DICTION outputs raw frequencies (in alphabetical 
order), percentages, and standardized scores; custom dictionaries can be created for additional analyses. 
OXFORD 
CONCORDANCE 
Linguistics • Smith & Tamer 
(2000) 
No thematic dimensions. 
Key words 
The Oxford Concordance Program (OCP) is a general purpose tool for generating concordances, word lists. and indexes from 
texts. A concordance starts with a list of words occurring in a text which is arranged in alphabetical order. However, as 
opposed to an index, the concordance additionally provides ~e ~ontext in which. th.e word occurs in a given text. ."':he OCP is a 
general purpose tool for text analysis and is suitable for apphcatlons such as styhstlc analYSIS, vocabulary acquIsItIon. 
dictionary making, textual editing, and content analysis. 
Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count 
Psychology (focus • this study 
on personal 
narratives) 
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• Linguistic dimensions 
• Psychological processes 
• Relativity 
• Personal concerns 
(thematic dimensions) 
Appendix V: Reliability statistics 
According to Neuendorf (2002: 159), " ... the reliability subsample should probably 
never be smaller than 50 and should rarely need to be larger than about 300". 
Lombard et al. (2004) claim that a sample size of 50 units or ten percent of the full 
sample is appropriate. 
'Blind coding' should be conducted by the coders of the intercoder reliability sub-
sample (i.e. neither coder should see the coding of other coders prior to completion of 
the assessment) to avoid what researchers term 'demand characteristic'. namely a 
tendency of participants in a study to try to give what the primary researcher wants or 
to skew results to meet a desired goal. 
The coding is carried out by two coders, the author of this study and a linguist. A 
randomly chosen sample of seven chairman's reports is used to assess intercoder 
reliability. The sample size corresponds to the ten percent level established by 
research to be appropriate (Lombard et al. 2004), i.e. Minitab's random sampling 
procedure is used to select seven companies out of the 93. which include the 
following: (l) Surfcontrol PLC, (2) Atlantic Global PLC, (3) Whittard of Chelsea, (4) 
Corporate Services Group PLC, (5) Datamonitor PLC, (6) Albion PLC, (7) Meggitt 
PLC, (8) House of Fraser PLC, and (9) Cookson Group PLC. 
Intercoder reliability statistics are calculated by means of the F-statistic which 
measures the average of precision and recall (see chapter 3, section 3.3.3). is 
computed as shown below. 
Interannotator agreement statistic 
I F=-----
a I-a 
+ p R 
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Alpha (a) allows researchers to weight precision and recall. We adopt conventional 
practise (Manning and Schlitze 1999) and set alpha to 0.5, thus assigning equal 
weights precision and recall. Annotator agreement tends to be in the low 70s for 
precision and in the high 50s to low 60s for recall (Hirschman et al. 1997). \\,ith 
average scores of 0.7187 for precision and 0.8151 for recall (see table below), 
interannotator agreement is within the accepted range. 
This ascertains that the marking of grammatical and lexical ties within and between 
sentences (which provide the basis of the three manually generated cohesion-based 
measures of reading difficulty measures, namely (1) amount of cohesive ties, (2) 
cohesion density, and (3) proportion between given and new information) is based on 
objective criteria and does not reflect "the idiosyncratic results of one's rather 
subjective judgment" (Tinsley and Weiss 1975: 359). 
Results for interannotator agreement 
Entity Name True False False Precision Recall 
positive positive negative 
(# of pairs) (# of pairs) (# of pairs) 
Albion PLC 22 16 4 0.5789 0.8462 
Atlantic Global PLC 144 40 92 0.7826 0.6102 
Datamonitor PLC 2 4 I 0.3333 0.6667 
Whittard Of Chelsea PLC 8 9 3 0.4706 0.7273 
Corporate Services Group PLC 102 10 32 0.9107 0.7612 
Surfcontrol PLC 64 8 4 0.8889 0.9412 
House Of Fraser PLC 119 46 15 0.7212 0.8881 
Cookson Group PLC 35 7 2 0.8333 0.9459 
Meggitt PLC 93 5 5 0.9490 0.9490 
Average 65 16 18 0.7187 0.8151 
360 
F 
0.6875 
0.6857 
0.4.+.+.+ 
0.571'+ 
0.8293 
0.91'+3 
0.7960 
0.8861 
0.9'+90 
0.7515 
Appendix VI: Annotated example text 
The following example is based on the chairman's report of Linx (2002). It illustrates 
the text annotation with MMAX2. Noun phrases are marked by brackets [ ]. potentially 
cohesive noun phrases are marked in blue, and noun phrases standing cohesiye 
relationships with on another are marked in blue and italics. 
{ [Overview] } 
{[I] am pleased to report that [Li11X] achieved [[[[its] stated [objecti\e]] for [the year]]] of 
maintaining [under! ying [profitability]] while continuing to invest in [[the future 
[development]] of [[our] [bllsinesses]]] around [the world].} 
{In the face of [uncertain [economic [conditions]], [this consistent [[profit] [perfonnance]]] 
amply demonstrates [[the robustness] of [[our] business]]].} {With [prudent [planning]]. 
we have maintained [[[[investment] in [the two fundamental [a~pech]]] of [[our] 
[business]]] that will underpin [future [growth]]] - [[[a stream of new and improved 
[[products] and [technologies]]], and [a committed and focused [[distribution] net\\ork]]]] 
to provide [[access] to [[world] [markets]]].} 
{In [the current [year]] [we] have launched [[important new [products]] in [our] [Lil1x] 
[inkjet]] and [Linx] [Xymark]] [laser] [businesses]]]], expanded [[~ale~] of [[LiIl.\] 
[prodllcts]]] in [China] by more than [30c(] and established [a fully-fledged [[di~tribution] 
[operation]]] in [the USA] to sell and support [[laser] [products]] in [thot impOrTlIl1f 
[market]]. } 
[Results] and [Dividend]] 
[Total [sales]] increased by [20~] to [f-J.S.7m] (£47.6m). [Operating [rrt/!ir,]] hefon~ 
[[interest] [charges]]] and [[the amortization] of goodwill]]] were [f5 . .,tm] compared with 
[fS.8m] achieved [last [ year]], [({ figu re] which included [[ an e\l'ept ionall ~ "trnng I fir"t 
[haltl]] from [[Linx] [Xymark]]]. where [J7/"(~lir'] \\'ere materially higher than originally 
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expected by [£O.4m]. [[[Group] [profit]] before [tax]] was [£:\Om] (£5.2m). exactly in line 
with [[market] [expectations]]. 
{[[Earnings] [per [share]]] were [25.7p] (23.6p) equivalent to [27Ap] (25.5p) before [[[th(' 
amortization] of [goodwill] on [acquisitions I].} {[The Board] proposes [[u}lllal [diridend]] 
of[[5.6p] [per [share]]]] (5.5p), bringing [[the total] for [the year]] to [[SAp] [per [share]]] 
(8.2p), [[an increase] of [2(;(]].} {[This [dil'idend]] is covered 3.1 times by [curning'].: {If 
approved at [the Annual [General Meeting]]] [the dividend] will be paid on [22 November 
2002] to [shareholders] on [the register] at [[the close] of [business]] on [1 November 
2002]. } 
{ [Prospects] } 
{While [economic [conditions]] may be no more certain than [they] were [t\\('l\c [month~]] 
ago, [[order] [[input] [levels]]] continue to remain at [satisfactory [\e\eb]]. \ 
{Looking ahead, [we] have [new [products]] to sell, and there are [more] in [the pipeline].l 
{[We] shall be working to develop further [[[our] [[distribution] [performance]]] in [all 
[Ilwrkets ]]], and we are actively looking for [opportunitie~] to build on [[[our] already 
[well-established [position]] in the rapidly growing [Chinese [market]]]].} 
{[We] are looking forward to [a successful [year]] for [the Group]].} 
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1. Antecedent: Linx; cohesive set {2} 
. ., I: ,. 
File Settings Display Tools Info 
([Over Ie ) 
-------
[I) am pleased to report that (um) achieved [[(( ) stated [oOJel.Dlle )) for [the year))) of maintaining [ le ng [ 011 j )) WIllie cont nu ng to lfM'st r 
[[ the future [de> elopment)) of [[ our [ [busmesses[)) around [f! E' wono) .J 
In the tace ot [ Jr eltaln economic [conditions)) . [tr 3 ~onslS "n [[ rr~ft) [ ;Jerrorm31 PIJI amply demonstrates [[ " ,, ) [[ II 
Wilh [prUdent [planning)) , [ Ie) have maintained [[[(in IE';Ol1ent] In [the '1 f~nda pr'31 Ia,p;>, .< ))) [[ . [I ; 'e:~1II 'I 
. [[[ a stream) of new and Impro red ([ proaucts) and [terhnoll"lgles lJl and [a romml e,j ano "'v;ed [[ d·t b mon) ( ~ ())) 0 pna" Cle II 
[marketS))) 
' In I the r.Jrrent [Y"'ar)) I e) have launched [[ Impnrtant ne [prOOt'" II r ([ our) [[ Lr ,) ( r ~ p II [[ ,) [ ""'I ill II [[ ) ( 
[[ sales ( ot [[ Lmv) [proQ'ucrsJ]) In [China) by more than (3D ) and established [a JIi I Prj>!e [[ 5 10 H 1 ( pef, II) In ( 
[[ raser) [proQ'ucrs]) In (rnar Important (mar)'E't)) 
([ResultS) and [Dr'ldenCl)) 
II)) e panded 
) to sel and 'upport 
[Total (sales)) Increased by [2" ) to 1£48 -m ) ( £47 6m ) 
([Operating [profltslllbefore ((InterestJ( 1131 ges J]) all( ([ 1e amor sat, ) I g' ))) were I '" ) compareCl With I " )achieved ( • ( )) ( 
figure) which Included [[an e.'ct'ptlOnali~ strong Iflf5t [halt ))) from [[ I If 1 [ I a ))) . where II" 'r~1 were matenally higher than onglnally e'<Pected by ( 
I 
([[[ Group) [profit)) before [ta II was £5 Om ( 1£5 2rr ) ) , exactly In line With II n" e'l I ;> "e t1 I II 
. [[ Earmngs) [pel I sna. e)lI were 1_5 'p i ( 23 6p ) equJValent to [_ - 1~ 1 ( 25 5p ) betore III I -' Jl )) 
I [The 81lard) proposes [[ a .fmal [ t1!\1oenoll 0' [[ 5 ;:~ I [reI [s ,aT )))) ( 5 5p ) , bnnglng [[ P J I r [ II to [[ 1(1. ))) (8 2p I[ 
Inl.rea~e J of [ :'''' II I 
[ rnls "1Vlt1eno) Is covered 3 1 times by I eammysl 
If approved at [tne A.nn .131 [General (/1t'E'Mg ))) [m" cJl~ ""'11 Will be paid on ( ~~. emo;>r 1 to II 11 "hOld;>r<;1 ;) I jO P 1 II at II el 
[buslnes< 1I on [ I November :'00:'1 J 
III 
I 
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Antecedent: businesses; cohe et {4} 
File Settings Display Tools Info 
(II am pleased to report that (Lm,] achieved ([((ItS] stated (ooJect! ell ror l !tle lio'arlJ] of maintaining I Je rg I Jta 
([ the ruture Ide 'elopmentll of (( ourl [busmessE'5111 around l /1le )\>'Or' . ___ 
In the face of l uncertaln economiC IconcJitlOns ll , [ thIS "onsistenr ([profit] [performarr.>?1J] amply demonstrates ere 0 
WIth Iprudent Iplan[llngll . I ·"/el have maintained ([((In'estmentj ln (the ;0 tund3menlal l a;pemlJ] rr II "·url (l'_: -111 ' 'l 
. ((( a stream] ot new and Improved (( proOU([s] and ItechnOlogles lJ] ar-a (a comrrlltted and ' 0': sed II ' 0;1 " 'O'"1n ]I"e" , lUI 10 pro 
(marketslll I 
{In Ithe current Iyearlllwe ] have launched ((importantne-.. (prooue sll In ((our]IILlmll lnhletll ard II Lln~]1 ,ar II II .:j>P I ( 1111 expanded 
([ sa iesl of ((Lim] (proauctslllin IChina ] by more than (30% ] and established l a ful~ ·1'eLiged ([ :lI~tnblJtl'1 I ( o~e at IJ] In [, .. 5 ... ) to sell ana up port 
(( faserl [proou([sll in I that Important (marnetll , 
{([ReSI.Jlts) and (Dlvldend llJ 
HTotal l sales ll increased by I:?% ) to [£48 7m l (£47 6m) \ 
m Operatlng [prontsllloefore ((Interest) (, harges lJ] and (Ithe amortlsatlor ) 01 (gooo )11 were (£5'" I compared WIth I ~ ~ I achieved ( ( ... II , ( 
figure) which included ((an exceptJonally strong (f irst (half ll) from ([ Unx( r -(ymar1o IJ] . where [r DMs) were matenally higher than originally expected by ( 
I 
{([[Group) [prof/til before (ta)(l1 was £5 Om ( [£5 2m l ) . exactly In line W1th IIrrarket) (>? per t3Dons ll I 
III Earnmgsl (pel (snare]1I were (25 7p I ( 23 .6p ) eqUIValent to [27 4p l ( 25 5p ) before lilt e ilr-ort uDor I uf (Juu I )) (d lU r II 
{(The Board I proposes (( a final l olVloenoll 01(( 5 6pl (per Isnarellll (5 5p). bringing [[tr,e totall for (.I·e "ar ll to li e 1' 111'1" [sn III ( e 2p ), fl ltl 
Increase) of [2%11 .1 
II rms OMoen Is covered 3 1 times oy (earnmgsl I 
{If approved at Ithe Annual [General [ME't'tlng11l [mE' <J"MOE'n')1 Will be paid on 1_. No ember 291 21 to (( SharehOlder l or (tne "g Ie II at (( C' PI r 
[buslness ll on [ I November 2002) I 
3. Antecedent: our business; cohesive et {2} 
~'MMAX21 . 0 BETA 3 C.\Oo".\MMX2Texle\Lin"lIUI1dl 
File Settings Display Tools Info 
IIOvervlewll 
!II) am pleased to report that (Lim) achieved [[[[ ItS) stated [ Jolecbve ll 'or [tile yearlll of maintaining [ J je my [ .J t 
lithE rutur E Idevelopmentll or [(our] [1.)usmessesll1 around [ll't' won,]1 I 
(In the fa ce of (uncertain economic [condlllOn' l1 , (thiS ~e.'lSI~tent IIprotlt) (pell''Jrrrar "111 amplydemonstra"-=te",s ...... _ 
{With [prudent Iplannlngll . [we ) have maintained [(((In estrnent) ul [the a :~nd3' ,er 31 [ ,;;pe',. 1II r (t[ !l _._ 
_ liP stream) of new and unproved [( proC'uctsl and I e-'lnologles lll ar 1 [; or-Iml e:J an .ed (( j II 
(mar et <; llJ I 
l in [trlE current [,,-ear II ('~e l have launched ((I rnportant ne [prOOLc,. JI ,r [[our I 11- 'I [ rl -·11 - J 11 1.. 01" 1 ( al 
[( ,ale,1 of [( LlI'V)[P!OOu t5m ln lehlr al by more than p O I and established P ·Pd" II rr but II p:r 
II 3serllp,o,Jurtsll ln ['''at IfllJ; )rIa"l [ ma'~E'r]) 
1I I Re~ults l .:md IDrvldpndll 
IT utal l sale II rncreased by (_ ~ I to [ ~Ito 111 ( £47 6m ) 
[IOper Jt, lQ ( ,: "fl,oll [t lrp II ere II I r III ([ 1 
fJ!ltJrel which Included If 1n "'Xl P~"II:JIl ~II .t 1 [I" ,( [I 'II 111 I" ([ II 
111 1.,., L P II ro "ll ['efor" [t'l ll'tlias (5 Orn ( [ 0 ~m l ) • e aclly In line WIth II 
[ 
III 
p i [ 
m.=a 111' ')[,' [ s.. ' III were [ - I ( 23 6p ) eqUIValent to [ ) ( 5 5p ) betore [II 
'II ' 11 - )1 ( 1111 ( 5 5p ) • onnglng II II The 8e. II j l proposes II r [v' ~ 
rrt~l 1 ' 1 II 
( ~, ,~ " . ,» ') Is covered 3 1 times by (. 
If approved at [ n ( ~ 1 I 
, ) 
III [ I 111 be paid on [ 
[ Inr' 11 on [ I , r"1be 00 ) 
II while con~nUlng to Invest In 
1111 expanded 
~ I to sell and support 
II II 
11 [ 
I 
111 
I 
4. Antecedent: the world; cohesive set {2} 
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[I) am pleased to report that [U",) achieved [[[[ 'ts) stated [Jb etD ell ror [the, ear)]) of maintaining [ j Je r 9 [ :'It~, • II e conM I'g ~ n\ies ~ 
W e 'utu e [oe' el')pl"1er t] ) of [[our) [busmE'SSes)]) around [rhE' Ie J) 
In the face of [ Jr E' rtalr econom,c [conditIOns)) , [thiS onslstent [[profit] [performa' e)]) amply demonstrates W e oJb - ''' ) [[ II It! 
'With [prudent [planning)) , [ e) have maintained [[[[In 'estment) In [the 0' Jndar-en,al [a5per'S )]) or 11 0' ) [bJS rFF)1I tr~- ~ [ _ [ 
- l[Ja stream) of ne and Improed [J prooucts ) and [techrologles )]) and [3 LOmmltte,j ard 'DC 5E'd II d,st, b ~on)l I"e ~ 1111 to prov de 1('; e I II 
[rrarketS)ll I 
{In Ithe current [v-ear ll [we ) have launched [[Important ne , [proouctsll ir [[our) [[ unv)l ln~jetll arlll IlL''''1 [ rr 3rl ll II il.(' ) [ . 5 _ - 1111 expanded 
II ales) or [Jum) [produC1slllin [China) by more than [30· ) and established [a lui -rledged [J C1'Stribut or l [are at on ll) In [ h_ ~ I to sel and support 
[J aser) [pr"ouctsll in [tnar Imponam [mar'-E'tll 
([Pes J s) and [Dndendll 
[Total [sale,)) Increased by [2%1 to [£48 7m l (£47 6m ) , 
[[ Operating [ profits)) [before [(Interest) [ .harges ))1 and [Jthe arlortlsatlLr I of [gOOG III were [f" .J~ I compared WIth [ -" I acn,eved ( [ II • ( 
ngure) which Included [[an exceptionally strong [first [halflll from lIun, ) r 'fnarl ))] , where [p 1fitsl were matenally nigher than onglnally e peeted by ( ~ m( 
I 
[[( GroUPI (profit )) before [tav )) was £5 Om ( [£5 <!m ) ) , exactly In line With IImar' err [expectation II I 
IIEammgs) [PE'f [ sharelll were [25 7p l ( 23 6p ) equlVcllent to [::"7 4p) ( 25 5p) before [)[ t e amorti.laOon) _f l ;pOdWIlI lI 13 
[Tne Boardl proposes lI a rtnai [ d,'II1(l enO)) 0/ ([ :; 5p) [pef [sharp)))) (5 5p ) ,bnnglng (It' e Lal l ror (the ar )) to II -l I (Of' ( t 
Increase) Of [20,. )) I 
• [ r h!S OI'.1oen is covered 3 1 times by [ earnmgs) I 
II 
))) 8 2p ) , [) 
,If approved at [the Annua [General [Heetlng lll [ tnt' )11-")1"'1,) 1 will be paid on [:: 10 ember ~ I to [) harehO 0'" 5 1 
[bUSineSs)) on [ 1 November ~OO~) 
;- ~ 1 !p )) at II 
5. Antecedent: products; cohe ive set {4} 
• 1f. I: I • 
File Sl!l1ings Dis~ Tools Info 
([Overvle II 
11 JJ 
_ 8 x 
[(I I am pleased to report that [ Lln~) achieved [([[ Itsl stated (JCJt' t ell 01 [U,e earll) of maintaining I le ng I 
[[ the future [developmentll or [[ ourl [busmesseslll around [tI'e ,1'(; 01 
fila )) while continuing to Invest In 
In the face Of [un elt 3lr econ mlc [cO'1(1'O'Jns ll , [tl slSle'lt [[plUr ) [ '''IT('rm3 ,,))) amply demonstrates II e t II 
'With [prudent [pl'1nnlngl) , [ " I have maintained [[[[ n "SIMer t) '1 [ he OJ nd3 " 
_ [[P stream) '1t '1e an lJ'1pro /P,] [[~,- I"nIO(,j e ))) an [a cmmrJ:" ' 
[marhet -1lI 
1 II [[~ ]([- ,( I 
) and established [ " 
[[ ~'e It' ) md p Idpnd ll 
[ ,Jt31 [ jl. II Increased by [ _ I to [ ~.ol 'r I (£47 6m) 
[[ ('pe, 11 [ , II [ II ' ) [ ,eo III [[ 
r; "') which Included II jl" ~ 11 st [ [ III 
[[[l, r r I [, 'II ~r I [ II was £5 Om ( [ I ) e actly In hne ..,tn II " II 
[[ t: I 
[ Eo 
I ( 23 6p ) equlVcllent 10 I I \ 25 5p ) oetore II[ 
[ I.I'~ 11 [[ ) [ [ JIll (5 P) , b ng ng [[ 
I 
III [ 1 II t e 3 on [ 
[ap" 111 ' 11 I( t;"'~-III " 
p II t 0 I ( ~ 1111 a proVIde II 
e ll 
[[ 
I il ([ 
1 1111 I [ 
lII ,n [ 
II I 
I [ 
II 
III (8 
II ([ 
(I 
6. Antecedent: Linx; cohesive set {3} 
I: .. . ., 
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[II am pleased to report that [uml achieved [[[[ llsl stated [obJecb ell for [the yeal lll of malntalmng [ ~je ng [ ~.~t3() • II wtJle conOn Ing a nvest In 
[[ the future [dE" elopr entll of [[ourl [busmesse'sllI around [me ..ronol .J 
In the face of [Jncertaln economic [conditions II . [thiS ronslstent [[profitl [performar'cellJ amply demonstrates U- p O,,-,C p [ - [[ I [ ~. III 
With [prudent [planmngll , [ el have maintained [[[(in· 'e5UT1ent) n Itt-, e oundamental [ aspe'n lll or [( ou' l [ ~JS "e5sll1 3 ~ [ P [ III 
- [[[ a streaml Of <1e and Impro 'ed [[~nologles lll and [a commmed ard rc,~ sed [[ d st·" "Jonl l "'e ]- 1111 to prOVIde [[ 3 p ) ~ II ' I 
[markets III J 
110 ,m, ""'''' , .. " Jl~' h~ """'he, II~P'O"",,,II " 11'"'1 IIUn-, ,,,,,"11 "" II ,," ," , • '" 11110" " M 0<.' •• '111 "",,"" 
[[ ,ales I of Li r 'r JuctsllJ In [Chlnal by more than [3D· I and established [a rul -rtedgea [[ dlstnbutO" 1 [ open u IJJ n it' e <;J ) to sel l and support 
[( raser) II" vaucrslI In [mar Imponam [mart;etll 
[[ResultSI and [DIvidend))) 
I[Total [salesll increased by [2%) to [£48 7m l ( £47 .6m ) .J 
m Operatlng [profltsll [before [[ Interestl [chargeslll and [[ the amortlsatlor I of [gooOwill lll were [£5 -'l "11 compared with 1£" I aChieved I [ 'Edr ll . Ie 
figurel which Included [[an exceptionally strong [first [haltl ll from [[Unxl [ ., marl- Ill , wtJere [po :>N.;) were matenally higher than onglnally expected by I 
I 
([[[ GrouP) IprOflT1I before [ta ll was £5 Om ( [£5 2m ) ) , exactly In line With [[man.,etlle pect3t1on< 1J I 
I[[ Earmngsl [per [sharelll were [25 7p ) ( 23 6p ) eqUIValent to [ ~- 4pl ( 25 5p ) before ([[the 31 ortJsatJor I ~ l \ivl~ II _ I II 
([The Board l proposes [[a fmal[ oMoenoll 01 [[ 5 6p) [pel I sharellll ( 5 5p ) , bnnglng [[ the tutal ) for Itt e earll to II 4, I [r IS' .' III ( 8 2p ) , II ar 
Increasel of [2% 11 I 
I n/S G'lvl t1E'n.1) Is covered 3 1 times by l earnmgsl .J 
/If approved at [the Annual lGeneral [Meetlng[IJ I tne I1lvlaen tf[ will be paid on [n No ember 200~ 1 to 1(5t>3reholders l ~n 1m", '''J,st'' II at IItt" 1(' 1'1 Of 
IbuSlness lI on [ I November ~OO~I I 
7. Antecedent: laser; cohesive set {2} 
. : . ,
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[0' 'ervlewl l 
1111 am pleased to report that [Unvl achieved [[[[ '[s l stated [oblelD ell or Ithe ~ear lll of maintaining I Ie' r,g I rita r II wtJlle contmulng to Invest In 
lithe future [developmentll or [[ourl [bJs,,.,esseslll around [,'7e "Ie 0) 
, In the race of [ uneert31r ecoromlc [coreJiOon; 1I , [tliS lSI ter [(prLflt) I le-.r'1'3 to lll a~p~.dem~n~tes II .- ~~:lJ " I t II I II 
{With [prudent (plannlng ]1 ' [ Ne ) have maintained [[[[1n e5tment) In (the 1 Tund3r' en 31 1 3~Pt?1 <:. ))1 If 1 [ .... III [ I P _ . 
_ 11 [.'1 stre3r11 of ne' 3nd Impro 'ed [[ pro,,!Y!sl 3M [ eC'1nologle5111 3nd p 'onmmeCl 3~d 1('- F.'d 1(:1 -[ :.or 11 -1' )1 1111 to proVIde II ~ 
III 
I III 
II I 
[marl.etslII J 
In [the current [I.'e3r ll [ e) have launched lI ,n pvtant ne [prca!.',.!' 11 
[( sa les I Of lIuml [P oaL rts) II In [CI' na t by more than [30 1 and estahUsbed Ii'-' 
[[ L.. ,I [ 
rr7 II e 
1111 expanded 
~ I to sell and support 
II .. rl [proau·-rsll in (Ina! imporram I mar~ efll I 
/[[ Pe< Jlt< I 1nd [Lil' Idendll 
{[ Total I .lIe II Increased by [, I to [ olt '1'11 ( £47 6m ) 
tI[ C'lpE'r1tl'''l [f ,r'. 11 [ I:e ,I" II PI 1 [ r l " III II e'l 0 
'II).,,,,,) Which Included [( .3n '! e lor 31 stl ('1. It t I f 1 [IJ "l II I [ 
[ II) were li<; 4 I compared Wltn I " jaC 
III wtJere [ ", I were materia . h gtler an ong 
[II .r('up l II "" II er r" [t II was £5 Om ( [ :>. I ) e actty In line With II " I ( 
II 
III ( Il • Ol l ( 23 6p 1 eqUIValent to 1_ I ( ~5 5p 1 before III 
"II II )[ ( [IJ I ( 5 5p ) , oong ng II Hl Ea I [ [ )11 were [ , II T'1e E 11 proposes [[ fJ' [[ 
II [ II 
,~ ') Is covered 3 1 times by I .J ' I I 
It approved at [ I ~ [ 1111 P; J ;1. 111 be pa a on [ I a II II II 
l int> II on [ 
6 
8. Antecedent: the USA ; cohesive et {2} 
I: I, 
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[I) am pleased to report that [Lim) achieved [[[[ '.5) tated [ClbJe tJ ell 01 [lI"", eal III of maintaining [u- je ng [ , • Ita , )) Ie on U ng IrlVe: In 
[( the futu e [ de-'elop' ent)) or [(our) [busmesses))) around [me ~'(lr''' ) 
In the face of [uncertain ecur1rriC [ condltlon~ 1I , [ tr s n1Slslp'lr [[prof ) [ .. erforma l e))] amply demonstrates W ~ 5 p l ' [( I ( 
IWIth (prudent (planning)) , ( ve l have maintained ([([Investment) In (the t 8 'Jndal ertal ( "spel '< Ill '-r ([ L~ I (t> .. s np-"(]J " "' ( " (1 
• ([( a stream) of nE"l and Impro eo ([ prOOUClsl and [terhnologles (]J 3rCl (3 comml::::ej 3r~ '''Ie ie,- ([ :1 5t " ~-,; ) ("e 1111 0 proViae [( l " ) ' (( 
[mar ets))] 
(In [ the LJrrent [ !Eal )( [ e( haVle launched ([ Important ne. [prooucts )( Ir ([ our) [(~n'l ( I et)) a [( _,, ) [ 
[( sales ) of [( LIm) (prMucts In [:hlna) by more than ( 3~" ) and established [a ully-tlp? jen !! Ih 't,n ~ 
[( ,aser) (prolJucts)[ In ( ' 131 "'1rC''tam [mar et)( 
a )( [( ~ -e ) ( E. 1111 e pandeo 
u~ m In [ - - ) to sell ana support 
([[Results ) and [Dr 'Idendll l 
, [Total [ sales )( increased by (. "!o ) to (,A8 '?rn ) (£47 6m ) 
([[Operating [profitS)) (before [( Interest) [charges (]J and [(tile amortlsatlor l Of (gOOd ))( were (_ 
figure) which Included ([an e<ceptionalh, strong ( ~rst (halfJ lI frorn [(Unx ) [K\II1 3 III where [ ~ 
I 
) compared WIth ('-'5 ) achieved ( l [ lI lI , ( 
I were matenally higher than onglnally e'(pected by ( 
(((( GrouPI (proflt)( before [ta , )( was £5 Om ( (£5 lm ) ) , exactly In line With (( I' 31 E'tl Ie p" t'l un II 1 
([Ear'lrngs) [per (sriare)ll were ( ~5 7p) (23 6p) eqUIValent to ( ~ 4p) ( 25 5p ) before ((( e J , u ) , ( 
[The Board) proposes [( a final (C'Io"Jeno)) 01 [( 5 6p) (pe (sl,'are)(]J (5 5p ) ,bnnglng ([t! e tutJ I v' l f' II to II 
Increase ) or (2% 11 I 
' [ 'nlS olVl,)ent1) Is covered 3 1 times by [earnrngsl 
II )l 
Il r ' ( 
l lf approved at [the Annual (Gener31 [Meeting ))) (me JIVIt1eM1 Will be paid on 1 2~ No E'mber 21 I to II ,t :1rp hCld p r ) [ p f' 
[buSiness II on [ I No ember 2002) } 
9. Antecedent: profits; cohesive et {3} 
. : I, 
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II 
111 (8 p), 11 t 
II at II I r 
[I) am pleased to report that (um) achieved ([(( '15 ) ;t.lted ( Dt'''ct~e ll 'or (tile ear)1I or maintaining ( 
[[ the ruture (deelopmentll ot [l our) [O-.lsrnesseslll around [r"e I',OM) } 
II while continuing to Invest In 
,In the face of ( Jr celt'lln ec InU1111C (corrJltlonsll , [t 11< 151 er ([pmt ) [ F'r)[ 3 elll amply demonstrates [( ~ • 111 1 
'With [prudent (planning )) , [ e ) have maintained [(([ !') ~5trT el .t) ( -~e " • rd3' ~r 31 [ 'he er III - [( 0 II 0 ~~'-'-III e [ 1 III 
• [(( 3 srre.3l1) :Jr new 3f\( Impr0 e,' [( Pro~L!"-1 3n(, W,-n", IC~ esll ) "nil (3 11,-":1" - f' [( ] a ,) ( r~· 1111 0 provide [[ I ' II ) 
Imarl--etslll 
, In I the._ ent [ 'eJI II ( e) haVle launched [I 11>.L ,ant Ie ( ~l.)L .· 11 I (( - )11 - ) ( 
([';ale l or [lumllp'.t1u",sll) In ( - If a) by more than ( '" ) and established [3' -
[[ raSE'f) [P' .]u 'IS)) In (":3: '"l( "ani ( mar~"T II 
((Per JI ,' ) 3nd ( " ,,'1end)1l 
( Jt31 1S lit u~aSed bt (. ) to ( f.4~ 
lI 'pPI.1t [ II [ [[ PI" ) ( I 
(] ~I Which Included II in ~ C e(' 0031 str 
) ( £47 6m) 
lTiT II 
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10. Antecedent: [5.4m ; cohesive et {2} 
Fde Settings Oislllall Tools Info 
I'::' i"r e ] 
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Appendix VII: Coding manual 
1. Coding Guidelines and Methods of Coding 
1.1. Coding objective 
The objective of this study is to analyse cohesion between noun phrases in the 2()()2 
chairman's reports of nine UK companies, namely (1) Surfcontrol PLC. (2) Atlantic 
Global PLC, (3) Whittard Of Chelsea PLC, (4) Corporate Services Group PLC. ()) 
Datamonitor PLC, (6) Albion PLC, (7) Meggitt PLC, (8) House Of Fraser PLC. and 
(9) Cookson Group PLC 
It is your job to identify the noun phrases which stand in a cohesin~ relation to each 
other and mark them as (a) antecedents and (b) anaphoric expressions. The following 
figure illustrates the types of cohesive devices covered by this study: 
Type of 
cohesion 
Cohesive 
devices 
Linguistic 
devices 
Examples 
Reference 
Endophora 
Anaphora 
• pronouns 
• direct 
anaphors 
• synonym 
he. him, his, 
himself 
Types of cohesive devices included in this study 
Grammatical 
cohesion 
Substitution 
Exophora 
llmylmille; do. Olle, rhe 
I\'e/O II rl same 
ours; 
you/yourl 
YOllrs 
~ ., 1 
_, I 
Lexical 
cohesion 
Repetition S) n(ln) m \l'~lI 
synonym 
Note: It i not required to c1a ify cohe ion into the fi e different categorie Ii t d 
above. This mean that it is not neces ary to di tingui h between referential r p ti ti n 
(direct anaphor) and lexical repetition or referential ynon m Inear 
anaphors) and lexical synonym or near ynonym. Thi mean that in t rm f 
annotation, the following two sentence will be treated identicall : 
1a. Referential use of repetition, i.e. direct anaphor: 
[The Board] proposes [[a final [dividend]] ~f [[5. 6p] [per [ ,hare]]]] (S.Sp . brine-in,.., 
[[the total] for [the year]] to [[S.4p] [per [ hare]]] (S .2p), [[an increa ] of [2 ( ]] .} 
{[ This [dividend] ] is covered 3.1 time by [earning ]. 
Both expressions refer to the same extra-linguistic entity, nam ly a di id nd f 5. P 
per share. 
lb. Non-referentialllexical use of repetition: 
l in [the CUlTent [year]] [we] have ... expanded [[. al ] of [[Lll1x] [prodUCT\ ]]] III [ hina ] 
by more than [30%] and established [a fully-fledged [[ ui~tnbuti n] [operation ]]] in [The 
USA ] to sell and support [ [laser] [product, ]] in [thot 1Illportw/! /I/(/,."CI ]]. 
The two express ion refer to different extra- lingui tic entitie ,narnel Lint prodll I. 
and laser products. 
2a. Referential use of synonym, i.e. IS-A anaphor: 
In [the CUlTent [year]] [we ] ha e ... e tabli hed [a fully-tl ugctl [l ui trihution ] 
[ peration]]] in [Ihe U A] to ell and upport [ [lo.\('r] [prod/{( 1\ ]] in [Llllll import lilt 
market]]. } 
Both expre Ion refer to the arne extra-lingui ti entit . narn 1 . til 
2b. (Non-referentialllexical u e of ynonym): 
[Part of [[ourl [ trakgy]] will in Iud [[ th I ur ha ( I f L dd- n 
[bu ine e )]] and \\c .1rc plea L'd l) haH: ann un ld [lI th [[ th 
btl. inc ,,]] and [n:rtain [a d ]]] )f [BR kf r 111' III I III . 
The expreSSions the purchase and the acquisition refer to two different e. tra-
linguistic entities , namely the purchase to the purchase of add-on bu ine e and liz 
acquisition to the acquisition of BRS Taskforce. 
1.2. Text annotation 
Text annotation is carried out according to the guideline e tabli hed b the Sev nth 
Message Understanding Conference (MUC-7) on co-reference I which have b n 
adapted to annotate cohesive relations. 
Text annotation is carried out in two steps. The first tep invol e marking all th 
linguistic entities which could potentially form a cohe i e relation hip ith th r 
linguistic entities. The second step entails marking two or more lingui tic ntiti a 
being cohesive, i.e. being interconnected. 
1.2.1. Marking linguistic entities 
The first step in the annotation proces i to mark the lingui tic entitie hich ar 
potentially cohesive with other linguistic entitie. Thi mean that a mark d 
expressIOn mayor may not form a cohe ive tie with another marked xpre ' Ion. 
Linguistic entities to be marked are referred to a markable . 
1.2.2. Style of annotation 
In the context of this study markable expre ion (potentially cohe i e noun phra ' ) 
are rendered in blue and cohe ive noun phra e (antecedent and anaphori 
expressions) are rendered in blue and italics. The boundarie of markabl ar 
rendered by means of brackets [ ]. 
Expre sion may contain two or more markable , i.e. 
pecific part of other expre ion . The pre en e of t 0 or 
n m 
ex pres ion are rendered by mean of bra k t within bra k t fl] r [ 11: 
r [ r t 
\\ ithin n 
[[ l ~ . ] [ I ]]] \l /ere l'':; '{11 ) e ui\al nt t 1- Al l -: .':-p) (/1'1/ /II g' Jc.'r ,. 1(1 n' vv - - • _ . 
[[[ thL amortization] of [gOl d\\ ill l 011 [.ll lui iti 111 11 [ h B r 1 I r P L ! [ I 111 rI 
[dh'iciend]] of [[5.6p] [per [ hare]]]] (S.Sp) ... [Thi, [d/ I'idelld]] i coyer d 3.1 time 
by [earning.s ]. 
In the first sentence there are three markable in the expre ion earnin p r h r , 
namely earnings per share, earnings, and per share. The expre ion per har in th 
econd sentence refers back to per share in the fir t entence and the noun phra 
earnings in the third sentence refers back to earnings in the fir t enten e. 
1.2.3. Type of linguistic entities to be marked 
Nouns, noun phrases and pronouns 
Cohesion will be marked between element of the following at gon : (a) nun,' , 
such as [earnings], (b) noun phra e , uch a [[a final [di\ id nd]] ot [[56p] [pt:r 
[, hare]]]], and and (c) pronoun, uch a [the) ] and [ /he]. Pronoun in Iud (a 
personal pronouns [they, them], [ !he, her!him], (b) po e 1 e pron un [their, 
their ], [her/ , hi ], (c) reflexive pronoun [them~eh , ] and [h r elf. hUll eltl. and d) 
demonstrative pronouns [thi ]. 
Possessive and reflexive pronoun 
The pos essive forms of pronoun u ed a determiner are markable: 
l [1] am pleased to report that [Linx] achie ed [[[[i t, ] tated [ bJ t1 e]] ... 
There are three potential markable for relation in the ex pre i n it toted l~ecli\'e, 
namely its, the entire noun phra e it tated objective, and bje ti\'e. 
Reflexi e pronoun are markable: 
f11cl hot [him elf] with [hi [re1'0l\' rj. 
H ~, him. e~f, and hi h uld all mark d h , i\ . 
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Name and named entitie 
Names and named entities, such as [Linx] and [Xymark]. including dat [22 
November 2002], times , currency amounts [£-t-8.7m], and percentage [2(( ] ar all 
considered noun phrases and thu represent markables (all Linx 2002). 
Present participles 
Present participles which are modified by other nouns [program trading] or adje tiv 
[prudent [planning]] (Linx 2002), are preceded by an article, uch a a [a placing] 
"the" , "my" , etc.) or are followed by an "of" phra e (" lowing of the econom ") ar t 
be considered noun-like and ARE markable. 
Pre-nominal modifiers 
Pre-nominal modifiers , such as [[trade] [I.,tocktaking]] ill [[ trade] [[ ... tockti1king] 
business]]] are markable (Christie 2002). 
The pre-nominal modifier [ tocktaking] form a cohe ive relation hip with the n un 
phrase [stocktaking] in the next paragraph: 
[Orridge & Co] ... complements [[our] Venn rl.,' itcen, ed [trade] [l \lockl{/kiJl~ ] 
[lmsille ]]] ... 
[The Group] now has [[substantial [platfornl ]] in [ \lock/({kiJl~ ] . .. 
J7~ 
The following table provides a summary of 1m' gu' t' , , I IC entItle to be mark d 
potentially cohesive with other lingui tic entitie : 
Expressions to be marked as being potentially cohesive with other expre IOn 
Linguistic Categories 
Noun phrases 
Pronouns 
Dates 
Currency expressions 
Percentages 
Names 
Named entities 
Present participles 
Pre-nominal modifiers 
Subcategories and example 
Simple noun (firm , Noun with article (a 
firms) firm. the firm) 
Personal pronouns (I, Demon trati e 
myself) pronoun (this, that) 
January 23, 1999 
£1,2 million 
17% 
Amanda Street 
(Christie 2002) 
Reuters, United 
Nations, London 
Modified by noun or 
adjectives 
(Program trading, 
excessive spending) 
Stocktaking business 
(Christies 2002) 
Preceded by arti Ie (the 
spending, Ollr 
spending) 
Type of linguistic entities not to be marked 
un with adje ti\e (0 
large finn, large jiml\) 
Po e ive pr n un 
(JII\'. mine) 
F 1I0wed b of 
( 10 ing f th 
c nomy) 
The relation is marked only between pairs of element both of which are markable . 
This means that some markables that look anaphoric will not be coded. 
Pronouns without antecedents 
In certain cases, pronouns may not have an antecedent and are thu not to be marked: 
As [shareholders] are aware, it is [[our] [ trategy]] to extend [[our] [acti'vitie ]], either 
in [geographical or product [term ]], in order to achieve [[a 'ati'Sactory [level ]] of 
[1 ng-term [growth]]] (Christie 2002). 
Pronoun (including demonstrative pronoun) may refer to omething unrnarkabl ,f r 
example, a dau al construction. In uch cases they are not to be marked: 
Program trading is not to the benefit of the small illve tor, that' for l{ r . 
1th u"",h that i r lat d to pro ram trading i !lot t the benefit of the mall [11\' {or. 
the 1 .. tt r is n t markabl , n antec dent i annotated for that. 
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Implicit pronouns 
Do not code relations between a relative pronoun and the noun phra e to which it 
attaches or the gap that it fills: 
the movie which I saw 
The relative pronoun which bears no markable relation to either the movie (the h ad to 
which the relative pronoun attaches) or to the implicit object of saw (the gap that th 
pronoun fills). 
Gerunds 
Gerunds, i.e. phrases headed by a present participle, are taken to be verbal if th y an 
take an object or can be modified by an adverb and are thu not markable: 
{[I] am pleased to report that [Linx] achieved [[[[ its] ~tated [obj eliv ]] for [the 
year]]] of maintaining [underlying [profitability]] while continuing to in e t in [[ the 
future [development]] of [[ ollr] [bu. ine..,~e , ]]] around [the world]. (Linx 2002). 
In the above example maintaining is not treated a part of the noun phra e [unuerl) II1g 
[profitability]] since it could take an adjective, uch a con fanfly maintainin 
[underl ying profi tabil ity ]. 
1.2.4 Expressions not to be marked as cohesive: 
Inter-year comparisons 
[Total [sales]] increased by [2%] to [£48 .7m] (£47.6m) (Linx 2002). 
The following Table provides a ummary of lingui tic entitie not to be marked a 
being potentially cohe ive with other lingui tic entitie : 
Expressions NOT to be marked as being potentially cohe ive with other expre ion 
Linguistic Categories Subcategories and examples 
Pronouns 
Gerundi 
Inter-year 
comparisons 
Antecedent is clause: 
TIC pic will go 
bankrupt, that's 
certain. 
Slowing the economy is 
supported by some; 
Total sales increased 
by 2% to £4B.7m 
(£47.6m). 
1.2.5 Size of linguistic entities 
How much of the markable to annotate 
Implicit pronouns: 
the film l;vhich I sa\\' 
Pronouns withollt 
antecedent : 
It' s raillillg 
Markables must include the head of the markable (a defined below) and rna in lud 
any additional text up to a maximal noun phrase (a defined below). 
For most noun phrases, the head will be the main noun, without it left and right 
modifiers. In the following examples the head of the noun phra e i marked in bold: 
[uncertain [economic [condition ]] (Linx 2002) 
[that [important [market]]. } 
[[[[ it ] stated [objective]] for [the year]]] (Linx 2002) 
The last example can be decomposed into two further noun phra e with the follo 1l1g 
heads: 
[[[ it ] tated [objective]] 
[its] 
Fixed phrases 
[CEOs} who receil e [golden handshakes} face [critici 111J by [uHi Il 
[repre entafi esj. 
Minimum noun phra e 
2 fund = a rbal form u ing a pr nt partiLiple. 
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The minimum noun phrase is the head of a noun phra e, often a imple noun, uch a 
[earning ] or [the world] (Linx 2002). 
Maximum noun phrase 
The maximal noun phrase includes all text which may be considered a modifier of the 
noun phrase. The following linguistic entities can act as modifiers: 
Adjectives 
[prudent [planning]], 
Appositional phrases 
Appositional phrases are two noun phrases referring to the arne entity. 
[[QueueBuster], [[a product] which provide. [tangible and quantifiable [ben fit ]] to 
[[our] [customers]]]] (Netca1l2002) 
Non-restrictive relative clauses 
Non-restrictive relative clauses do not restrict the reference of a phra e to which r to 
whose head it relates. 
[[a figure] which included [[an exceptionally trong [first [half] ]] fr III [[Lin. ] 
[Xymark]]]] 
[[[[ investment] in [the two fundamental [a. peeL ]]] of [[ 0[(1'] [/J[(\i11e\\ ]]] that will 
underpin [future [growth]]] 
The noun phrase [a figure] refers to the specific figure of £5.4m, regardle of the 
presence or absence of the relative clau e which included [[an e ceptionall) strong 
[first [half]]] from [[Linx] [Xymark]]]] that follow ; therefore it con titute a n n-
re trictive (also called an appositional) relative dau e), 
Contrast thi with the example of a re trictive relative dau e: 
[eEOs] who receh e [ olden handshake J face [criti i mJ by [unioll 
[repre entath esj. 
Re trictive relative clau e re trict th referen [a phra. t \\-hi h h d it r lat 
The noun phra e CEO ref r onl to th , EO. wh r i\' d c ld n h no hak 
and not to CEO ' in g neral. 
nal phras s 
Prepositional phrases which may be viewed as modifier of the noun phra or fa 
containing clause (i.e. phrases which provide the an wer to the que tion ~V7zaf kiJld 
of?): 
[[[[ it~ ] tated [ objective]] for [the year]]] (Linx) [What kind of objective?] 
[[the future [development]] of [[our] bu ine e ]] (Linx) [What kind offutllr 
development ?] 
[[[ investment] in [the two fundamental [aspect ]]] of [[our] [bu me ]]] (Linx ["VlI It 
kind of investment?] 
[important new [products]] in [our] [Linx] [inkjet]] and [Linx] [X;mark]] [ Ia er] 
[busines es]]] (Linx 2002) [What kind of important new prodllct ?] 
[[our] already well-established [position] in the rapidly gro\\ ing Chll1e e mark. t (Linx 
2002) [What kind of position?] 
[[acce s] to [[world] [market ]]] (Linx 2002) [What kind of a ce ?] 
However, prepositional phrases which do not modify the noun phra e or ntaining 
clause are regarded as separate noun phrase : 
[[the future [development]] of [[our] businesse ,]] around [the world] (Linx) [Where? ] 
[[sales] of [[Linx] [products]]] in [China] (Linx) [Where?] 
Conjoined noun phrases 
Conjoined noun phrases are noun phra es which contain the conjunction and: 
[[[a stream] of new and improved [[product~ ] and [technologie\]] 
Noun phrases which contain two or more heads are marked by defining the minimal 
string (head of noun phrase) as the pan from the fir t head through the la t 'h ad' 
including all material in between. The maximal tring include the entire maximal 
conjoined noun phrase. Thus we mark cohe ion between The leepy bo) Clnd irl 
and their as follows: 
[[[[a stream] of new and improved [[product ] and [technologil? ]]], and [a L'l mmiltcd 
and rocll~ed [[ di~triblltion] net\\ ork.]]]]] 
2. Using MMAX2 
2.1. Text preparation 
Since not all noun phrases are correctly identified during the auto mati noun phra 
identification process described in section 5.4.1., a manual po t-edit i requir d Thi 
entails (a) creating new markables , i.e. marking noun phra e not recoeniz d , th 
program and (b) resizing markables , i.e. changing the ize f k bl o a mar ' a ,1. 
including/excluding words from a particular noun phra e. Thi in olv thr 
different tasks, namely (1) creating new noun phrase , (2) re izing noun phra ,and 
(3) inserting markable handles: 
2.2. Creating new noun phrases 
In order to create a new noun phrase, the word/words need to be highlight d by In an.' 
of left clicking in the word/first word in question and dragging th mou to th nd 
of the word/last word in question. Thi highlight the word/word pal blu. Thi 
action causes a popup menu to appear with variou option. The option rating 
markable on nplevel' needs to be selected. Thi render the pre iou ly black 
word/words blue, indicating that they are marked a noun phra e . 
2.3 Resizing noun phrases 
To add a word to a particular noun phra e, the noun phra in que tion ha.' to be 
selected. This is shown by it being highlighted in yellow. Then, the word/word to b 
added need to be highlighted by means of left clicking in the word/fir t w rd in 
question and dragging the mouse to the end of the wordlla t word in que tion. Thi 
highlights the word/words pale blue. Thi action cau e a popup menu to app ar 
saying 'append to this markable'. Clicking on it re ize the noun phra . Thi. i ' 
indicated by the additional words also being highlighted in yellow. 
2.4 Inserting markable handles 
Markable handle, i.e. black bracket of the type [ ], mark n un ina ' undari . 
When a noun phra eire ized they are not automati all in: rt d. Thi. n d tc h 
done by opening the di play menu in th main menu and . I tinb 'r ppl): urI' nt 
tyle . h et'. Thi au e the entire di pIa t b r built (. n th markabl handl 
b c m isi Ie n th r ntly creat d noun phra 
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Annotations need to be saved by mean of opening the file menu in the main m nu 
and selecting 'save' and ' all ' . 
2.5 Starting MMAX2 
MMAX2 is started by clicking on startmax2_htc_win.bat. Thi ill cau e a ox t 
pop up saying 'do not validate' and 'validate now'. Choo e 'do not alidat'. Thi 
will cause three boxes to appear on your screen, namely (1) the markable level ntr I 
panel in the top right corner, (2) a box for marking coreference r lation (in th 
context of this study cohesive relations) in your top left comer, and (3) the ampl t 
Stadttheater in the centre: 
(l) Markable level control panel 
Settings 
levels 
~ I Update II Validate I ~ ~L:J core f 
~I Update II Validate I ~~..:J sentences 
(2) Box for marking coreference relation: 
~ co ret .i sentences 
npJorm 
grammaticalJole 
agreement 
semantic _class 
Coref_class 
< > Type 
~ Suppress check ~ Warn on extra attributes 
o to front 0 Auto-apply 
(3) Sample text Stadttheater: 
Settings Display Tools Info 
Oas Stadttheater , 1m Gegensatz zu anderen Stadten steht das 
HeideffJerger Stadttheater nicht an t-Ierausgerlot)ener Ste lle , sondern es 
fUgt sieh in eJie Straf3,enflueht orlne Vorplatz ein , 0 er Haupteingang 
zeigt noerl das alte .A.rkaejenrnotiv rnit den flacrlen Segmentb o~le n , Erst 
1874 Clbernahrn die Stadt das bis dahin von emer privaten frntlative 
getragene Theater , Es vvurde in der Foige stark verandert , Nach dern 
-I " 
The annotation process only involves the box displaying the actual text to b 
annotated. The markable menu control box and the box for marking corefer nc 
relations can be ignored. 
2.6 Loading chairman's reports 
You load your chairman's reports to be annotated by mean of clicking on 'file' and 
then 'load' in the Stadttheater box. This allows you to choo e any of your ampl 
texts: 
Loading chairman's reports: ~~~~~~~~---=I 
Info 
Load 
Save ~ ttheater , 1m Gegensatz zu ander"en Stadten steht cas 
Exit rger Stadttf/eater nicht an herausgetlobener Stelle , sondern es 
fUgt sictl in Ijie Strar~ enfluctlt ohne Vorplatz ein , Der Haupteingang 
zeigt noch das alte Arkadenmoti'v' mit clen fla ctlen Segmentbogen , Erst 
'1874 L~bernahm die Stadt (Jas [),IS cJ'a.rnn von enter p,r,Jvaten !n,l[iam,e 
getragene if/eater , Es wurde in der Foige stark verandert , ~ach den~1 
~ : 
2.7 Information regarding the visual display in MMAX2 
T 
h O I d ' 1 f t t · r nd r d in 1 1·\ -The following creen hot illu trate t e VI ua I p a 
format: 
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File Settings Display Tools Info 
(Overview) 
( ) am pleased to report that (Lm,X) achieved [([( ItS) stated (obJective)) for [the yearlll of maintaining [underlYing [profitability)) while continuing to invest in 
[[ he Jtu'-e [de",;elopment)) of [[ our) [busmesseslll around [ the warla) 1 
In the face of [unceltaln economic [conditions)) , [this consistent [[ profit) [performancelll amply demonstrates [[tilE robustness) of [[ our] [busmesslll .} 
With [pr.J.jent [planning)) , [we) have maintained ([[[Investment) In (trle two fundamental (aspects lll of [[ ow) (busmess))) that Will underpin [future (groWtt11ll 
- [[[ 3 tle,:sr ) of rew and Improved [( proaucts) and (technologleslll ' and (a committed and focused [[ distribution) (networklll) to provide [[access) to (( WOr,lQ] 
( m~r~ p -Ill 
In [tt'lf? -unent ['year)] [we ) have launched ([Important new (products)] In [[our) [[Un)!) [ In~(jet)] and [[Unx) [Xymark)] [[ laser ) [busmesses))]) , expanded 
II ~II -) J lIL1m) [proauct.illJ In ( c..hln~ by more than (30% J and established [a fuily-fiedoed [( dlstnhIINm l l gFlertl~IOII ]rrrn1the USA] to sell and support 
[(I,.,~ ,) [ WC'ou.-r~)) in (''"t )IJ u'!::mi (n:arhet)] 
([ ..J ~<;lJltS ) aml (Or '1ljend l1 
( 1 ( II 11 Increased by [ ~'t.) ) to [£48 1m] (£47 6m ) 
II " 1 I [ r ,"~ II [t.,!:,,1 ) t' ([Interp')tj (r:.halqt's ))) and ([the amortisation] or [qoOd'."(III ))) were (£5 -1m] compared with [£5.8m) achieved (l a':>t [vear)) , (a 
) 'IImlch Included [( 1'1 F reptlon311', ·)tlong [flr'St (rI3If))) from IIUny) [ Xymar~ ))) , where (profits) were matenally higher than originally expected by (fO 4m] 
((I ) (/ 'fil II before (tdxll was £5 Om ( I ~ 5 2rn ) ) , exactly In line with [(marl.et) l e~pe(tatJons )) 
I (([ Fdrnmgs1 IpeT Isr ' 111 were [ J 'p) ( 23 6p ) eqUivalent to I ..' I 4p) ( 25 5p ) before ([[tt'le amortl~ltton ] Jf IgCN1wllI)] )n I .Ie lUI:)ltlon:, )] (( TI"tf' Be dfd) proposes [( r 1.' [ J'. ,J!:; ',J)) )1 [( p) [ru [snare)])) ( 5 5p ) , bnnglng [( tl,t' total ] r,,)1 [thf 'P'lr )) to [( P 4p) [rei I ' "J'lreJ(] ( 8 2p ) , II Jh 
lb.]] I 
20CJ~ ) to II ,tl.Heho'der ] Jr Irtw reql')tf'r )) at [[ ltll" cleo ,1"' ] or 
1209 
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(1) The part of text which are not noun phrase (i .e. verb and erb phra e ar 
rendered in black. 
(2) All potentially cohesive noun phrases, i.e. all noun phra e which could tand 
in a cohesive relation to each other, have been rendered in blue. 
(3) The noun phrases standing in a cohesive relation are rendered in bIu and 
italics. 
( 4) In a set of noun phrases marked as being cohesive, the elected noun phra e i 
highlighted in yellow (see [the USA] and the other noun phra e belonging t 
the same set are highlighted in grey (see [that im ortant [markcl ]l). S 1 cting a 
noun phrase which is part of a cohesive set, cau e all the noun phra e in th 
cohesive set to be connected by a green line. 
(5) Sentence boundaries are marked in green bracket of the type }. 
(6) Noun phrase boundaries are marked in black bracket of the type [ ]. 
Note that the easiest way to select a particular noun phra e i to eli k on it han Ie , 
which are marked by means of brackets. Thi allow you to elect either ntire noun 
phrases or noun phrases embedded within noun phra e : 
{In [the CUlTent [year]] [we] have launched [[ important nev.. [product \ ]] III [our ] I Lillxl 
[inkjet]] and [Linx] [Xymark]] [laser] [busines c ]]]], expanded [[ ale'. ] or [[ Lin I 
[product ]]] in [China] by more than [30~ ] and e tabli hed [n full y- fl ogco [[ 01 trihution l 
[operation]]] in [the USA ] to sell and upport [[laver] [producf.\ ]] in [Ihot iIJ/IJO r!UIl 1 
market]]. } 
In order to mark the cohe ion between [the U A] and [that important [murh:t]), U 
elick on the outer handles. In order to mark the cohe ion betw en th fir ' t nd th 
second occurrence of product, you eli k on the inner handl . i .. [[ impllrtal1\ Ilc\ 
[products]] and [[ la..,er] [produch]], re p cti l . 
It i important t not that anaph ri e, pr n CL n r fer t dirren.:nt part r 
emb dd d noun phra, s, f rming mpi crammati al .. nd 1 lall( n hq 
b tw n nt 11 s. B th 0111P n nb r the n un phr.. 11 III III 1 ]] an: 
s parat ly with th r n lin phra'.c in the tc t. namcl_ I 1 I ] with I ia 1 I in 
th n un phrL " [[ illlpPl taI11 n \ III Jut II III I 11 11 111 I IIIlk.J 1\ ] lid I I III I 
[Xymark]] [l a~er] [bu~ine e ]]]] and [product. ] with [produ t ] in the noun phr 
[[ important new [product ]] in [our] [Linx] [inkjet]] and [Linx] [. ymark]] [I r] 
[businesses ]]]]. 
3. Coding instructions 
3.1 Types of cohesive relations to be marked 
Endophoric references (anaphoric and cataphoric) 
Two cohesive expressions can stand in an either anaphoric or ataphoric r lati n t 
other. 
In the sentence below, [the USA] and [that important market ]] tand in a r lati 11 
with one another with [the USA] as the antecedent and [that Important marh.ct ] 1 a. th 
anaphoric expression. 
l In [the CUlTent [year]] [we] have ... establi hed [a full J -ll dg u [lui trihution l 
[operation]]] in [the USA ] to sell and support [[ lcl\er] [prot/lie! \ ]] in [Ihol il11porlolll 
market]]. } 
Two cohesive expressions can also stand in a cataphoric relation to each oth r. 
In spite of [[ its] [difficultie ]] , [M{{,\ter C/wllge] earned [a Ignift ant [gro [profit ]]] 
in [[[ its] [major [[trading] [area]]]], [Pari.' ]]. 
3.2 Types of cohesive relations not to be marked 
3.2.1 Exophoric references 
I I · Hlell( lo[(rlo[(f. and .Y ul.yourly( un r tr t d a The pronoun lime l71} nune, ' 1 ' 
f t t ' t ' Ollt l' tl1 t xt it If. h) arc 11 t xophoric ref rence , i.e. re erence 0 nile . -
marked a cor fer ntial. 
) 
3.3 Cohesive span 
Cohesion i only marked within one paragraph and from one paragraph to th n . t. If 
there are occurrences of the arne expres ion in two paragraph not imm diat I) 
adjacent to each other, they are not to be marked as cohe i e. 
Headings are treated as boundaries between paragraph . Therefore, coh ion b tw n 
noun phrases is not to be marked if they occur in two paragraph 
heading. 
parat d by a 
Enumerations in the form of bullet points are treated a an entit . Therefore, h 1 n 
is marked across bullet points. 
3.4 Marking cohesive ties between noun phrases with MMAX2 
Are some noun phrases dependent on their interpretation on a noun phra 0 UlTl11
b 
earlier in the text? If yes, you need to mark thi grammati al or I xical conn ti n 
between noun phrases. 
For this purpose, the first noun phrase to be included in the et i el cted y I ft-
clicking it. As a result, it will be highlighted in yellow. The econd noun phra ' t b 
added is then right-clicked, which causes a popup button aying 'mark a c r r r nt' 
to appear. This is due to the fact that this software ha been dev loped for anal y ing 
referential relations. In the context of this tudy, interpret 'mark a oref r nt' a. 
'mark as cohesive': 
File Settings Display Tools Info 
{[ O'\o"e t"ll ew') } 
([I ) am pleased to report ttlat [Unx .- .±:I - - r -Ib'ect' p]] for 
. .. - , Mark as coreferent ltlnuing to [ttle y'ear)]] of maintaining [under Iy • 
invest in [[tIle futut'e [development]] of [[ our) [tn}smessesJJ) around [ , 
~'vor,ra] . 
I ,. C « c , I P" • II 
, ,. 
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Clicking on 'mark as coreferent' causes the two noun phrase to be linked. Thi i 
graphically displayed by means of the noun phrases appearing in italic and b them 
being connected by means of a green line. The green line indicate that the two nOW1 
phrases are cohesive and belong to the same set: 
Visual display of cohesion: 
File Settings Display Tools Info 
{[Overv'ie'w] } 
------------HI] am pleased to report that [Un)( ] achieved [[[[ its ] statecj [obJective ]] fOt' 
[H-Ie '::lear]]] of maintaining [uncJet-lying [profitabillrl]] wh ile continu ing to 
invest in [[trle future [cjevelopment]] of [[ our] [businesses]] ] around [me 
world] .} 
{ In the face of [ uncertain economic [conditions ]] , [tt-ds consistent [[ profit] y 
If additional noun phrases belong to the same et, the whole proce repeat d. 
This process causes noun phrases to be ex pre sed by mean of an identi al member 
attribute, i.e. MMAX2 identifies them a being member of the arne et. 
Note: The initial introduction of an object into the text often occur a an ind fi nit 
noun phrase (TIC ptc opened a new call centre in North York hire. It will b ~ ({ble TO 
process 10,000 calls a day). 
If you revise your opinion, you can unmark oh ' ion b ri ht Ii kinb n th n lin 
phra e again and clicking on the pop-up butt n a ing 'unm rk (. . r [ r nl ': 
~ l l 
U nmarking cohesion: 
File Settings Display Tools Info 
{ [ O··.;e r··/i eVIl ] } 
~ 
HI] am pleased to report that [Un.x 0 °ective11 for 
[trle year]]] of maintaining [underly uing to 
invest in [[trle future [development]] of [[ our] [businesses]]] around [t.f7e 
worrQ] o} 
{In the face of [uncertain economic [conditions ]] I [this consistent [[profit] ... 
_ t l) 
Appendix XIII: Linguistic Inquiry and Word COUll! categorie 
Comparison of dimension values of chairman's repor with other genre 
Dimension Examples Emotion C ntrol B Talkin hair 
Writin~ Writin~ man's 
Mean lean :\1 an ~lean ~lean 
I. LINGUISTIC DIMENSIONS 
Word count 327 301 6 7 -: -+ )9 . 
Words per sentence 20.9 19.4 13.0 I .9 _ O. I 
Sentences ending with? 2.1 0.4 9. _1.6 O. ) 
Unique words (type/token ratio) 51.5 50.1 of. -0. -L.6 
% words captured, dictionary words 3.3 78.9 7-+. 75.4 ..I 
% words longer than 6 letters 13 .1 14.1 16.4 10.1 29.(' 
Total pronouns I, our, they, YOll're 17.2 12.4 13.6 15. 3. 
1 st person singular I, my, me 10.6 8.2 1.7 _ .6 0.4 
1 st person plural we, our, LIS O. 1.5 .5 1.0 2.3 
Total first person I, we, me 11.4 9.7 3.3 .6 _.7 
Total second person you, you 'll 0.4 0.3 I. -1- .0 0.1 
Total third person she, their, them 3.3 1.2 7.0 2.5 0.4 
Negations no, never, not 2.3 0.8 1.9 2.8 0.3 
Assents yes, OK, mmhmm 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.6 0.1 
Articles a, an, the 5.0 7.2 7.5 -1- .3 9.1 
Prepositions on, to. from 12.6 15.2 13 .2 9.2 16.0 
Numbers one, thirty. million 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 5.0 
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES 
Affective or Emotional Proces es happy, ugly. bitter 5.3 2.3 3.9 4.0 -1- .0 
Po itive Emotions happy,pretty good 2.7 1.7 _.2 2.7 3.2 
Positive feel ings happy, joy. love 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.2 
Optimi m and energy certainty, pride. win 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 1.5 
Negative Emotions hate, H orthless, 2.6 0.6 1.6 1.3 0.8 
Anx iety or fear nen OLiS. afraid. 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.0 
Anger hate, kill. pissed 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.1 
Sadne or depre Ion grief. cry. sad 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.4 
Cognitive Proce e cause. knoll'. ought 7.8 4.1 6 .1 7.3 3.5 
Cau ation becallse, effect. 1.1 0.6 G.6 1.1 n.9-
In. ight think, knoll', 2. 1.1 1.9 2.4 1.0 
Oi, l' pancy shoLild. lI'ollld, 2.7 1.1 2. I 1.7 0: 
Inhibition block. call traill 0.3 0.3 OA 02 ()4 
maybe. perhap . 2.5 1.6 l.X ") ") 0: T ntati e 
--
Certaint alway, Il e\'er 1.-+ 0.7 0.9 ().9 ( .0 
S n, or and P r ptual Pr ce . e ee, (OIlCh. Ii tell 2."- 22 3.2 _.6 0,4 
Se ing \ 'It'll', all'. loo/.. 0.5 () l' O.l) 1.0 0.3 
Haring hea rd. listen .. olllul 1.1 O.X 1.7 1.3 (). I 
Feeling tOIlCh. holt!. felt O. ' n.J () 02 (J. I 
Social Proces es talk, Its. friend 9.5 6.0 L'I I 10.9 1 49 1 
Communication talk, share. 1.7 1.3 ' .. I 1.9 I 0.8 _.-
Other references to people 1ft pl, 2M , 3personai 4.8 3.0 9.2 I 7.6 ' .9 
Friends pal, buddy. 0.6 0.3 0.1 I 0.1 0.\ 
Family mom, brother, 1.2 0.-+ 0.-+ 0.' 0.0 
Humans boy, woman, group 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.7 O. ' 
m. RELATIVITY 
Time hour, day, o 'clock 5.0 6.2 3.5 3 .~ - 1 
- .-
Past tense verb walked. were, had 6.9 5.8 7. - ~ . .:- 2.1 
Present tense verb walk, is, be 10.2 8.7 6._ 13 .7 ~ .8 
Future tense verb will, might, shall 1.0 1.7 0.9 0.9 \.0 
Space around, over. up 2.4 3.3 3.0 _.6 2.9 
Up up, above, over 1.2 2.0 1.3 1.2 1.3 
Down do wn, below. under 0.2 0.5 0.-+ 0._ 0.3 
Inclusive with, and, include 6.3 7. \ 5.9 4.5 7.9-
Exclusive but, except, without 4.0 2.6 3. \ 3.8 1.-+ 
Motion walk, move, go 1.3 2.6 1.\ 1.6 0.7 
IV. PERSONAL CONCERNS 
Occupation work, cla s, boss 2.5 3.9 1.3 1.7 5.2 
School class, student, 1.2 2.6 0.3 0.8 0.5 
Job or work employ. boss, 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 3.5 
Achievement try, goal, win 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 1.5 
Lei ure activity house, TV, mll ic 1.1 2.6 0.9 0.8 0.5 
Home house. kitchen, 0.8 1.5 0.5 0.3 0.1 
Sports football . game. play 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Television and movies TV, sitcom, cinema 0. \ 0.3 0. \ 0.\ 0.1 
Music tunes. song. cd 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 
Money and financial issues cash, taxes, income 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 2.3 
Metaphy ical is ue God. heaven. coffi/1 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 
Religion God. church rabbi 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 
Death and dying dead. burial, coffill 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 n.o 
Phy ical tates and functions ache. breast. sleep 1.2 2.5 2.0 0.9 O.J 
Body tates symptom ache. heart. cough 0.6 0~8 1.5 n.5 02 
Sex and exuality llist. pelli . f lick 0.3 0.1 0.2 n.2 n.n 
Eati ng. drinking, dieting eat. swallow. taste 0.2 1.1 0.2 0.2 n.o 
Sleeping, dreaming a leep. bed. dream 0.1 0.6 0.2 O. I cUf 
Gro ming \\'a h. bath. clea/1 0.1 0.6 () . 1 0. 1 0.0 
_ 1 
Anaphor 
Antecedent 
Bridge 
Clause 
Cohesion 
Collocation 
Conjunction 
Co-reference 
Corpus 
Corpus analysis 
Corpus 
linguistics 
Discourse 
Discourse 
analysis 
Ellipsis 
Euphemism 
Genre 
Grammatical 
cohesion 
Hyperonym 
Appendix IX: Linguistic terminology 
A word or phrase which explicitly refers back to an earlier word or 
phrase. Peter was late. He H'as stuck in a trqftlc jam. He i .... an 
anaphor which refers back to Peter. 
The first occurrence of a word or phrase which later word.... or 
phrases refer back to. Peter was late. He was stuck in a traffic ;a111. 
Peter is the antecedent which he refers back to. .. . 
A word or phrase which implicitl y refers back to an earlier \\'ord or 
phrase. Peter became Chairman in 1999. The responsibility soon 
became too much for him. The responsibility is a bridge which 
refers back to Chairman. . ~ 
Part of a sentence. The brackets indicate that the following 
sentence consists of two clauses: [He \\'as late] [hecause he was 
stuck in a traffic jam]. 
The connection within and between sentences in texts, e.g. P{'[er 
came late. He was stuck in a trqffic jam. The link between the 
pronoun he and its antecedent Peter are aspects of cohesion. 
A customary association of words with other words, such as in the 
phrases innocent bystander. far reaching consequences. etc. 
A word used to connect sentences or part of sentences. He was late 
because he was stuck in a trqlj'ic jam. Because is a conjunction. 
A relation holding between two or more noun phrases specifying 
the same extra-linguistic entity. Co-reference needs to be 
distinguished from substitution, which in\'ol \,es the relationship 
between words onl y. 
A collection of texts which is carefully sampled to be maximally 
representative of the language being analyzed. 
Involves the computerized analysis of the linguistic features of the 
sample texts. 
Involves the study of language that includes all processes related to 
processing, usage and analysis of corpora. 
Discourse is the name given to units of language longer than a 
single sentence 
The study of cohesion and other relationships between sentences in 
written or spoken discourse. 
The omission of a word that is superfluous or can be understood 
from contextual clues, e.g. This year's projit is higher than lat 
"ear's [prl?fit]. The ellipsis is indicated by bracket-.. 
A mild or vague expression substituted for one thought to he too 
harsh or direct (e.g .. pass O\'cr for die). 
A grouping of texts which are related by sharing recognizahly 
functionalized features of form and content. 
Connection within and between sentences in a text hy mean .... of 
grammatical de\'ices. e.g. Peter ("(1Il.le Ime. I!e H'as sfllck ill a tn,ltlle 
jam. The sentences are grammatIcally lll1ked hy me~lh of h(' 
referrin o back to Peter. :=-
A generic or superordinate term. The word /70\\'('1' is the 
hyp~ronym for rose. lily. and riol£'!. 
Appendix VII: Linguistic terminology (cont.) 
Hyponym 
Lexical cohesion 
Lexis 
Morphology 
Passive voice 
Noun 
Noun phrase 
(Personal) 
Pronouns 
Reference 
Rhetoric 
Substitution 
Synonym 
Syntax 
Tense 
A su~ordinate term. A word or phrase of narrower or more specific 
meanmg that comes 'under' another of wider or more (Jeneral 
. e 
meanmg, e.g. rose under flower. 
Connection within and between sentences in a text by means of 
meaning, e.g. Mr. Biggs has brought TIC Pic into the 21 st celltur\'. 
Changes involve the launch of a brand new website alld a major 
face-lift of stores. The sentences are linked by means of changes 
referring back to the 21st century. 
Vocabulary 
A branch of linguistics concerned with analysing the structure of 
words. The morphology of a given word is its structure or form. e.g. 
grow - growth - growing, profit - profitability - profitable. 
Grammatical construction involving a passive verb. A grammatical 
term that contrasts with active voice. The sentence Helen met the 
visitors is in the active voice and the sentence The \'isitors were met 
by Helen is in the passive voice. 
A noun is a word that names a person or thing. Common nouns 
name persons or things which are not peculiar to one example. i.e. 
are of a general nature (director. balance sheet), whereas proper 
nouns name persons or things of which there is only one example 
(Asia, Enron). Concrete nouns refer to physical things (jactory. 
annual report), and abstract nouns to concepts (prudence. 
dishonesty). 
A word or group of words functioning in a sentence exactly like a 
noun, with a noun or pronoun as head. In the following noun 
phrases the heads are indicated by underlining: the newly appointed 
CEO andfailing industries. 
Each of the pronouns in English (I, you, he, she, it, we, they, me, 
him, her, us, and them) comprising a set that shows contrasts of 
person, gender, number, and case. 
Relationship between two expressions which may appear to refer to 
each other, but they share the same referent in the real world. An 
example is anaphoric reference which is concerned with one 
expression, referring back to another, e.g. The CEO claims that he 
has not been informed. 
Language designed to persuade or impress 
Substitution, in contrast to reference, is a relationship between 
words. Contrast: Is that your paper? May I borrow it! (reference) 
Is that your paper? I didn't get one today (substitution) 
A word or phrase that means the same as another word or phrase. 
e.g. to go into administration and to go bankrupt. 
The way in which words and clauses are o.rdered and conn~cted so 
as to form sentences: or the set of grammatical rules govemmg such 
word-order. 
Tense is expressed by verbs and indicates whether the action 
denoted by the verb takes place in the present. past. or f~turc. e.~. 
profits are stable vs. profits hal'£' been stable. proflh will rcmam 
stable. 
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